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  • Sections 21 and 22, NDPS Act, 1985
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  • Sections 21 and 22, NDPS Act, 1985
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision Petition (Kishan Singh)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from an order dated 4.2.1994 in which the Special Judge (NDPS Cases), Jaisalmer framed a charge under Section 29 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ("the Act") against the petitioner Kishan Singh.

According to the prosecution narrative in the record: - On receiving information about transport of charas/heroin, police laid a nakabandi near village Shipla on the night of 30 July (the opinion records both 1987 and later references to 1989 in different paragraphs of the record). - A Jonga Jeep was first stopped; a second Jonga Jeep failed to stop and fled. The police chased it and later, near village Bhojka, observed three persons alighting and fleeing; one was identified on the spot as co-accused Kan Singh. The Jonga Jeep was searched and 19 bags containing 717 packets (total 754.80 kg) of charas were found; samples and the consignment were seized and sealed. - Co-accused Kan Singh, Bachaya (Bachaya Khan) and Bheru Singh subsequently gave statements recorded by the Superintendent, Customs under Section 108 of the Customs Act and Section 67 of the NDPS Act disclosing involvement of several persons, naming Tanerav/Tan Singh, Allah Bux and stating delivery was to be made to petitioner Kishan Singh. - The petitioner was arrested on 19.6.1990; a chargesheet was submitted on 25.7.1990 and the case was committed to the Special Judge, who framed the impugned charge under Section 29 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act against the petitioner and related charges against other accused.

The revision petition challenges the framing of charge against the petitioner and seeks his discharge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a charge under Section 29 (abetment and criminal conspiracy) read with Sections 21 and 22 of the NDPS Act can be lawfully framed against the petitioner where the only material connecting him to the offence are confessional statements of co-accused recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act and Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
  2. Whether confessional statements of co-accused can be treated as substantive evidence against the petitioner at the stage of framing charge, or whether independent corroborative evidence is required to prima facie connect the petitioner to the alleged conspiracy or abetment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments — Mr. Mridul Jain

  • The record contains only the confessional statements of co-accused Bachaya Khan, Kan Singh and Bheru Singh; there is no other iota of evidence even to prima facie show the petitioner's involvement in a criminal conspiracy or abetment to transport the contraband or that delivery was to be given to him.
  • Confessional statements made by co-accused are not admissible as substantive evidence against the petitioner and thus cannot be read into evidence to frame a charge against him.
  • Framing of charge in the absence of any legal evidence connecting the petitioner was illegal.

Respondent's (Prosecution's) Arguments — Mr. S.M. Singhvi, Public Prosecutor

  • A very large quantity of charas was recovered from the Jonga Jeep which was being transported by accused Kan Singh (identified on the spot) and other arrested co-accused who were identified later in a test identification parade.
  • Express proof of agreement or direct evidence of conspiracy is rarely available; conspiracy may be inferred from overt acts and conduct of the parties.
  • However, the Public Prosecutor conceded that, apart from the confessional statements of Kan Singh, Bachaya and Bheru Singh, there was no other evidence connecting the petitioner with the crime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 Confession by an accused is not substantive evidence against co-accused; it can only be used to give assurance to other substantive evidence, if any. The court relied on this authority to state the settled principle that a co-accused's confession cannot, by itself, form substantive evidence against another accused for the purpose of framing charge.
Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 The court cannot begin with a co-accused's confession; it must first consider other evidence and then, if necessary, use the confession as assurance to conclusions drawn from that other evidence. Quoted to reinforce that confessions of co-accused cannot be the starting point; they may only be used after independent evidence has inclined the court to a conclusion.
Param Hans Yadav & Sadanand Tripathi v. State of Bihar, 1987 2 SCC 197 Reiteration of the principle limiting the use of co-accused confessions as non-substantive evidence. Cited to show consistent Supreme Court authority that co-accused confessions do not constitute substantive evidence sufficient by themselves.
Gopal Govind Chogale v. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Maharashtra, 1985 Cr. L.R. Maharashtra 495 Held that the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be the foundation against other accused even for the purpose of framing of charge. Used to support the proposition that even at the framing stage a co-accused confession is an inadequate foundation for charging others.
Superintendent of Customs v. Bhanabhai Khalpathai Patel, 1993 Supp 1 SCC 475 Statement made before Customs Officer cannot be relied upon to corroborate evidence of a co-accused turned prosecution witness; conviction based solely on such a statement is unsustainable. Applied to hold that confessional statements recorded by Customs cannot be treated as corroborative evidence to sustain a charge or conviction against co-accused when no independent evidence exists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis grounded in Section 29 of the NDPS Act and established principles of law on the evidentiary value of confessions by co-accused:

  1. Legal framework: Section 29 penalises abetment or being party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence under the Act. The court observed that to establish abetment or conspiracy there must be a joining together of two or more persons and some illegal act or omission must take place in pursuance of that conspiracy. Prima facie proof of actual complicity (by conduct, assistance, instigation or agreement) is required.
  2. On the admissibility and weight of confessions: The court reviewed settled law (as cited) that confessions by one accused are not substantive evidence against co-accused. Such confessions may only be used after independent evidence has inclined the court to a conclusion, and even then they serve only to give assurance to that conclusion.
  3. Necessity of corroboration: The court emphasised that for a charge under Section 29, the prosecution must adduce some independent or corroborative affirmative legal evidence connecting the accused to the conspiracy or abetment. Formation of conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, but there must be independent material from which such inference can be drawn.
  4. Application to the facts: The court examined the prosecution material and found the following: (a) confessions by co-accused Kan Singh, Bachaya and Bheru Singh were recorded in May 1989 (about one year and ten months after the seizure); (b) the petitioner was arrested on 19.6.1990 and was not subjected to a test identification parade, so no witness identified him; (c) there was no evidence that the seized charas belonged to the petitioner or that delivery was intended for him; (d) there was no evidence that the petitioner was present in the Jonga Jeep at the time of stop; (e) the Jonga Jeep was registered in the name of co-accused Bhike Khan; (f) the petitioner's name did not appear in the FIR or the statements of prosecution witnesses.
  5. Conclusion of illegality at framing stage: The court concluded the Special Judge had relied solely on confessional statements of the three co-accused to frame a charge against the petitioner. Given the legal constraints on using co-accused confessions as substantive material and the absence of any independent corroborative evidence, reliance on such confessions for framing charge was held to be inappropriate and illegal.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling: The revision petition is allowed. The order dated 4.2.1994 insofar as it framed the charge against petitioner Kishan Singh under Section 29 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the NDPS Act is set aside, and the petitioner is discharged of that offence.

Immediate Consequence: The petitioner is discharged of the charge framed under Section 29 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act.

Further Directions / Practical Implications: The court directed that the record of the lower court be immediately returned to the learned Special Judge, NDPS Cases, Jaisalmer, with a direction to expedite the trial of this old case.

Broader Legal Implication: The opinion applies established precedents limiting the use of co-accused confessions as substantive evidence and underscores that framing of a charge for conspiracy or abetment requires some independent, corroborative evidence linking the accused to the offence. The judgment itself does not purport to lay down new law; it applies settled principles to the facts and sets aside a charge founded solely on confessions of co-accused.

    Kishan Singh v. State Of Raj.(61)

    Rajendra Saxena, J.:— This revision has been preferred against the order dt. 4.2.94, whereby the learned Special Judge, NDPS Cases (Sessions Judge), Jaisalmer ordered for framing charge against the accused petitioner for the offence u/s. 29 read with Sections 21 and 22, NDPS Act, 1985 (in short, ‘the Act’).

    2. Briefly the relevant facts for disposal of this revision petition are that on receiving a credible information that Charas/heroin will be brought from some area falling within the jurisdiction of Police Station Sam and that the same will be transported to Jodhpur, the police party laid ‘Nakabandi’ near village Shipla in the night of 30th July, 1987. At about 11.15 PM, one Jonga Jeep was sighted, which was coming from a kachha route. That jeep was stopped, wherein co-accused Tannerao Singh along with some other person was sitting; that Jonga Jeep was driven away towards Jaisalmer. Thereafter at about 11.25 PM, another Jonga Jeep came through Kachha route, which did not stop despite the signal given by the police party and crossing the barriers, erected by putting smoulders went away with a high speed. The police party chased the said Jonga Jeep and also flashed wireless message to the S.P, Jaisalmer. It is alleged that on the night intervening 30th and 31st July, 1989 at about 12.30 PM near village Bhojka, the police party saw three persons alighting from the said Jonga Jeep, who made good their escape under the cover of darkness. However, one of those persons was identified by the police party, who was co-accused Kan Singh. At the same time, the Superintendent, Customs Range Jaisalmer alongwith his party also reached there. The said Jonga Jeep was searched, wherein 19 bags having 717 packets containing 754.80 kgms. of Charas were found. Samples of Charas therefrom were taken and those were sealed. The consignment of contraband Charas was also seized and sealed. It is alleged that the accused persons absconded and could not be arrested. It is the case of the prosecution that on 2.5.89, co-accused Kan Singh and on 31.5.89 co-accused Bachaya and Bheru Singh in their respective statements under Sec. 108, Customs Act, 1962 and under Sec. 67 of the Act recorded by the Superintendent, Customs, Jaisalmer disclosed that the aforementioned Charas was purchased by co-accused Tan Singh and Allah Bux, the brother of co-accused Bachaya and that the same was to be delivered to petitioner Kishan Singh; that on 30.7.89, co-accused Tanerav Singh and Kan Singh alongwith the petitioner had come in a Jonga Jeep in village Pithla; that from there, they went to village Shipla and that Tanerav Singh had asked co-accused Kan Singh, Bheru Singh and Bachaya to go into the jungle near village Shipla, where 4-5 persons alongwith 6-7 camels carrying bags containing Charas were waiting for them. They further stated that accused Bheru Singh, Bachaya and Kan Singh went to that jungle and loaded the said consignment of Charas in the said Jonga Jeep and that while they were going to deliver the same to petitioner Kishan Singh, they were intercepted and chased by the police party and ultimately, they fled away from the said Jonga Jeep leaving behind the contraband Charas. Petitioner was arrested by the police as late as on 19.6.90 After investigation, on 25.7.90, the police submitted a chargesheet against the petitioner and accused Tanerav Singh, Kan Singh, Bheru Singh, Bachaya Khan and Bhike Khan in the court of learned CJM, Jaisalmer, who committed the case to the learned Special Judge, NDPS cases, Jaisalmer, who by the impugned order framed the charge under Sec. 29 read with Sees. 21 and 22 of the Act against the petitioner and under Sec. 8 read with Ss. 21 and 22 of the Act against other accused persons. Hence this revision petition. I have heard Mr. Mridul Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. SM Singhvi Public Prosecutor at length and carefully perused the record of the lower court in extenso.

    3. Mr. Mridul Jain has vehemently asserted that in this case, except the alleged confessions made by the co-accused Bachaya Khan, Kan Singh and Bheru Singh before the Superintendent, Customs, u/s. 108, Customs Act and Sec. 67 of the Act, there is not an iota of evidence, even to prima facie show that petitioner had entered into a criminal conspiracy or abetted the other accused persons to transport the said contraband Charas or that the delivery thereof was to be given to him. Mr. Jain has canvassed that these confessional statements made by co-accused persons cannot be read into evidence against the petitioner. He has, therefore, contended that the learned Special Judge has committed an illegality in framing the charge against the petitioner in absence of any legal evidence.

    4. Mr. SM Singhvi, Public Prosecutor, has submitted that huge quantity of Charas was recovered from the Jonga Jeep, which was being transported by accused Kan Singh, who was indentified by the police party on the spot and other co-accused persons Bachaya Khan and Bheru Singh, who were later on arrested and correctly identified during the test identification parade; that express proof of agreement or direct evidence of conspiracy is rarely available and that it should be inferred from the overt acts and conduct of the parties. He has, however, clearly conceded that except the confessional statements of Kan Singh, Bachya and Bheru Singh recorded by the Superintends, Customs, there is no other evidence to connect the petitioner with the crime.

    5. I have given my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. Sec. 29 of the Act proclaims that whoever abets, or is party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under the Act shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 116 of the IPC, be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence. Thus, the abetment may take place either by instigation or consipiracy or by intentional act. But for the proof of abetment or conspiracy, there must be joining together two or more persons in the conspiracy and an act of illegal omission or commission of an offence must take place in pursuance thereof. Therefore, the actual complicity which precedes the actual commission of an offence by the principal offender either through substantial assistance for the commission of the offence or through some word or conduct which instigated the commission of the offence should be prima facie shown. It is true that formation of conspiracy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence or by conduct & act of parties because affirmative evidence is not always possible. But for establishing the charge for abetment and criminal conspiracy u/s. 29 of the Act, the prosecution must adduce some independent, corroborative of affirmative legal evidence.

    6. It is now no more res integra that the confession by an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence against the co-accused persons in the same trial. For this, I place reliance on the law laid down in Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh . AIR 1952 SC 159. The confession of an accused can only be used against the co-accused for leading assurance to any substantive evidence, if there be any, to be utilised or acted upon.

    7. In Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar . AIR 1964 SC 1184, the Apex Court observed as under:

    “Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Sec. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Sec. 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence.

    …………that the confession of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service only when the court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from the said evidence.”

    8. The Apex Court has reiterated the same principle in Param Hans Yadav and Sadanand Tripathi v. State of Bihar . 1987 2 SCC 197.

    9. In Gopal Govind Chogale v. The Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Maharashtra . 1985 Cr. L.R Maharashtra 495, it has been held that confessional statement of co-accused cannot be the foundation against other accused even for the purpose of framing of charge.

    10. Hence the confessional statement u/s. 67 of the Act can be admissible in evidence only as against the person, who has made such confession but the same cannot be made the sole basis even for framing charge against other accused person in absence of any independent affirmative evidence.

    11. In Superintendent of Customs v. Bhanabhai Khalpathai Patel . 1993 Supp 1 SCC 475, it has been made clear that the statement of the accused given before the Customs Officer cannot be relied upon to corroborate the evidence of co-accused, who has turned as a prosecution witness. It was held that the conviction based solely on such a statement was not sustainable.

    12. In the instant case, co-accused Kan Singh, Bachya and Bheru Singh made confessional statements u/s. 108 Customs Act and Sec. 67 of the Act in May, 1989 i.e after about one year and ten months of the alleged incident when the contraband charas was seized. The petitioner Kishan Singh was arrested on 19.6.90, but the I.O did not care to arrange for his test parade. Thus, he was not identified by any witness. There is not a fringe of evidence collected by the I.O even to prima facie show that the seized Charas belonged to the petitioner or it was being transported for giving its delivery to him. Again, there in no evidence that on 30.7.87, the petitioner was present in the Jonga Jeep, which was being driven by co-accused Tanerav Singh and was stopped by the police party. The seized Jonga Jeep also did not belong to the petitioner. On the other hand, it was registered in the name of co-accused Bhike Khan. The name of the petitioner also does not find mention either in the FIR or in any of the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, except the confessional statements of the aforesaid three accused persons, there is not a shred of direct or indirect evidence from which it can be inferred even prima fcie that the accused petitioner had entered into a criminal conspiracy with the other co-accused persons or had abetted them to possess/transport the contraband charas. A bare persual of the impugned order unmistakably reveals that the learned Special Judge has solely relied on the confessional statements of the co-accused Kan Singh, Bachaya Khan and Bheru Singh, which is not at all a legal or substantive evidence as against the petitioner, for framing the charge. He has, thus, committed an illegality in relying on an inadmissible evidence against the petitioner. Hence, the charge framed against the accused petitioner for the offence u/s. 29 r/w Ss. 21 and 22 of the Act cannot be sustained.

    13. In the result, this revision petition is allowed and the order dated 4.2.94 qua the petitioner Kishan Singh and the charge framed against him for the offence u/s. 29 r/w sees. 21 and 22 of the Act are hereby set aside and he is hereby discharged of the said offence. The record of the lower court be immediately sent back to the learned Special Judge, NDPS Cases, Jaisalmer, who is directed to expedite the trial of this old case.

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    Comments

    Kishan Singh v. State Of Raj.(61)
    (Jan 19, 1995)