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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Section 47 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, No. 38 or 1952,
  • Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act No. 28 of 1951.
  • Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. (5)
  • Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952,
  • Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951
  • SECTION 116 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Reforms Land Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952,
  • Section 47(3) of the Municipal Act
  • SECTION 116 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Order VIII, Rule 5 C.P.C.
  • Indian Partnership Act.
  • Section 116, T.P. Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Section 47 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, No. 38 or 1952,
  • Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act No. 28 of 1951.
  • Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. (5)
  • Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952,
  • Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951
  • SECTION 116 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Reforms Land Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952,
  • Section 47(3) of the Municipal Act
  • SECTION 116 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Order VIII, Rule 5 C.P.C.
  • Indian Partnership Act.
  • Section 116, T.P. Act
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal by Defendant (Ejectment)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit for ejectment was instituted in the Court of Munsiff, Alwar on 10-2-1962 by the plaintiff-respondent firm Bhonreylai Hiralal, Kedalganj, Alwar and its partners (respondents Nos. 2–6). The plaintiffs alleged that Thakur Shivelal Singh (a muafidar) sold a plot of land in Alwar to them by a registered sale deed dated 22-7-1956 (or 26-7-1956 as recorded in evidence) and that the defendant-appellant was occupying a part of that land as a tenant of Shivelal Singh, paying rent at Rs. 2/8 (described in pleadings alternatively as Rs. 2.50) per year and that rent had been paid up to 31-12-1960. Plaintiffs claimed ejectment on grounds of bona fide and reasonable personal necessity and averred they had served a notice of ejectment dated 28-8-1961; the defendant gave an evasive reply dated 12-9-1961 (disputed in evidence).

At trial the learned Munsiff (judgment dated 21-1-1966) found in favour of the plaintiffs on several key issues: that the plaintiffs (Nos. 2–6) constituted a joint Hindu family carrying on business as a firm; that Shivelal Singh validly sold the property to the plaintiffs; that the defendant was a tenant (not a permanent tenant); and that plaintiffs had established bona fide personal necessity — and decreed the suit for eviction.

The defendant appealed to the District Judge, Alwar; the appeal was dismissed by the District Judge on 31-10-1967. An application by the Urban Improvement Trust to be impleaded on the ground the land had been resumed as muafi was rejected by the District Judge. The defendant thereupon filed this second appeal to the Court that delivered the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the land in dispute was a muafi grant which had been resumed (and therefore incapable of valid sale).
  2. Whether Thakur Shivelal Singh, being said to have been under the management of the Court of Wards, was competent to sell the land (i.e., whether Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951 rendered the sale void).
  3. Whether a relationship of landlord and tenant was established between the plaintiffs and the defendant (attornment, payment of rent, admissions and other evidence).
  4. Whether the notice of ejectment given by the plaintiffs was valid and whether service was established so as to terminate the tenancy.
  5. Whether the plaintiffs (the firm and its partners) had locus standi to file the suit where the sale deed was said to have been executed in favour of Hiralal alone.
  6. Whether the defendant had acquired status of a permanent tenant (and therefore could not be evicted).
  7. Whether a new point (disability of vendor because of Court of Wards management) could be raised for the first time in the first appeal (i.e., whether it was a pure question of law permissible to be taken up on appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The land was muafi land and had been resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, so it could not lawfully have been sold.
  • Shivelal Singh was under the management of the Court of Wards from 1924 to 1950 and therefore, by Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951, he was not competent to transfer the land; accordingly the sale in 1950 (as pleaded) was void.
  • No landlord–tenant relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant; the defendant denied tenancy and claimed long possession and ancestral occupation (over a century), and raised denial of service and validity of notice of ejectment.
  • The plaintiffs lacked locus standi because the sale deed was argued to have been executed in favour of Hiralal personally and not the firm; hence the firm could not have maintained the suit.
  • The defendant was a permanent tenant (owing to long occupation and constructions) and could not be evicted.
  • The notice of ejectment was not validly served and particulars of defect were not shown by the plaintiffs; identity of person issuing notice and person suing was challenged invoking Section 106 Transfer of Property Act principles.

Respondent's (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs are members of a joint Hindu family and carry on business as the firm Bhonreylal Hiralal; the sale deed (Ex. 10) was in the name of 'Malik firm' Bhonrey Lal Hiralal and the property should be treated as firm property.
  • The defendant attorned to the plaintiffs after purchase by payment of rent (receipts produced, Ex. 14) and by acknowledging plaintiffs as landlords in a reply (Ex. 9); consequently the defendant cannot challenge the plaintiffs' title as landlords.
  • The objection based on the Court of Wards management was not raised at trial and is not a pure question of law; it was a mixed question of fact and law and therefore improperly raised for the first time in appeal.
  • The suit is premised on landlord–tenant relationship rather than on title; if landlord–tenant relationship is established (by attornment and payment of rent) plaintiffs are entitled to ejectment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subbanna v. Subbanna, AIR 1965 SC 1325 Authority relied on to support that a pure question of law may be raised for the first time on appeal. The appellant relied on it but the Court found the point not to be a pure question of law and therefore declined to allow it to be raised in appeal.
M. K. Ranganathan v. Government of Madras, AIR 1955 SC 604 Also cited to support ability to raise pure questions of law in first appeal. The Court rejected reliance on it because the point raised was held to be mixed fact and law and not properly admissible first in appeal.
Choteylal v. Chandra Bhan, AIR 1923 All. 176 Cited for proposition that issues of mixed fact and law which were not raised at trial cannot be taken for the first time in appeal. Used by respondents' counsel and accepted by the Court to justify refusing the late point about Court of Wards.
Kehar Singh & Others v. Dewan Singh & Others, AIR 1966 SC 1555 Cited as authority on the admissibility of new points in appeal (mixed fact-law issues). Relied upon by respondents; the Court treated the new point as not properly raised first on appeal and therefore not tenable.
Siddik (Siddiq) Mohammed Shaik v. Mt. Saran and Ors, AIR 1930 PC 57 Authority establishing that a claim not made in defence at trial cannot later be founded upon in appeal. The Court applied the principle to refuse the appellant's late contention regarding vendor's disability to sell.
Kanhaiyalal v. Abdul Karim, 1956 RLW 351 Cited in support of respondents' position on new points and appellate procedure. Relied upon by respondents; contributed to Court's view that the new point could not be entertained on appeal.
Bhagat Singh v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1361 Another authority cited in the context of whether new points can be raised in appeal. Considered among the authorities supporting the principle that new mixed issues should not be entertained first in appeal.
Rao Bhagwat Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1954 RLW 411 Referenced concerning provisions regarding management by Court of Wards being declared unconstitutional (as argued by respondents). The Court noted the appellant's contention invoking this case but did not permit the new pleading in appeal; ultimately the Court did not reopen the point.
Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 SC 758 Cited by appellant to contend payment of rent does not necessarily prove tenancy (permissive occupation may explain rent paid). The Court distinguished the case: here the defendant gave no explanation of permissive occupation and had not pleaded it, so payment of rent supported a finding of tenancy.
Purnima Debi v. Khagendra Narayan, AIR 1962 SC 567 Also cited by the appellant in the argument that payment of rent alone cannot conclusively establish tenancy. The Court held the cited authority distinguishable on facts and did not accept it as overturning the attornment and rent evidence here.
Krishna Prasad Lal v. Baraboni Coal Concern (Krishna Prasad v. Baraboni Coal Concern), AIR 1937 PC 251 Authority on estoppel by attornment (acceptance of rent leading to recognition of landlord–tenant relationship). Invoked by respondents to support that attornment and acceptance of rent estop the tenant from denying landlord's title; Court accepted the reasoning as relevant.
Parmeshwarlal v. Dalu Ram, AIR 1967 Assam 188 Held that a tenant attorning to successor in interest is estopped under Section 116 Evidence Act from denying landlord's title. The Court relied on the case to affirm that attornment by payment and acknowledgement supports estoppel against the tenant.
Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai, AIR 1949 PC 124 Explained the operation of Section 116 T.P. Act / Section 116 Evidence Act principles: acceptance of rent as clear recognition of tenancy. The Court quoted and applied the principle that acceptance of rent as such is a clear recognition of tenancy rights and cannot later be disclaimed.
Gurcharan Singh v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1955 Punj. 34 Held that payment of rent raises a presumption of landlord–tenant relationship, but it is rebuttable by inconsistent acts/conduct. The Court applied the presumption and found it unrebutted here (no pleaded permissive occupation or adequate rebuttal), supporting tenancy finding.
Habib Bux v. Samuel Fitz & Co. Ltd., AIR 1926 All. 161 Authority on postal correspondence: a received letter may raise a presumption of posting where there is prior postal exchange. The Court relied on the observations to treat the defendant's typed but unsigned reply (Ex. 9) as reasonably provable as the defendant's reply and as an admission.
H. S. Rikhy v. New Delhi Municipality, AIR 1962 SC 554 Illustrates that statutory requirements (e.g., a written lease where mandatory) cannot be cured merely by receipt of rent. The Court distinguished that case because no similar statutory bar applied here and accepted rent receipts as tending to prove tenancy.
Pramatha Nath v. Rajoh Bejoy, AIR 1927 Cal. 234; Promatha Nath Das v. Champa Dasi, AIR 1929 Cal. 473; Dinabandhu v. Gopinath, AIR 1948 Pat. 12 Cited by appellant to support the contention that long possession and construction may indicate permanent tenancy. The Court found the appellant's reliance inapplicable: the defendant had not proved a permanent tenancy and had not averred any agreement of permanent tenancy; constructions were not pucca.
Nainapillai v. T.A.R.A. Ramanathan, AIR 1924 PC 65 Authority holding the onus is on a tenant who claims permanent tenancy and that long occupation at fixed rent does not raise a presumption of permanent tenancy. The Court applied this principle to require the defendant to prove permanent tenancy; the defendant failed to discharge that onus.
Motiram v. Parmanand, 1960 RLW 251 Cited for the proposition that a party who complains of a defective notice should produce the original and show particulars of defect. The Court applied this view in holding the defendant should have produced the original notice and explained defects; failure to do so precluded his attack on notice validity.
S. N. Datt v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1449 Invoked by appellant regarding identity/authority of person issuing a notice vis-à-vis person suing (in context of Section 106 Transfer of Property Act). The Court noted the authority but found the appellant had not pleaded or proved identity defects or produced the original notice, so the contention failed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded issue by issue, applying evidence-law principles and the authorities cited by both sides without entertaining any matter not properly raised at trial:

  1. Muafi/resumption point: The Court examined witness evidence. It rejected reliance on a passing statement of P.W. 5 (Hiralal) that the land was muafi because the witness said he did not know Shivelal Singh and did not disclose the source of his knowledge. The Court accepted the testimony of P.W. 7 (Shivelal Singh) and D.W. 2 (Gyasi Ram, Patwari) that the land was in Abadi and neither muafi nor biswedari. On that record the Court found no reason to disagree with the District Judge's finding that the land was not muafi.
  2. Competency of vendor (Court of Wards / Section 37): The appellant raised for the first time on appeal the contention that Shivelal Singh had been under Court of Wards and therefore could not sell. The Court analysed whether that objection was a pure question of law (which might be entertained first on appeal) or a mixed question of fact and law. Having considered authorities on both sides, the Court concluded the point was not a pure question of law but a mixed question; it was not raised at trial and the solitary statement in cross-examination (by P.W. 7) could not be used to found a late objection which plaintiffs had no opportunity to meet by adducing further evidence. Consequently the Court refused to admit the new contention on appeal.
  3. Landlord–tenant relationship and attornment: The Court carefully reviewed the documentary and oral evidence. It noted that the plaintiffs produced: (a) Ex. 1 — a notice by Shivelal Singh to the defendant after sale informing him to pay rent to purchasers; (b) Ex. 14 — the printed receipt (counterfoil) dated 26-5-1961 evidencing payment by the defendant (through his son) of Rs. 7.50 said to be arrears for three years 1-1-1958 to 31-12-1960; and (c) Ex. 9 — a typed unsigned reply purporting to be from the defendant acknowledging his possession as a tenant and stating he had been paying rent year to year. The defendant had not produced the original of Ex. 9, but the Court accepted that the written pleadings (Order VIII, Rule 5 C.P.C. implications) and the oral testimony permitted treating the reply as proved or at least admitted by omission. The Court held that payment of rent together with the admissions/giving of notice and receipt supported a presumption of landlord–tenant relationship which the defendant did not successfully rebut. The Court relied on cases establishing that acceptance of rent and attornment can estop the tenant from denying landlord's title.
  4. Validity and service of notice of ejectment: The defendant admitted receipt of the notice dated 28-8-1961 but pleaded only that it was "wrong and improper" without supplying particulars or producing the original notice. The Court held it was the defendant's duty to produce the original and prove defects; in absence of particulars or original document, the defendant could not successfully attack the notice. Motiram v. Parmanand was cited to support that position.
  5. Plaintiffs' locus standi: The Court examined the sale deed (Ex. 10) which was executed in the name 'Malik firm' Bhonrey Lal Hiralal, Kedalganj, Alwar, evidence that the partners were brothers forming a joint Hindu family, testimony that no partition had occurred, and the rent receipt in the firm's name. On these facts the Court concluded that the property was properly treated as firm property and the plaintiffs (firm and partners) were competent to sue.
  6. Permanent tenancy: The Court applied established law that the burden lies on a tenant who asserts permanent tenancy to prove it, and that mere long possession at a fixed rent or erection of non-pucca structures does not conclusively establish permanent tenancy. The defendant had not pleaded any agreement of permanent tenancy nor discharged the onus; accordingly the Court rejected the permanent-tenancy defence.
  7. Overall assessment: Synthesising the evidence and the law, and giving due weight to the findings of the trial and first appellate courts (which the Court found no reason to overturn), the Court concluded the relationship of landlord and tenant between plaintiffs and defendant was established; the defendant's attempts to raise new points in appeal (particularly the Court of Wards claim) were rejected as improperly taken first on appeal; the notices were treated as valid in the circumstances; and the defendant had not proved permanent tenancy.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal was dismissed with costs. The decree for ejectment passed by the Munsiff and upheld by the District Judge stands.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the judgment and decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs (the firm Bhonreylai Hiralal and its partners) are upheld and the defendant's appeal fails.
  • The Court refused to admit a new contention (disability of vendor due to Court of Wards management) raised for the first time on appeal because it was a mixed question of fact and law and the plaintiffs had no opportunity to meet it; this reinforces the procedural principle that mixed questions not raised at trial are ordinarily not entertainable first in appeal.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; the decision's immediate effect is confined to disposing of the present appeal and affirming the lower courts' findings.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to content and findings expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Nathuram v. Firm Bhonreylal Hiralal And Ors.

    1. This is a second appeal by the defendant against whom a decree for ejectment was passed by the Munsiff, Alwar and on appeal by the defendant the same are upheld by the District Judge, Alwar.

    2. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Firm Bhonreylai Hiralal, Kedalganj, Alwar and its partners respondent No. 2 to 6 filed the suit in the Court of Munsiff, Alwar on 10-2-62 alleging that the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 constitute a joint Hindu family and carry on business under the name and style: Firm Bhonrey lal Hiralal, which was also registered under the Indian Partnership Act. It was alleged that one Thakur Shivelal Singh, Muafidar of Thikana Burja sold a place of land measuring 370,10 "x'3" situated in the city of Alwar to the plaintiffs by a registered sale deed dated 22-7-1956 for a conit sideration of Rs. 3000/-, and that the defendant was occupying a portion of this land measuring .27' x 33' as a tenant of the vendor Shivelal Singh for which the rent settled was Rs. 2/8/- per month. It was also alleged that the defendant had paid rent to the plaintiffs upto 31-12-1960, and thereafter no rent had been paid. The plaintiffs' case was that that they wanted to construct shops on the land in question for carrying on their own business, and thus ejectment was claimed on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the landlords. It was also averred that the plaintiffs had terminated the defendant's tenancy by giving him a notice of ejecment dated 28-8-1961 to which the defendant had given an evasive reply dated 12-9-1961.

    3. The defendant denied the plaintiffs' suit and in the written statement filed by him it was pleaded that the plaintiffs did not constitute a joint Hindu family and that their firm was unregistered under the partnership Act and consequently the firm was not cempetent to file the suit. The ownership of Shivelal Singh to the land in dispute was also denied, and so also Shivlal Singh's right to sell it to the plaintiffs It was pleaded that the plaintiffs had not acquired any valid title to the land in dispute. The defendant also denied his status as a tenant of Shivalal Singh and pleaded that he had been in possession of this land for more than 100 years and his ancestors had built a house on it at their own cost. The alleged relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant and Shivelal Singh, the vendor of the plaintiff was denied and so also the alleged attronment by defendant in favour of the plaintiffs by payment of rent. It was pleaded that the defendant being illiterate had once paid a sun of Rs. 7.50 paisa to the plaintiffs under the pressure of the plaintiffs who were rich and influential people in the city. The service of notice of ejectment was also denied. In the alternative it was* pleaded that the land in question was muafi land which could not have been sold on account of the enforcement of the and Reforms Land Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, The defendant also took the plea that Shivelal Singh had executed the sale deed in favour of Hitalal alone, and, therefore the plaintiffs had no locus standi to file the suit. In the last resort the defendant pleaded that in any case if all other points are decided against the defendant, the defendant was a permanent tenant in respect of the land in question and consequently no suit for ejectment could be brought against him. It may be stated here that for the purposes of ejectment the plaintifis had also alleged that the defendant Nathuram had sublet the land in question to defendant No. 2 Gopiram. But it appears that this ground was not pressed.

    4. After recording the evidence produced by the parties the learned Munsiff by her judgment dated 21-1-1966 held that the plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 6 constitute a joint Hindu family and carry on business under the name and style Firm Bhonrey Lal Hiralal, Kedalganj, Aiwar. It was also found that Shivelal Singh was competent to sell the land in question and had validly sold the same to the plaintiffs by a registered sale deed Ex 10, dated 26-7-1956 She also found that the defendant-appellant was a tenant in the suit premises and that the tenancy was not a permanent one. As regards the alleged reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiffs for the premises in question the finding of the learned Munsiff was also in favour of the plaintiffs. She held that the plaintiffs had lawfully terminated the defendant's tenancy by a valid notice of ejectment. She found that the defendant had failed to prove that the land in question was a muafi. In the result she decreed the plaintiff's suit for eviction.

    5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff the defendant filed appeal which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Alwer on 31-10-1967 Consequntly the defendant has come in second appeal to this Court.

    6. Before I proceed to consider the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties I may summarise the findings of the learned District Judge also. An application was moved on behalf of the Urban Improvement Trust before the learned District Judge stating that the land in question was a muafi land which had been resumed and had vested in the Urban Improvement Trust and consequently it was prayed that the Urban Improvement Trust may be ordered to be impleaded as a party to this appeal. This application was rejected by the learned District Judge. As regards the merits of the case his findings are as below:

    (1) That the plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 6 are members of joint Hindu family.

    (2) That the sale deed in respect of the property in question was executed by Thakur Shivelal Singh in favour of the purchaser Hiralal, who had purchased the same as a partner of the firm Bhonreylal Hiralal, and, therefore, the property will be deemed to be the property of the firm.

    (3) That the defandant had paid Rs. 7.50 paisa as rent to the plaintiffs after they had purchased the property from Shivelal Singh and had thereby attorned to the plaintiffs, and consequently the defendant cannot challenge the plaintiff's position as his landlords.

    (4) That the land in question was not muafi land and cannot be said to have been resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952.

    (5) That the plaintiffs had succeeded in proving their bonafide and reasonable personal necessity for the land in question.

    (6) That the defendant cannot be allowed to attack the validity of the notice of ejectment and lastly.

    (7) That the defendant had failed to establish a permanent tenancy in respect of the land in question.

    7. It may be pointed out here that the defendant wanted to urge a new point before the learned District Judge that Shivelal Singh the vendor of the plaintiffs was, according to Shivelal Singh's own statement, under the management of the Court of Wards from the year 1924 to 1950 and consequently the sale of the land in question by him in 1950 was null and void under Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act No. 28 of 1951. But the learned District Judge held that this was not a pure question of law and could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal.

    8. Learned Counsel for the appellant has reiterated before me almost all the contentions which had been raised on behalf of the appellant before the learned District Judge. He has contended that Shivelal Singh the vendor of the plaintiffs was not competent to sell the land in question in favour of the plaintiffs Hiralal, firstly because the land in question was a muafi land which had been resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, and secondly that as admitted by Shivelal Singh himself he was under the management of the Court of Wards from 1924 to 1950 A.D. that is, at the time when the sale of the land in question was made by him. It is urged that by virue of Section 37 of the Rajasthan Court of Wards Act, 1951 Shivelal Singh was not competent to transfer any part of his estate including the land in question which was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.

    9. I shall first take up the question whether the land in question was a muafi grant which had been resumed and could not be sold away. In this connection learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the statement of P.W. 5 Hiralal, who has stated in cross-examination that he did not know Shivelal Singh, who was a muafidar, but that the land which has been purchased by the plaintiffs was a muafi land of Shive Lal Singh. It may be observed that the learned District Judge did not place reliance on this part of the statement of PW. 5 Hiralal on the ground that the witness has stated that he does not know Shivelal Singh and that he does not disclose the source of his knowledge as to how he considered the land in question to be muafi On the other hand he has relied on the statement of P.W. 7 Shivelal Singh and D.W. 2 Gyasi Ram, Patwari, who have stated in clear terms that the land in question is in Abadi and is neither a muafi land nor a Biswedari, and I do not see any adequate reason to disagree with the learned District Judge.

    10. Coming to the question, whether Shivelal Singh was incompetent to sell the land in question on account of being under the Court of Wards, it is not disputed that this point was not taken before the trial court and was raised for the first time before the learned District Judge in appeal, A large number of authorities were cited by the learned Counsel for both the parties on the question whether the objection of the learned Counsel as to the disability of Shivelalsingh to sell the land should be entertained or not? It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the question raised by him was a pure question of law not dependent on the determination of any question of fact, and should have been allowed to be raised for the first time by the first appellate court. He relied on Subbanna v. Subbanna AIR 1965 SC 1325 and M K. Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras AIR 1955 SC 604. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the new point taken by the appellant was not a pure question of law that was a mixed question of fact and law, and that a solitary statement elicited in cross-examination from Shivelal Singh, a witness of the plaintiffs which they had no opportunity explaining cannot be utilised for the purpose of founding an objection which had not been taken in the trial ceart or put into issue In support of his contention he has placed reliance on Choteylal v. Chandra Bhan AIR 1923 AII. 176, Kehar Singh & Others v. Dewan Singh & Others. AIR 1966 SC 1555, Siddik Mahammed Shah v. Mt. Sayan and Ors. AIR 1930 PC 57, Kanhaiyalal v. Abdul Knrim 1956 RLW 351, and Bhagat Singh v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1966 SC 1361. It is contended by him that if this point had been made a subject matter of issue he would have shown that Shivelal Singh's estate had been taken under the management of Court of Wards under the provisons which had been declared unconstitutional by this Court vide Rao Bhagwat Singh v. The State of Rajasthan 1954 RLW 411, or would have shown that the land in question was ever taken under the management of the Court of Wards or would have otherwise successfully challenged the allegation of the plaintiffs.

    11. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also contended that the plaintiffs had not brought the present suit on the basis of title, but the suit has been based on the relationship of landlord and tenant and consequently the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed in case they are able to prove that the defendant was their tenant either by contract or by operation of law. He has contended that the defendant has in the present case attorned the plaintiffs by paying 3 years' rent to them and consequently the defendant is precluded from denying the title of the plaintiffs, who allowed him to occupy the land in question as their tenent.

    12. After a casual consideration of the contentions raised' by the learned Counsel for the parties I have come to the conclusion that the defendant cannot be allowed to raise this new point which he had not teken up in the trial court. It would not be correct to say that the point raised by the defendant is a pure question of law I am also of view that a solitary statement of that character by P.W. 7 Shivelal Singh elicited in cross-examination by the defendant which plaintiffs hap no opportunity for explaining cannot be utilised for the purpose of founding an objection which had not previously been taken by putting into issue. It is possible that the plaintiff's might have a good explanation as to how that statement was made or as to how and in what circumstances Shivelal Singh's estate was taken under the management of the Court of Wards. In any case it appears to me that the learned District Judge was right in holding that a plea of that character can not be allowed to be entertained at the appellate stage when it is not open to the other party to meet it by calling other evidence. It is well established that where a claim has been never made in the defence presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward: Siddiq Mohamed Shaik v. Mt. Saran and Ors. AIR 1930 PC 57 . I, therefore, reject this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Shivelalsingh had no right to sell the land in question.

    13. I would now consider the other important point raised on behalf of the appellant, namely, that no relationship of landlord and tenant has been established between the plaintiffs and the defendant. This is undoubtedly the most important point in the case. The plaintiff's case in this connection is that there was an oral agreement between their predecessor in title Shivelal singh and the defendant by which the defendant was admitted as tenant on the land in question on the yearly rent of Rs. 2.50 paisa and that Shivelal Singh gave a notice to the defendant after the sale in favour of the plaintiffs informing him that he had sold away the land in question to the plaintiffs and that rent in receipt of this should be paid by the defendant from 1-1-1958 to the plaintiffs. The original notice has been placed on the record and marked Ex. 1, and it has been admitted by the defendant. It is also the plaintiff's case that after they had purchased the property the defendant paid three years' rent to them, that is, Rs. 7.50 paisa through his son Ganga Sahay for which the plaintiffs had issued a receipt signed by the plaintiff Nand Lal and Ganga Sahay. A counter foil or that receipt has been produced and marked Ex. 4. It is also alleged by the plaintiffs that they gave a notice of ejectment to the defendant dated 28-8-1961 to which they received an unsigned reply from the defendant marked Ex. 9 in which the defendant admitted his possession as a tenant but denied his liability to evict the premises.

    14. The first point to be determined in this connection is whether there was an agreement of oral tenancy between Shivelal Singh and the defendant and this is the subject matter of issue No. 3. P. W. 1 Nandlal plaintiff has stated that Shivelal Singh had rented out the land in dispute to Nathuram on rent of Rs. 2.50 paisa per year, and that Nathuram defendant used to pay rent to Shivelal Singh P. W. 7 Shivelal Singh has stated that Nathuram had been in occupation of the land in question for 200 to 250 years and that he had handed over the rent deed to Hiralal plaintiff. It must be noticed that no rent deed alleged to have been executed by the defendant in favour of Shivelaisingh has been produced by the plaintiffs, and the allegation of the plaintiffs in para No. 3 of the plaint that there was an oral agreement between Shivelal Singh and the defendant by which the defendant was admitted as a tenant on the land in question cannot be said to have been proved. It may not be out of place to mention here that even though there was a specific issue on the point, namely, issue No. 3 neither trial court nor the learned District Judge gave any specific finding on this issue. The position, therefore, boils down to this that the defendant had been in possession of the land in question for a very long time and as stated by Shivelal singh for more than 200 years, but it has not been proved by the plaintiffs that any rent had been realised from the defendant by Shivelal singh not it had been proved that there was any oral or written agreement between Shivelal Singh and the defendant by which the defendant agreed to occupy the land in question as Shivelal Singh's tenant. That the position was not clear even to Shivelal Singh, is further borne out from the language of the notice Ex. 1 given by him to the defendant after the, sale of the land in favour of the plaintiffs. It is mentioned therein that the defendant was in possession of the land in question as a tenant by virtue or a note (the date of which was left blank, while typing the notice but a cross was put in the blank, while signing the notice). This clearly shows that there was no oral agreement of tenancy between the defendant & Shivelal Singh who was merely groping in the dark. The fact, however, remains that the defendant received this notice and did not give any reply to Shivelal Singh, nor repudiated the averments there in. It further transpires from para No. 9 of the plaint that after having purchased the property the plaintiffs gave a notice of ejectment to the defendant dated 28-3-61. This notice was given by Shri Kailash Nath, Advocate on behalf of the plaintiffs. The receipt of this notice is admitted by the defendant in para No. 9 of the written statement, and, it was further stated that the notice was wrong and improper. The defendant's case is that the reply to the notice Ex. 9 alleged to have been given, be him is in fact a manipulation and this reply, was not sent by him. Learned counsel for the appellant is correct in his connection that the reply Ex. 9 in a typed document from start to the finish and has not been signed by any body, and there is no proof worth the name to show that this reply had been sent by or on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiff Nandram (P.W 1) has no doubt stated that the plaintiffs received Ex. 9 from the defend-; ant by post in reply to the notice given bv them The defendant Nathuram has no doubt stated as D.W. 1 that Ex. 9 was not sent by him or on his. behalf.

    15. It is, however, contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent in para No. 9 of the plaint the plaintiffs had clearly alleged that the defendant gave a notice dated 12-9-61 in reply to the plaintiffs' notice in which the defendant gave an evasive reply and that the reply in original and the acknowledgement receipt of the notice given by the plaintiffs were being filed, and that the defendant replied to this para in para No. 9 of his written statement that para No. 9 of the plaint was correct to this extent that Shri Kailash Nath Vakil had given a notice which was wrong and improper. His contention is that under Order VIII, Rule 5 C.P.C. every allegation of fact in the plaint, if denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be; hot admitted in the pleading of the defendant shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. It is significant that though in certain other paras of the written statemement the allegations made in the plaint have been denied, but in para No. 9 of the written statement there is no such denial at all, nor it. can be said that the allegations of fact made in para No, 9 of the plaint have been denied by the defendant by necessary implication. In my opinion in absence of an express and specific denial of the plaintiffs' allegations in the present circumstances, the allegation of the plaintiffs that the defendant had sent a reply to the plaintiffs' notice must be taken to be admitted. The defendant Nathuram no doubt in his statement has tried to repair this omission by stating that he had not given any reply to the plaintiffs' notice but he has not given any explanation for his omission to reply to this part of the plaintiffs' case, in his written statement. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the implied admission contained in the defendant's written statement in this respect must be taken to be conclusive. However, without going into this question I am of opinion that on the stage of pleadings as well as after the consideration of the evidence of P.W. 1 Nandlal and D.W. 1 Nathuram 1 have come to the conclusion that plaintiffs' case that Ex. 9 was a reply received by the plaintiffs from the defendant in reply to the former's notice must be accepted.

    16. The other relevant point which has a bearing on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant is the factum of payment of Rs. 7.50 paisa. That the amount has been paid was not denied in the written statemement nor has been disputed before me at the bar even though D.W. 1 Nathuram (defendant) had denied this payment as a witness. But since it his not been challenged before me it must be said that Nathuram has made a false statement when he said that no such payment was made to the plaintiffs. In para No. 4 of the plaint it was alleged by the plaintiffs that the defendant paid rent upto 31-12-1960 at the rate of Rs. 2.50 paisa per year. In reply to this para the defendant has stated in para No. 4 of the written statement that he made this payment under the influence of the plaintiffs who are rich and influential people in the city. Nothing has been said as to what for this payment of Rs. 7.50 paisa was made by him. The plaintiffs have proved this payment as rent by the counter foil of the receipt Ex. 14, which is proved by P.W. 1 Nand Lal, who had signed it. Nandlal has proved the signature of of Ganga Sahay on Ex. 9. It is further mentioned in this receipt dated 26-5-1961, that it was in respect of arrears of rent for three years from 1-1-1958 to 31-12-1960 It is a printed receipt issued by the firm Bhonrylal Hiralal, Kedalganj, Alwar. As already stated above the defendant has denied this payment altogether a stand diametrically opposed to the pleading in the written statement The lower court has accepted the plaintiffs' evidence in this connection, and I fail to see how the finding of the learned District Judge in this connection is vitiated. I, therefore, hold that the defendant had paid rent for the land in question to the plaintiffs by Ex. 14 for three from years 1-1-1958 to 31-12-1960.

    17. In ultimate analysis the facts as they emerge from the record are that the defendant had been in occupation of the land in question prior to its sale by Shive Lal Singh in favour of the plaintiffs and according to Shivlal Singh the defendant was occupying the same in the position of a tenant though the date of tenancy as well as the terms of the tenancy are not proved. But after the sale Shivelal Singh gave a notice to the defendant to pay the rent in respect of the land in question hence forth to the purchaser plaintiffs (Ex. P. l) but the defendant failed to reply or controvert this notice. It is further proved that after the purchase of the land in question the plaintiffs' gave a notice of ejectment to the defendant to which the defendant gave a reply Ex. 9 and did not repudiate the claim of the plaintiffs that they were the landlords and the defendant was a tenant On the other hand the defendant asserted that he had been paying rent regularly year to year and was not liable to be ejected. Then again it is established that on 26-6-1961 the defendant paid rent to the plaintiffs for three years from 1-1-1958 to 31-12-1960 Rs. 7-50 paisa through his son Ganga Sahay (vide Ex. 14).

    18. From the aforesaid facts the learned District Judge concluded that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant as established, and after a critical examination of the facts and circumstances of the case I do not see any reason to take a different view.

    19. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that mere payment of rent does not necessarily establish relationship of landlord "and tenant. In support of his contention he has relied upon Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh AIR 1954 SC 758, and Purnima Debi v. Khagendra Narayan AIR 1962 SC 567, On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that there was attornment by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs by payment of rent and by acknowledging the plaintiffs as his landlords. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon Krishna Prasad v. Baraboni Coal Concern AIR 1937 PC 251, Parameshwarlal v. Dalu Ram AIR 1967Assam 188, Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai AIR 1949 PC 124, Gurcharan Singh v. Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1955 Punj. 34.

    20. The two Supreme Court cases relied upon by the learned learned Counsel for the appellant are distinguishable and have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh AIR 1954 SC 758 it appears that the High Court from whose judgment an appeal had been filed in the Supreme Court had found that the fact of payment of rent by the defendants first party to the superior landlords as evidenced by the rent receipts produced by the defendants first party from their own custody was quite consistent with their having permissive occupation of the lands under an amicable arrangement with the defendants seconds party without there being any relationship of landlord and tenant between the two sets of defendants. The High Court also found that as Kisans of the defendants second party, they were cultivating the lands and paying rents payable in respect of them to the proprietors by virtue of an arrangement for permissible occupation, and that any relationship of landlord and tenant was never contemplated between them. In these circumstances it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the fact of payment of by the defendants first party to the superior landlords was quite consistent with their having permissive occupation of the lands under an amicable arrangement with the defendants second party without there being any relationship of landlords and tenant between the two sets of defendants. It will be noticed that in the present case the defendant has not pleaded any permissible occupation, nor has given any explanation for payment of Rs. 7,50 paisa by him as rent to the landlords.

    21. In H. S. Rikhy v. New Delhi Municipality AIR 1962 SC 554 the appellants plea was that they were the tenants of the New Delhi Municipal Committee, and in support of their plea they relied upon certain receipts of rent granted by the Municipal Committee. Their Lordships, however, found that no contract of lease had been executed by the Municipal Committee as as required by Section 47 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, No. 38 or 1952, which was a mandarory provision and the absence of such a contract cannot be cured by the mere receipt of rent from the occupiers of the shops owned by the Municipality. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships were pleased to observe that the use of the term "rent" cannot preclude the landlord from pleading that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. In it was further held that absence of a written contract as provided by Section 47(3) of the Municipal Act cannot be cured by the mere receipt of rent from the occupiers and consequently it was held ' that no relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence.

    22. In Gurcharan Singh v. Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1955 Punj. 34 it was held that, Rent is a usual, though not an essential incident of the relationship of landlord and tenants and payment of rent by the occupier to the owner of premises raises a presumption that the relationship of landlord and tenant has come into existence. The presumption however is a rebuttable one and may be rebutted by showing that the acts and conduct of the parties are inconsistent with the existence.

    23. Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jorbai AIR 1949 PC 124 B.K. Mukherjea J., who delivered the majority judgment stated the law as following:

    What Section 116, T.P. Act contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of taking a renewed or fresh devise evidenced by the lessee's or sub-lessee's continuing in occupation of the property after his interest has ceased and on the other side there must be a definite assent to his continuance of possession by the landlord otherwise. The assent of the landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and be clear recognition of tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it.

    It was further held that when the landlord accepted the rent from the sublessee, the agreement between the parties was complete by acceptance of rent as such and it did not lie in the mouth of the landlord to say that he would receive the money but not as rent.

    24. In Parmeshwarlal v. Dalu Ram AIR 1967Assam 188 where a tenant in possession had by payment of rent attorned to the successor in interest of the deceased landlyrd he was held to be estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from denoing the title of successor landlord. In this connection the learned Judges observed as follows:

    The decision of the Judicial Committee in Krishna Prasad Lal v. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd., AIR 1937 PC 251: 64 India App 311 (D), supports the line of reasoning that in case of such an attornment, estoppel will operate against the tenant. In that ease, their Lordships held that Section 116, Evidence Act, does not deal or profess to deal with the kinds of estoppel or occasions of estoppel which may arise between landlord and tenant.

    It deals with only one kind of estoppel. The section postulates that there is a continuing tenancy, that it had its beginning at a given date from a given landlord, and it provides that neither a tentant nor any one claiming through a tenant, shall be heard to deny that particular landlord had at that date a title to the property. The words "at the beginning of tenancy" in Section 116, Evidence Act, do not give a ground for the contention that when person already in possession of land, becomes tenant to another, there is no estoppel against his denying his landlord's title.

    25. In the present case as already held above the defendant had paid Rs. 7.50. paisa as rent for three years to the plaintiffs vide counter foil of the receipt Ex. 14. It is further clear from Ex. 9, the reply alleged to have been given by the defendant, which I have held in the earlier part of my judgment to have been proved that the defendant acknowledged the plaintiffs as landlords and stated that he had been paying rent year to year. This reply was received through post purporting to come from the defendant and in view of the fact that it has been impliedly admitted by the defendant in the written statement it would not be unfair to presume that it was a reply despatched on behalf of the defendant even through it is only typed and not signed by any-body. In this connection I may refer to the observations of Sulaiman J , in Habib Bux v. Samuel Fitz & Co. Ltd., AIR 1926'AII. 161 (2).

    When a letter is only posted there may be a presumption that it reaches the addressee in the ordinary course of business. But the mere fact that a letter had been received through post raises no presumption that it was despatched by the person on whose behalf it purports to have been written. If however it were proved that a previous letter was sent by the decree-holder's firm through post to the judgment debtor and a reply thereto was duly received by the firm through post purporting to come from judgment debtor the court may under certain circumstances presume that it was a reply despatched on behalf of the judgment-debtor though not necessarily in his own handwriting.

    26. In view of the aforesaid discussion I have come to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the plaintiffs and defendant.

    27. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the tenancy had not been terminated by a valid notice. The defendant has admitted the receipt of notice by the plaintiffs, dated 28.8.1961 both in the written statement as well as in his statement as D.W. 1. All that has been pleaded in this connection in para No. 9 of the written statement, is that the notice was wrong and improper. The original notice has not been produced by the defendant. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the burden of proving that the notice was served upon the defendant and the notice was in accordance with law, and, therefore, resulted in determination of the tenancy is upon the plaintiffs, and in as much as there is no evidence on other side, the plaintifis's suit for ejectment should fall on that ground alone. It may be observed that the particulars as to how the notice was not considered to be in accordance with law were not given by the defendant. Besides withholding the original notice the defendant did not lead any evidence to show that the notice was defective In my opinion, it was the duty of the defendant to produce the original notice and also to have shown how the notice was defective and not in accordance with law? He cannot lie by and then be allowed to take the advantage of the abstract doctrine of onus of proof. In this connection I am supported by the view taken in Motiram v. Parmanand 1960 RLW 251.

    28. In this connection learned Counsel for the appellant has also submitted that identity of person issuing the notice and the parson bringing the suit has not been established and when there is no such identity the provisions regarding notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must be deemed to have been not complied with. In this connection he has placed reliance on S.N. Datt v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 1449. But in view of the fact that the defendant has not produced the original notice even though he was admittedly in possession of the same and that he has not pleaded the details regarding the insuffiency or illegality of the notice. It is not possible to accept the connection of the learned Counsel that the person giving the notice was different from the person bringing the suit or that the notice did not otherwise comply with the requirements of Section 116. of the Transfer of Property Act, I, therefore, find myself in agreement with lower appellate court that the defendant cannot defeat the plaintiff's claim on the ground of validity of notice of ejectment

    29. The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the plaintiffs had no locus standi ,to file the suit. It is urged that the sale of the land in question had taken place in favour of Hiralal alone in his personal capacity and the suit has been brought by firm Bhonreylal Hiralal and its partners among whom Hiralal is no doubt one. But he has not sued in his personal capacity. In this connection it may be relevant to point out that the learned Counsel has not challenged the finding of the first appellate court that the plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 6 are brothers and they constitute a a join Hindu family. It may be useful to point out at this stage that the sale deed Ex. 10 has been executed in favour of Hiralal as 'Malik firm' Bhonrey Lal Hiralal, Kedalgarj, Alwar. The learned District Judge found that the property was purchased by Hiralal as a partner of the firm Bhonrylal Hiralal it will be deemed to be the property of the firm as the partners of the firm are brothers. P.W. 1 Nandlal, plaintiff No. 6, has stated that no partition has taken place between the plaintiffs and that he had purchased the property in question from Shivelal Singh. It may be pointed out that even though the sale deed is not in his favour he has stated that the property was purchased by him. The counter foil of the receipt of rent Ex. 14 is in the name of firm Bhonrey Lal Hirelal. Taking all the circumstances into consideration I have come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. My finding is that the property was purchased by all the partners, and the relationship of landlord and tenant also came into existence between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendant on the other. In this view of the matter the plaintiffs must be held to be competent to file the present auit.

    30. Lastly the learned Counsel for the appellant urged that the defendant was a permanent tenant and could not be evicted in as much as he had been in possession of the premises in question for more than 100 years, and had raised construction over it. In this connection he placed reliance on Pramatha Nath v. Rajoh Bejoy AIR 1927 Cal. 234, Promatha Nath Das v. Champa Dasi AIR 1929 Cal. 473, and Dinabandhu v. Gopinath AIR 1948 Pat. 12. However I find it difficult to accept this contention either. In the first place the defendant has taken this plea as a last resort which is highly inconsistent with all other pleas taken by him. It is not his case that there was any agreement of permanent tenency between him and Shivelal Singh. On the other hand he has denied the factum of tenancy altogether. In Nainapillai v. T.A.R.A Ramanathan AIR 1924 PC 65, it was held by their Lordships that when a tenant sets up a defence that he has a right of permanent tenancy in the land, the onus of proving that he has such a right is upon the tenant and proof of long occupation at a fixed rent does not raise the presumption of permanant tenancy. The mere fact that the defendant has raised some construction on the land in question also cannot give rise to presumption of permanent tenancy. It may be observed that the constructions in the present, case are not pucca. Thus in the circumstances of the case I am unable to hold that the defendant had ever acquired the status of a permanent tenant. It may by observed that the finding of the learned District Judge that the plaintiffs had proved their reasonable and bonafide personal necessity for the land in question was not a sailed by the learned Counsel of the appellant. In fact no other point except those which I have referred to above was argued on behalf of the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondents raised an additional point almost towards the conclusion of his reply that the plaintiff Bhonrey Lal died during the pendency of the appeal in the first appellate court, but his legal representatives were not impleaded in the memo of appeal before this Court, and, there-fore the appeal was not properly constituted. But at the same time he conceded that if the suit is considered on behalf of the firm, and its partners as contended by him' there will be no difficulty on account of not impleading the legal representatives of Bhonrey Lal. In my opinion, the suit has been instituted on behalf of the firm and its partners, who are also members of a joint Hindu family, and therefore, this objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent does not deserve any consideration.

    31. In the result I do not see any force in this appeal, and hereby diamiss it with costs.

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    Nathuram v. Firm Bhonreylal Hiralal And Ors.
    (May 12, 1970)