AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Tyagi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the plaintiffs' second appeal from the judgment and decree dated 31 July 1961 of the District Judge, Jaipur, which set aside a decree previously passed by the Munsiff (30 April 1960) in a suit for possession and mesne profits concerning a disputed shop.

Concise narrative (based solely on the text):

  • The plaint was filed jointly by three persons: Kesarlal (who claimed to be the adopted son of Chhaganlal), Magan Lal (who claimed succession after the death of Mst. Godawari Bai, widow of Chhaganlal), and Mst. Ladhi Bai (daughter of Chhaganlal). After findings against Kesarlal on adoption he did not challenge that finding and the present appeal is prosecuted only by Mst. Ladhi Bai.
  • The disputed shop had been rented by Mst. Godawari Bai to Sunderlal (the temple manager). Sunderlal allegedly failed to pay rent during Godawari Bai's lifetime. After Godawari Bai's death (17 August 1956), Kesarlal served a notice on Sunderlal to pay rent to him. Sunderlal replied that he was no longer tenant because Godawari Bai had bequeathed the property to the temple of Beespanthiyan by a will dated 24 April 1956.
  • The three plaintiffs sued Sunderlal and the temple (Shriji Beespanthiyan) for possession, ejectment of Sunderlal, arrears of rent (Rs. 260/-) and mesne profits. The Munsiff decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs (30 April 1960). On appeal the District Judge reversed that decree (31 July 1961), holding that the will vested the shop in the temple by reason of the Hindu Succession Act having come into force before the testator's death. Mst. Ladhi Bai alone filed the present second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the will (Ex. A.1) executed by Mst. Godawari on 24.4.1956 — at a time when she was a "limited owner" — could validly be operative to pass title to the legatee given that the property vested in the legatee only on the testator's death and the Hindu Succession Act came into force after execution but before death.
  2. Whether the attestation of the will Ex. A.1 was proved, given that the attesting witnesses did not explicitly state that they signed in the presence of the testator (impugned attestation compliance with Sec. 63, Indian Succession Act and Sec. 61, Evidence Act).
  3. Whether a will in favour of Temple Beespanthiyan (allegedly not a juristic person) is void because the temple is not a juristic person and thus incapable of taking under a will.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mst. Ladhi Bai)

  • The will Ex. A.1 was executed when Mst. Godawari was only a limited owner and therefore lacked authority to bequeath the property; a defect at execution cannot be cured later by the Hindu Succession Act.
  • The will was not duly attested: attesting witnesses did not state that they attested the document in the presence of the testator, and reliance was placed on the Supreme Court authority in Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh regarding the requirement to call attesting witnesses under Sec. 61, Evidence Act.
  • The will is void because it makes a bequest to Temple Beespanthiyan, which is not a juristic person incapable of receiving property under a will; reliance was placed on Thakardwara Amritsar v. Ishar Das.
  • Appellant relied on Jagdeo Singh v. Mussammat Raja Kuer and A.R. Srinivasachariar v. A. Raghavachariar to support the submission that a bequest cannot vest before death and that certain principles concerning a widow's powers to bequeath were relevant to invalidate the will in the appellant's view.

Respondent's Arguments (Defendants / Temple)

  • The will took effect on the testator's death; the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17 June 1956 and by the testator's death on 17 August 1956 she had become absolute owner and therefore capable of bequeathing the property.
  • The attesting witnesses were produced and narrated events indicating the will was executed in one sitting; the witnesses' testimony permitted the court to infer that signatures were appended in the presence of the testator.
  • The objection that the temple is not a juristic person was raised for the first time in the second appeal; this raises a mixed question of law and fact and could prejudice the respondents because they were not given an opportunity at trial to demonstrate that the temple constituted an endowment or juristic entity capable of taking the bequest. The respondents relied on Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Ayyar pointing to authority that gifts can be made to an idol or temple.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagdeo Singh v. Mussammat Raja Kuer Discussed the nature of a will as a continuous act of gift which operates on the death of the donor (quoting Judicial Committee observations). The court held the ratio had no adverse bearing on the case; it emphasized that a will vests the property in the legatee only on the death of the testator and therefore the subsequent coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act (before the testator's death) cured any earlier defect.
A.R. Srinivasachariar v. A. Raghavachariar Authority applied in discussions about the rule that a legatee under the will of a Hindu widow derived no title where the widow held only a life estate. The court distinguished this authority: after the Hindu Succession Act a widow could be absolute owner of property possessed at the commencement of the Act, so the earlier proposition did not apply to the facts of the present case.
Tirathram v. Mst. Khan Devi Held that a legatee under the will of a Hindu widow derived no title where the widow had only a life estate. Distinguished on the basis that the Hindu Succession Act changed the widow's estate into absolute ownership at the relevant time, making those authorities inapplicable.
Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh (Supreme Court) Held that mere signatures cannot be presumed to be as attesting witnesses; Sec. 61, Evidence Act requires calling attesting witnesses to prove due execution/attestation. The court found this authority not applicable here because the attesting witnesses had unequivocally stated they signed as attesting witnesses and were produced; accordingly the procedural requirement was satisfied by evidence in the record.
Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta (Supreme Court) Held that failure of a witness in examination-in-chief to state explicitly that he signed in the presence of the testator does not as a matter of law negate due attestation; the matter depends on circumstances and evidence. The court relied on this principle to hold that the omission to use the precise statutory language is not fatal where the sequence of events proved by witnesses permits the inference that attestation occurred in the presence of the testator.
Thakardwara Amritsar v. Ishar Das Authority relied upon by appellant for the proposition that a will must be made in favour of a juristic person. The court recorded the appellant's reliance but rejected allowing the point to be raised for the first time in the second appeal because it is a mixed question of law and fact likely to prejudice the respondents; the court did not decide the substantive applicability of this authority on the merits at this stage.
Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Ayyar Authority indicating that a gift can be made directly to an idol or temple. The court referred to this authority when noting that a defendant could, at trial, have explained that the temple is an endowment or juristic entity capable of taking property; the court used this to justify refusing to permit the mixed question to be raised first time in second appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning follows a structured treatment of the three principal contentions raised by the appellant.

Regard to whether the will is invalid because executed when testator was a limited owner

Legal principle applied:

  • The court emphasized that a will operates to transfer the property disposed of only at the moment of the testator's death; earlier observations that a will is a "continuous act of gift" support vesting on death, not on execution.
  • The Hindu Succession Act had come into force on 17 June 1956; the testator died on 17 August 1956. At death the testator had become absolute owner under the Act. Thus any defect in the testator's power at the date of execution (24 April 1956) was cured by the operation of the Hindu Succession Act before her death.

Application:

The court found that because the property vested in the legatee only upon the testator's death and the Hindu Succession Act conferred absolute ownership on the testator prior to her death, the will was operative and the earlier alleged defect did not vitiate the transfer.

Regard to attestation of the will

Legal principle applied:

  • Sec. 63 Indian Succession Act requires that the testator and attesting witnesses sign in each other's presence; Sec. 61 Evidence Act requires attesting witnesses to be called to prove attestation.
  • Supreme Court authorities were considered: Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh requires calling attesting witnesses and warns against presumption from signatures alone; Naresh Charan Das Gupta holds that omission by witnesses to phrase their evidence in the statutory terms does not automatically defeat attestation where the sequence of events proves compliance.

Application:

The court found the attesting witnesses (Gulabchand, Phoolji, Nand Kumar, Chandmal) were produced and their evidence showed the will was executed in one sitting, which permitted the inference that they had signed in the presence of the testator. The court held that the omission of an attesting witness to use the exact statutory language does not preclude drawing the inference of due attestation from the evidence as a whole. Consequently, the attestation requirement was satisfied on the facts.

Regard to whether the temple is a juristic person and thus incapable of taking under a will

Legal and procedural considerations:

  • The appellant argued a will in favour of Temple Beespanthiyan is void because the temple is not a juristic person.
  • The respondents countered that the objection was first raised in the second appeal and that at trial they could have shown the temple was an endowment or otherwise capable of taking the property; reference was made to Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Ayyar on gifts to idols/temples.

Application:

The court treated the question as a mixed one of law and fact. Because the objection was not taken at trial and raising it for the first time in the second appeal would prejudice the respondents (who were not afforded an opportunity to produce evidence about the temple's status), the court refused to entertain the issue at this stage. The court did not finally determine the substantive legal question of the temple's juristic status on the merits in this appeal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed — APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and practical effect on the parties:

  • The District Judge's judgment (which set aside the Munsiff's decree and held that the shop vested in the temple by virtue of the will and operation of the Hindu Succession Act) stands.
  • The plaintiff-appellant's contentions regarding invalidity of the will for being executed when the testator was only a limited owner, and regarding defective attestation, were rejected by the court on the grounds explained above.
  • The court refused to permit the appellant to raise, for the first time in the second appeal, the mixed question whether the temple is a juristic person capable of taking under the will; that substantive question was not resolved on the merits in this appeal.
  • No order as to costs was made by the court ("looking to the circumstances of the case I pass no order as to costs").
  • Leave to file an appeal to the Division Bench under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance was refused.

Broader implications:

The opinion limits itself to applying existing principles (particularly the effect of a will vesting on death and the operation of the Hindu Succession Act) and to procedural prudence about raising mixed questions of fact and law at the second-appeal stage. The court did not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; it distinguished earlier authorities and applied them to the facts of this case.


Prepared from the single provided opinion text authored by Tyagi, J. All content in this summary is derived exclusively from the supplied opinion and does not introduce facts or conclusions not present in that text.

    Smt. Ladhi Bai v. Thakur Shriji Beespanthiya Digambar Jain Temple

    Tyagi, J.:— This is plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31st July, 1961 passed by the District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur setting aside the judgment of the Munsiff, Jaipur District, Jaipur in a suit for possession and mesne profits of the disputed shop.

    2. The plaint was filed in this case jointly by three persons Kesarlal, Magan Lal and Mst. Ladhi Bai. Kesarlal claimed himself to be the adopted son of Chhaganlal, while Maganlal joined as one, who claimed the succession to the property of Chhaganlal after the death of Mst. Godawari Bai, widow of Chhagan Lal and Mst. Ladhi Bai as the daughter of Chhaganlal. The disputed shop was rented out by Mst. Godawari Bai in her life time to Sunderlal, who happened to be the manager of the temple of Beespanthiyan. It is alleged that Sunderlal did not pay any rent to Mst. Godawari Bai till her death, and, therefore, after Godawari's death, a notice was served on defendant Sunderlal by Kesarlal to pay the rent to him. While replying to this notice Sunderlal intimated to Kesarlal that he was no longer the tenant of deceased Godawari Bai as the property was long back bequeathed by Mst. Godawari to the temple of Beespanthiyan. On receipt of this reply the suit was filed by the three plaintiffs against both Sunderlal and the temple Shriji Beespanthiyan praying that a decree for possession of the shop may be passed in their favour, and defendant No. 1 Sunderlal may be ejected therefrom, and he should be held liable for the payment of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 260/- and for the mesne profits for retaining the possession of the suit property till it is vacated. The defendants contested the suit. It was pleaded on behalf of the temple Beespanthiyan that the shop was bequeathed by Mst. Godawari by executing a will Ex. A. 1 dated 24.4.1956, and that after the death of Mst. Godawari, who died on 17.8.1956, the temple treated itself the owner of the property and therefore it was prayed that the suit of the plaintiffs be dismissed. After trial the suit was decreed by the learned Munsiff, Jaipur District, Jaipur on 30th April, 1960 but on an appeal the learned District Judge of District Jaipur reversed the decree and held that the disputed shop vests in the temple by virtue of the will executed by Mst. Godawari who died on 17.8.56 when the Hindu Succession Act had come into force and she being the absolute owner thereof had the authority to bequeath the same in favour of the temple. It was also held by both the courts below that Kesarlal failed to prove himself to be the adopted son of Chhaganlal and therefore he had no right to file the suit. Kesarlal did not Challenge this finding against him and therefore Mst. Ladhibai, daughter of Chhaganlal alone has filed this appeal.

    3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has assailed the judgment of the first appellate court only on three points:

    (1) The will Ex. A. 1 was executed by Mst. Godawari on 24.4.1956 when she was a limited owner and had no right to bequeath the property in favour of the temple, and, therefore, such a defective will could not pass any valid title to the legatee in the property.

    (2) The defendants have failed to prove the due attestation of the will Ex. A. 1 as the attesting witnesses have not stated that they attested the document in the presence of Mst. Godawari.

    (3) The will in favour of the temple which is not a juristic person is void. Reg. Point No. 1—The main contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the property bequeathed by the testator is vested in the legatee from the date of the execution of the will and as Mst. Godawari was not the absolute owner of the property on the day the will was executed she had no authority to transfer in favour of the legatee cannot be cured even by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. In support of this plea reliance has been placed on Jagdeo Singh v. Mussammat Raja Kuer*(2), and A.R. Srinivasachariar v. A. Raghavachariar (3).

    4. I carefully perused these three rulings and I am of opinion that the ratio of these authorities has no bearing on the present case, and, therefore, these judgments are of no avail to the appellant. In Jagdeo Singh v. Mt. Raja Kuer(2) learned Judge has pointed out the difference between a will and a settlement or deed inter vivos, and in that connection observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in (1872) 18 Weekly Reports, 359 have been cited which are as follows—

    “Will” means a continuous act of gift up to moment of the donor's death and, though revocable in his life time, is, until revocation, a continuous act of gift up to the moment of death, and does then operate to give the property disposed of to the persons designated as beneficiaries.

    Relying on these observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee it is contended that the shop was transferred by Godawari Bai on the day when the will Ex. A. 1 was executed, and that at that time the testator was not empowered to do so as she was then only a limited owner. This contention of learned counsel in my opinion does not find support from the observations quoted above. Their Lordships themselves have observed that the continuous act of gift operates to give the property disposed of by the will to the person designated as beneficiary on the death of the testator, which clearly means that the property bequeathed vests in the legatee on the death of the testator and not before that. Thus it is obvious that the property by means of a will is transferred only after the death of the testator when the will takes effect and not before that. It is an admitted case of the parties that the testator in the present case died on the 17th August, 1956, when the Hindu Succession Act had already come into force on 17th June, 1956. It is not disputed that Mst. Godawari when she died had become the absolute owner of the property bequeathed by her and therefore at the time of her death when the property is deemed to have been transferred to the legatee she had full authority to dispose it of. In this state of law it is difficult for me to hold that the will executed by Mst. Godawari when she was a limited owner cannot operate even after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act which made testator an absolute owner of the property. The defect that was attached to the will when it was executed was in my opinion cured when the Hindu Succession Act came into force and conferred the right of absolute ownership on Godawari in respect of the disputed property which was admittedly possessed by her. In this view of the matter it is difficult to uphold the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the aforementioned defect that Mr. Godawari had no right to dispose of such a property by will when it was executed still continued to be attached to the will even after the Hindu Succession Act came into force, and the transfer made by such a will is therefore vitiated.

    5. In Tirathram v. Mst. Khan Devi(1) and A.R. Srinivasachariar v. A. Raghavachariar(3) it has been held that a legatee under the will of a Hindu widow derives no title in the property bequeathed by her. This finding is based on the principle that a widow at that time when these judgments were passed used to acquire only life estate in the property left by her husband and as soon as she died no rights were left in such property and therefore she could not convey or transfer by means of a will which came into operation only after the death of the testator any rights in the property which she held for her life time only. But the position is now different. With the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act the widow has now become absolute owner of the property which she possessed at the time the said Act came into force and therefore after her death she leaves her interest which she could transfer by means of a will to any one whom she liked. In this view of the matter the proposition of law laid down in these authorities is not applicable to the circumstances of the present case.

    Reg. Point No. 2—It is next contended that the impugned will was not duly attested as the attesting witnesses have not clearly stated that they did put their signatures to the document in the presence of the testator, and, therefore, it being not a valid will, it cannot pass a valid title in the property to the legatee. In support of this contention Mr. Rastogi has placed reliance on a Supreme Court authority in Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh(4). In that case the Supreme Court has held—

    “It cannot be presumed from the mere signatures of two persons appearing at the foot of the endorsement of registration of a will that they had appended their signatures to the document as attesting witnesses or can be construed to have done so in their capacity as attesting witnesses Sec. 61, Evidence Act requires an attesting witness to be called as a witness to prove the due execution and attestation of the will. This provision should be complied with in order that these two persons might be treated as attesting witnesses.”

    6. In my opinion this authority of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case as the attesting witnesses in this case have clearly stated that they had signed the will in the capacity of the attesting witnesses. It is not disputed before me that the entire will, including the attestation part thereof, was executed in one sitting. Gulabchand (D.W 3), Phoolji (D.W 6), Nand Kumar (D.W 7) and Chandmal (D.W 8) are the attesting witnesses of this document and they have been produced in this case. There is no doubt that these witnesses have not said in so many words that they had put their signatures in the presence of Mst. Godawari but from the perusal of their evidence it becomes clear that the will was executed at one sitting and therefore the witnesses must have appended their signatures in the presence of the testator. The Supreme Court in Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta. (5) has held—

    “It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination in chief that they signed the will in the presence of the testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend on the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator.”

    7. This is purely a question of fact whether the attesting witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator. Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act simply lays down that the testator shall sign the will in the presence of the attestator and vice versa but it does not say how the compliance of the requirements of the provisions of sec. 63 shall be established. Where the witnesses come before the Court and narrate the sequence of events showing that after the testator had put her thumb impression on the document they attested the document, the court can easily draw an inference that the witnesses had appended their signatures to the document in the presence of the testator. If a witness owing to inadvertance omits to say that he had attested the document in the presence of the testator and narrates the sequence which lead to no other inference but the one that he had put his signatures in the presence of the testator then this omission on the part of the witness would not invalidate the will and it shall not preclude this Court to infer this fact from other evidence on the record that the attestator had signed the document in the presence of the testator. The law does not emphasise that the witness must use the language of the section to prove the requisite merits thereof. If it is clear from the sequence of events described by a witness, that the witness had attested the document in the presence of the testator, then this technicality that he did not say so in the language used in sec. 63 would not be of any avail to the opposite party. I do not find any weight in this contention of learned counsel for the appellant and it is therefore repelled.

    8. The last and he important question that has been urged before me by the appellant is that the will is void as it was made in favour of Temple Beespanthiyan which is not a juristic person. According to the learned counsel for the appellant a will can be made only in favour of the person who is recognised by law as juristic person. His contention is that Mandir Beespanthiyan is not a juristic person and therefore the will should be declared void. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on Thakardwara Amritsar v. Ishar Das (6). The learned counsel for the respondents has on the contrary urged that this question has been raised for the first time in the second appeal. His contention is that if this objection was raised by the plaintiff at the trial then it was open for the defendant to say that the Mandir Beespanthiyan is endowment and as such it was a juristic person capable of receiving the properties bequeathed to it by means of a will. By raising this question of law and fact at this stage the defendant-respondent has been taken by surprise and therefore his prayer is that the plaintiff should not be allowed to raise this question at this stage. In this connection my attention has been drawn to Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Ayyar (7), wherein their Lordships have held that gift can directly be made to an idol or temple. I agree that the objection raised by Mr. Kasliwal that this question whether temple Beespanthiyan is a juristic person or not is a mixed question of law and fact and therefore this cannot be allowed to be raised at the stage of second appeal, where the defendant is likely to be prejudiced because he has not been afforded an opportunity to show that the temple in whose favour the property has been dedicated by making a will is really a juristic person. In view of this complexity I cannot permit the plaintiff-appellant to raise the mixed question of law and fact at this stage.

    9. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. But looking to the circumstances of the case I pass no order as to costs.

    10. Learned counsel prays leave to file an appeal before the Division Bench under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. It is not a fit case for granting leave. Hence leave is refused.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Smt. Ladhi Bai v. Thakur Shriji Beespanthiya Digambar Jain Temple
    (Oct 19, 1966)