Citation Codes

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Case Number

S.B Civil Second Appeal No. 163 of 1995

Advocates

S.L Jain, for Appellant

Judges

Mr. R.R. Yadav

Acts

sub-sec. (1) of the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 22 of 1974)
Sec. 2(2) of C.P.C by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976
provisions of Civil Procedure Code and Indian Evidence Act
Civil Procedure Code and Indian Evidence Act,
ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974,
sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974,
provisions of C.P.C and Evidence Act
Rule 1 to Rule 106 of C.P.C

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.R. Yadav, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant obtained financial assistance of Rs. 68,000 from Punjab National Bank to purchase an agricultural implement (a tractor). After alleged default, the Bank filed an application under section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 (Act No. 22 of 1974) before the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Chittorgarh, who had been notified as the "prescribed authority" for that purpose.

The prescribed authority issued notice; the appellant filed a detailed reply denying the dues and claimed payments totalling Rs. 76,485 up to 5.7.85. After hearing the parties, the prescribed authority directed payment by its order dated 11.5.1987.

The appellant appealed under Order 41 Rule 1/Section 96 CPC (described in the opinion as "appeal under Sec. 96 CPC") before the Additional District and Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh, which appeal was dismissed on 23.12.1994 thereby affirming the prescribed authority's order. The appellant then filed the present second appeal under Section 100 CPC before the High Court, contending inter alia that the order of the prescribed authority is to be deemed a decree of a civil court and hence appeals (including second appeals) are maintainable.

The High Court (R.R. Yadav, J.) has admitted the present second appeal and issued notice to the respondent Bank, while also directing reconsideration of an earlier Single Judge decision (Daulat Ram v. Punjab National Bank) by referring certain questions to a Larger Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in the absence of any statutory provision for an appeal under Act No. 22 of 1974 against orders of the prescribed authority under section 13(1), an appeal under Section 96 CPC and a second appeal under Section 100 CPC are nonetheless maintainable by virtue of the general subordination of civil courts (Section 3 CPC).
Whether a prescribed authority notified by the State Government to make an order on a bank's application under section 13(1) of Act No. 22 of 1974 falls within the meaning of "civil court" as contemplated by section 13(2) of the Act.
Whether the option given to a bank to choose between invoking section 13(1) (application to the prescribed authority) or filing a civil suit under section 13(3)—without guidelines or limitations—amounts to hostile discrimination between similarly circumstanced agriculturists contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Learned counsel for the appellant (Mr. S.L. Jain) argued that questions (A) and (B) are covered by the decision in Daulat Ram v. Punjab National Bank (earlier Single Judge decision) in favour of the appellant, implying that appeals under Sections 96 and 100 CPC are maintainable against orders of the prescribed authority.
Counsel also advanced the contention that, under section 13(2) of Act No. 22 of 1974, the prescribed authority is to be treated as a civil court (i.e., the explanation renders the prescribed authority a "civil court" for relevant purposes).
Counsel conceded that question (C) (the discrimination/Article 14 issue) was a new point not previously decided in Daulat Ram.

The opinion does not set out detailed or specific arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent Bank in the text provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Daulat Ram v. Punjab National Bank (Single Judge decision)	Held — according to the opinion, previously treated as supporting maintainability of appeals against prescribed authority's orders (as relied upon by the appellant).	The Court concluded that the Daulat Ram decision requires reconsideration and should be referred to a Larger Bench; it is not followed as decisive in the present judgment. The present judge stated that Daulat Ram's conclusion is not in consonance with his view of the governing principles.
Sainik Motors v. S.T. Authority	Referenced by the Single Judge in Daulat Ram (as precedent considered relevant by that Single Judge).	The present Court observed that the Single Judge had relied on this decision, but opined that Daulat Ram's conclusion is not in consonance with the ratio of Sainik Motors (i.e., the present judge does not accept that reliance as settling the present questions).
Kishan Lal v. Sohan Lal	Referenced by the Single Judge in Daulat Ram (as precedent considered relevant by that Single Judge).	As with Sainik Motors, the present Court noted reliance by the Single Judge but expressed that Daulat Ram's conclusion does not align with the ratio of Kishan Lal.
Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (Apex Court decision)	Relied upon by the Single Judge in Daulat Ram.	The present Court stated that the Single Judge placed reliance on this Supreme Court decision, but concluded that Daulat Ram's inference is not consonant with the ratio of Ganga Bai.
Smt. Gulab Kanwar v. UCO Bank (this Court, decided 6.10.1995)	Interpreted sub-section (2) of section 13 and its explanation; addressed revisional jurisdiction and effect of amendment to definition of "decree" (Sec. 2(2) CPC).	The present Court relied on and reiterated the proposition from this decision that an order passed by the prescribed authority assumes the colour of a decree for limited purposes of execution and that, after the 1976 amendment to Sec. 2(2) CPC, objections under Sec. 47 CPC are not "decrees" but decisions on execution objections are revisable under Sec. 115 CPC. The Court distinguished the facts and scope of Gulab Kanwar from Daulat Ram.
(1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555; (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597; (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628	Principles under Article 14 — that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness and ensures equality of treatment between similarly circumstanced persons.	The Court cited these Supreme Court authorities to support the proposition that differential treatment by allowing a Bank to choose between forums (without guidelines) may amount to arbitrariness violating Article 14.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in several interconnected steps:

Nature of appeals under Section 96 CPC: The Court emphasized that Section 96 CPC permits an appeal only from a decree. It relied on the statutory definition of "decree" in Section 2(2) CPC to underline that a "decree" is the formal expression of an adjudication given in a suit which conclusively determines the parties' rights. The Court concluded that where no decree is drawn (i.e., not arising out of a suit), Section 96 CPC does not provide a route of appeal as a matter of "corollary of subordination" of civil courts.
Character of proceedings before the prescribed authority under section 13(1) of Act No. 22 of 1974: The Court held that the prescribed authority performs quasi-judicial functions and cannot be equated with a civil court in the sense of Section 3 CPC. Proceedings under section 13(1) are not suits; procedural features of suits (plaint, written statement, the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act) are absent. Thus orders passed in such proceedings are not "decrees" for the general purpose of invoking appellate jurisdiction under Sections 96/100 CPC.
Limited statutory fiction of section 13(2): The Court recognized that section 13(2) of the Act contains an explanation which deems the prescribed authority to be a "civil court" for the limited purpose of executing orders passed under section 13(1). The Court interpreted this as a legal fiction created by statute: such orders "obtain a colour of decree" only for execution. Consequently, while execution machinery (Order 21 Rules 1–106 CPC) may be employed and objections under Section 47 CPC entertained in execution proceedings, this deeming does not convert the original order into a decree for purposes of instituting appeals under Section 96 CPC.
Effect of amendment to Section 2(2) CPC (Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976): The Court noted that words referring to Section 47 were omitted from Section 2(2) CPC by the 1976 amendment, with effect from 1.2.1977. The practical consequence outlined in the opinion is that an order under Section 47 CPC is no longer treated as a "decree" within the definition of Section 2(2). Thus, orders on execution objections are subject to revision under Section 115 CPC rather than appeals as "decrees."
Distinction between the present approach and earlier decisions: The Court observed that the Single Judge in Daulat Ram had relied on several authorities (including Sainik Motors, Kishan Lal, and Ganga Bai) to support the view that appeals are maintainable. The present Court disagreed with that conclusion and held Daulat Ram requires reconsideration; it further explained the limited applicability of Gulab Kanwar (its own earlier decision) which interpreted section 13(2) in the context of execution and revisional jurisdiction.
Article 14 / forum-selection issue (Point C): The Court analysed whether permitting the Bank to choose between invoking the prescribed authority under section 13(1) or filing a civil suit under section 13(3) — without any statutory guideline — could lead to arbitrary, discriminatory results between similarly situated agriculturists. The Court reasoned that allowing a Bank to "pick and choose" can produce prejudice: an agriculturist subjected to proceedings before an administratively trained presiding officer (the prescribed authority) may be deprived of the full procedural protections available in a civil suit (CPC and Evidence Act). The Court drew a conceptual distinction between an administratively trained mind (prescribed authority/SDO) and a judicially trained mind (civil court judge), arguing that the former may be more influenced by administrative exigencies.
Conclusion on Article 14: Relying on Supreme Court authorities cited in the opinion, the Court held that such forum-choice without safeguards could amount to arbitrariness and hostile discrimination contrary to Article 14. Given the substantial legal questions and potential conflict with earlier Single Judge authority, the Court considered it necessary to refer the matter to a Larger Bench.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Court held that the decision in Daulat Ram v. Punjab National Bank requires reconsideration and accordingly the present second appeal is admitted; the Registry is directed to place the complete record before the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench to decide the referred questions.

Direct consequences and practical implications explicitly stated in the opinion:

The instant second appeal has been admitted and notice is to be issued to the respondent Bank (as indicated at the outset of the opinion).
The Registry is directed to place the complete case record before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench under the Rajasthan High Court Rules to reconsider the Single Judge decision in Daulat Ram.
The Court expressed its view (which it directs the Larger Bench to consider) that:
- Orders passed by the prescribed authority under section 13(1) of Act No. 22 of 1974 are quasi-judicial and are not "decrees" for purposes of appeals under Sections 96 and 100 CPC.
- For the limited purpose of execution the order is deemed to be a decree under section 13(2) (legal fiction), enabling execution procedures (Order 21 Rules) and objections under Section 47 CPC; however, post-amendment to Section 2(2) CPC, execution objections are subject to revision (Section 115) and are no longer within the definition of "decree."
- The statutory option afforded to banks to choose between forum(s) (section 13(1) or section 13(3)) may, without guidelines, produce arbitrariness or unequal treatment violative of Article 14 and thus merits authoritative reconsideration.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a final, binding precedent on these contested points; instead, it admits the appeal and refers the controlling questions to a Larger Bench for authoritative resolution.

Note: This summary is constrained strictly to the content and conclusions contained in the provided opinion. No factual or legal inferences beyond the text have been introduced.

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Smt. Maina Kumari v. Punjab National Bank, Chittorgarh

R.R Yadav, J.:— Since there is a decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Daulat Ram v. Punjab National Bank (1), in favour of the appellant, therefore, till reference is decided by the Larger Bench, the instant second appeal deserves to be admitted, therefore, it is hereby admitted and notice be issued to the respondent Bank.

2. This second appeal has been preferred against the order dated 23.12.1994 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 1., Chittorgarh in alleged Civil Appeal No. 83 of 1988 whereby the order dated 11.5.87 passed by the Prescribed Authority under sub-sec. (1) of the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act No. 22 of 1974’) has been affirmed.

3. Brief facts necessary to be noticed are that the appellant was granted a financial assistance of Rs. 68,000/- for purchase of a Tractor which is an agricultural implement by the Punjab National Bank. It appears that due to default in payment the respondent Bank filed an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Chittorgarh. Indisputably, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Chittorgarh has been notified by the State Government to function as a ‘Prescribed Authority’ for the purposes of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act.

4. The sub Divisional Officer, Chittorgarh in his capacity as a prescribed authority within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 issued notice to the appellant who filed a detailed reply denying the alleged outstanding dues against her. According to the appellant she has already deposited Rs. 76,485/- upto 5.7.85

5. After hearing the appellant as well as respondent Bank the prescribed authority directed the payment of sum in question alleged to be due to the respondent Bank vide its order dated 11.5.87

6. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 11.5.87 the appellant filed an appeal under Sec. 96 CPC before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 1, Chittorgarh whereby he dismissed the same and upheld the order dated 11.5.87 passed by the prescribed authority.

7. Aggrieved against the dismissal of her appeal by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 1, Chittorgarh the appellant has filed the instant second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC before this Court on the ground that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Chittorgarh in his capacity as prescribed authority under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 will be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court, therefore, an appeal as well as second appeal is maintainable.

8. Before entertaining the instant second appeal the following questions were asked by this Court to the learned counsel for the appellant:—

A. WHETHER filing of an appeal is creation of statute and in absence of any provision for appeal under Act No. 22 of 1974 against the order passed by the prescribed authority in exercise of his powers under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act yet an appeal under Sec. 96 CPC and second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC are maintainable as a matter of corollary of the subordination of all courts of civil jurisdiction to the District Court in a District area and to the High Court in a provincial area within the meaning of Sec. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

B. WHETHER a prescribed authority notified by the State Government to make an order on an application of a Bank for payment of any sum due to the Bank on account of financial assistance availed of by an agriculturist under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 falls within the ambit of Civil Court as contemplated under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the aforesaid Act.?

C. WHETHER option of a Bank to choose a forum either to make an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 or to file a civil suit as envisaged under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 13 of the aforesaid Act without prescribing any guideline between similarly circumstanced agriculturists amounts hostile discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and run counter to the doctrine of equality.

9. In reply, it is urged by learned counsel Mr. S.L Jain appearing on behalf of the appellant that questions No. A and B are squarely covered by the decision rendered in the case of Daulat Ram (supra) while question No. C is a new point.

10. I propose to discuss the aforesaid points in detail in seriatim. Since points No. A and B are interlinked hence these two points deserve to be discussed together while point No. C requires discussion separately.

POINTS NO. A AND B.

11. In my considered opinion, the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Daulat Ram (supra) requires reconsideration, inasmuch as, an appeal under Sec. 96 CPC is entertainable against a decree. Therefore, unless a decree is drawn, no appeal lies as a matter of corollary of the subordination of all the courts of civil jurisdiction to the District Court and to the High Court within the meaning of Sec. 3 CPC. Indisputably, on the basis of the orders passed by the prescribed authority in exercise of his power under Sec. 13(1) of Act No. 22 of 1974 no decrees are drawn, therefore, appeals under Sec. 96 CPC are not maintainable and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable by any stretch of imagination.

12. The expression ‘decree’ used under Sec. 96 CPC has been defined under Sec. 2(2) of CPC which reads thus:—

“2(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Sec.

144, but shall not include—

(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

(b) any order of dismissal for default.

Explanation. — A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.”

In my humble opinion the expression ‘decree’ used under Sec. 2(2) of C.P.C encompasses that there must be an adjudication, the adjudication must have been given in a suit, it must have determined the right of the parties arising out of a suit and drawing of a decree either final or preliminary. Drawing of a decree arising out of a suit is a condition precedent to entertain an appeal under Sec. 96 CPC.

13. Secondly, I am of the opinion that the prescribed authority notified by the State Government under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 cannot said to be a civil Court within the meaning of Sec. 3 of C.P.C The prescribed authority under the aforesaid section cannot be termed to be even a court. In this regard, suffice it to say that at the most the prescribed authority can said to be either an arbitrator or a tribunal within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974. The prescribed authority notified under the aforesaid section by the State Government is meant to discharge only a quasi judicial function which cannot be termed as a civil court within the meaning of Sec. 3 CPC. Hence, such orders passed by prescribed authorities are not amenable to appeals as contemplated under Sec. 96 CPC and also not amenable to second appeals under Sec. 100 CPC.

14. I am also of the opinion that the proceedings under subsec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 are not judicial proceedings but these proceedings can said to be only quasi judicial proceedings. Detail procedure of suits are not made applicable in a proceeding under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act. Concept of filing of a plaint or a written statement is foreign to such proceedings. It is further noticed that provisions of Civil Procedure Code and Indian Evidence Act have not been extended to the proceedings envisaged under the aforesaid section.

15. It is true that the learned Single Judge while deciding the case of Daulat Ram (supra) has taken into account decisions rendered by this Court in cases of Sainik Motors v. S.T Authority (2) and Kishan Lal v. Sohan Lal (3). Learned Single Judge has also placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (4). In my humble opinion it appears that the conclusion arrived at in the case of Daulat Ram (supra) is not in consonance with the ratio decidendi of the aforesaid decisions.

16. It is strenuously urged before me by the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. S.L Jain that under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974, the prescribed authority is to be deemed to be a civil court but for the reasons stated herein below, it is not possible for me to accept the aforesaid argument of Mr. S.L Jain.

17. According to me, under the aforesaid Section, the prescribed authority acts as a quasi judicial authority and not as a Civil Court. At the risk of repetition, it is reiterated that no decree is drawn up on the basis of the order passed although the order passed by the prescribed authority under the aforesaid section is executable in the same manner as the decree passed by a Civil Court as contemplated under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974. Explanation added under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the said Act throws a flood of light that for the purpose of exercising powers conferred by this sub-section i.e sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the aforesaid Act the prescribed authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court.

18. From close scrutiny of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 read with Explanation added to the aforesaid sub-sec. (2) of the said section further make it abundantly clear that the order passed by the prescribed authority under sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 of the said Act obtains a colour of decree for a limited purpose of its execution by way of legal fiction created by the statute under the said Section. I am of the view that while executing the order passed under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974, the prescribed authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and as such, he can press into service all the provisions contained under O. 21 from Rule 1 to Rule 106 of C.P.C for the purposes of executing its orders so passed under Sec. 13(1) of the said Act as a decree passed by a civil court. Any objection filed by an agriculturist opposing the execution of the order is entertainable under Sec. 47 CPC and the order passed by the prescribed authority while executing its order, either allowing or refusing such objection filed by an agriculturist under Sec. 47 CPC is revisable within the meaning of Sec. 115 CPC read with amended Sec. 2(2) of C.P.C

19. It is pertinent to mention that words ‘Sec. 47 or’ have been omitted from Sec. 2(2) of C.P.C by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977, therefore, after enforcement of amended Sec. 2(2) of C.P.C modifying the definition of ‘decree’ an order passed under Sec. 47 CPC is only revisable under Sec. 115 CPC. Before enforcement of amendment of Sec. 2(2) CPC an order passed under Sec. 47 of C.P.C was included within the definition ‘decree’ but now under amended Sec. 2(2) CPC it is excluded.

20. Almost an identical question was raised before me in S.B Civil Revision Petition No. 662 of 1995. Smt. Gulab Kanwar v. UCO Bank, decided on 6.10.1995 where reliance was placed on the case of Daulat Ram (supra). After going through the case of Daulat Ram (supra), it was held in paragraph 7, which reads thus:—

“In my considered opinion, the revisionist was perfectly justified to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 115 CPC, inasmuch as, earlier it is true that the order passed under Sec. 47 CPC was included within the ambit of a decree as defined under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code but by amending Act No. 104 of 1976 the words and figures of Sec. 47 are omitted, therefore, in my opinion, if any objection is filed under the said Section by the revisionist before the prescribed authority then against its rejection he is justified to file a revision before this Court and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable to me. The facts and circumstances of the case of Daulat Ram (supra) are not attracted in the present case. So the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the non petitioner-Bank is hereby over-ruled and I propose to decide the present revision on merits.”

21. Argument of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that in the case of Smt. Gulab Kanwar (supra), the proposition of law enunciated in the case of Daulat Ram (supra) has been followed by this Court, is being raised merely to be rejected which is hereby rejected as untenable.

22. The aforesaid facts is obvious from reading of paragraph 7 of the judgment rendered by me in the case of Smt. Gulab Kanwar (supra). Suffice it to say that in the case of Smt. Gulab Kanwar (supra), the interpretation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 and its explanation was involved and this Court was not called upon to interprete the provisions envisaged under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974. It is true that an order passed by a prescribed authority in exercise of his power under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 assumes a colour of decree for limited purpose of its execution. Every order passed by a prescribed authority in terms of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and shall be executed by him in the same manner as a decree passed by a civil court. For the purpose of exercising powers conferred by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 the prescribed authority shall be deemed to be a civil court. The aforesaid proposition of law enunciated in case of Smt. Gulab Kanwar (supra) is hereby reiterated.

Point NO. C:

23. As regards the last question formulated in the preceding paragraph about option of a Bank to choose a forum is an unique provision under Act No. 22 of 1974. A Bank has been given option either to make an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 or to file a civil suit as envisaged under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 13 of the aforesaid Act. It is true that if a litigant has been given option by an enactment either passed by the Parliament or by the State Legislature to invoke two forums for mitigating his grievances then in such a situation option should be left open by courts of law to the litigant public to invoke the jurisdiction of either of the forum. For example under Sec. 397 Cr. P.C against an order passed by any inferior criminal court a revision is maintainable either before the High Court or before any Sessions Judge. A litigant is at liberty to invoke either the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or Sessions Judge although no guidelines are prescribed. To my mind where there is no element of prejudice in invoking either of the forum such options given to litigant public are valid but where such options cause prejudice it should be declared to be invalid.

24. With the aforesaid introspection it is to be examined whether choosing of forum by a Bank under Act No. 22 of 1974 is also so innocuous as contemplated under Sec. 397 Cr. P.C

25. In my humble opinion in absence of any guideline it goes without saying that if the Bank is allowed to adopt the practice of pick and choose between two similarly circumstanced agriculturists then a serious prejudice would be caused to such agriculturists against whom a Bank has opted to move an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act before the prescribed authority notified by the State Government. Such agriculturists will be deprived of a full fledged trial of a suit by a competent civil court with the aid of Civil Procedure Code and Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as, the provisions of C.P.C and Evidence Act have not been extended to the proceedings under subsec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 before a prescribed authority. Such agriculturists will be further deprived of to file an appeal against order passed under Sec. 13(1) of the said Act as there is no provision to file an appeal against the order passed by the prescribed authority under Sec. 13(1) of the said Act whereas if Bank has opted to file a civil suit against a similarly circumstanced agriculturists who had also obtained financial assistance from a Bank then such agriculturists shall be entitled for full fledged trial by a competent civil Court and will also be entitled to file a regular appeal under Sec. 96 CPC as well as a second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC.

26. The case of an agriculturist against whom the Bank has opted to make an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act before a prescribed authority will be decided by a Sub Divisional Officer whose mind is administratively trained whereas latter's suit will be tried by a competent civil court whose mind is trained judicially. There are fundamental and basic difference between administratively trained mind of an administrator and a judicially trained mind of a presiding Judicial Officer. Former is always prone to be influenced with administrative exigencies and administrative necessity which may or may not be justice oriented whereas latter's approach is always justice oriented unenfluenced with administrative exigencies and administrative necessity. For an administrator while taking a decision administrative exigency and administrative necessity is a paramount consideration whereas for a Judicial Officer presiding in a court of law justice and justice alone is paramount consideration unenfluenced with administrative exigency or administrative necessity.

27. The aforesaid option in choosing either of the forum mentioned above given to the Bank in absence of any guideline may lead to hostile discrimination between two agriculturists similarly circumstanced. Discrimination of any kind is to be taken an anathema to our constitutional philosophy. To my mind State, Parliament or State Legislature cannot be permitted to deny any person equality before law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

28. In my humble opinion the circumstances stated in the preceding paragraphs run counter to the doctrine of quality embodied under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It should be taken to be settled principle of law that Article 14 of the Constitution of India strikes at arbitrariness and ensures fairness and quality of treatment between two persons similarly circumstanced (See (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555 (5), (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 (6) and (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 (7)).

29. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the decision given by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Daulat Ram (supra) requires reconsideration on the following points:—

1. WHETHER filing of an appeal is creation of statute and in absence of any provision for appeal under Act No. 22 of 1974 against the order passed by the prescribed authority in exercise of his powers under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the said Act can be made appealable under Sec. 96 CPC and Sec. 100 CPC as a matter of corollary of the subordination of all courts of Civil Jurisdiction to the District Court in a District area and to the High Court in a provincial area within the meaning of Sec. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

2. WHETHER a prescribed authority notified by the State Government to make an order on the application of a Bank for payment of any sum due to the Bank on account of financial assistance availed of by an agriculturist under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 falls within the ambit of Civil Court as contemplated under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the aforesaid Act?

3. WHETHER option of a Bank to choose a forum either to make an application under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 22 of 1974 or to file a civil suit as envisaged under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 13 of the said Act without prescribing any guideline between similarly circumstanced agriculturists amounts hostile discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and run counter to the doctrine of equality.

As a result of the aforementioned discussion, the office of the Registry is hereby directed to place the complete record of this case before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench under the Rajasthan High Court Rules to reconsider the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Daulat Ram (supra).

Smt. Maina Kumari v. Punjab National Bank, Chittorgarh

Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.R. Yadav, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Smt. Maina Kumari v. Punjab National Bank, Chittorgarh

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