Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Writ Petn. No. 144 of 1979

Advocates

Shyam Arya
K.C.Sharma
Hanuman Chaudhary
H.N.Sharma

Judges

Mr. Mahendra Bhushan Sharma
C.M. Lodha
Mr. Dwarka Prasad Gupta
Mr. Narendra Mohan Kasliwal
Dr. Kashmir Singh Sidhu

Acts

Section 72 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act
Section 64(1)(b) read with Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
provisions of S. 57 Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5).
provisions of Section 57 Sub-Sections (3), (4)
ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Section 57, Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5).

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lodha, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The court was asked to consider, by reference, whether the Full Bench decision in Jai Ramdas v. Regional Transport Authority (AIR 1957 Raj 312) remained correct in view of subsequent decisions by other High Courts. The broader reference question was not decided because the present case could be disposed of on other grounds.

The narrower facts of the writ petition are as follows. The petitioner, Jagan Singh, was granted a stage carriage permit on September 10, 1971 for the Chirawa to Udika route via Devroad–Surajgarh–Jakhod for three years. The Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Jaipur, extended the route from Chirawa to Sultana by order dated April 10, 1972. Part of the original route (Chirawa to Devroad) was nationalised effective June 5, 1974; as a result the petitioner's remaining service was divided into two parts (Sultana–Chirawa and Devroad–Udika). From June 5, 1974 to July 23, 1978 the petitioner operated only the Udika–Devroad portion.

On March 28, 1978 the petitioner applied to the RTA for diversion of his route to run Udika to Sultana via Surajgarh, Raghunathpura and Shyamlu. The RTA, after receiving a report from the District Transport Officer, allowed the diversion by order dated October 25, 1978.

Non-petitioner No. 2, Sagruddin, an operator on the Chirawa–Sultana–Jhunjhunu route, appealed the RTA's diversion order to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (STAT), which, by order dated January 11, 1979, allowed the appeal and set aside the RTA's order of October 25, 1978. The petitioner challenged the STAT order by writ petition, contending lack of jurisdiction on the part of the STAT to entertain Sagruddin's appeal under Section 64(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act because Sagruddin was not a person aggrieved by variation of the petitioner's permit. The court, however, disposed of the petition on other grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Full Bench decision in Jai Ramdas v. Regional Transport Authority (AIR 1957 Raj 312) — holding that a rival permit-holder aggrieved by variation of a route condition could appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 64(1)(b) read with Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 — remains correct in view of subsequent High Court decisions (issue referred to the court).
Whether the petitioner's application to vary his permit by including a new route must be treated as an application for grant of a new permit under Section 57(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act and, if so, whether the RTA was bound to follow the procedural requirements of the cited sub-sections of Section 57.
Whether the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain Sagruddin's appeal (or revision under Section 64-A) given the question whether Sagruddin was a "person aggrieved" by the variation of the petitioner's permit.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The STAT had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under Section 64(1)(b) because Sagruddin was not a "person aggrieved" by the RTA's variation of the petitioner's permit.
A rival permit-holder (Sagruddin) lacked locus standi to appeal against variation of conditions of a permit granted to another permit-holder.
The variation was not detrimental to Sagruddin because, the petitioner already held a permit to ply between Chirawa and Sultana prior to the variation.

Non-petitioner's (Respondent's) Arguments

Even if no appeal lay under Section 64(1)(b), Sagruddin could maintain a revision under Section 64-A of the Act; thus the STAT's order could be justified by its revisional jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jai Ramdas v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1957 Raj 312	Held that a rival permit-holder aggrieved by variation of a route condition could appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 64(1)(b) read with Section 48.	The opinion noted the Full Bench view but declined to decide the correctness of Jai Ramdas in this case, because the case could be disposed of on other grounds.
AIR 1961 Madh Pra 81 (Madhya Pradesh High Court)	Described in the opinion as taking a contrary view to Jai Ramdas on the appealability point.	The court recorded that a contrary view exists in this precedent; it informed the reference background but was not adjudicated upon.
AIR 1961 Pat 313 (Patna High Court)	Described as taking a contrary view to Jai Ramdas.	Noted by the court as part of the catalogue of contrary High Court decisions; not decided upon in this opinion.
AIR 1960 Ker 18 (Kerala High Court)	Described as taking a contrary view to Jai Ramdas.	Noted; the court did not decide the referenced question in this case.
AIR 1965 Andh Pra 115 (Andhra Pradesh High Court)	Described as taking a contrary view to Jai Ramdas.	Noted among contrary authorities; not applied to resolve the present case.
AIR 1970 All 182 (Allahabad High Court)	Described as taking a contrary view to Jai Ramdas.	Noted in the list of contrary decisions; not further applied.
AIR 1987 All 336 (Allahabad High Court)	Also cited as a contrary view to Jai Ramdas.	Noted among contrary authorities; not addressed substantively in this opinion.
Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Zamindar Motor Transport Co. (P.) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 840 : AIR 1970 SC 466	Holds that an application to vary a permit by inclusion of a new route must be treated as an application for grant of a new permit under Section 57(8) and that the authority cannot ignore the procedural provisions of Section 57 (sub-sections (3), (4) and (5)).	The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to conclude that the petitioner's application, which included a new route, ought to have been treated under Section 57(8) and that the RTA was bound to follow the procedures prescribed in the cited sub-sections; failure to do so rendered the RTA's order bad in law.
Gani Mohammed v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1976 Raj LW 201	Observed that while granting certiorari the High Court should not exercise discretion in a manner that restores an illegal order passed by the Regional Transport Authority.	The court relied on this principle to justify refusing relief that would have the practical effect of restoring an illegal RTA order (i.e., by setting aside the STAT order), and thus dismissed the writ petition.
G. Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828	Supreme Court refused to interfere with an order (notwithstanding lack of power of the State Government under the cited statute to review) on the ground that quashing the later order would reinstate an earlier illegal order; High Court's refusal to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 was upheld.	The court cited this authority to reinforce the proposition that it should not exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction in a manner that would restore an illegal earlier order; this supported the decision to dismiss the petition rather than set aside the STAT order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in several discrete steps, each tied to the statutory provisions and the factual matrix of the case:

Reference question vs. present disposal: The court acknowledged the referred question about Jai Ramdas but observed that the present case could be decided on narrower grounds; therefore the broader reference need not be answered here.
Factual analysis of the petitioner's application: The petitioner's March 28, 1978 application sought diversion of his route so as to include a new route (Udika to Sultana via Surajgarh, Raghunathpura and Shyamlu). The court treated that application as one that sought inclusion of a new route within the permit.
Statutory construction and reliance on precedent: By reference to the wording of Sections 48(3)(xxi) and 57(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Zamindar Motor Transport Co., the court concluded that any application to vary a permit by including a new route must be treated as an application for a new permit under Section 57(8). Consequently, the RTA was required to observe the procedures specified in the relevant sub-sections of Section 57 (namely sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) as cited in the opinion).
Application of the law to the facts: The RTA did not treat the petitioner's application as one under Section 57(8) nor did it follow the mandatory procedural requirements under the cited sub-sections of Section 57 before allowing the diversion. The court therefore concluded that the RTA's order dated May 27, 1978 (allowing the petitioner to ply via Shyamlu and Raghunathpura in place of Devroad between Chirawa and Surajgarh) was legally unsupportable and bad.
Jurisdictional challenge and discretionary remedy: The petitioner contended that the STAT lacked jurisdiction because Sagruddin was not a person aggrieved and thus had no locus to appeal. The respondent contended that, in any event, revision under Section 64-A could validate the STAT's action. The court declined to decide whether Sagruddin was a person aggrieved.
Exercise of discretionary writ relief: The decisive practical consideration was that if the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the STAT's order, the immediate legal consequence would be to reinstate the RTA's illegal order. Relying on prior authority (Gani Mohammed and G. Venkateswara Rao), the court held that it should not exercise its discretionary power of certiorari in a way that would restore an unlawful earlier order when there has been no failure of justice. For these reasons the court refused to interfere.
Directions left open: The court observed that STAT, although it set aside the RTA order, had given no further directions. The court held it would be open to the RTA to treat the petitioner's application as one for a new permit under Section 57(8) and to decide it afresh after following the required procedure of the cited sub-sections.

Holding and Implications

PETITION DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The writ petition was dismissed. The court held that the RTA order permitting the diversion was legally bad because the petitioner's application involved inclusion of a new route and should have been treated as an application for a new permit under Section 57(8) with the mandatory procedures of the relevant sub-sections followed. Nevertheless, the court refused to set aside the STAT order because that would have the practical effect of restoring the illegal RTA order.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

The writ petition by the petitioner (seeking to challenge the STAT order) was dismissed and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
The RTA's order of May 27, 1978 was characterized as unlawful for failing to follow Section 57(8) procedures; however the STAT order that set aside that RTA order was not quashed by the High Court.
The court expressly left it open for the RTA to treat the petitioner's application as one for a new permit under Section 57(8) and to decide it afresh after complying with the procedures prescribed in sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 57.

Broader legal implication: The court declined to resolve the referred question about the correctness of Jai Ramdas in light of contrary High Court decisions; no new precedent on that reference question was laid down by this opinion.

End of summary.

Show full summary ...

Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan And Another Non-Petitioners.

Lodha, C.J:— This reference was made by one of us for decision of the question whether the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Jai Ramdas v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1957 Raj 312 is correct in the light of subsequent decisions on the point by a number of other High Courts. It was held in Jai Ramdas's case (supra) that on the interpretation of Section 64(1)(b) read with Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (which will hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”), the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority varying a condition of the permit, such condition being as respects the route, was appealable to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by the rival permit-holder who was aggrieved by such variation. However, it appears that a contrary view was taken by the Madhya Pradesh High court, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 81, Patna High Court AIR 1961 Pat 313, Kerala High Court AIR 1960 Ker 18, Andhra Pradesh High Court AIR 1965 Andh Pra 115 and Allahabad High Court AIR 1987 All 336 and AIR 1970 All 182.

2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the point which has been referred to us need not be decided in this case as the case can be disposed of on other points. The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass. The petitioner Jagan Singh was granted permit on Chirawa to Udika route via Devroad-Surajgarh-Jakhod on September 10, 1971, for a period of three years. The route was extended from Chirawa to Sultana by the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur, by its order dated April 10, 1972. Subsequently, a portion of the route, Chirawa to Devroad, came under the scheme of nationalisation from June 5, 1974. Consequently, that portion of the route i.e, Chirawa to Devroad, was curtailed and the petitioner's remaining route was divided in two portions, namely, Sultana to Chirawa and Devroad to Udika. It further appears that from June 5, 1974 to July 23, 1978, the petitioner plied on one portion of the route only viz., Udika to Devroad and did not ply on the other portion of the route i.e, Chirawa to Sultana. However, he made an application before the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur, on March 28, 1978, for diversion of his route-Udika to Sultana via Surajgarh, Raghunathpura and Shyamlu. After obtaining report from the District Transport Officer, Jhunjhunu, the Regional Transport Authority allowed diversion of the petitioner's route via Surajgarh, Raghunathpura-Shyamlu by its order dated October 25, 1978.

3. At this stage, it may be mentioned that the Non-petitioner No. 2, Sagruddin, was an operator on the Chirawa-Sultana-Jhunjhunu route. Being aggrieved by the grant of diversion of the petitioner's route, Sagruddin filed an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, for setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated October 25, 1978. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, by its order dated January 11, 1979, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated October 25, 1978.

4. The petitioner has challenged the validity and correctness of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by this writ petition and has contended that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain Sagruddin's appeal under S. 64(1)(b) of the Act as he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved by variation of the conditions of the permit held by the petitioner. But we shall presently show that it is not necessary to decide this point as the petition is liable to be dismissed on other grounds.

5. It may be pointed out that the Regional Transport Authority could not varied the conditions of the petitioner's permit of its own accord under Section 48(3)(xxi), but an application was made by the petitioner for variation of the conditions of the permit by allowing him to divert his route through new vias. Such an application must be treated as an application for grant of a new permit under Section 57(8) of the Act and the Regional Transport Authority had not ignore the provisions of S. 57 Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5). This position is clearly borne out by the wordings of Sections 48(3)(xxi) and 57(8) of the Act, which read as under:—

“48. Grant of stage carriage permits- (1) Subject to the provisions of S. 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under S. 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit:

Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application.

(2) …… …… …… …….

(3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriages of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages, and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:

(1) to (XX) … … … …

(xxi) that the Regional Transport Authority may, after giving notice of not less than one month—

(a) vary the conditions of the permit;

(b) attach to the permit further conditions:

Provided that the conditions specified in pursuance of cl. (i) shall not be varied so as to alter the distance covered by the original route by more than 24 kilometres, and any variation within such limit's shall be made only after the Regional Transport Authority is satisfied that such variation will serve the public convenience and that it is not expedient to grant a separate permit in respect of the original route also varied or any part thereof.

…. …. …. ….”

“57. Procedure in applying for and granting permits :— (1) An application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier's permit may be made at any time.

(2) to (7) … …

(8) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum, or by altering the route covered by it, or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit:

Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles.”

6. In support of the proposition stated above, reference may be made to Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Zamindar Motor Transport Co. (P.) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 840 : AIR 1970 SC 466, wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“By Section 48(3)(xxi) it is open to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving notice of not less than one month. (a) to vary the conditions of the permit, and (b) to attach to the permit further conditions. But an application was made by the D.T.U for variation of the conditions of the permit including a new route or routes or a new area had to be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit under Section 57(8) of the Act and the State Transport Authority could not ignore the provisions of Section 57 Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5).”

7. Admittedly in the present case, the petitioner made an application for variation of the conditions of his permit including new route and therefore his application ought to have been treated as an application for grant of a new permit under Section 57(8), and the procedure prescribed under Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 59 of the Act should have been followed. But, in fact, the petitioner's application was neither treated as one under Section 57(8) nor did the Regional Transport Authority follow the procedure prescribed under Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 57 of the Act before allowing it. Consequently, the order dated May 27, 1958, passed by the Regional Transport Authority allowing the petitioner “to ply via Shyamlu and Raghunathpura in place of Devroad between Chirawa to Surajgarh” is bad and cannot be sustained in law.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal by Sagruddin, non-petitioner No. 2, as he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority by variation of the conditions of the permit for two reasons; firstly, that the variation cannot be said to have been allowed to the detriment of Sagruddin, non-petitioner No. 2, as even prior to the variation the petitioner did hold the permit to ply between Chirawa to, Sultana; and secondly, a rival permit holder has no locus standi to file appeal against the variation of conditions of permit granted to another permit holder. To this contention, the reply on behalf of the non-petitioner is that, assuming for argument's sake, that even if no appeal lay by the non-petitioner, he could file revision under Section 64-A of the Act and, therefore, the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may be held to be justified as having been passed in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 64-A of the Act.

9. We may here point out that for upholding the impugned order by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 64-A, the non-petitioner must show that he is a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority inasmuch as under the first proviso to Section 64-A, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain any application from the person aggrieved by an order of the Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within 30 days of the date of order. The contention of the non-petitioner is that in the circumstances of the case, the non-petitioner No. 2, Sagruddin cannot be held to be a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority because a person aggrieved in case of variation of the conditions of a permit can only be the permit holder of the permit, the conditions of which have been varied and not any other rival permit holder.

10. As we have already stated above, we do not feel inclined to decide this question in the facts and circumstances of this case; whether Sagruddin, non-petitioner No. 2, can be considered as a person aggrieved by the variation in the conditions of the petitioner's permit. We have already held above that the order of the Regional Transport Authority, whereby the variation in the conditions of the permit of the petitioner was allowed, was not legal and proper as it had been passed without following the procedure prescribed under Section 57, Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5). Assuming for argument's sake, that the non-petitioner No. 2, Sagruddin, had no locus standi to file an appeal or revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated May 27, 1978, the fact remains that the said order of the Regional Transport Authority is illegal and if we were to allow this writ petition and set aside the impugned order by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the result would be that the illegal order of the Regional Transport Authority would be restored. It may be noted that there has been no failure of justice in the present case and we would be justified in refusing to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it. We are of opinion, that having regard to the facts of the case and the law bearing on the subject, we should decline to interfere.

11. In Gani Mohammed v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1976 Raj LW 201, it was observed that while granting a writ of certiorari, this court would not exercise its discretion in such a manner which would have the effect of restoring an illegal order passed by the Regional Transport Authority. As we have already pointed out above, the effect of setting aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal by a writ of certiorari would be restoring an invalid and illegal order passed by the Regional Transport Authority. Reference may also be made to G. Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 wherein the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the State Government had no power under Section 72 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act to review its previous order, yet their Lordships refused to interfere with the order passed by the State Government upon such a review on the ground that quashing of that order would lead to restoration of an illegal order passed earlier by the State Government. In this connection, their Lordships further observed that the High Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

12. Before parting with the case, we may observe that even though the State Transport Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated May 27, 1978, yet it has given no further direction to the Regional Transport Authority in the matter.

13. We are, however, of opinion that it will be open to the Regional Transport Authority to treat the petitioner's application for variation of the route as an application for the grant of a new permit under Section 57(8) of the Act and decide it afresh after following the procedure prescribed in Sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 57 of the Act.

14. With these observations, the writ petition is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

15. Petition dismissed.

Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan And Another Non-Petitioners.

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lodha, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Non-petitioner's (Respondent's) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan And Another Non-Petitioners.

Comments