1. These three writ petitions raise common questions for consideration and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a common order.
2. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board, respondent in these writ petitions (hereinafter referred to as the Board) is a State Electricity Board constituted under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Section 11 of the Apprentices Act), 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Apprentices Act, imposes an obligation on every employer to engage apprentices and to provide training to them in his trade in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and the rules made thereunder. In pursuance of the said obligation, the Board has been engaging trade apprentices for imparting training in various trades. The Board issued an advertisement in the year 1977 inviting applications for apprenticeship training and in response to the said advertisement the petitioners submitted their applications and they were selected. Thereafter, the petitioners were engaged as trade apprentices in different trades in January/February 1978, and the period of training was three years and in the first year of training they were to be paid Rs. 130 per month, in the second year, they were to be paid Rs. 143 per month and in the third year they were to be paid Rs. 150 par month. The petitioners were also required to sign a contract of apprenticeship and each of them signed the said contract. In the contract, it was provided that it shall not be obligatory on the part of the Board to offer any employment to the apprentice on completion of the period of his apprenticeship training in its establishment nor shall it bs obligatory on the part of the apprentice to accept an employment under the employer. Under the Apprentices Act and the Apprentices Rules, 1963, framed under the Apprentices Act (hereinafter referred to as the Apprentices Rules), an apprentice is required to pass the test conducted by the National Council for Training in Vocational Trades. Although the three years' apprenticeship training period of the petitioner expired in January/February 1981, they were continued as apprentice-trainees beyond that period because the All India Trade Test was delayed and was held in April 1981. The result of the said test was declared on 23 June 1981. Thereafter an order, dated 9 July 1981, was passed by the Assistant Engineer of the Board whereby the services of Brij Mohan (petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1178 of 1981) and Vijendra (petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 11???7 of 1981), were discontinued with effect from 9 July 1981. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, dated 9 July 1981, the said petitioners have filed Writ Petition Nos. 1178 and 1177, respectively. In so far as Hanuman Prasad Choudhary and Prem Narain (petitioners in S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 722 of 1981) are concerned, the said petitioners approached the Court on 30 April 1981, with the allegation that although they had not been served with the order terminating their services, but the Board was likely to consider that the said petitioners are deemed to be relieved from service from 30 April 1981, and the said petitioners have prayed that an appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued restraining the Board from terminating the services of the petitioners as trade apprentices and that the Board may be directed to fix the petitioners in the regular pay-scale No. 2 with effect from the date on which they successfully qualified the prescribed test. These writ petitions have been contested by the Board and the Board has filed a reply to the same.
3. The first contention that has been urged by Sri Kuhad, the learned counsel for the petitioners in all these writ petitions, was that the petitioners were workmen under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Disputes Act), and that they are entitled to the protection of the said Act. Sri Kuhad has submitted that the termination of the services of the petitioners amounts to retrenchment under S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the said retrenchment has been done in violation of the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sri Gupta and Sri Rastogi, the learned counsel for the Board, have, however, submitted that the petitioners cannot invoke the protection of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, since they are not workmen under S. 2(s) of the said Act. In view of the aforesaid submissions urged by the learned counsel, the question which needs to be determined is as to whether the petitioners fail within the ambit of the definition of “workman” as contained in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:
“2(s) ‘workman’ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge, or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person—
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1954 (34 of 1954); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”
4. At this stage reference may also be made to the relevant provisions of the Apprentices Act. The expression “apprentice” has been defined in S. 2(aa) of the said Act as under:
“‘apprentice’ means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship.”
5. Section 18 of the Apprentices Act expressly lays down that the apprentices are trainees and not workers and provides as under:
“18. Apprentices are trainees and not workers.— Save as otherwise provided in this Act,—
(a) every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in an establishment shall be a trainee and not a worker; and
(b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice.”
6. In S. 22 it is provided as under:
“22. Offer and acceptance of employment.— (1) It shall not be obligatory in the part of the employer to offer any employment to any apprentice who has completed the period of his apprenticeship training in his establishment, nor shall it be obligatory on the part of the apprentice to accept an employment under the employer.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-sec. (1), where there is a condition in a contract of apprenticeship that the apprentice shall, after the successful completion of the apprenticeship training, serve the employer, the employer shall, on such completion, be bound to offer suitable employment to the apprentice, and the apprentice shall be bound to serve the employer in that capacity for such period and on such remuneration as may be specified in the contract
Provided that where such period or remuneration is not, in the opinion of the Apprenticeship Adviser, reasonable, he may revise such period or remuneration so as to make it reasonable, and the period of remuneration so revised shall be deemed to be the period or remuneration agreed to between the apprentice and the employer.”
7. Sri Kuhad has submitted that apprentices have been expressly included within the definition of workman and, therefore, apprentices under the Apprentices Act have to be treated as workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection, Sri Kuhad has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company, Ltd. [1975—II L.L.N 498].
8. In Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company, Ltd. [1975—II L.L.N 498] (vide supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether an apprentice is an “employee” as the said expression is defined in S. 2(9) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court after examining the scheme of the Apprentices Act as well as the Employees' State Insurance Act, has held that an apprentice is not an employee under S. 2(9) of the Employees,' state Insurance Act. In the said case, the Supreme Court has observed as under in Para. 7, at page 500:
“The heart of the matter in apprenticeship is, therefore, the dominant object and intent to impart on the part of the employer and to accept on the part of the other person learning under certain agreed terms. That certain payment is made during the apprenticeship, by whatever name called, and that the apprentice has to be under certain rules of discipline do convert the apprentice to a regular employee under the employer. Such a person remains a learner and is not an employee. An examination of the provisions of the entire agreement leads us to the conclusion that the principal object with which the parties enter into an agreement of apprenticeship was offering by the employer an opportunity to learn the trade or craft and the other person to acquire such theoretical or practical knowledge that may be obtained in the course of the training. This is the primary feature that is obvious in the agreement.”
9. After referring to the definition of apprentice, as contained in the Apprentices Act, the Supreme Court has observed in Para. 8, at page 501:
“It is, therefore, inherent in the word ‘apprentice’ that there is no element of employment as such in a trade or industry but only an adequate well-guarded provision for training to enable the trainee after completion of his course to be suitably absorbed in earning employment as a regular worker. The fact that a trainee may have been absorbed in the company where he is undergoing the training, is not relevant for toe purpose of comprehending the content of the term.”
5. The Supreme Court has further observed in Para. 12, at pages 501 and 502:
“From the terms of the agreement it is clear that apprentices are mere trainees for a particular period for a distinct purpose and the employer is not bound to employ them in their works after the period of training is over. During the apprenticeship they cannot be said to be employed in the work of the company or in connection with the work of the company. That would have been so if they were employed in a regular way by the company. On the other hand, the purpose of the engagement under the particular scheme is only to offer training under certain terms and conditions. Besides, the apprentices are not given wages within the meaning of that term under the Act. If they were regular employees under the Act, they would have been entitled to additional remunerations such as daily allowance and other allowances which are available to the regular employees. We are, therefore, unable to hold that an apprentice is an employee within the meaning of S. 2(9) of the Act.”
In the said decision, the Supreme Court has taken note of S. 18 of the Apprentices Act as well as the definition of workman contained in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Supreme Court has also pointed out the distinction between the definition of “workman” as contained in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the definition of “employee” as contained in S. 2(9) of the Employees' State Insurance Act and has observed that it was open to the Legislature to enlarge the definition of the word “employee” to include an apprentice but the Legislature did not choose to do so.
10. In view of the aforesaid decision, Sri Kuhad has submitted that even though there is no element of employment present in the contract of apprenticeship, but it was permissible for the Legislature to enlarge the definition of “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act to include an apprentice and that in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Legislature has enlarged the definition of “workman” by expressly including an apprentice.
11. In my opinion, the definition of “workman” as contained in S.???(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be read in isolation and while construing the said provision, one cannot loss sight of the provisions contained in S. 18 of the Apprentices Act. The provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act were substituted by the industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1956. The Apprentices Act was enacted by Parliament thereafter. In S. 18 of the Apprentices Act, it has been expressly laid down that save as otherwise provided in the said Act, every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in an establishment shall be a trainee and not a worker. The said section further lays down that the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice. This would show that in S. 18 of the Apprentices Act the Parliament has unequivocally declared that a person who is an apprentice under the Apprentices Act is not a worker and the provisions of any law in respect of labour shall not apply to such a person. Industrial Disputes Act, is undoubtedly a law with respect to labour inasmuch as it has been enacted for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes mentioned therein. This would imply that in view of S. 18 of the Apprentices Act, provisions of Industrial Disputes Act would not apply to the persons who are apprentices under the Apprentices Act. It would thus appear that there is apparent conflict between the provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and S. 18 of the Apprentices Act inasmuch as S. 2(s) postulates that an apprentice is a workman to whom the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act would be applicable whereas S. 18 of the Apprentices Act declares that an apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act is not to be treated as a workman and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable to him. In my view, this conflict between the provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and S. 18 of the Apprentices Act can be resolved by applying the principle of harmonious construction so that each provision may operate without encroaching on the held of the other.
12. The Apprentices Act it not an exhaustive Act to cover all types of apprentices because in view of the definition of the term “apprentice” as contained in S. 2(aa) of the Apprentices Act, it is applicable only to persons who are undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of the contract of the Apprentices Act executed under S. 4 of the said Act. It is possible to visualise persons who may be engaged as apprentices out who are not covered by the Apprentices Act. In this connection reference may be made to the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Technical workmen Service Regulations, 1975. In the said regulations, the term “workman” has been defined in regulation 3(i) to include an apprentice. Regulation 5 contains the classification of the various types of workman governed by these regulations and in Cl. (vi) of regulation 5, the apprentice has been defined as under:
“(vi) Apprentice: A learner, who is or is not paid an allowance during the period of his training including an apprentice under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961.”
13. This would show that an apprentice who is a workman under the said regulations would include a person who may not be an apprentice under the Apprentices Act. In that view of the matter, it can be said that for the purpose of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act a person who is designated as apprentice but is not governed by the Apprentices Act would be a workman governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But an apprentice who is governed by the provisions of the Apprentices Act, would not be a workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and would not be governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
14. Apart from the aforesaid principle of harmonious construction, the conflict between the provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and S. 18 of the Apprentices Act can also be resolved by applying tae principle of statutory interpretation that the operation of a prior general law may be curtailed by a subsequent particular law. The Industrial Disputes Act is a general law applicable to all categories of workmen whereas the Apprentices Act is a particular law enacted with special reference to apprentices. The definition of workman in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act was enacted in 1956 whereas the Apprentices Act was enacted in 1961. Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is thus the prior general law and S. 18 of the Apprentices Act is a subsequent particular law. The provisions of S. 18 of the Apprentices Act will, therefore, prevail over the provisions contained in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act relating to apprentices and an apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act cannot be regarded as a workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
15. It is true that in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company, Ltd. [1975—II L.L.N 498] (vide supra), the Supreme Court has referred to the inclusive definition of workman contained in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and has pointed out that apprentice has been expressly included in the said definition. But in the said case, the Supreme Court has not considered the definition of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act in conjunction with the provisions of S. 18 of the Apprentices Act. In that case, the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the question as to whether an apprentice could be regarded as an “employee” under S. 2(9) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The aforesaid decision cannot be read as laying down that in spite of the provisions of S. 18 of the Apprentices Act, an apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act is to be treated as a workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It must, therefore, be concluded that an apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act is not a workman for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable to him.
16. Sri Kuhad has next submitted that even if an apprentice under the Apprentices Act is not to be regarded as a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioners were workman under the Industrial Disputes Act because on the date of the passing of the impugned order terminating their services the petitioners has ceased to be apprentices and had become regular employees of the Board. In this connection, the submission of Sri Kuhad was that under the contract of apprenticeship the period of training was three years which expired in January February 1981 and that in spite of the completion of the aforesaid period of apprenticeship the petitioners were paid their emoluments till the passing of the impugned order and this would mean that the relationship of master and servant came into existence between the petitioners and the Board after the termination of the contract of apprenticeship in January/February 1981. In my opinion, there is no substance in the aforesaid contention. It is true that under the contract of apprenticeship the period of apprenticeship training of the petitioners was three years from the date of joining and that the said period of three years expired in January/February 1981. But under S. 7 of the Apprentices Act it is laid down that the contract of apprenticeship shall terminate on the expiry of the period of apprenticeship training. Provision with regard to the period of apprenticeship training is made in S. 6 of the Apprentices Act. In Sub-secs. (a), (aa) and (b) of S. 6 the period of apprenticeship training for various categories of trade apprentices is prescribed and in respect of the trade apprentices who are not covered by Sub-secs. (a) and (aa) provision is made in Sub-sec. (b) of S. 6 which lays down that the period of apprenticeship training for such trade apprenticeship shall be such as may be prescribed. The term “prescribed” has been defined in S. 2(m) of the Apprentices Act to mean prescribed by rules made under the said Act. Since the petitioners are not covered by Sub-secs. (a) and (aa) their case is covered by Sub-sec. (b) of S. 6 and the period of apprenticeship training in their case was to be as may be prescribed in the rules made under the Apprentices Act. Provisions with regard to apprenticeship training for trade apprentices is contained in rule 5 of the Apprentices Rules. sub-rule (1) of rule 5 prescribed the period for apprenticeship training in the various trades and for the trades for which the petitioners were engaged as apprentices, the said period is three years. Sub-rule (2) of rule 5 reads as under:
“Where a trade apprentice is unable to complete the full apprenticeship course within the period prescribed in sub-rule (1) or to take the final test owing to illness or other circumstances beyond his control the establishment concerned shall extend the period of his apprenticeship until the next test is held if so required by the Apprenticeship Adviser. Similar extension of the period of training may also be allowed in the case of those trade apprentices who having completed the course, fail in the final test. A trade apprentice who fails in the second test shall not be allowed any extension of the period of training.”
17. The aforesaid sub-rule postulates that in cases where a trade apprentice is unable to complete full apprenticeship course within the period prescribed in sub-rule (1) or to take the final test owing to illness or other circumstances beyond his control, the establishment concerned shall extent the period of apprenticeship until he completes the full apprenticeship course and the next test is held, if so required by the Apprentice ship Adviser and that a similar extension of the period of training may also be allowed in the case of those trade apprentices who having completed the course, fail in the final test, and that the extension would not be allowed to a trade apprentice who fails in the second test. In other words, Sub-rule (2) of rule 5 postulates that the period of apprenticeship will be continued till the trainee appears in the final test and the result is declared and in case he fails in the said test, the said period can be extended till he appears in second test. In the present case, even though three years' period of apprenticeship training expired in January/February 1981, the final test was held only in the month of April 1981 and the result was declared on 23 June 1981. The period of apprenticeship training of the petitioners could, therefore, be said to continue till the result was declared on 23 June 1981. Shortly thereafter the order, dated 9 July 1981, was passed whereby Brij Mohan and Vijendra Singh (petitioners in S. B Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1178 and 1177 of 1981) were informed that their apprenticeship had been discontinued. In so, far as Hanuman Prasad and Prem Narain (Petitioner in S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 722 of 1981) are concerned, the said petitioners approached this Court on 30 April 1981, before the result of the final test was declared. It cannot, therefore, be said that the relationship of master and servant had come into existence between the petitioners and the Board as a result of payment of the allowance to them after the expiry of the period of three years of the apprenticeship training as mentioned in the contract of apprenticeship. The petitioners cannot, therefore, be treated as workman of the Board.
18. Since the petitioners were not workmen under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, they cannot invoke protection of S. 25-F of the said Act and the impugned orders cannot be assailed on the ground that the same were passed in contravention of the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The first contention urged by Sri Kuhad is, therefore, rejected.
19. The second contention urged by Sri Kuhad was that the petitioners were entitled to be absorbed in Board's service in regular pay-scale No. 2 on satisfactory and successful completion of their apprenticeship as per prescribed period and the prescribed examination/test in the very first attempt, in view of Para. 22 of the Arbitration Award, dated 15 June 1979, given by Sarvasri Prithvi Singh and A.L Kencheti as Arbitrators made under S. 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this context, it may be mentioned that by an agreement, dated 19 December 1977, made between the Board and the General Secretary, Prantiya Vidyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation, the following matters under dispute were referred to the Arbitrators under S. 10-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(1) To decide the principles to regulate fixation/adjustment/promotion of all technical workmen of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board in respect of the following periods:
(i) From 1 April 1968 to 31 March 1977, who have completed a continuous service of two years or more by 31 March 1977.
(ii) In respect of all the technical workmen from 1 April 1977 and onwards.
(2) To decide/frame the procedure regulations for recruitment and promotion of all technical workmen to come into force with effect from 1 April 1977.”
In Para. 22 of the award the Arbitrators considered the cases of apprentices/trainees and the relevant portion of the said paragraph on which reliance has been placed by Sri Kuhad is as under:
(iii) In respect of such of the apprentices as bad not obtained I.T.I certificate but had been taken at apprentices under the Apprentices Act, 1961, for both the plant and institutional training may be continued in the Board's service by allowing regular pay-scale No. 2 on satisfactory and successful completion of the apprenticeship as per prescribed period and the prescribed examination/tests in the very first attempt. Allowing of pay-scale No. 2 would commence from the date he is declared successful in the prescribed examination/tests It is to prescribe that such fixation shall be in addition to the posts in pay-scale No. 2 created or to be created as up to 31 March 1979, on the basis of norms as referred to herein and that they should be taken as a leave reserve and/or taken into consideration in fixing the nucleus of the E.H.T Wing provided they have been in the E.H.T trade. It is further prescribed that in the direct recruitment quota for the pay-scale No. 3, these persons may be made eligible to compete irrespective of minimum prescribed by the management for regulating promotion from pay-scale No. 2 to pay-scale No. 3. In addition to this, the treatment prescribed at (ii) above is to be extended to this category also.”
20. Sri Kuhad has submitted that this award made by the Arbitrators on a reference under S. 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on the Board and in terms of Para. 22(iii) of the award, the petitioners are entitled to be absorbed in the service of the Board in regular pay-scale No. 2 because they had completed the apprenticeship satisfactorily and successfully and have also passed the prescribed examination/tests in the very first attempt. Sri H.P Gupta and Sri H, C. Rastogi, the learned counsel for the Board have, however, submitted that the aforesaid part of Para. 22 of the award relating to apprentice, governed by the Apprentices Act, is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the apprentices governed by the Apprentices Act were not workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and their cases were not covered by the disputes referred to the Arbitrators. I find considerable force in the aforesaid submission urged by the learned counsel for the Board. Since I have already held that apprentices governed by the Apprentices Act, are not workmen under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, no industrial dispute relating to such apprentices could be raised under S. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the case of such apprentices cannot be said to be covered by the disputes which were referred to the Arbitrators under S. 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In making the award in relation to the apprentices governed by the Apprentices Act, the Arbitrators exceeded the juisdiction that was vested in them by virtue of the reference made to them under S. 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and the said part of the award cannot have binding force under the Industrial Disputes Act and the petitioners cannot claim any enforceable rights on the basis of the afore-said award made by the Arbitrators.
21. Sri Kuhad has lastly contended that the Board has acted arbitrarily in the matter of terminating the services of the apprentices after completion of the period of apprenticeship and that certain apprentices have been allowed to continue, whereas, services of the petitioners have been discontinued. In this connection, Sri Kuhad has invited my attention to the additional affidavit of Vijendra Singh filed in S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 1177 of 1981, wherein it has been stated that by order, dated 10 August 1981, passed by the Assistant Engineer (O. and M.), R.S.E.B, Sri Madhopur, the services of one Pokbarmal, apprentice, have been restored on the basis of the order, dated 25 July 1981, whereby the Personnel Officer (S.C) of the Board at Sikar informed the Assistant Engineer that order, dated 20 November 1980, does not apply to apprentices in his sub-division and that action should be taken under the order of the Director of Personnel, dated 18 February 1981. A reply has been filed on behalf of the Board to the aforesaid additional affidavit of Vijendra Singh, in the said reply, it has been stated that the order, dated 10 August 1981, has been passed by the Assistant Engineer (O. and M.), R.S.E.B Sri Madhopur, by mistake inasmuch as he has misinterpreted the letter, dated 25 July 1981. In the said reply it has been further stated that by letter, dated 25 July 1981, sent by the Personnel Officer to the Assistant Engineer, it vas made clear that the order, dated 20 November 1981, does not apply to apprentices including Pokharmal and that action was required to be taken under Order No. 224, dated 18 February 1981 of the Director of Personnel of the Board, Jaipur. In the said reply it war further stated that under order, dated 18 February 1981, it vas made clear that training period of apprentices vas extended up to 30 April 1981, since the apprentices were required to appear in the National Trade Test Examination which was to be held in the month of April 1981 and that in view of the said order, the Assistant Engineer was required to extend the training period only up to 30 April 1981, or up to the declaration of the result of the examination of the trade test which was declared in the month of June 1981. The Assistant Engineer of the Board at Sri Madhopur was required to terminate the training of Pokharmal in pursuance of the order, dated 18 February 1981, But he misinterpreted the orders and passed the order, dated 10 August 1981, under which for Pokharmal was taken back as apprentice. In the said reply it has also been stated that Pokharmal has not been taken in the service of the Board as yet and by mistake he has been continued to be a trainee and is being paid till now the stipend but be hat not been fixed in any of the scales. From the aforesaid reply filed on behalf of the Board, it is evident that the order, dated 10 August 1981, that was passed by the Assistant Engineer of the Board at Sri Madhopur was passed under a mistake and it proceeds on a misinterpretation of the orders of the officers of the Board and it cannot be said that the Board has arbitrarily discriminated between the petitioners on one hand and Pokharmal on the other in the matter of continuance after the expiry of the period of apprenticeship. The continuance of Sri Pokharmal on the basis of order, dated 10 August 1981, under a mistake, does not mean that the Board has contravened the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
22. No other contention was urged by Sri Kuhad.
23. In the result the writ petitions fail and they are hereby dismissed but with no order as to costs.
Industrial Disputes Act.