Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Revisions Nos. 350 and 361 to 368 of 1986

Advocates

Sri M.R Call.
For Non-Petitioners.— Sri G.S Singhvi.

Judges

Mrs. Mohini Kapoor

Acts

Ss. 29 and 34 of the Calcutta State Transport Corporation Act
Ss. 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act
Corporation Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
S. 7 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred
Ss. 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act
provisions of Ss. 6 and 7 of the Wages Act
Wages Act under S. 15(2) of the Wages Act
S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Act. In Ss. 7(2)(k)7(2)(kk), 1(2)(kkk), 7(2)(p)
S. 7(2)(h) of the Wages Act,
S. 2(vi) of the Wages Act.
S. 15(2) of the Wages Act
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT
S. 6 of the Wages Act.
S. 7 of the Wages Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation ("the corporation") is a body constituted under the Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962 with 50% state government ownership and its staff governed by Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1974. Regulation 24 provides that employees "shall be entitled to dearness and compensatory allowances at the rates admissible to employees of the State Government from time to time."

The State Government revised dearness allowance (D.A.) on several occasions and, while making increased D.A. payable in cash from specified future dates, ordered that the arrears up to certain dates be credited to employees' provident fund accounts (annexures 1 and 2). The corporation credited employees' provident fund accounts with arrears of D.A. in obedience to those state orders.

Respondent 2 applied to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (under S.15(2)) claiming the arrears of dearness allowance had been unlawfully deducted and sought payment in cash. The Authority by order dated 30 January 1985 directed the petitioner to pay arrears in cash along with compensation and costs. The corporation's appeal to the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, was dismissed on 25 April 1986. The corporation filed the present revisions challenging those decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation can deposit arrears of dearness allowance payable to its employees into the general provident fund (or a similar account) instead of paying the arrears in cash, and whether such deposit constitutes a "deduction of wages" within the meaning of Section 7 of the Payment of Wages Act.
Whether the Authority appointed under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application by respondent 2 alleging unlawful deduction of wages, given the legal and factual complexities and the fact that the contested orders originated from the State Government.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Corporation) — Principal Contentions

The government orders (annexures 1 and 2) that revised D.A. rates and directed that arrears be credited to provident fund accounts are composite orders. The petitioner argued these must be applied in their entirety and cannot be bifurcated; accordingly, the deposit into G.P.F. is not a deduction because the amounts were credited to employees' accounts.
Alternatively, the petitioner contended the deposit was an authorised deduction under Section 7(2)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act (deductions required to be made by order of a court or other competent authority).
Under Regulation 24 employees of the corporation are to be treated at par with State Government employees, and since arrears of State Government employees were deposited into G.P.F., the same mode should apply to corporation employees.
The corporation relied on Section 20(4) of the Act and said the deposit of arrears into G.P.F. was a policy decision guided by State Government instructions; the Board of Directors is expected to be guided by State policy.
The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, arguing that complex questions of law (including validity of government orders) could not be decided by that Authority and should be litigated in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It argued the Authority's exercise of jurisdiction was a material irregularity.
The petitioner also emphasized considerations of public interest and economic policy (impact on national economy and inflation) as reasons to accept the government's scheme of depositing arrears into provident funds.

Respondent 2 — Principal Contentions

Wages must be paid in current coin or currency notes as required by Section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act; payment by credit to an account is only permissible by the authority of the employee (cheque or bank credit).
Section 7 allows deductions only as permitted by the Act; Section 7(2)(h) permits deductions required to be made by order of a court or other authority competent to make such order. The Authority must determine whether the authority making the government order was competent to authorise such a deduction.
There is no dispute that dearness allowance is part of "wages" (Section 2(vi) of the Act) and that the amount payable is undisputed; the sole dispute is the mode of payment (cash vs deposit). This, the respondent argued, is within the jurisdiction of the Authority under Section 15(2).
The State Government is not the competent authority to pass orders authorising deduction from the wages of employees of a corporation that is constituted by a Central Act and has its own Board of Directors; thus the government order cannot be treated as authorising the deduction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Payment of Wages Inspector Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 590	The Authority under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act has jurisdiction only over unauthorised deductions and delay in payment of wages; it cannot entertain claims requiring determination of complicated questions of law that properly belong to another forum (example: claims under Industrial Disputes Act s.25-FF where proviso issues arise).	The court used this authority to explain the limited but meaningful scope of S.15(2): the Authority can decide claims where wages are certain and cannot be disputed, and may determine whether a deduction is authorised under the Wages Act. It held that this precedent does not oust the Authority from deciding the present deduction dispute.
Bijai Cotton Mills, Ltd., Bijainagar v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Beawar, A.I.R. 1965 Raj. 11	Applications under Section 15(2) for recovery of amounts payable under an award (which fall within the definition of "wages") are within the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.	Cited to support the proposition that claims for amounts included in "wages" can be heard by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.
Maruti Mahipati Mullick v. Poison, Ltd., 1970 L. & I.C. 308	The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is not a mere "summary" tribunal and should not refuse to entertain matters solely because they involve questions of some complexity; its jurisdiction, though limited, is exclusive for matters within its scope.	Relied upon to show that the Authority can try matters that may involve contest between contractual positions and is not automatically precluded from addressing complex issues incidental to a wages claim.
Gain Chand Isar Dass v. G. Key Industries, Amritsar, 1971 L. & I.C. 1360	Matters incidental to determination of wages — including wrongful deductions and delayed payment — can be settled by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.	Cited to reinforce that the Authority may decide all matters incidental to wage determination and thus could properly entertain the present application about deduction/mode of payment of D.A. arrears.
Samir Kumar Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 1974-II L.L.J. 407	A government order directing arrears to be credited to a special fund (retirement benefit fund) was held not to have been decided by the corporation itself and the Government could not direct deduction from wages lawfully payable; that decision was rendered in the writ jurisdiction.	The court acknowledged this decision as relevant to the question whether government can direct such deposits, but distinguished it: in that case the matter was decided in a writ petition and the issue of Authority jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act did not arise. The court declined to treat it as defeating the present proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed two intertwined questions: (a) whether the Authority under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction to decide respondent 2's claim; and (b) whether the deposit of D.A. arrears into G.P.F. constituted an authorised deduction under Section 7 of the Act.

On jurisdiction, the court reviewed authorities (notably Payment of Wages Inspector Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta) to interpret Section 15(2) as conferring a special but not unlimited jurisdiction to the Authority: it may entertain complaints about unauthorised deductions and delays in payment of wages where the wages payable are certain and not genuinely disputable. The court concluded that the present case was a straightforward allegation that wages (D.A. arrears) had been deducted: the amount and entitlement were not in dispute, only the mode of payment was contested. That situation falls squarely within the Authority's jurisdiction. The court rejected the argument that the Authority must be ousted simply because questions of law or policy arise or because the State Government issued orders; it held that the Authority could decide whether the deduction was authorised and competent.

On the substantive question of whether deposit into G.P.F. was an authorised deduction, the court analysed the statutory and regulatory scheme governing the corporation. Regulation 24, framed under Section 42 and pursuant to Section 23(2) of the Act, provides that dearness allowances shall be at the rates admissible to State Government employees, but it does not prescribe the mode of payment. The court emphasized that it is the corporation (through its Board of Directors) which determines conditions of service and remuneration under the Act and regulations; the State Government's orders directing deposit of arrears into provident funds did not, by themselves, constitute an order of a "competent authority" under Section 7(2)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act authorising a deduction from wages of corporation employees.

The court further considered Sections 6 and 7 of the Payment of Wages Act. Section 6 requires payment of wages in current coin or currency notes unless the employee authorises payment by cheque or bank credit. Section 7 allows only specified deductions and those required by order of a court or other competent authority (S.7(2)(h)). The court noted that the statute contemplates certain deductions only with written authorisation by the employee (S.7(2)(k), (kk), etc.), and there is no provision allowing a unilateral deduction for crediting wages into a G.P.F. merely because a government order so directs. Because the Board (or another authority competent under the Act/regulations) had not itself ordered the deduction, and because the State Government was not competent under the corporation's statutory scheme to authorise such a deduction for the corporation's employees, the deposit could not be characterised as an authorised deduction under S.7(2)(h).

The court distinguished the Samir Kumar Chatterjee decision as being decided in writ proceedings where different statutory provisions applied, and noted that decision did not establish that Section 15 remedies were unavailable. The court also observed that the availability of a writ remedy did not make Section 15 application non-maintainable because the Authority's remedy was a viable and available alternative and employees could legitimately seek relief under Section 15.

On the question of revision under Section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code (the provision invoked by the petitioner to challenge the authority's order), the court explained that mere disagreement with a decision or an erroneous decision by a competent authority is not sufficient to establish material illegality or irregularity that would justify interference; having found that the Authority and the District Judge had jurisdiction and reached conclusions that the revisional court did not find deserving of reversal, the court declined to disturb those decisions.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The revisions filed by the petitioner are dismissed. The court affirmed the orders of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and of the District and Sessions Judge that directed payment of the arrears of dearness allowance in cash to employees (with the prescribed compensation and costs in the Authority's order), and held that the corporation could not lawfully treat the state government's direction to credit arrears to provident fund accounts as an authorised deduction under Section 7(2)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act.

Implications:

Direct effect: The authority's order requiring payment of D.A. arrears in cash stands; the corporation's revisions are dismissed and parties are directed to bear their own costs.
On precedent/broader law: The opinion applies existing authorities about the scope of Section 15(2) and the limits on deductions under Section 7; the court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond articulating that only an order of a competent authority (within the scheme governing the employer) could authorise a deduction from wages. The decision is confined to the facts and statutory framework before the court.

This summary is limited strictly to the matters, facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning set out in the provided opinion.

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Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation v. Authority Appointed Under Payment Of Wages Of Act, Jaipur, And Another

JUDGMENT

1. The common question which arises in all these revision petitions is whether the Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) can deposit the arrears of dearness allowance (D.A) admissible to its employees in the general provident fund (G.P.F) or some similar account and not pay in cash, and would deposit in such general” provident fund or other account amount to deduction of wages under S. 7 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Wages Act).

2. The petitioner corporation has been constituted under the Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), in which 50 per cent shares belong to the State Government. It has its own staff and the service conditions of the staff are governed by regulations framed under S. 42 of the Act and are called Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the regulations). The Act provides for the constitution of the corporation and other bodies in order to carry its functions. Section 20 provides for the constitution of Board of Directors in which shall vest the general superintendence and management of affairs of the corporation.

3. Sections 23(1) and 23(2) of the Act read as under:

“23(1). A State Warehousing Corporation may appoint such officers and other employees as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions”.

23(2). Every person employed by a State Warehousing Corporation under this Act shall be subject to such conditions of service and shall be entitled to such remuneration as may be determined by regulations made by the corporation under this Act”

4. Regulation 24 of the regulations Trained under S. 42 of the Act reads as under:

“24. Dearness and compensatory allowances.— Employees of the corporation shall be entitled to clearness and compensatory allowances at the rates admissible to employees of the State Government from time to time”.

5. The Government from time to time revised the dearness allowance payable to the employees of the State Government and such increased dearness allowance was made payable in cash from a date specified in the order by which the dearness allowance was sanctioned, but as regards the arrears of dearness allowance it was - ordered that the same shall be credited to the provident fund account of each employee.

The relevant documents in this connection are annexures 1 and 2 Instalments of additional dearness allowance were, sanctioned by the Government with effect from 1 August, 1983: 1 October, 1983 and 1 November, 1983, by order, dated 22 July, 1984, and it was ordered that the arrears of dearness allowance payable up to 31 May, 1984 shall be impounded and thereafter the dearness allowance shall be paid in cash. Annexure 1 order passed by the Government says that all public sector undertakings corporations, autonomous bodies, etc., shall ensure that the amount of dearness allowance sanctioned to the employees with effect from the aforesaid date shall be recovered as arrears of the dearness allowance up to 31 May, 1984 and credited to the provident fund account of the employees. The order, annexure 2, passed by the Government on 31 October, 1984 is in respect of the revised dearness allowance rates with effect from 1 January, 1984, 1 February, 1984, 1 April, 1984 and 1 June, 1984. This order also directs the corporations, etc., to recover the arrears of dearness allowance and credit the same to the provident fund account of the employees.

6. The respondent 2 applied before the Authority under the Wages Act under S. 15(2) of the Wages Act and claimed that the arrears of dearness allowance payable to him has been unlawfully deducted by the employer who should be directed to pay the same. Upon this the corporation was heard and after considering the relevant law applicable in this context, the Authority under the Wages Act, by order, dated 30 January, 1985, directed the petitioner to pay the amount of arrears of dearness allowance payable to each employee, in cash along with compensation Rs. SO and costs Rs. 25 each. This order of the authority was challenged in an appeal before the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, who after taking into consideration all the pleas that were advanced before him dismissed the appeal on 25 April, 1986. Against this order the present revision has been preferred.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised several contentions in order to show that the decision of the Courts below is not proper. “His contention is that the annexures 1 and 2 are orders by which the rates of dearness allowance stood revised with the stipulation that the dearness allowance would be payable in cash only after a specified date subsequent to the issue of the orders and the calculation of amount prior to that be deposited in the fund. According to him this being a composite order has to be made applicable in all parts and different provisions cannot be bifurcated so as to make it applicable in parts. It is argued that the amount which has been calculated and deposited in the general provident fund cannot be said to be a deduction from the wages because the amount his been credited in to the account of the employees which shows that he has not been deprived of it. In the alternative, this deduction is said to be an authorised deduction under S. 7(2)(h) of the Wages Act. It is argued that under regulation 24, the employees of the corporation are to be treated at par with the employees of the State Government and when the arrears of the State Government's employees are being deposited in the general provident fund account then the said provision is applicable to the employees of the corporation also. His contention is that the employees of the corporation cannot ask for the quantum of allowance as payable to the State Government employees and contest the mode of paying the same which would amount to blowing hot and cold in the same breath. The deposit of arrears of dearness allowance in the general provident fund account is said to be a policy decided on the basis of instructions and guidance given by the State Government as is provided in S. 20(4) of the Act.

8. The jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act has also been challenged by putting forward the argument that complicated questions of law cannot be decided by the authority and if the validity of any order is to be challenged then it should be done in the writ jurisdiction of this Court and not before the authority under the Wages Act. According to him the exercise of jurisdiction by the authority amounts to material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction because the corporation is to obey all orders passed by the State Government and without getting the same quashed, no relief can be granted against the petitioner..

According to the petitioner the object of regulation 24 is fulfilled as soon as the employees of the corporation are treated similar to the Government servants in the matter of dearness allowances and beyond that they are not entitled to anything. Emphasis has also been laid on the ground that this matter of national interest and the payment of arrears of dearness allowance in cash would directly effect the economy of the country and the rate of growing inflation. The Government has adopted the present decision after taking into consideration such and other aspect which has to be accepted.

9. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner 2 has contended that the persons to whom the provisions of the Wages Act are applicable are to be paid wages without any deductions in accordance with S. 6 of the Wages Act. This provides that all wages shall be paid in current coin or in currency notes and it is only under the authority of the employee that the wages can be paid either by cheques or by crediting the wages in his bank account. Section 7 permits the authorised deduction and for the present purpose S. 7(2) (h) is relevant which reads as under:

“Section 7(2). Deductions from the wages of an employed person shall be made only in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and may be of the following kinds only namely:

(h) deductions required to be made by order of a Court or other authority competent to make such order”.

10. It is contended that the Authority under the Wages Act has to decide whether the authority which has made the order to make a deduction can be said to be competent authority or not. There is no dispute that dearness allowance payable to an employee is part of wages as defined in S. 2(vi) of the Wages Act. There is no dispute about the amount payable also and the only question is whether it has to be paid in cash or it can be deposited in the account of the employee. This is said to be a matter within the jurisdiction of the authority and cannot is be thrown out simply by saying that this a complicated question of law. It is contended that the State Government is not the competent authority to pass any order in respect of employees of the corporation which is a body constituted under the Central Act and has its own Board of Directors and Executive Committee, etc., to manage its affairs. Thus, any authority, to become a competent authority, to authorise a deduction has to be an Authority under the Act and its place cannot be taken by the State Government. The maintainability of a revision by the petitioner is also challenged on the contention that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act as well the District Judge have exercised jurisdiction vested in them and their decisions cannot be challenged merely on the ground that they should have arrived at a different conclusion.

11. The first question which arises is whether the Authority under the Wages Act has jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the non-petitioner 2. In this connection both the parties have placed reliance on Payment of Wages Inspector Ujjain v. Surajmal Metha, [A.I.R 1969 S.C 590]. In this case the employees of an Electricity Board were served with notices that their services would no longer be required. Upon this an application on behalf of the employees was submitted under S. 15(2) of the Wages Act to recover wages for the notice period and also retrenchment compensation payable to them under S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. This claim was contested by the employer and the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Wages Act was also challenged. In this connection it was held that the Authority under the Wages Act cannot entertain a claim for compensation under S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act as it involved complicated questions of law. The proper authority was held to be Labour Court. The compensation payable under Ss. 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act was held to be included in the definition of wages but no time limit was fixed for payment of this compensation. Referring to the jurisdiction of the authority under the Wages Act, it was observed as under:

“It is explicit from the terms of S 15(2) that the Authority appointed under Sub-sec. (1) has jurisdiction to entertain applications only in two classes of cases, namely, of deductions and fines not authorised under Ss. 7 to 13 and of delay in payment of wages beyond the wage-periods fixed under S. 4 and the time of payment laid down in S. 5. The only applications which the authority can entertain are those where deductions unauthorised under the Act are made from wages or there has been delay in payment beyond the wage-period and the time of payment of wages fixed or prescribed under Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. Section 15(2) postulates that the wages payable by the person responsible for payment under S. 3 are certain and such that they cannot be disputed.

It is true that the authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which are incidental to the claim in question. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to the claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction under S. 15 is a special jurisdiction. The authority is conferred with the power to award compensation over and above the liability for penalty of fine which an employer is liable to incur under S. 20.

The question, therefore, is whether on the footing that compensation payable under Ss. 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act being wages within the meaning of S. 2(vi)(d) of the Act, a claim for it on the ground that its payment was delayed by an employer could be entertained under S. 15(2) of the Act. In our view, it could not be so entertained. In the first place, the claim made in the instant case is not a simple case of deductions having been unauthorisedly made or payment having been delayed beyond the wages-periods and the time of payment fixed under Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. In the second place, in view of the defence taken by respondent 1, the authority would inevitably have to enter into questions arising under the proviso to S. 25-FF, viz., whether there was any interruption in the employment of the workmen, whether the conditions of service under the Board were any the less favourable than those under the company and whether the Board, as the new employer, had become liable to pay compensation to the workmen if there was retrenchment in the future. Such an inquiry would necessarily be a prolonged inquiry involving questions of fact and of law. Besides, the failure to pay compensation on the ground of such a plea cannot be said to be either a deduction which is unauthorised under the Act, nor can it fall under the class of delayed wages as envisaged by Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. It may be that there may conceivably be cases of claims of compensation which are either admitted or which cannot be disputed which by reason of its falling under the definition of wages the authority may have jurisdiction to try and determine. But we do not think that a claim for compensation under S. 28-FF which is denied by the employer on the ground that it was defeated by the proviso to that section, of which all the conditions were fulfilled, is one such claim which can fall within the ambit of S. 15(2)”.

12. On the basis of this decision, it can be said that the Authority under the Wages Act is empowered under S. 15 of the Act to entertain matters concerning delay in payment of wages and deduction from wages and while doing so it can decide whether the deduction is authorised and permissible under the provision of Wages Act. It cannot be said that merely because a question of law has arisen which has a wide effect it would become a matter beyond the purview of the authority or because the employer has raised a plea that the deduction is authorised by a competent authority then it would become a matter which cannot be decided by the authority. In the present case, the employees have come with the definite case that their wages have been deducted against the provisions of law and the case of the employer is that

firstly, there is no deduction, and

secondly, if there is a deduction then it has been authorised by competent authority.

Both these questions are such which the Authority under the Wages Act has jurisdiction to decide and such authority cannot, be divested of this power merely on the ground that the questions involved are complicated. The present matter cannot be equated with a claim for compensation under S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act which does not provide for any time for making the payment and the claim for such payment can also be defeated under the provisions of this section itself. The Industrial Disputes Act provides for separate forum for agitating claims for compensation arising under the provisions of that Act. Here, if there can be any alternative remedy, it is by way of a writ petition which cannot be said to be a remedy which should have been first availed of by the employees. On the contrary it would be contended in a writ petition that an alternative remedy by way of an application under S. 15(2) of the Wages Act was available.

13. On the basis of some other decisions also it can be said that the present claim of the employee was maintainable before the Authority under the Wages Act. In Bijai Cotton Mills, Ltd., Bijainagar v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Beawar, [A.I.R 1965 Raj. 11], the workmen applied under S. 15(2) of the Wages Act for recovery of a claim under an award. The amount payable under an award is included under the definition of “wages” under S. 2(vi) of the Wages Act and the application was held to be within the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. In Maruti Mahipati Mullick v. Poison, Ltd., [1970 L. & I.C 308], it was held that it cannot be said that the Authority under the Wages Act is a Tribunal of “summary jurisdiction” and that the Legislature did not intend that the authority should try and decide “complicated” questions which should normally be heard by a civil Court. The jurisdiction of the authority although limited in extent was held to be exclusive. It was held that the Authority under the Wages Act cannot refuse to entertain the application for fixation of wages on the ground that there is a variance between the contract pleaded by the workman and the contract relied upon by the employer. Similarly, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gain Chand Isar Dass v. G. Key Industries, Amritsar, [1971 L.& I.C 1360], has held that all matters which are incidental to the determination of wages: which have been wrongly deducted or wages payment of which have been delayed can be settled and decided by the authority concerned.

14. At the risk of repetition it may be stated that the present case is purely a case where the employee has alleged a deduction from his wages which is denied by the employer and in the alternative it is said to be justified as authorised deduction. If in deciding this question some incidental questions have to be gone into, the complexion of the claim would not change so as to say that the Authority under the Wages Act has no jurisdiction to entertain it. The claim in the present case cannot be said to be maintainable under the provisions of any other Act so as to say that the proper course would have been to apply before that forum.

15. In order to show that a revision under S. 115 of Criminal Procedure Code is maintainable the petitioner has to satisfy the existence of the conditions enumerated in this provision. The authority in the present case has exercised jurisdiction vested in it by law and this exercise of jurisdiction cannot be said to be materially illegal or irregular merely because it has arrived at a particular conclusion. If the authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter then even an incorrect decision would not make it illegal exercise of jurisdiction. However, as I am satisfied that the decision of the authority as well as the learned District Judge does not deserve to be varied or reversed, I would like to endorse their view in my own way.

16. Section 23(2) of the Act provides for laying down the conditions of service and the remuneration to which an employee of the corporation shall be entitled. Regulation 24 provides for payment of the dearness and compensatory allowances at the rates admissible to the employees of the State Government from time to time (emphasis mine). By this regulation it is the corporation which has decided that the dearness allowance of the employees shall be at the same rate which is admissible to the employees of the State Government and it is not the State Government which has directed the corporation to pay clearness allowance to the employees of the corporation at the same rate which is admissible to the employees of the State Government. When the direction to pay dearness allowance at a particular rate cannot be said to be that of the State Government then the direction of the State Government to make the payment of the arrears of the dearness allowance not in cash but by way of deposit in the provident fund account of each employee cannot be said to be an order which has to be accepted as a condition precedent for paying the dearness allowance at a particular rate. Regulation 24 has provided for dearness allowance at the rate admissible to the employees of the State Government without providing for the manner in which this dearness allowance is to be paid. The Board of Directors of the corporation to whom the general superintendence and management of the affairs of the corporation have been entrusted are to exercise powers on business principles having regard to public interest and can even be guided by instructions on questions of policies as may be given to them by the State Government or the Central Warehousing Corporation. It is the decision of the Board of Directors which will apply to the employees of the corporation and not the decision of the State Government. In order to make a deduction authorised deduction under S. 7(2)(h) of the Wages Act, the deduction should be made by order of a Court or other authority competent to make such order. In the present case, the competent authority, can be Board of Directors which has not passed any order for the deduction of wages but it is the State Government which has passed the order which is not the competent authority under the Act or the regulations.

17. On the face of it this argument appears to be attractive that the employees of the State Government will have to forego the arrears of dearness allowance by getting them deposited in the general provident fund account while the employees of the corporation shall be getting, the same in cash and it may be said to be treating different employees differently. However, it may be mentioned that the provisions of Ss. 6 and 7 of the Wages Act are not applicable to employees of the State Government. Section 6 may be referred to again which provides for payment of all wages in current coin or in currency notes and not payment either by cheque or by crediting in the bank account of the employee. It can be said that the employees who are governed by the Wages Act cannot be paid wages in kind. Again S. 7 of the Wages Act provides for payment of wages without any deduction except those authorised under the Act. In Ss. 7(2)(k)7(2)(kk), 1(2)(kkk), 7(2)(p) the circumstances have been given where deduction with the written authorisation of the employed persons can be made. They are on account of premium of life insurance to the Life Insurance Corporation of India and contribution to any trade union or to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund or such other funds as the Central Government may by notification in the gazette specify. All these deductions can be made only on the written authorisation of the employed person. There is no provision for making any deduction for the purpose of depositing it in the account of the general provident fund of the employees. The petitioner-corporation could have justified the deduction only under S. 7(2)(h) of the Wages Act but when the deduction has not been required to be made by the authority competent to make such order then the deduction cannot be said to be an authorised deduction. When the amount has not been paid in the current coin or currency notes but has been deposited in the account of the employee which will be payable at a future date which may be the date of superannuation or some other date then this cannot be said to be payment in accordance with the provisions of the Wages Act.

18. The only case which may be said to have a bearing on the question which is under consideration is the case of Samir Kumar Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, [1974-II L.L.J 407], The petitioners in this case were employees of the Calcutta State Transport Corporation. Pay revision was made on the recommendation of a Pay Revision Committee and it was accepted by the respondent - Government. By means of a Government order it was ordered that arrears of wages need not be paid to worker in cash but should be credited in a special fund called retirement benefit fund. It was held that it was not the corporation which had decided or determined that the arrears be carried to any fund nor did the corporation decide about the application of such money. Referring to Ss. 29 and 34 of the Calcutta State Transport Corporation Act it was held that it does not authorise the Government to determine or decide what should be done under S. 29 and the Government could not direct deduction from any wages lawfully payable to the employees. This decision was taken in a writ petition and the question whether the Authority under the Wages Act had jurisdiction to entertain such an application did not arise. The learned counsel for the petitioner wants to press this decision into service in order to argue that the application under S. 15 was not maintainable but this is not the principle laid down in this case. The decision on merits of the claim has been followed by both the Courts below and as stated above I am in agreement with this view.

19. Merely because some union of the employees has filed a writ petition challenging the order of the State Government by which the direction has been given to deposit the arrears of dearness allowance in general provident fund account, the claim before the Authority under the Wages Act would not become non-maintainable.

20. These revisions have no force and are accordingly dismissed; parties are left to bear their own costs.

Rajasthan State Ware... v. Authority Appointed ...