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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of Section 52 of the T.P Act, Hiralal's
  • LAND IMPROVEMENT LOANS ACT
  • SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of Section 52 of the T.P Act
  • 710).Article 134 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C
  • Order 22, Rule 10 C.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of Section 52 of the T.P Act, Hiralal's
  • LAND IMPROVEMENT LOANS ACT
  • SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of Section 52 of the T.P Act
  • 710).Article 134 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C
  • Order 22, Rule 10 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a mortgaged immovable property originally mortgaged by Shri Kishan in favour of Chaganlal, Paras Ram and Mool Chand. Gordhanlal, Pannalal and Shankar Lal obtained a money decree against Moolchand directing satisfaction from Moolchand's property; the mortgagee rights in the disputed property were attached in execution and sold at auction. The auction purchasers (Gordhanlal, Pannalal and Shankarlal) received a sale certificate dated November 27, 1943 and were put into possession on that date. Pannalal and Shankarlal subsequently (orally on Nov. 19, 1945, and by registered sale-deed dated April 6, 1950) transferred the mortgagee rights to Sohanlal. After Sohanlal's death his sons Damodar and Naresh (also referenced as Damodar and Ramesh/Rameshchandra in the record) sold the entire property to Hiralal by a registered sale-deed dated August 21, 1957. The appellant, Sayar Bai, is the widow of Hiralal.

Shri Kishan had filed a suit for redemption of mortgage on May 31, 1941. That suit resulted in a decree for redemption on April 27, 1972, confirmed on appeal by this Court on September 22, 1977; the trial court passed a final decree for redemption on September 22, 1978. When execution of that decree was sought the purchaser Hiralal (and thereafter Sayar Bai) resisted execution, claiming that Hiralal was the purchaser of all rights by the registered sale-deed of August 21, 1957 and in possession in his own right. Objections under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. were rejected by the executing Court on September 25, 1981; an appeal by Sayar Bai to the District Judge, Udaipur was dismissed on December 1, 1981. This is the second appeal by Sayar Bai against those orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When a transferee acquires a larger interest in immovable property than that possessed by the transferor pendente lite, whether that transfer is affected by the doctrine of lis pendens or whether the transferee stands as a representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor for the purpose of execution of a decree against the predecessor-in-interest.
  2. Whether a pre-existing charge created by an earlier order (the Mahendra Sabha order dated Jan. 7, 1936) could survive and remain unaffected by the subsequent suit for redemption filed in 1941 (i.e., whether the principle that lis pendens does not affect pre-existing rights applies).
  3. Whether a purchaser pendente lite (here, Hiralal or his predecessors) could acquire mortgagor's rights or acquire ownership by adverse possession to defeat a pending suit for redemption.
  4. Whether court sales or auction sales pendente lite are subject to the principle embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., whether purchasers at court sale are bound by subsequent decrees in a pending suit).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Sohanlal (and hence Hiralal / Sayar Bai) was not a party to the redemption suit because an application to be added as a defendant was rejected; therefore they should not be bound by the decree for redemption.
  • The Mahendra Sabha order (Jan. 7, 1936) in favour of Shankar Lal and Pannalal created a charge on the property which was a pre-existing right and therefore could not be affected by the subsequent suit for redemption (relying on Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami to the proposition that lis pendens does not affect pre‑existing rights).
  • Damodar and Rameshchandra sold the entire property to Hiralal, and mortgagor Shri Kishan knew of that sale (e.g., municipal proceedings), so Hiralal acquired mortgagor's rights and, by adverse possession (and limitation principles cited in cases such as Natesa Thevar and Nani Bai), should be treated as full owner not bound by the redemption decree.
  • Relied on various authorities (Bhagwati Lal v. Jhamak Lal; Natesa Thevar; Nani Bai; Rajendra Singh) to argue that transferees or purchasers may either be allowed to join proceedings or that limitation/adverse possession could cut down the mortgagor's remedy.

Respondent / Court's Position as Reflected in the Opinion

  • Sohanlal and his successors were transferees pendente lite: the oral sale (Nov. 19, 1945) and the registered sale-deed (April 6, 1950) were transfers made while the redemption suit (filed 1941) was pending and hence hit by lis pendens and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The Mahendra Sabha decree was merely a money decree with a direction that the decretal amount be realised out of Moolchand's property; it did not create a charge on the disputed property, and even if any charge existed it was satisfied by the sale in execution (auction) — so no pre-existing right survived to defeat the lis pendens principle.
  • The auction sale and sale certificate conveyed only the mortgagee rights of the judgment-debtor Moolchand; only those mortgagee rights could be passed to auction purchasers and their transferees, and transferees pendente lite remain bound by the pending suit's decree.
  • Adverse possession and limitation arguments fail because the suit for redemption was already pending when the transfers occurred; therefore Hiralal could not acquire mortgagor's rights against Shri Kishan by adverse possession while the suit was pending.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwati Lal v. Jhamak Lal, 1982 Raj LW 463 That ordinarily an assignee or transferee should be allowed to take part in further proceedings in a suit pendente lite to protect newly acquired interest (permissibility of adding assignee/transferee as party under Order 22, Rule 10). The court noted the principle but observed Bhagwati Lal did not hold that refusal to allow joinder would absolve the transferee from the effect of a decree or from application of Section 52 T.P. Act; the decision did not preclude lis pendens binding the transferee.
Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami, AIR 1973 SC 569 Principle that lis pendens does not affect valid pre-existing charges; a pre-existing charge subsists despite pendency of a subsequent suit. The court distinguished the present facts: the Mahendra Sabha decree did not create a charge, and even if any charge existed it had been satisfied by the auction sale — therefore Jayaram Mudaliar did not assist the appellant.
Natesa Thevar v. Narayanswami Padayachi, AIR 1952 Mad 844 Sale of both mortgagee's and mortgagor's interest and dispossession of the mortgagee could be adverse to the mortgagor if the mortgagor had knowledge; Article 144 Limitation Act applicability to such cases. The court considered the authority but found it inapplicable because the redemption suit was pending when Hiralal's vendors transferred rights; hence adverse possession could not operate against the mortgagor while suit was pending.
Nani Bai v. Gitabai, AIR 1958 SC 706 Article 134 Limitation Act reduces period (from 60 to 12 years) where mortgagee transfers a larger interest than mortgaged and mortgagor is aware — treating possession of such transferees as wrongful/adverse to mortgagor. The court accepted the principle generally but held it did not apply in the present facts because the redemption suit predated the transfers; therefore the shorter limitation period/adverse-possession principle could not be invoked to defeat the pending suit.
Rajendra Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537 That unlawful/forcible possession is a unilateral act and its continuance may ripen into a right by limitation even if the wrongdoer was party to a pending suit; pendency of a fresh suit may not arrest running of limitation where wrongful possession started earlier. The court relied on the distinction drawn in Rajendra Singh: unilateral wrongful possession differs from bilateral transfers; but here the claim was based on transfer pendente lite, not mere forcible possession; therefore Rajendra Singh did not support appellant's case.
Radhamadhub Holdar v. Manohur Mookerji, (15 Ind App 97) (Privy Council) Authority for the proposition that principle of lis pendens applies to court sales and transfers pendente lite. The court cited this and similar Privy Council authorities to support the proposition that purchasers at court sale pendente lite are bound by decrees later passed in the pending suit.
Motilal v. Karrabuldin, (24 Ind App 170) Held that a defendant in suit for possession was bound by a decree obtained by the mortgagee against the mortgagor where sale was pendente lite; earlier attachment did not avoid the result. The court relied on Motilal to show that earlier attachment does not prevent lis pendens from binding a purchaser pendente lite.
Nilakant Banerji v. Suresh Chunder Mullick, (12 Ind App 171) Privy Council authority recognizing lis pendens effect on transfers. The court cited it among authorities establishing that lis pendens can affect court sales and transfers.
Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag, AIR 1967 SC 1440 Although Section 52 T.P. Act does not strictly apply to involuntary alienations, the principle embodied in Section 52 applies to such alienations (purchasers at court sale are bound). The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that auction purchasers or transferees pendente lite are bound by decrees in the pending litigation.
Kedarnath Lal (dead) by his legal representatives v. Sheonarain, AIR 1970 SC 1717 If property was acquired pendente lite, the acquirer is bound by the decree ultimately obtained in the pending proceedings; attachment does not create title and Section 52 places embargo on transfer of property directly in question. The court invoked this authority to reinforce that transferees pendente lite (including purchasers at court sale) are bound by decrees in the pending suit and that prior attachment does not avert this effect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing each contention advanced and applying established legal principles, as follows:

  1. On the central lis pendens question the court held that Sohanlal (and his successors) were purchasers/transferees pendente lite because the redemption suit was filed on May 31, 1941 while the oral sale to Sohanlal occurred on Nov. 19, 1945 and the registered sale-deed in his favour was dated April 6, 1950. Transfers made while the suit was pending are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and by the operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (as extended in principle to court sales).
  2. The court examined the procedural step where Sohanlal applied on April 17, 1950 to be added as a party and that application was rejected; the court observed that Bhagwati Lal permitted, ordinarily, allowing assignees/transferees to participate, but that refusal to allow joinder did not mean the transferee would escape the effect of the decree or Section 52 T.P. Act. Sohanlal did not pursue the matter further and aligned with the vendor; moreover Sohanlal was connected (son) to an original mortgagee who was a party and later his legal representatives (Damodar and Rameshchandra) were brought on record in different capacities, so they could pursue available defences but remained bound by the decree.
  3. On the contention that an earlier Mahendra Sabha order created a pre-existing charge immune from lis pendens (relying on Jayaram Mudaliar), the court inspected the Mahendra Sabha judgment on record and concluded it was merely a money decree directing satisfaction from Moolchand's property and did not create a charge on the disputed property. Even if a charge had existed, it was satisfied by the auction sale and the auction purchasers acquired only the mortgagee rights of Moolchand as recited in the sale certificate dated Nov. 27, 1943. Therefore, no pre‑existing right surviving to defeat the lis pendens principle was shown.
  4. On the adverse possession/limitation submissions (relying on Natesa Thevar, Nani Bai, Rajendra Singh), the court explained the distinction between unilateral wrongful possession (which may ripen into a title by limitation) and bilateral transfers. The court restated that Section 52 T.P. Act is intended to prevent parties to litigation from defeating the court's jurisdiction and that its principle applies to court sales and bilateral transfers pendente lite. Because the redemption suit was pending long before the transfers to Hiralal, adverse-possession and limitation principles did not operate to defeat the plaintiff's rights under the pending suit.
  5. The court reviewed authorities (Privy Council and Supreme Court) which establish that purchasers at court sale and transferees pendente lite are bound by decrees ultimately passed in pending suits, and that attachment prior to suit does not prevent this effect. The court applied those authorities to conclude that the transferees here were bound.

The court’s analysis remained closely tied to the factual timeline (dates of suit, auctions, sales, and joinder attempts) and to the textual reach of precedents cited; it expressly distinguished cases relied upon by the appellant where their facts or legal principles were inapplicable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. (The judgment concludes: "Appeal dismissed.") The parties are directed to bear their own costs of the appeal.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the transferees pendente lite (Sohanlal and his legal representatives, Damodar and Rameshchandra, and the subsequent transferee Hiralal and his legal representative Sayar Bai) are bound by the decree for redemption obtained in the suit originally filed by Shri Kishan.
  • The court reaffirmed the established principle that transfers (including court/auction sales) pendente lite are subject to lis pendens and the protective effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (and the analogous reach of that principle to involuntary alienations), thereby preventing such transferees from defeating the pending suit's decree.
  • The judgment did not purport to lay down any novel principle of law; it applied and reconciled existing authorities to the facts and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.

Appeal dismissed.

    Smt. Sayar Bai v. Smt. Yashoda Bai And Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. The question which arises for determination in this appeal is that as to when a larger interest in immovable property than possessed by the transferor is sought to be transferred by him whether the transfer would not be affected by the principle of lis pendens or such a transferee would still be a representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor, in execution of the decree passed against the predecessor-in-interest of the transferor.

    2. The facts which have given rise to these proceedings are that Shri Kishan mortgaged with possession the property in dispute with Chaganlal, Paras Ram and Mool Chand. Gordhanlal, Pannalal and Shankar Lal had a claim for money against Mool Chand and they obtained a money decree against Moolchand with the stipulation that the decretal amount shall be realised from the property of Moolchand. The mortgagee rights in the disputed property were attached in execution of the decree obtained by Gordhanlal and others and were sold at an auction sale. Gordhanlal, Pannalal and Shankarlal decree-holders purchased the mortgagee rights of Moolchand in the aforesaid property and a sale certificate was issued in favour of the auction-purchasers. On November 27, 1943, Gordhanlal and others, who had purchased the mortgagee rights in the disputed property were put into possession of the said property. Pannalal and Shankerlal, auction purchasers, subsequently sold the mortgagee rights by an oral sale on November 19, 1945 to Sohanlal who is the son of Chhaganlal. A sale-deed in respect of the aforesaid transfer was subsequently executed on April 6, 1950, and the same was duly registered and thereby the mortgagee rights in the disputed property were transferred to Sohanlal. After the death of Sohanlal, his sons Damodar and Naresh Chandra, sold the entire property in dispute to Hiralal on August 21, 1957 by executing a sale deed in his favour. Sayar Bai appellant is the widow of Hira Lal.

    3. One fact which requires specific mention here is that Shri Kishan mortgagor filed a suit on May 31, 1941 for redemption of mortgage against Pannalal and his brother Moolchand. That suit lingered on for several years and ultimately a decree for redemption of mortgage was passed on April 27, 1972, which was confirmed on appeal by this Court on September 22, 1977. Thereafter, the trial Court passed a final decree for redemption on September 22, 1978. When the decree for redemption was sought to be executed by the plaintiff decree-holder the same was resisted by Hiralal, who set up the case that he was the purchaser of all rights in the entire property, by means of a registered sale-deed dt. August 21, 1957 from Damodar and Nareshchandra and that he was in possession of the disputed property in his own right and not on behalf of the judgment-debtor. The objections were raised under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C but the executing Court rejected the objections by its order dated September 25, 1981. An appeal preferred by Sayar Bai, widow of Hiralal who had expired by then, was dismissed by the District Judge, Udaipur by his order dated December 1, 1981. Hence this second appeal has been filed by Sayar Bai.

    4. In the first place, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Sohanlal, after purchasing the mortgagee rights in the suit property from Pannalal and Shankerlal had made an application in the trial Court to the effect that he may be added as a party defendant in the suit, but his application was rejected and as he was not made a party to suit, he was not bound by the decree for redemption passed in that suit and for the same reason neither, Hiralal nor Sayar Bai were bound by the said decree. This submission cannot be accepted because Sohanlal was a purchaser pendente lite. As already stated above, the suit for redemption of mortgage was filed on May 31, 1941 and the oral sale in favour of Sohanlal is alleged to have been made on Nov. 19, 1945, while a sale-deed was registered in his favour on April 6, 1950 and thus the transfer was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. Sohanlal undoubtedly filed an application on April 17, 1950 in that suit for being added as a party defendant in the suit, but that application was rejected by the trial Court. Learned counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Bhagwati Lal v. Jhamak Lal, 1982 Raj LW 463, in support of his contention that Sohanlal should have been made a party defendant in the suit. In the aforesaid case it has been held that unless there were exceptional circumstances the Court should ordinarily allow the assignee or the transferee to take part in the further proceedings in the suit and allow him to take up the further prosecution of the case in his hands, if he so likes, in order to protect his newly acquired interest in the property, which was the subject matter of the suit, but it has not been held in Bhagwati Lal's case that if the Court refuses to allow an application filed under Order 22, Rule 10 C.P.C by the assignee or transferee pendente lite, to become a party defendant in the suit, then such a transferee or assignee shall not be bound by the decree passed in the suit or that the provisions of Section 52 of the T.P Act would not be applicable to such a transferee. It would have been more appropriate for the trial Court to allow Sohanlal to take part in the further proceedings in the suit, when he desired to become a party defendant after purchasing the mortgagee rights in the suit property. But Sohanlal does not appear to have pursued the matter further when his application for being added as a party defendant in the suit was rejected and he apparently felt contented by throwing his lot with that of the vendor and the original mortgagee. It would not be out of place to mention here that Sohanlal was the son of Chhaganlal, who was one of the mortgagees and Chagganlal was made a party defendant to the suit in that capacity. After Chagganlal's death, Damodar, and Rameshchandra, sons of Sohanlal were brought on the record of the suit on account of their being sons of a predeceased son of Chhaganlal, because Sohanlal had expired some time prior to Chhaganlal. Thus, Damodar and Ramesh Chandra and other legal representatives of Sohanlal were brought on the record of the suit as party defendants, although in a different capacity, yet they could have taken all the legitimate defences which were open to them, even as transferees pendente lite. Hiralal was a transferee pendente lite from Damodar and Ramesh Chandra by means of a sale-deed Ex. 3 dt. August 21, 1957. It is apparent from the aforesaid facts that Sohanlal was fully alive to the situation and he was well aware of the fact that a suit for redemption was filed by Shri Kishan against the original mortgagee and that the same was pending before the Court and neither he nor his legal representatives, Damodar and Ramesh Chandra nor their transferee pendente lite, Hiralal and his legal representative Smt. Sayar Bai could be absolved from the disability arising on account of the provisions of Section 52 of the T.P Act, Hiralal's predecessor-in-title, Damodar and Ramesh Chandra were present on the record of the suit for redemption as defendants and Hiralal is for that reason also bound by the decree for redemption passed against his transferors, Damodar and Ramesh Chandra.

    5. Learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that the order passed by the Mahendra Sabha of the former State of Mewar on Jan. 7, 1936 in the suit filed by Shankar Lal and Pannalal created a charge on the property in dispute and as the said charge was a pre-existing right, which could not be wiped away by the subsequent suit for redemption filed by Sri Kishan on June 1, 1941 and the same could not be affected by the doctrine of pendente lite. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the case in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami, AIR 1973 SC 569 to support the aforesaid proposition, in which it was held that the principle of lis pendens does not affect pre-existing rights. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that if there was a valid charge or mortgage on a property, the same does not vanish because the property becomes the subject matter of a subsequent suit. In that case a valid charge subsisted on the basis of a loan on the land, which became subject matter of a subsequent suit for partition, by virtue of the provisions of the Land Improvement Loans Act. In this context their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under (at p. 574):—

    “The liability of the land to be sold under Section 7(c) of the Act was a pre-existing charge and that subsisted as from the date of the loan. This was not affected by the institution of the suit for partition. This charge could be enforced by the State notwithstanding the pendency of the partition suit. No decree in the partition suit could have affected the charge. Therefore, if the State has sold only the property in respect of which loan was taken, the purchaser-defendant No. 12 is not prejudiced by the principle of lis pendens.”

    6. A copy of the judgment of the Mahendra Sabha is on the record and it shows that Shankerlal and Pannalal merely obtained a money decree against Moolchand and the Court further directed that the money decree may be satisfied out of Moolchand's property. Thus, no charge as such was created on the property in dispute by the money decree obtained by Shankerlal and Pannalal. As a matter of fact, even if there was any charge, the same was fully satisfied when the mortgagee rights in the property in dispute were sold by public auction in execution of the decree and the same were purchased by Pannalal and Shankarlal decree-holders. As there was no charge actually created by the decree, the question of any pre-existing right does not arise. Moreover, only the mortgagee rights of Moolchand, judgment debtor in that case, could only be passed on to the auction purchasers, Pannalal and Shankarlal as a result of the court sale and on the basis of the sale certificate Ex. 4 dated November 27, 1943; Moolchand was possessed only of the mortgagee rights in the property in dispute and such rights alone could have been validly transferred to the auction purchasers Pannalal and Shankerlal. The sale certificate Ex. 4, also clearly recites that the mortgagee rights to the extent of the share of the judgment-debtor Moolchand were passed on to the auction purchasers by means of the auction sale. Thus, the interest of Moolchand who was represented by his sons, Inderlal, Chhaganlal and Laxmilal was conveyed to the auction purchasers Pannalal and Shankar Lal by means of the aforesaid sale. Thus no pre-existing rights were ever created by the decree passed in the money suit, which was ultimately decided by the Mahendra Sabha, nor any such pre-existing rights vested in the auction purchasers, as even the mortgagee rights, which they purchased at the auction sale, were transferred to them pendente lite by means of the sale certificate dated November 27, 1943.

    7. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant was that Damodar and Rameshchandra had sold the entire property to Hiralal and thus Hiralal was possessed of all the rights in the disputed property and not only the mortgagee rights but also the mortgagor's rights vested in him and that as the mortgagor Shri Kishan was well aware of the sale made by Damodar and Rameshchandra in favour of Hiralal, the latter became full owner of the entire property by adverse possession. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Natesa Thevar v. Narayanswami Padayachi, AIR 1952 Mad 844, in support of the aforesaid contention. It was held in that case that the sale of both the mortgagee's and mortgagor's interest, in execution of the decree against the mortgagee and the dispossession of the mortgagee from the mortgaged properties in consequence thereof could be adverse to the mortgagor also, if the mortgagor has knowledge of the hostile acts or of adverse possession. It was observed by their Lordships that Article 144 of the Limitation Act was applicable to cases where the mortgaged properties were sold as absolute properties of the mortgagee, without any limitation on the interests thus sold and subsequently the vendee enjoyed the properties in his own right and to the knowledge of the mortgagor, beyond the prescribed period. It was argued by the learned counsel that Hiralal had filed an application for making constructions before the Municipal Council, Udaipur on the basis of the sale effected in his favour and in those proceedings Sri Kishan filed objections on the ground that the property belonged to him and not to Hiralal. It was argued by learned counsel that from the proceedings before the Administrator, Municipal Council, it was clear that Sri Kishan was aware of the sale of the property in dispute in his favour. In the first place, the order of the Additional Collector, Udaipur, as Administrator of the Municipal Council, dated June 22, 1970 (Ex. 2) does not show that Hiralal had claimed his rights in the property in dispute on the basis of sale of the entire property in his favour by Damodar and Rameschandra. It cannot be lost sight of the Hiralal was a transferee from Damodar and Ramesh Chandra, who were grandsons of Chhaganlal and Hiralal could be in possession of the property in dispute as a transferee of the mortgagee rights. Moreover, the suit for redemption was already pending since 1941 and adverse possession of Hiralal, if any, could have only begun after the sale of the entire property in dispute in his favour came to the notice of Sri Kishan. As Sri Kishan's suit for redemption of mortgage was already pending at the time when Hiralal purchased the property in dispute from Damodar and Ramesh Chandra, there was no question of Hiralal acquiring any rights in the said property against Sri Kishan by adverse possession.

    8. Learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance upon the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nani Bai v. Gitabai, AIR 1958 SC 706, in this context (at p. 710).

    “Article 134 of the Limitation Act contemplates a sale by the mortgagee in excess of his interest as such. The legislature, naturally, treats the possession of such transferees as wrongful, and therefore, adverse to the mortgagor if he is aware of the transaction. Hence, the longer period of 60 years for redemption of the mortgaged property in the hands of the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest, is cut down to the shorter period of 12 years' wrongful possession if the transfer by the mortgagee is in respect of a larger interest than that mortgaged to him. In order, therefore, to attract the operation of Article 134, the defendant has got affirmatively to prove that the mortgagee or his successors-in-interest has transferred a larger interest than justified by the mortgage. If there is no such proof, the shorter period under Article 134 is not available to the defendant in a suit for possession after redemption.”

    Undoubtedly if the larger interest is sold by the mortgagee in the mortgaged property and if the transferee comes into possession or continues to remain in possession of the mortgaged property is the full owner thereof to the knowledge of the mortgagor, then the period of limitation for filing a suit for redemption or possession would be reduced from 60 years to 12 years, as the transferee would become owner of the property by adverse possession on the expiry of 12 years. But the aforesaid principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case, because of the fact that a suit for possession by redemption had already been filed by Shrikishan in the year 1941, to which Hiralal's vendors, Damodar and Rameshchandra were parties.

    9. Similarly, a reference was also made by the learned counsel for the appellant to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537. In that case, a decree for possession was passed in favour of the plaintiff earlier but thereafter the defendants had illegally and forcibly obtained possession of the disputed property and continued to remain in possession thereof for a period of more than 12 years. In such circumstances, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the pendency of fresh suit would not arrest the running of the period of limitation which had started earlier. It was observed by their Lordships in the aforesaid case as under (at p. 2542):—

    “It is very difficult to view the act of taking illegal possession of immoveable property or continuance of wrongful possession, even if the wrong doer be a party to the pending suit, as a “dealing with” the property otherwise than by its transfer so as to be covered by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The prohibition which prevents the immovable property being “transferred or otherwise dealt with” by a party is apparently directed against some action which would have an immediate effect, similar to or comparable with that of transfer, but for the principle of lis pendens taking of illegal possession or its continuance neither resemble nor are comparable to a transfer. They are one sided wrongful acts and not bilateral transactions of a kind which ordinarily constitute “deals” or dealings with property (e.g contracts to sell). They cannot confer immediate rights on the possessor. Continued illegal possession ripens into a legally enforceable right only after the prescribed period of time has elapsed. It matures into a right due to inaction and not due to the action of the injured party which can approach a Court of appropriate jurisdiction for redress by a suit to regain possession. The relief against the wrong done must be sought within the time prescribed. This is the only mode of redress provided by law for such cases. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was not meant to serve, indirectly, as a provision or a substitute for a provision of the Limitation Act to exclude time.”

    (emphasis added).

    10. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid passage, only unilateral transactions such as taking illegal or forcible possession of the property can ripen into a legally enforceable right after the expiry of the prescribed period of time. But so far as bilateral transactions are concerned, when property is transferred by one person to another by contract or the like, the transferee is undoubtedly bound on account of the provisions of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act by the decree or order, which may be passed against his transferor, in respect of the property in dispute. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not intended to strike at the running of the period of limitation in case of taking of illegal or forcible possession of the property, which is the subject matter of litigation by a stranger because such possession does not confer any immediate right on the trespasser. It is only after the expiry of the period provided in the Limitation Act that the right of the trespasser could ripen into that of an owner, during which period the original or lawful owner has ample opportunity to institute a suit for obtaining redress against the wrongdoer or trespasser. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of lis pendens is intended to strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Court, when a dispute in respect of any right or interest in immovable property is pending. A party to the litigation cannot by private dealings remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a pending dispute or to frustrate the decree that may be passed in the suit. It could be effective against such third parties who are dealing with parties to the pending litigation. But it could not affect strangers who acquire possession on their own, by forcible or unlawful act on their part, and not on account of a transfer or dealing with a party to the pending litigation.

    11. It is well-established that the principle of lis pendens is applicable not only to private transfers inter vivos but also to Court sales, as has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Radhamadhub Holdar v. Manohur Mookerji, (1887-1988) 15 Ind App 97, Motilal v. Karrabuldin, (1897) 24 Ind App 170) and Nilakant Banerji v. Suresh Chunder Mullick, (1884-1985) 12 Ind App 171. In Motilal's case it was held by their Lordships that a defendant in a suit for possession was bound by the decree obtained by the mortgagee against the mortgagor as the sale was made pendente lite and it was observed that the result could not be avoided even if the mortgagee decree-holder had attached the land in dispute prior to the suit by the plaintiff vendor. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag, AIR 1967 SC 1440 and in Kedarnath Lal (dead) by his legal representatives v. Sheonarain, AIR 1970 SC 1717. It was held in Samarendra Nath's case that although Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act did not strictly apply in terms to involuntary alienations like Court sales, but the principle thereof applies to such alienations. In Kedarnath Lal's case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under (at p. 1721):—

    “If the property was acquired pendente lite, the acquirer is bound by the decree ultimately obtained in the proceedings pending at the time of acquisition. This result is not avoided by reason of the earlier attachment. Attachment of property is only effective in preventing alienation but it is not intended to create any title to the property. On the other hand, Section 52 places a complete embargo on the transfer of immovable property right to which is directly and specifically in question in a pending litigation.”

    (emphasis added)

    The same principle was also laid down in Jayaram Mudaliar's case, (AIR 1973 SC 569) where their Lordships of the Supreme Court recognised the general principle that during the pendency of an action, of which the object is to vest the property or obtain the possession of real estate, a purchaser shall be held to take that estate as it stands in the person of the seller, and would be bound by the claims which shall ultimately be pronounced. When a suit is filed in respect of immovable property, the jurisdiction, power or control over the property involved in the suit is acquired by the Court pending the continuance of the action and until the final judgment is pronounced and any transaction or dealing of the property by the parties to the suit or proceedings would not affect the decree or order which may be passed by the Court.

    12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this appeal.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Smt. Sayar Bai v. Smt. Yashoda Bai And Others
    (Dec 15, 1982)