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  • Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') Rule 16
  • provisions of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') Rule 16
  • provisions of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Sources: paragraphs 1–3 of the provided opinion.

On 3 June 1979 at about 9:30 A.M., the claimant's truck (RJQ 9681) was standing outside his godown in village Fidusar on the Jodhpur–Jaisalmer Road. A military truck (No. 281/74F 1010) with a trailer (No. 7552490H), travelling from the Jodhpur side at excessive speed, struck the claimant's stationary truck. The collision caused serious damage to the claimant's vehicle (axle, shaft, back-side body damaged; three tyres damaged; chassis slightly bent). The claimant incurred repair expenses of Rs. 9,171.60 and claimed Rs. 5,600 for loss of income for 56 days (at Rs. 100 per day), totalling Rs. 14,771 as damages.

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur found that the non-claimant driver drove in a rash and negligent manner and caused damage. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 9,234 for repairs and Rs. 1,700 for loss of business (truck idle for one month and 26 days), totalling Rs. 10,934, with interest at 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition.

Aggrieved, the non-claimants — Union of India and the driver Ram Kripal Singh — filed the present appeal against the Tribunal's award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the military vehicle's operation amounted to a "sovereign function" such that the Union of India would be immune from liability for the collision (i.e., whether sovereign immunity applies).
  2. Whether negligence for the accident was attributable to the military driver (and/or whether negligence was shared or not established).
  3. Whether the claimant sufficiently proved the quantum of damages (vouchers/evidence) and the proper standard of proof applicable before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
  4. Whether compensation for loss of business / future loss of income (future earnings) arising from damage to the vehicle is recoverable under the Motor Vehicles Act (scope of Section 110 and related provisions).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Union of India & driver Ram Kripal Singh)

  • The military truck was operating in discharge of a sovereign function, which should absolve the Union of India from liability for the accident.
  • Negligence in the accident is not attributable solely to the appellants; therefore, the appellants should not be held fully liable.
  • The claimant failed to prove the vouchers and proof of damage to the truck; only vouchers 1 to 5 were proved, while vouchers 6 to 14 were not proved, rendering the damage assessment incorrect.
  • The claimant is not entitled to compensation for future loss of income (loss of business) resulting from the accident.

Respondent's Arguments (Claimant)

  • Strict formal proof of each voucher is not required in proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal; tribunals conduct inquiries and may apply a relaxed standard of proof.
  • Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 permits the Tribunal to record summaries of witness evidence and supports the practical, less formal approach to proof in tribunal proceedings.
  • The claimant produced vouchers and witness evidence (PW 5 and others) showing repairs and purchases; requiring shopkeepers for every voucher would frustrate the tribunal's function.
  • The Tribunal properly awarded compensation for future loss of earning (loss of business), relying on a broad reading of Section 110 and Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act to include such damages as "damage to property" or consequential loss.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pushpa Thakar v. Union of India, 1984 ACJ 559 Used to address the sovereign-function immunity argument raised by Union of India. The court referred to this Supreme Court authority to reject the appellant's plea that the accident took place while discharging a sovereign function; the sovereign-function defence was not accepted in the present case.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Gauri Shanker Sharma & Ors., 1985 ACJ 734 Authority for the principle that Tribunal proceedings are inquisitorial/inquiry-oriented and need not adhere to strict rules of evidence. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that strict legal proof is not required in Tribunal proceedings and that a preponderance-based, pragmatic approach to vouchers and evidence is appropriate.
Smt. Gunwat Kumar & Ors. v. Sardar Sandhu Singh & Ors., AIR 1987 1020 Same evidentiary principle: Tribunal need not follow strict rules of evidence in assessing claims. The court relied on this authority alongside New India Assurance to justify a relaxed standard of proof and the Tribunal's practice of recording brief memoranda of witness testimony under Rule 16.
Raj Kumar v. Mahendra Singh & Ors., ACJ 1985 Page 103 Interpreting Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act: the M.P. High Court held that the Tribunal can only award compensation for death, bodily injury and damage to property (excluding loss of business). The court expressly disagreed with the M.P. High Court's narrow interpretation in Raj Kumar, holding that future earnings/loss of business fall within the broad ambit of "damage to property" and that Section 110 should be given a wide, remedial construction to benefit accident victims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

This section summarizes the court's step-by-step legal analysis as stated in the opinion.

  1. Sovereign-function defence: The court considered and rejected the Union of India's submission that the military truck was operating in discharge of a sovereign function and thus immune. The court relied on the Supreme Court authority Pushpa Thakar v. Union of India (1984 ACJ 559) and concluded that the sovereign-function plea could not be accepted in the present facts.
  2. Negligence and attribution of fault: The court reviewed the factual record and the Tribunal's finding that the military truck driver was rash and negligent. The court observed:
    • The claimant's truck was standing away from the main road; there was sufficient road space; the military truck was carrying a tank.
    • If the military driver had been careful (slowed down and been vigilant in a populated area), the accident could likely have been avoided.
    • The military truck did not display red flags when passing with the tank (as submitted would normally be done), and the claimant's stationary truck was struck and dragged 30–50 ft.
    On these factual points, the court found the military driver negligent and rejected the appellant's contention that the accident was inevitable or that the driver was not at fault.
  3. Standard of proof and vouchers: Addressing the appellant's challenge to the claimant's vouchers (claimed that only vouchers 1–5 were proved and vouchers 6–14 were not), the court endorsed a pragmatic evidentiary approach for Motor Accident Claims Tribunals:
    • The court invoked Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964, which contemplates brief memoranda of witness evidence and indicates that medical evidence be taken down verbatim.
    • The court relied on appellate authorities (New India Assurance; Smt. Gunwat Kumar) holding that tribunals conduct inquiries and that strict legal proof is not required.
    • The court explained the impracticality of calling numerous shopkeepers to prove each voucher and stressed tribunal prudence in assessing vouchers and the preponderance of probabilities; unless vouchers were shown to be fabricated or unnecessary, they need not be rejected in whole.
    • Accordingly, the court overruled the objection to the claimant's vouchers and accepted that the claimant had produced relevant vouchers and evidence to establish repairs and purchases associated with the accident.
  4. Credit for replaced old parts: The Tribunal had allowed a rebate of Rs. 60 when new parts were fitted. The appellate court considered what credit should be given for the benefit derived from old parts that were replaced. The appellate court held that when new parts replace old ones, a sufficient credit must be given for the benefit of the old parts; the court decided that one-third (1/3rd) of the total should be allowed as credit. The opinion records a reduction in the amount of Rs. 5,160 by giving a 1/3rd credit to reach Rs. 4,634 (the opinion states these figures as the court's calculation and adjustment).
  5. Compensation for future loss of income (loss of business): The court considered the submission based on Raj Kumar (M.P. High Court) that tribunals cannot award compensation for loss of business under Section 110-D. The appellate court rejected that narrow interpretation:
    • The court held Section 110 should be given a wide and comprehensive meaning because it is remedial/social legislation intended to benefit victims of motor accidents.
    • The court reasoned "damage to property" has a wide amplitude and that future earnings (recurring income the owner would have earned but for the damage) constitute "property in future" and thus fall within the scope of damage recoverable by the Tribunal.
    • The court referred to Section 110-F as indicating the Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction over motor accident claims, cautioning against multiplicity of proceedings if claims for consequential or future losses had to be litigated elsewhere.
    • On that basis, the court agreed with the Tribunal's award of Rs. 1,700 for loss of business and refused to accept the appellant's contention that such future loss is not compensable.
  6. Conclusion of quantum and outcome: After adjusting the repairs award by the one-third credit for old parts, and upholding the Tribunal's award for loss of business, the appellate court concluded with a revised monetary determination reflected in the final decree (see Holding below).

Holding and Implications

Final decision and immediate consequences as stated in the opinion.

Core holding: The appeal is partly allowed and the claimant's claim is decreed to the extent of Rs. 7,860/-. The claimant shall also be entitled to interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition. No costs.

Immediate implications for the parties

  • The Union of India and the driver were not absolved by a sovereign-function defence; liability was maintained to the extent reflected in the final monetary decree.
  • The claimant recovers Rs. 7,860 plus interest at 9% p.a. from the date the claim petition was filed; no costs were awarded.
  • The Tribunal's evidentiary practices (relaxed standard of proof, pragmatic assessment of vouchers under Rule 16) were endorsed; the court overruled the appellants' objections to the vouchers.
  • The court accepted an award for future loss of earning (loss of business) as compensable under Section 110 when read broadly; the court explicitly disagreed with the narrower interpretation in Raj Kumar (M.P. High Court).

Broader legal implications (as articulated in the opinion)

The court advocated a wide and remedial interpretation of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to include future earnings as part of "damage to property" and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings (referring also to Section 110-F which limits civil court jurisdiction). The opinion thus signals a willingness to allow reasonable awards for future loss of income in motor accident claims and to apply a practical evidentiary approach in Tribunal proceedings. The opinion does not formally state that it establishes a binding new precedent; it records its disagreement with the M.P. High Court's narrower view and applies existing Supreme Court authority and Tribunal rules in support of its conclusions.


End of summary. This document strictly summarizes only the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Union Of India (Uoi) v. Ratan Lal

    1. This is an appeal against the award of the Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur dated 13-10-82.

    2. The brief facts, giving rise to this appeal are that on 3rd June, 1979 at about 930 A.M. claimant's truck RJQ 9681 was standing outside his godown in village Fidusar on Jodhpur Jaisalmer Road. At that time, truck No. 281/74F 1010 alongwith trailer No. 7552490H came with an excessive speed in a rash and negligent manner from Jodhpur side and struck against the truck of the claimant and as a result of this the truck of the claimant was damaged. On account of the accident the excel, shaft and back side body of the the truck was seriously damaged. Three tyres of the truck were also damages. Chesis also got little bend. Claimant suffered hige and he got his transport repaired for that he had to pay a sum of Rs. 9171 60 The claimant claimed a sum of Rs. 5600/- for period 3rd June, 79 to 28th July, 1979 when the truck remains unserviceble for a period of 56 days. The daily income by the truck was Rs. 100/- therefore, a sum of Rs. 5600/- was claimed for loss of income. Thus Rs. 14,771/- was claimed as damages. The truck was driven by the driver Ram Kripal Singh, who was in the service of non-claimant No. 2. The learned Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur after considering over the matter, came to the conclusion that non-claimant driver drove the truck in rash and negligent manner and caused damages to the truck of the claimant. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to the damages to the extent of money spent by him for repairing the truck. On this head the amount of compensation was quantified to the extent of Rs. 9,234/- which was caused on account of the accident. The truck remained idle for a month and 26 days, therefore, the learned Judge, awarded Rs. 1700/- for loss of business to the claimant on account of truck being remained idle. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 10,934/- was awarded as a compensation with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the filing of the claim petition till realisation.

    3. Aggrieved against this, the non- claimants Union of India and Ram Kripal Singh, driver have filed the present appeal.

    4. I have heard both the learned Counsel at length. Mr. Sisodia, learned Counsel for the appellant, strenuously urged that the accident took place by the military truck of the appellant in discharge of sovereign function, therefore, the claimant is not entitled to any compensation against the appellant. This application of the learned Counsel cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in somewhat identical situation their lordships of Supreme Court have not accepted the argument in the matter of such accident. In the present situation, the plea of sovereign function cannot be accepted. Reference in this connection may be made to Pushpa Thakar v. Union of India 1984 ACJ 559. In view of this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the contention of the sovereign function cannot be accepted.

    5. Learned Counsel has contended that negligence in the present case is not attributable to appellant alone, therefore, the Union of India and the, driver Ram Kripal Singh cannot be made liable.

    6. I have considered this argument of learned Counsel and perused the evidence on record and the finding given by the Tribunal. The very fact that the truck was catrying a tank alongwith it and there was sufficient space on road. If the driver of the military truck was little careful then perhaps he would have avoided the accident. The truck of the claimant was standing away from the main road. The plea of the driver that since there was a small passage and a truck from opposite direction was coming therefore, in order to avoid that the later struck against the stationary truck of the claimant. The accident was inevitable and there was no negligence on the part of the military truck driver. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned Counsel. Since the driver of the military truck knew very well that the truck is already standing then in that case he should have slowed down his speed and he should have been more vigilant while passing through the populated area. Mr. Jasmatia has submitted that as a matter of fact when the military truck passed alongwith the tank then normally they fly red flags so that the incoming traffic would have sufficient notice. That was not done in the present case. Moreover the truck of the claimant was not standing on the main road but it was standing away from the road and as such the stationary truck was hit by the military truck and was dragged to 30 to 50 ft. Thus, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the driver of the truck was not negligent and negligence is not attributable to him.

    7. Mr. Sisodia has submitted that the claimant has failed to prove the vouchers nor damage to the truck. Mr. Sisodia invited my attention to the statement of PW 1 Ram Pal Singh He has also submitted that only voucher 1 to 5 have been proved but rest of the vouchers 6 to 14 have not been proved. Therefore, the assessment of damages on the basis of these vouchers is not correct.

    8. Mr. Jasmatia learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that in a case like the present one before the Tribunal a strict proof is not required. Mr. Jasmatiya submitted that strict principle of proof cannot be made applicable to these proceedings. In this connection, learned Counsel has invited my attention to Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') Rule 16 reads as under:

    Method of recording evidence.

    The claims Tribunal shall as examination of witness proceeds make brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of such witness and such memorandum shall be written and signed by members of the Claims Tribunal and shall form part of the record; provided that the evidence of any medical witness shall be taken down as nearly as may be word for word.

    9. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that as a matter of fact before these tribunals strict rule of evidence should not be adhered to as the Tribunal is to make the enquiry for assessing the amount of compensation. The learned Counsel for the appellant has invited my attention to New India Assurance Company Ltd. and Ors. v. Gauri Shanker Sharma and Ors. 1985 ACJ 734 and Smt. Gunwat Kumar and Ors. v. Sardar Sandhu Singh and Ors. AIR 1987 1020. In both these cases it has been observed that the Tribunal has to make enquiry only. Therefore, the strict rule of evidence should not be adhered to. Rule 16 also lays down that the Tribunals should examine the witnesses and make a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of such witnesses. Therefore, in this view of the matter, the strict principle of legal proof is not required to be adhered to in the enquiries conducted by the Tribunal. All that Tribunals have to see that whether the damages suffered has been established by producing necessary vouchers or not, Tribunal has to see prepondrance of probability in each case.

    10. Now coming to the case in hand PW 5 claimant has produced vouchers, showing the damage to his truck and the goods purchased by him from various shops. If the strict proof is required then each voucher will be proved by calling the person from where the particular part of the vehicles were purchased. If this process is adopted then perhaps the very purpose of establishing the Tribunal would be frustrated and it will take months to examine 10 to 20 shopkeepers to prove each individual vouchers. Thus, the Tribunal has to use its prudence to judge the damages with reference to the vouchers produced before the Tribunal In case vouchers which have been found to be got up and if it is found that parts which have been purchased for the damaged vehicle Were not required then of course, the Tribunal can reject the claim to the extent of that part It is a matter of appreciation only, therefore, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. In the present case petitioner has produced vouchers for the part which were purchased and replaced by the claimant. The claimant instead of proving each voucher by calling the shopkeeper from whom part was puchased has proved by his evidence only. It has not been shown that how part were not required in present. Thus, in this view of the matter I overrule the objection of Mr. Sisodia.

    11. Next question arises for the consideration is when the old parts were replaced by the new one's then what credit be given for replacement of new parts. In the present case the Tribunal has given a rebate of Rs. 60/-. As a matter of fact when the new parts are being replaced on account of the accident and in that case it cannot be said that the owner of the vehicle has used the old parts and has availed their benefits and new parts are being replaced for this damaged one then a sufficient credit has to be given for that purpose. Therefore, I think l/3rd of the total amount should be given a credit to the appellant and I reduce the amount Rs. 5160/- by giving l/3rd credit to the appellant to Rs. 4634/-.

    12. Mr. Sisodia has urged that the claimant is not entitled for a future loss of income arising out of the present accident.

    13. The Tribunal has awarded under this head a compensation to the extent of Rs. 1700/-. In this connection Mr. Sisodia has invited my attention to Raj Kumar v. Mahendra Singh and Ors. ACJ 1985 Page 103 In this case the division bench of M.P. High Court has interpreted the provisions of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and held that the tribunal is only entitled to grant compensation in respect of (i) death (ii) bodily injury and (iii) damage to property. As such loss of the business can not be compensated. Therefore, this claim cannot be entertained. With great respect I do not agree with the view taken by the M.P. High Court. It may not be lost sight of that legislature in its wisdom has thought it proper to draft Section 110 for purpose of giving benefit to the victims of the Motor accidents. It will not be proper to circumscribe the scope of Section 110 by narrow interpretation. It is a social legislation for the benefit of the public at large and it should be interpreted in a more wider and comprehensive manner so as to give relief to the victims and not to debar them. The expression damage to property is of very wide amplitude. Though the future earning cannot be said to be ascertained sum. But it is a property in future which the owner of the damaged vehicle would have earned out of this track, if this vehicle has not been damaged. Thus his recurring income has been lost on account of this damage and how can this be deprived to owner of vehicle. In this connection, the reference may be made to Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act which have the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, meaning thereby that all the claims arising out the motor accidents should be disposed of by the Tribunal only. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court has been bared. It would mean that part of the claim is to be raised before Tribunal and for remaining the incumbent has to take recourse to the civil courts then this will give rise to multiplicity of the proceedings. Thus, the scope of Section 110 is wide enough to include the future earning as a damage to the future property of the claimant.

    14. In this view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sisodia. The Tribunal has already awarded a sum of Rs. 1700/- for future loss of earning and rightly so.

    15. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed and claim of the appellant is decreed to the extent of Rs. 7860/-. The claimant shall also be entitled to the interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition. No costs.

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    Comments

    Union Of India (Uoi) v. Ratan Lal
    (Mar 18, 1987)