Citation Codes

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Case Number

S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 623 of 1999

Advocates

S.L Jain,

Judges

Dr. B.S. Chouhan

Acts

Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 (for short, "the Act").
provisions of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 (hereinafter called "the Act, 1949").
SECTION 146 CONTRACT ACT 1872
USURIOUS LOANS ACT 1918
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions were filed seeking quashing of proceedings and orders passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974. The petitions were identical and the Court considered the facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 623/1999 to decide the controversy.

In the lead matter the petitioner alleged that he obtained a loan of Rs. 1,50,000 on 10-6-1994 repayable in half-yearly instalments, but failed to make timely payments. Proceedings under the Act were initiated on 1-4-1998. As of the date of the opinion no final order had been passed by the Tribunal and no order for sale of movable or immovable property had been made. The present petition sought quashing of the recovery proceedings under the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the recovery proceedings and orders passed by the Tribunal under the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 should be quashed in the facts of these petitions.
Whether the judicial authorities can interfere with or test the rate/structure of interest charged on agricultural bank loans in view of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the statutory force of Reserve Bank of India circulars and Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.
Whether the petitioner was entitled to an order similar to interim relief granted in another writ petition before the Court, on the ground of non-discrimination among litigants where facts/circumstances are claimed to be similar.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner relied on Corporation Bank v. D. S. Gowda ((1994) 5 SCC 213) asserting that charging interest above 12.5% is excessive and unfair in relation to agricultural loans.
The petitioner argued that because this Court had entertained S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2154/1998 and passed some interim order in that matter, the Court was bound to pass a similar order in these petitions to avoid discrimination between litigants with similar cases.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-banks or Tribunal; only the petitioner's contentions are specifically summarised in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Corporation Bank v. D. S. Gowda, (1994) 5 SCC 213 : 1994 AIR SCW 2721	The Supreme Court held that interest with periodical rest on bank loans is governed by the agreement between bank and borrower and bank rates should conform to RBI directions/circulars issued under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949; recovery contrary to such RBI circulars is not permissible; the condition of quarterly rest in agricultural loans was found contrary to those circulars in that case.	The Court explained the correct scope of this authority and observed that the petitioner had not shown the agreement, the applicable RBI circulars, or that the circulars relevant in Gowda remain applicable; consequently the petitioner could not rely simply on a bald reference to Gowda to quash proceedings.
State Bank of Patiala v. Harbans Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 495	Held that liability to pay quarterly rest interest was illegal (as stated in the opinion).	The decision was cited as part of the chain of authorities concerning the legality of quarterly rest of interest; the opinion notes subsequent consideration by later cases.
Central Bank of India v. Ravindra, (1996) 5 SCC 279	Referred to Constitution Bench on the issue whether liability of borrower to pay interest includes interest that became merged with principal—question requiring fuller consideration.	The opinion notes that the Gowda matter was referred to the Constitution Bench in Central Bank of India v. Ravindra for further consideration of related issues.
Canara Bank v. P.R.N. Upadhyaya, (1998) 6 SCC 526 : AIR 1998 SC 3000	Held that Harbans Singh was per incuriam; "term loan" implies a grant for a fixed term and the purpose for which loan is granted is irrelevant to the rate of interest.	Used to show that the purpose of loan is immaterial to interest rate disputes and that some earlier authorities were open to reappraisal.
Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. U.P. Financial Corporation, 1994 Suppl (2) SCC 108	Held that the issue of interest cannot be determined by a Court in writ jurisdiction as it is a matter of contract between the Corporation and the borrower.	Relied upon to support the proposition that courts generally should not decide contractual interest disputes in writ proceedings.
State Bank of India v. Y. Venketashwara Rao, (1999) AIR 1999 SC 896	Held that courts cannot interfere to reduce agreed interest on bank loans; Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is constitutionally valid and applies to all types of loans.	The Court cited this authority to emphasise the constitutional validity of Section 21-A and the limited role of courts in re-opening interest stipulations in bank loans.
Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181	When a point of law needs to be substantiated by facts, a writ petitioner must plead and prove such facts by evidence appended to the writ petition; writ petitions require not only facts but also evidence in support.	The Court applied this principle to criticise the petitioners' failure to plead facts or annex supporting documents/evidence, holding that incomplete pleadings disentitle the petitioner to relief.
Larson and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 4 SCC 387 : AIR 1998 SC 1608	Reiterates the obligation to plead material facts and evidence in writ petitions.	Cited to reinforce the requirement that writ petitions be properly pleaded and supported by evidence.
National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 : AIR 1998 SC 2779	Affirms the need for pleadings and supporting evidence in writ proceedings.	Relied upon for the same procedural principle regarding adequate pleadings and annexed evidence.
Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141 : AIR 1998 SC 3012	Similar pronouncement on procedural requirements for writ petitions (pleadings and evidence).	Used to support the Court's rejection of casually filed petitions lacking documentary support.
Vinod Trading Company v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 40	Interim orders should not be contradictory to each other when facts and circumstances are identical.	Cited in context of the petitioner's claim that a prior interim order required the Court to pass a similar order; Court held that the petitioner failed to show the prior order or that facts were identical.
Bir Bajrang Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1345	Expresses view that interlocutory orders should be consistent where facts are identical.	Referred to support the general principle of consistent treatment of similar cases, subject to factual differences.
Vishnu Traders v. State of Haryana, 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 461	Observes that while binding precedent does not strictly apply to interlocutory orders, consistency and uniformity are desirable; similar matters should receive similar treatment unless factual differences justify otherwise.	Quoted to explain that similar interim orders are desirable but not mechanically binding where factual differences or absence of supporting material exist.
Rampati Jaiswal v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 All 170	Reiterates the need for consistent judicial approach in interlocutory matters.	Referenced as another authority emphasising the desirability of consistency in interim orders.
Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 1048	"To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience." (statement endorsing correction of earlier erroneous decisions).	Invoked to justify that a prior decision of the same Court which runs counter to Supreme Court law may be corrected and does not bind the Court.
Re: Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 SCC 619 : 1995 AIR SCW 2203	Recognises judicial fallibility and outlines internal checks (appeals, reviews, references) to correct errors; also criticises casual and incomplete pleadings by members of the profession.	Used to (a) state that earlier erroneous decisions by the same Court are not binding and (b) to censure casual filing practices and indicate that contempt proceedings might be warranted though the Court declined to initiate them in the facts before it.
Mohd. Swalleh v. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut, AIR 1988 SC 94	Even if a Court's order is without jurisdiction, a higher Court is not bound to interfere if the order was passed in the interest of justice.	Applied to the observation that even an order without jurisdiction need not be upset where it was passed in the interest of justice and the petitioner had failed to present particulars.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the two principal grounds pleaded by the petitioner (relying on Corporation Bank v. D. S. Gowda and claiming an entitlement to similar interim relief already granted in another petition). The Court analysed those grounds against the relevant Supreme Court authorities and procedural requirements for writ petitions.

On substantive law regarding interest, the Court reviewed the line of Supreme Court decisions and summarised their combined ratio: (i) RBI instructions/circulars issued under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 have statutory force and are binding where applicable; and (ii) Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 places a bar on Courts re-opening banking transactions on the ground that the rate of interest is excessive, subject to the limited role of examining whether recovery contravenes RBI circulars. The Court noted that some earlier formulations (e.g., Harbans Singh) had been reconsidered in subsequent decisions and that the scope of the law had been clarified in later cases (for instance, Canara Bank and State Bank of India v. Venketashwara Rao).

Turning to the petitions before it, the Court applied established procedural principles: a writ petitioner must plead material facts and append evidence or documents (such as the loan agreement, schedule of repayment, and any relevant RBI circulars) to substantiate claims of illegality. The opinion emphasised that the petitioner had omitted these essential particulars: the loan agreement and schedule of repayment were not placed on record; no RBI circular was produced to show contravention; the exact rate of interest being recovered was not stated; and there was no claim that the borrower had not been furnished copies of the agreement or schedule.

Because the petitioner's pleadings were incomplete and unsupported by documentary evidence, the Court applied the procedural authorities (notably Bharat Singh and related Supreme Court decisions) to hold that the petitions were not maintainable. The Court also rejected the submission that it was bound to pass the same interim order as in an earlier petition because the petitioner failed to produce the earlier interim order or demonstrate identical facts; the Court reiterated the principle that similar interim treatment is desirable only where facts and circumstances are shown to be similar.

The Court further observed that the Tribunal had not passed any final adverse order against the petitioner (only an attachment of movable property had been ordered more than six months ago) and the petitioner had not stated whether the attachment had been executed or whether the loan was secured (for example, by a mortgaged tractor) or involved guarantors. The Court treated these lacunae as additional reasons to refuse relief.

While the Court censured the casual and cavalier manner in which the petitions were filed and noted that, in view of Re: Sanjiv Dutta, contempt proceedings might have been warranted, it declined to initiate contempt proceedings because of "peculiar conditions of the petitioners."

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — Both writ petitions were dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties:

Both petitions are dismissed with costs of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees two thousand) each.
The costs are to be recovered by the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, treating the sum as a decree of the Court and to be deposited into the Account of the Rajasthan Legal Services Authority, Jaipur.
The Registry was directed to send a copy of the order to the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar within a week for compliance.

Broader implications:

The opinion emphasises and applies settled Supreme Court principles limiting the scope of judicial interference with bank interest disputes (particularly the statutory force of RBI circulars and the bar in Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949).
The Court reaffirmed procedural strictures requiring that writ petitions be supported by pleadings and documentary evidence; casual or incomplete petitions will not be entertained and may attract censure.
The Court expressly stated that an earlier decision of the same Court inconsistent with Supreme Court law is not binding and may be corrected; however, the opinion did not purport to lay down any new precedent—its operative effect is dismissal of the instant petitions on the facts and procedural deficiencies.

This summary is strictly confined to the matters contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer or speculate beyond the text of that opinion.

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Bhola Singh v. Prescribed Authority

1. Both these writ petitions have been filed for quashing the proceedings and the orders passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 (for short, "the Act"). Both cases are identical but the facts of S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 623/1999 are considered to decide the controversy.

2. Petitioner's grievance is that he had taken the loan to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/- on 10-6-1994, which had to be paid in half-yearly instalments. Petitioner could not deposit the instalments in time, proceedings have been initiated against him under the provisions of the Act on 1-4-1998. Till today, no final order has been passed. No order of sale of movable/immovable properties has been passed, The instant petition has been filed for quashing the said proceedings for recovery.

3. Two main grounds have been taken in, the petition. Firstly, that in Corporation Bank v. D. S. Gowda, (1994) 5 SCC 213 : (1994 AIR SCW 2721) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that charging interest above 12.5% is excessive and unfair in case of agricultural loan. Secondly, this Court has already entertained a petition, i.e., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2154/1998 and passed some interim order, the Court is bound to pass the similar order for the reason that the Court cannot discriminate among the litigants. Mr. Jain has vehemently argued both the points. There is a complete fallacy in the arguments advanced by Mr. Jain. In Corporation Bank v. D. S. Gowda, (1994) 5 SCC 213 : (1994 AIR SCW 2721), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the interest with the periodical rest on bank loan is governed by the terms of Agreement between the bank and the borrower; and secondly, that the bank rate should be in conformity with the direction/Circular/Notification issued by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time as they are of Statutory nature as having been issued under the provisions of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 (hereinafter called "the Act, 1949"). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the Circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India on 14-3-72, 15-10-74, 13-3-76, 17-8-76, 28-2-78 and 15-9-94. It was also held that the condition of recovery of interest on quarterly rest in a case of agricultural loan, was contrary to the conditions laid down in those circulars. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the provisions of Section 21-A of the Act of 1949, which reads as under:--

"21-A. Rates of interest charged by banking companies not to be subject to scrutiny by Courts. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, or any other law relating to indebtedness in force in any State, a transaction between a banking company and its debtor shall not be reopened by any Court on the ground that the rate of interest charged by the banking company in respect of such transaction is excessive."

4. The Court observed that as the validity of the said provisions was not under challenge and the recovery was in contravention of the said Circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India, the recovery of interest at a rate higher than provided in those Circulars, by the bank was not permissible.

5. The issue had also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v. Harbans Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 495, wherein it was held that the liability to pay quarterly rest interest was illegal. In Corporation Bank (1994 AIR SCW 2721) (supra), entire contents of the particular circular had not been taken into account and, thus, the matter has been referred to the Constitution Bench in Central Bank of India v. Ravindra (1996) 5 SCC 279, as the Supreme Court was of the view that the issue : whether the liability of borrower to pay interest on principal sum includes interest that became merged with the principal sum adjudged or it would be the principal sum as loans.

6. In Canara Bank v. P.R.N. Upadhyaya (1998) 6 SCC 526 : (AIR 1998 SC 3000), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the law laid down in Harbans Singh (1994 (3) SCC 495) (supra) was per incuriam and the expression "term loan" implies the grant of loan for a fixed term. "It has no relevance with the purpose, for which loan is granted." Therefore, it makes it clear that the purpose, for which the loan is taken or granted, is immaterial or irrelevant and it has nothing to do so far as rate of interest is concerned.

7. In Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. U. P. Financial Corporation, 1994 Suppl (2) SCC 108, the Apex Court has held that the issue of interest cannot be determined by the Court in writ jurisdiction as it is purely a matter of contract between the Corporation and the borrower. Similarly, in State Bank of India v. Y. Venketashwara Rao, (1999) 1 JT (SC) 145 : (AIR 1999 SC 896) the Supreme Court, while dealing with the case of agricultural loan, has held that in case of bank loans, the Court cannot interfere and reduce the interest, as that is a matter of contract between the parties. The Court made the following observations (at p. 897 of AIR) :--

"If the parties agreed that in respect of the amount advanced against a mortgage, the compound interest will be paid, we fail to understand as to how the Court can possibly interfere and reduce the amount of interest agreed to be paid on the loan so taken. The mortgage of a property is with a view to secure loan and has no relation whatsoever with the quantum of interest to be charged."

8. The Court further held that the provisions of Section 21 -A of the Act, 1949, were constitutionally valid. The Court observed as under :--

"The enactment of Section 21-A was clearly within the domain of the Parliament. The said Section applies to all types of loans which are granted by a banking company, whether to an agriculturist or a non-agriculturist, ....... the said Section 21-A had been validly enacted."

9. Therefore, in sum and substance, the ratio of all the judgments, which have been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that (i) the Instructions/Circulars/Notifications issued by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time, in exercise of its power under the Act, 1949, are binding as the same have statutory force; and (ii) Section 21-A of the said Act puts an embargo on the powers of the Court to interfere with the amount of interest to be charged on the loan, however, me Court can examine the matter to satisfy itself only to the extent whether the interest etc. is to be recovered in contravention of the Circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time.

10. In the instant case, the agreement reached between the parties has not been placed on record. Petitioner has not stated anywhere that the copy of the Agreement or Schedule of Repayment had not been given to him or if he has ever asked the bank to furnish the copies of the same. The Schedule of Repayment has, also, not been filed. Any Circular/Instruction/Notification issued by the Reserve Bank of India, which may be applicable in this case, or is in force for the time being, has not been filed. It has not been said that the Circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India, which were applicable in the case of Corporation Bank (1994 AIR SCW 2721) (supra), are applicable in the instant case and the same had not been superseded by subsequent circulars etc. It has, also, not been pointed-out anywhere that what are the terms mentioned in the circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India which prohibit the recovery of interest at the rate which the respondents are charging. It is nowhere mentioned as what is the rate of interest which is being recovered from the petitioner. A bald statement that the proceedings are being held in contravention of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Corporation Bank (supra), is not sufficient to maintain the writ petition.

11. The petitions have been filed with utmost irresponsibility and in complete dereliction of duty towards the Court. It is settled principle of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/ adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the petition. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181; the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under (at p. 2186 of AIR) :

"In our opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point........... There is a distinction between a hearing under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e. a plaint or written statement, the facts and not the evidence are required to be pleaded. In a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit, not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it."

12. Similar view has been reiterated in Larson and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387 : (AIR 1998 SC 1608); National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan (1998) 7 SCC 66: (AIR 1998 SC 2779); and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141 : (AIR 1998 SC 3012).

13. In the instant petitions, the petitioners have not made any proper pleadings nor produced any document in support of the said pleadings. Thus, the petitions, which have been filed in a most casual and cavalier manner, are not liable to be entertained.

14. It has been mentioned in the petitions that this Court has entertained S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2152/1998, Shrawan Singh v. Tehsildar, Revenue and others, but it has not been mentioned what interim order has been passed in that case and on what date the order was passed. Neither a copy of the said order has been filed nor it is produced in the Court. Mr. Jain's argument that Court is bound to pass same interim order, is untenable in a case where filing such vague petitions amount to abuse of the process of the Court. There can be no quarrel on legal proposition that a Court must pass the similar interim order in petitions having similar facts and circumstances.

15. In Vinod Trading Company v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 40; and Bir Bajrang Kumar v. State Of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1345, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed the view that the interim orders should not be contradictory to each other if the facts and circumstances of the case are identical. Similarly, in Vishnu Traders v. State of Haryana, 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 461, the Supreme Court has observed as under:--

"In the matters of interlocutory orders, principle of bind precedent cannot be said to apply. However, the need for consistency, approach and uniformity in the exercise of judicial discretion respecting similar causes and the desirability to eliminate occasions for grievance of discriminatory treatment requires that all similar matters should receive similar treatment except where factual differences require a different treatment so that there is an assurance of consistency, uniformity, predictability and certainty of judicial approach."

16. Same view has been reiterated in Rampati Jaiswal v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 All 170.

17. In the conditions mentioned hereinabove, such an issue is not worth considering. It has been repeatedly pointed-out by Mr. Jain that I myself had decided some cases of agricultural loan and issued direction to the respondent-banks therein not to recover compound interest. Copy of such a judgment has not been produced. Even if a direction has been issued by me earlier, which runs counter to law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above and particularly in State Bank of India v. Y. Venketashwar Rao, (AIR 1999 SC 896), the same cannot be said to have a binding effect on this Court. In Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 1048, the Hon'ble Supreme Court as observed as under:--

"To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience."

18. Thus, if this Court has committed a mistake earlier, it is required to be rectified at the earliest. In Re: Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 SCC 619: (1995 AIR SCW 2203), the Apex Court has observed as under (at p. 2208 of AIR SCW) :--

"None is free from errors, and the Judiciary does not claim infallibility. It is truly stated that a Judge, who has not committed mistake, is yet to be born. Our legal system, in fact, acknowledges the fallibility of the Courts and provides for both internal and external checks to correct the errors. The law, ...........appeals, reviews, references and revisions constitute the internal checks..........Together they go a long way to ensure judicial accountability."

19. Thus, in view of the above, even if a wrong decision has been given earlier by me, it cannot be said to be a binding authority on this Court. Moreover, the quality of the judgment depends upon the assistance rendered at the Bar. The Judge cannot take the entire responsibility of laying down a correct law ex parte without any assistance of the learned members of the Bar. The Judge cannot afford to retire from Chamber and sit in the library and find out the case law on the issues involved in every case and what is the occasion to do anything in a case where the pleadings are so vague as the petition itself cannot be entertained.

20. There is another aspect of the matter. The Tribunal has not passed any order till today which may adversely affect the petitioner, though there is an order of attachment of movable property passed more than six months ago. Petitioner has not stated anywhere whether this order has been executed and if loan was granted to the petitioner for purchasing a tractor, whether the tractor has been mortgaged with the respondent-bank and if it has been mortgaged, what is wrong in passing an order of attachment as it may be necessary for securing the amount of the said loan. It has further not been mentioned whether there was any guarantor in the case, who may, also, be held liable under the provisions of Section 146 of the Contract Act, 1872. Whether the proceedings under the Act of 1974 are attracted or not, is irrelevant in a case where petitioner has not furnished any particulars giving rise to the case. Even if a Court's order is without jurisdiction, the Court is not bound to interfere if it has been passed in the interest of justice, (vide Mohd. Swalleh v. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut, AIR 1988 SC 94).

21. In Re: Sanjiv Datta (1995 AIR SCW 2203) (supra), the Apex Court has also observed, as under (at p. 2211 of AIR SCW) :--

"Some members of the profession have been adopting perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from............. the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings.......... and the failure to remove office objections......... they do not realise the seriousness of these acts and omissions. They not only amount to the contempt of the Court but do positive dis-service to the litigants and create embarrassing situation with Court leading to avoidable, unpleasantness and delay in disposal of matters. This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system."

22. Filing of petitions in such a cavalier and casual manner is depricated and the conduct of the petitioners and the counsel is censured. Though it is a fit case where, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Re : Sanjiv Dutta (supra), proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are warranted to be initiated but because of the peculiar conditions of the petitioners, I am not inclined to resort to such a course.

23. Both the petitions are dismissed with costs of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two thousand) each and the same is to be recovered by the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar treating it as a decree of the Court and to be deposited in the Account of the Rajasthan Legal Services Authority, Jaipur. A copy of the order be sent to the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar by the Registry within a week from today for compliance.

Bhola Singh v. Prescribed Authority

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Bhola Singh v. Prescribed Authority

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