Raja Harisingh v. The State Of Rajasthan

1. These are two applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Raja Harisingh (No. 25) and Thakur Jaswant Singh (No. 33). The points raised in the two applications are exactly the same, and we propose therefore to decide them by one Judgment.

2. The case of the applicants is that they are jagirdars of certain villages in Tahsil Nawa, district Nagaur. Settlement operations were going on in that Tahsil for sometime past, and, on 31-8-1950, a notification was issued as provided by Section 81(1)(d) of the Marwar Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as the Land Revenue Act) inviting objections to the rent rates published therein within one month. On the publication of this notification, the applicants raised a number of objections to the rent rates fixed, and said inter alia that the general principles governing settlement were not followed in fixing the rates, and in particular the provisions of the Land Revenue Act had not been complied with both as to the manner of the publication of the rates and to the method of arriving at them.

It was also objected that the Marwar Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act) and the Land Revenue Act were ultra vires. A date was then fixed for hearing of these objections, & the Assistant Settlement Commissioner heard them. It was pressed before him that it was impossible to submit proper objections in view of the fact that the report, on which the rent rates were based, had not been published, and the applicants were not being allowed to inspect the settlement records. No orders disposing of the objections were communicated to the applicants; but, on 25-10-1951, the applicants were informed that the rent rates had been approved by the Board of Revenue and the approval of the Government was being awaited. On 25-11-1951, the applicants were informed that the Government had sanctioned the rent rates, and Parchas would be distributed to the tenants accordingly.

The applicants then made representations to the Board of Revenue and the Revenue Minister, and the distribution of Parchas was stayed from time to time. Eventually, on 14-3-1952, the applicants were informed that distribution of Parchas would begin soon. In April, 1952, the applicants were informed that the cash rents fixed would take effect from Kharif St. 2008, i.e. July, 1951. Consequently the present applications were filed on or about 25-4-1952, praying that an appropriate writ, order, or direction be issued declaring the Land Revenue Act and the Tenancy Act ultra vires of the powers of the then Government of Jodhpur, and prohibiting the State from enforcing the rent rates nxed in contravention of the law.

3. A large number of grounds were taken in support of the applications, and we think it unnecessary to set them out one by one. Some of them were not pressed before us in arguments, and such of them as were pressed will appear from our decision on those grounds in the course of this judgment, and where we do not deal with any ground appearing in the applications, it will be because it was given up. But the main points urged were four and they are these-

(1) That the then Government of Jodhpur had no legal authority to enact any law after 30-3-1949, when the Rajpramukh assumed office under the covenant;

(2) That even if the two impugned Acts could be enacted by the then Government of Jodhpur, they have now become invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution in view of the discriminatory provisions which they contain;

(3) That the impugned Acts are invalid in view of Article 19(1)(f) as they impose unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the applicants to acquire, hold and dispose of property;

(4) That the fixing of rent under the Land Revenue Act was a quasi-judicial proceeding, and inasmuch as the procedure prescribed under the Act and principles of natural justice were not followed, the rent rates fixed should be set aside.

4. The applications have been opposed on behalf of the State, and all the points raised on behalf of the applicants have been traversed, it is not necessary to put down the various contentions raised by the State on the various points raised by the applicants as they will appear from our decisions on those points, but the reply of the State on the four main points is as follows:

(1) The then Government of Jodhpur had full power to enact the two impugned Acts, and legislative power vested in the then Government of Jodhpur till 6-4-1949, and the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan got the power to legislate for the State of Rajasthan from 7-4-1949.

(2) There is no discrimination in the two Acts, and both the Acts apply to all lands in Rajasthan, whether in jagir area or in Khalsa area, and therefore Article 14 is not applicable. If there is any apparent conflict between some of the provisions of the two Acts, that is a matter to be resolved if and when, the question arises. That, however, does not create any discrimination.

(3) The restrictions imposed by the impugned Acts are reasonable by all standards, and therefore the impugned Acts are not hit by Article 19(1)(f).

(4) The fixation of rent rates under the Land Revenue Act is a purely administrative or executive act. These rates have been fixed according to the procedure provided in the Land Revenue Act, and there is no question of the application of principles of natural justice in the circumstances.

5. Before we deal with these four points we should like to dispose of the other points which have been raised on behalf of the applicants. It is said that the petitioners believed that the Land Revenue Act and the Tenancy Act did not receive the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur on 6-4-1949, and that on that day His Highness was not in Jodhpur. The two Acts as published show that the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur was given to them on 6-4-1949. The burden, under the circumstances, lay heavily on the applicants to prove that this was really not so. The belief of the applicants that assent was not given would not serve the purpose. The fact that the Maharaja was not in Jodhpur on the 6th April, even if correct, is in itself not enough to prove that his assent could not have been obtained. There are other methods of obtaining his assent, viz. by telephone, or by telegram, or by sending a special messenger to wherever he was.

An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State, and it is said therein that the impugned Acts received the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur on 6-4-1949. In the face of this affidavit and the recital in the Gazette at the time of the publication of the Acts, it is not possible to hold that the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur was not given to these Acts on 6-4-1949.

6. Then it is urged that these Acts were published in a Gazette Extraordinary, dated 6-4-1949, and that this was physically impossible, if the assent of His Highness was obtained on the 6th April. We do not see any force in this argument. The bills, on which these Acts are based, were published some weeks before, and there is not much difference between the bills and the Acts. If the type-setting had been preserved, and it may very well have been preserved considering that the creation of the Rajasthan State was expected at any time, it would have been quite possible to publish the impugned Acts in an Extraordinary Gazette of the 6th of April immediately after the assent of His Highness had been obtained. We, therefore, see no force in this contention.

7. Then it is said that the Gazette Extraordinary, in which the impugned Acts were published, bears No. 96 (a). The Gazette Extraordinary bearing No. 96 is dated 5th April, and the Gazette Extraordinary bearing No. 97 is dated the 7th of April, we are asked to infer from this that the impugned Gazette Extraordinary containing the impugned Acts was really published after 7-4-1949t as otherwise it should, in the normal course, have borne No. 97, and the Gazette Extraordinary of the 7th April should have borne No. 98. We are of opinion that this inference is not a necessary corollary from the facts. After all, Government orders are received in the Press sometime before their publication.

If, for example, the Extraordinary Gazette of: the 7th of April was printed on the 6th of April, as it may very well have been, and if the Press-received an urgent order on the 6th to publish the impugned Acts on that very day, it could only bring out the Gazette Extraordinary containing the Acts as No. 96 (a), as it would not change the number that was given to the Gazette Extraordinary of the 7th of April. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept that merely because the Extraordinary Gazette containing the impugned Acts bore No. 96(a), it must have been issued after 7-4-1949.

8. Then it was urged that the impugned Acts were ultra vires because they were not passed in accordance with the Jodhpur Government Act of 1947, and the proclamation of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur, dated 31-8-1948. The argument is that though the Legislature of Jodhpur was not actually sitting on 6-4-1949, it had neither been prorogued nor dissolved, and therefore the two impugned Acts could not have been submitted for the assent of the Ruler, and could not be passed into law in that manner. It is submitted that His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur could only pass ordinance under Section 31 of the Jodhpur Government Act, 1947, and could not pass permanent legislation of this kind.

The Jodhpur Government Act of 1947 became law in that year. In Chapter III of the Act, there, was provision for the legislature. Later, however, His Highness the Maharaja issued a proclamation on 31-8-1948. By that proclamation he appointed a coalition ministry consisting of a President and a Council of Ministers which were to be responsible for the entire administration of the State; It was also provided that the Council of Ministers would function pending the inauguration of a fully democratic Constitution framed by the Constitution making body based on adult franchise.

Then comes the following paragraph which may be quoted:

"Until the formation of the Constituent Assembly, which will also act as a legislature, the provisions of the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, relating to the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly and such other provisions of the said Act as are inconsistent with this proclamation, shall remain inoperative."

9. Learned counsel for the applicant urges that this proclamation itself was beyond the powers of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur, and relies on Section 6 of the Government of Jodhpur Act in this connection. That section to our mind does not support this conclusion. It says that all sovereign powers, legislative, executive and judicial, and sovereign authority and jurisdiction appertaining or incidental to the State and the Government are hereby declared to be and to have always been possessed and retained and exercisable by His Highness the Maharaja. This provision clearly shows that sovereignty was retained by the Maharaja. Then follow the following words:

"nothing, except in so far as in this Act provided, shall affect or be deemed to have affected the sovereign right' and prerogative of His Highness to make laws and issue proclamations, orders and ordinances by virtue of all such sovereign authority."

These words clearly show that His Highness was voluntarily limiting his sovereign powers so long as he allowed the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, to continue; but his power to abrogate the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, still remained with him under the first part of the section, and we cannot accept the contention that he had no power to abrogate the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, when we find that he had reserved all sovereign authority in himself by Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, it was open to him to suspend the Government of Jodhpur Act, or any part thereof in exercise of his sovereign authority. This is what he actually did by the proclamation of 31-8- 1948, to which we have referred, and which was published in the Jodhpur Government Gazette Extraordinary, Vol. 83, No. 89, dated 31-8-1948. He had, therefore, full power to suspend any part of the Government of Jodhpur Act, 1947, and we now turn to see what parts he had suspended by this proclamation.

10. We have already quoted the paragraph relative to the legislative assembly. By that paragraph, that part of the Government of Jodhpur Act which related to the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly, was suspended. That part, in our opinion, is Chapter III dealing with the legislature. The legislature1 was to consist, under Section 16, of His Highness the Maharaja, and a chamber to be known as the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly. The remaining provisions of Chapter III from Sections 17 to 51 all deal with the powers of the legislative assembly and certain supplemental provisions in case that assembly was not sitting.

Section 31 is a section which provides that when the assembly is not in session, and it is necessary to pass any law, the Government may frame the law and pass it after getting the assent of His Highness the Maharaja. Such law would be in force for a period of six months or if the period is extended for another six months, and may be terminated at any time by His Highness the Maharaja, provided that when the Assembly next meets the Government shall place the law before the Assembly so that it may be passed therein.

Now this section could only apply when the provisions relating to the Jodhpur State Legislative Assembly remained in force; but in his proclamation of 3lst August, His Highness the Maharaja said that all the provisions relating to the Jodhpur legislative assembly would remain inoperative. There was, therefore, no case for exercising powers under Section 31, and what happened was that, after 31-8-1948, the restriction, which the Maharaja had put on himself about legislation by Chapter 111 of the Government of Jodhpur Act, was done away with. He, therefore, had full powers to pass any law, and the provisions of Chapter III of the Government of Jodhpur Act would not apply to such exercise of power by him. We, therefore, see no force in the contention that the impugned Acts are invalid because they do not comply with the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Government of Jodhpur Act,. 1947.

11. The next point, that is urged, is that all the actions of the Settlement Officer were invalid as no rules had been prescribed under the Land Revenue Act. In particular, it was urged that as no rules had been prescribed under Section 81(1)(d) of the Land Revenue Act, the fixing of rent rates was illegal. Reference in this connection may be made to Section 2(2) of the Land Revenue Act, which says that all previous rules, notifications and orders relating to matters for which provision may be made fay rules, notifications or orders under this Act, shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, continue in force as if they had been made or issued under this Act.

It is not denied that there were previous rules relating to settlement operations in Marwar.. Therefore, Section 2(2) continued those previous rules except where they were inconsistent with the Act. As to Section 81(1)(d), which prescribes publication of rent rates in such manner as may be prescribed, it is urged that no rules were prescribed indicating, the manner in which rent rates should be published, and that the old rules also did not prescribe any such manner. It may be accepted that the old rules did not prescribe anything about publication of rent rates. It is admitted that no new rules were made for this purpose. But the mere fact that certain rules were not made would not make the publication of the rent rates irregular, or the rent rates sanctioned after due publication invalid, what Section 81(1)(d) requires is that the rent rates should be published. That is a mandatory provision. The manner, in which these rent rates should be published, is merely directory, and the provision as to making of rules Is only an enabling provision. If no rules are prescribed, it would be the duty of the Settlement Officer to see that rent rates are published in such manner as, in his opinion, will carry out the object of the legislature. That object was to give publicity to the rent rates, so that jagirdars and tenants, or all those who are interested in the fixing of rent rates, may have information.

It is not the applicants' case that they had no information of the rent rates intended to be applied. They obviously had information and had objected, as provided by Section 81(1)(e). The absence, therefore, of any rules prescribing the manner of publication, when it is not disputed that the rates were published and the applicants had knowledge of them, would not invalidate the subsequent proceedings. We, therefore, hold that there is nothing in this objection.

12. Then it is urged that the Settlement Officer did not follow the mandatory provisions of section 81 and did not inspect every village in the local area and divide the local area into soil-classes and assessment circles, and further that he did not follow the criteria prescribed in Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act in arriving at the rent rates. The reply of the State to this objection is that the provisions of sections 81 & 82 were fully complied with, and that reply, in our opinion, concludes the matter. In these extraordinary proceedings, we cannot turn ourselves into an appellate court in respect of the proceedings before a settlement officer. We have no reason not to accept the affidavit of the State that the provisions of Sections 81 and 82 were complied in fixing rent rates. There is no force, therefore, in this contention either.

13. Then it is urged that so far as the petitioner knew neither the Revenue Board, under Section 81(3),, nor the Government, under Section 83, had approved and sanctioned the proposals of the settlement officer. The affidavit of the State in reply to this is that the Revenue Board had approved of the proposals, and the Government had sanctioned them. This, in our opinion, finishes these objections.

14. The other minor grounds, that appear in the applications, were not pressed before us, and it is unnecessary to deal with them.

15. We now come to the main point urged on behalf of the applicant, namely that the Government of Jodhpur had no right to pass any legislation after 30-3-1949, and therefore the two impugned Acts, as they were passed on 6-4-1949, were invalid. Reliance is placed on Article 10(3) of the Covenant constituting the United State of Rajas-than, read with Article 3(5) and (8). Article 10(3) is as follows;

"Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Raj Pramukh, the legislative authority of the United State shall vest in the Raj Pramukh, who may make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the State or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made shall have the like force of law as an Act passed by the legislature of the United State."

Later, there was an amendment of this Article, but that related only to the period up to which the Rajpramukh would have the authority to legislate, and is immaterial for our purposes.

16. The argument of the applicants runs thus--They say that Article 10(3) conferred power on the Rajpramukh to pass laws for the United State of Rajasthan. Article 3(5) provided that the Ruler of Jaipur would be the first President of the Council of Rulers, and shall enter upon the duties of his office on 30-3-1949, while Article 3(8) provided that the President of the Council of Rulers shall be the Raj Pramukh of the United State. Therefore, it is urged that as the Rajpramukh took office on 30-3-1949, he was immediately clothed with legislative authority over the whole of the United State of Rajasthan, and the Government of Jodhpur had no legislative authority left thereafter. Reliance is placed in support of this argument on --State of Saurashtra v. Bholanath Jatashankar', AIR 1952 Sau 49 (PB) (A).

16a. The reply to this argument is that, under Article 6(2) of the Covenant, it was provided that the Ruler of each new Covenanting State, which included Jodhpur, shall, not later than 7-4-1949, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, and thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall vest in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder. The Ruler of Jodhpur handed over the administration of his State on 7-4-1949, and it was thereafter that the rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of Jodhpur vested in the United state and became exercisable only as provided in the covenant. Therefore, the Ruler of Jodhpur had authority to make laws I up to 6-4-1949, and as these impugned Acts were passed on 6-4-1949, they were valid.

17. In -- 'AIR 1952 Sau 49 (A)', mentioned above, the court held that though the administration of Wadhwan State was handed over to the Raj Pramukh on 16-3-1948, legislative authority over the whole State passed to the Raj Pramukh from 1-2-1948, the date on which he entered upon the duties of his office by virtue of Article 9(3) of the Covenant. It may be mentioned that Article 9(3) of the Saurashtra Covenant corresponds exactly with Article 10(3) of the Rajasthan Covenant. It was, therefore, held that certain rules passed by the Ruler of Wadhwan, after 1-2-1948, but before 16-3-1948, were invalid, as the Ruler had no legislative powers.

This case certainly supports the submission of learned counsel for the applicants, and stress has been laid by the learned Judges of the Saurashtra High Court on the absence of the words 'subject to the provisions of this Covenant' from their Article 9(3) (equal to our Article 10(3)), and their presence in their Article 8 (equal to our Article 9) which provides for exercise of executive authority of the United State. It was, therefore, held that their Article 9(3) conferred legislative powers on the Raj Pramukh on the day he entered upon the duties of his office, as it was not subject to the other provisions of the Covenant.

Reference was made by the learned Judges to Article 6 of their Covenant, which corresponds to Article 6 of our Covenant. But it was held that the making over of the administration, of the various states naturally took some time, and during that time the Rulers of the States were merely in the position of caretakers, and were to run the day to day administration till the actual handing over of the administration to the Raj Pramukh.

18. With great respect to the learned Judges, we feel that this interpretation of Article 6 is not justified, and it cannot be said that the Rulers were merely care-takers between 30-3-1949, and 7-4-1949, when the actual administration was handed over. We are of opinion that Article 10(3) merely provides for exercise of legislative authority by the Raj Pramukh. It does not lay down the date from which the legislative authority would be exercised, and we have to find the date from the other provisions of the Covenant. The Raj Pramukh derived his authority, both legislative and executive, from the Rulers, and this could only be from the date on which the administration of a particular State was handed over to the Rajpramukh. Article 6(2) clearly shows that it was only upon the handing over of the administration that the rights, authority and jurisdiction, belonging to the Ruler, vested in the United State, and were exercisable as provided in the Covenant.

19. Article 6(2)(a) of the Vindhya Pradesh Covenant which was exactly similar to our Article 6(2)(a), came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in -- 'Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pra.', AIR 1953 SC 394 (B), & the learned Judges, while dealing with the legislative authority of the Raj Pramukh, observed as follows at page 403-

"The Authority of the Rajpramukh .... is not only the unfettered legislative authority "to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the united States or any part thereof" vested in him by Article 9 (which corresponds to our Article 10) of the integration Covenant dated 18-3-1948, but also that which is vested in him under Article 6 (which corresponds to Article 6 of our Covenant) of the said agreement. This Article vests in him "all rights, authority, & jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of each Covenanting State and incidental to the Government thereof."

The learned Judges then went on to point out that the State of Rewa in particular had the power to pass extra-territorial laws to a certain extent, and that power was not, in any way, curtailed either by the integration covenant or the Instrument of Accession.

It is clear therefore that Article 6(2)(a) contemplates both legislative and executive authority, and this authority passed to the Raj Pramukh only when the administration of the State was handed over, and thereafter the Raj Pramukh was the sole authority to pass laws under Article 10(3). But before the State was handed over all legislative authority and jurisdiction remained in the Ruler who could pass laws up to the date of handing over. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Rulers were mere care-takers looking after the day to day administration after 30-3-1949.

20. The absence of the words 'subject to the provisions of this covenant' in article 10 is clearly explicable as those words were not necessary in that Article. Article 9, where they appear, provides for the exercise of executive authority, and such exercise must be subject to the legislative authority vested in the Raj Pramukh by Article 10, if not in any other manner. But the legislative authority vested in the Rajpramukh by Article 10 was unfettered at the time when the Covenant was passed, and it only came to be fettered with the passing of the Constitution of India. The absence, therefore, of these qualifying words from Article 10 does not necessarily mean that Article 6(2)(a) was not applicable to the exercise of legislative authority by the Raj Pramukh so far as the date from which it was to arise.

21. Further we find that Article 3(5), which gives the date 30-3-1949, provides for the assumption of the duties of his office by the Ruler of Jaipur as the President of the Council of Rulers. It does not refer to the Rajpramukh at all, though Article 3(8) provides that the President of the Council of Rulers shall be the Raj Pramukh. It is obvious therefore that the Ruler of Jaipur assumed the office of the President of the Council of Rulers on 30-3-1949, and entered upon the duties of that office, which are given in Article 3. These duties are different from the duties of the office of the Rajpramukh, which are defined in various Articles throughout the Covenant. It seems to us, therefore, that the scheme was that the President of the Council of Rulers should enter upon his duties on 30-3-1949, and he was also to be the Rajpramukh to whom the administration of the Covenanting States would be handed over up to 7-4-1949.

It was necessary to indicate who the Raj Pramukh was in order that the handing over of the administration should take place. But, in view of the clear provisions of Article 6(2)(a), the Rajpramukh could only assume his duties as Raj Pramukh when the Ruler of each Covenanting State handed over the administration to him. These duties included the authority to pass laws under Article 10(3); but the Raj Pramukh could only assume that authority as from the date when the Ruler of a Covenanting State handed over his administration to him. We are, therefore, of opinion that all rights, authority, and jurisdiction, which include the authority to legislate, vested in the Government of Jodhpur up to 6-4-1949, and that it was only from 7-4-1949, that the Raj Pramukh had the power to legislate under Article 10(3).

22. We understand that in Rajasthan all the Covenanting States handed over administration on the same day, namely 7-4-1949. We also find that the first legislative Act by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan took place on 7-4-1949, when the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance (No. 1) of 1949 was passed. Further, Article 5 of the Covenant provides for a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Raj Pramukh in the exercise of his functions, except those under paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 7. It is not disputed that the Council of Ministers came into existence, for the first time, on 7-4-1949, for purposes of aiding and advising the Rajpramukh in the exercise of his functions, including his power to legislate under Article 10(3). These' circumstances, in our opinion, bear out the conclusion which we have arrived at, namely that in Rajasthan the Raj pramukh's legislative authority began on 7-4-1949, when the Covenanting States handed over the administration to him. In this view of the matter, the two impugned Acts, which were passed on 6-4-1949, were on that day within the powers of the Government of Jodhpur, and are valid.

23. We now turn to the contention that the two impugned Acts have now become invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution in view of the discriminatory provisions which they contain. The argument is put in two ways, in the first place, it is urged that these laws are discriminatory in so far as they only apply to that part of the State of Rajasthan, which comprises the former State of Marwar, and not to other parts, and reliance is placed in this connection on -- 'Manohar, singhji v. State of Rajasthan', AIR 1953 Raj 22 (C). In that case, the administration of jagirs in certain parts of Rajasthan, which were comprised in what was known as the former State of Rajasthan, was taken over by the State, while jagirdars in the remaining parts of Rajasthan were managing their own jagirs. It was held in that case that this discriminated between jagirs and jagirs, and therefore the law was invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution.

24. We are, however, of opinion that that case does not apply for two reasons. In the first place, it has not been shown that there are no similar tenancy laws and land revenue laws in other parts of Rajasthan. It is not necessary that the laws should be exactly the same, for so long as there are almost similar laws in other areas, discrimination cannot be said to arise.

In the second place, it must be remembered that the two impugned acts and the tenancy act in particular are ameliorating legislation designed to raise the economic status of agriculturists in Mar-war. They mark the progressiveness of the former State of Marwar, and show that it was alive to the welfare of the people committed to its charge. In the peculiar circumstances that have come to exist in Rajasthan because of the creation of the United State in 1949, some differences in laws may be persisting even now. The mere persistence of these differences would not be enough, to hit all such laws as give rise to differences and make them invalid under Article 14. We have to see in each particular case the nature of the law, and to judge if that law is of a progressive character meant for the amelioration of the people of the particular State by which it was passed. If it is a law of that character, and if similar progressive laws do not exist in some States which integrated to form the State of Rajasthan, it would, in our opinion, be wrong to declare such progressive and ameliorating measures invalid, and thus bring the progressive states back to the level of the unprogressive states. The effort should be to bring the former unprogressive states to the level of the progressive states, and that, we understand, is being attempted, but is taking time.

It is not every difference which would necessarily be hit by Article 14. We may in this connection refer to the observations in -- 'Prank J. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis', (1880) 101 US 22 (D), which are in these words:

"If a Mexican State should be acquired by treaty and added to an adjoining State or part of a State, in the United States, and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State might allow the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion, and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited by any fair construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would not be based on any respect of persons or classes, but on municipal considerations alone, and a regard to the welfare of all classes within the particular territory of jurisdiction."

We are of opinion that the principle laid down in this passage applies with full force to such progressive law as the two impugned Acts. These laws are for the welfare of all classes within the area which was formerly the State of Marwar, and as such can be allowed to continue even if similar progressive laws do not exist in other parts of Rajasthan. In -- 'Manoharsinghji's case (C)', we could not find justification of this nature for merely taking over the administration of jagirs in one part by the State and leaving them to the jagirdars in other parts of the State. We are, therefore, of opinion that even if it were correct that similar laws dp not exist in other parts of Rajasthan (though it has not been shown to us), we would uphold the two impugned Acts on the ground that they are progressive and ameliorating pieces of legislation, the continuance of which is justified by the welfare of all classes within this area. We may in this connection refer to the view taken in -- Madansingh v. Collector Sikar', AIR 1954 Raj 104 (E), where the former Jaipur State law relating to district boards was upheld on similar grounds, though there were no district boards in other parts of Rajasthan.

25. The other contention under Article 14 is that there is discrimination as between jagir lands in the former State of Marwar and Khalsa lands, and therefore these two impugned Acts are hit by Article 14. In this connection, our attention was drawn to the statement of objects and reasons of the bill which culminated into the Marwar Tenancy Act. In that statement it was certainly stated that the bill would apply to jagirdars' lands only. But we find that the Tenancy Act, as it was finally passed, provides that it extends to the whole of Marwar except the Sambhar Shamlal; area. The reason why Sambhar Shamlat area was excluded was special, inasmuch as it was governed by a special set of laws enacted jointly by the former State of Marwar and the former State of Jaipur. The Tenancy Act, therefore, as it stands, applies to all lands, and not merely the jagirdari lands.

26. Our attention was drawn to the provisions contained in Chapter 11 of the Revenue Act dealing with Khalsa villages. It is urged that these provisions clearly show that the Tenancy Act was not to apply to Khalsa land. Whatever may have been the original intention of the framers of these two Acts, the fact remains that both the Acts were applied to the whole of Marwar except the Sambhar Shamlat area. It may be that some conflict may arise between the Tenancy Act and the provisions of Chapter 11 of the Revenue Act; but such conflict does not mean that the legislation was discriminatory. The courts will find ways and means of dealing with the conflict, if and when cases arise before them of that nature. But, as the two Acts stand, they both apply with equal force to the entire area in the former State of Marwar, excluding Sambhar Shamlat, and it cannot, therefore, be said that there is discrimination as between jagir land and Khalsa land. Further, even if it were correct that there was discrimination, only such provisions as are discriminatory will be hit by Article 14 and not the entire laws.

27. In the present case, we are concerned With, the sections relating to settlement operations, and so far as these sections are concerned, they appear, only in the Land Revenue Act and apply to all settlements whether in Jagirdari land or Khalsa, land, and must be held to be valid. We, therefore, see no force in the contentions based on Article 14 of the Constitution.

28. We now come to the contention based on Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It is urged that the impugned Acts, and particularly the Tenancy Act, are invalid, as they impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the applicants to acquire, hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Article 19(5) provides that nothing in Article 19(1)(f) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by Article 19(1)(f) either in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. It cannot be seriously disputed that it is open to the State to pass a law fixing principles on which rents should be fixed, and determining the rights of tenants and landlords with respect to the nature of tenure, ejectment and so on. Such laws are a feature of all progressive states, and it is too late in the day to say that they are hit by Article 19(1)(f), unless it is shown that the restriction is unreasonable and goes beyond the necessities of the case.

The provision of the Tenancy Act, which is specially attacked, is Section 10 which provides that subject to the provisions of section 11, every person, who, at the commencement of this Act, is a tenant, or who is, after the commencement of this Act, admitted as a tenant, otherwise than as a subtenant, shall be a Khatedar. Section 13 provides that Khatedars would have heritable rights but not transferable right. Section 16 gives a limited right of transfer to a Khatedar, and this is confined to alienation by sale or otherwise to any co-tenant or to a person who, if he survived the tenant, without nearer heirs, would inherit his right. It is urged that these provisions detract good deal from the right of the landholder to admit and eject tenants. They cannot, however, in our opinion, be called unreasonable restrictions which go beyond the necessities of the case. Fixity of tenure is necessary in order that tenants, who form the majority of the population of this State, may have a reasonable chance of decent economic existence.

29. In this connection, we may refer to --Rajah of Bobbili v. State of Madras', AIR 1952 Mad 203 (F). It was held in that case that enjoyment of property in the case of landholders does not mean an absolute right to charge from the tenants whatever they like or to eject old tenants whenever they like and to keep new tenants on whatever terms they like. It only means enjoyment of the land in accordance with the laws that may regulate the relationship between landholders and tenants. Collection of such rents as would be lawful would be full enjoyment of the property, and similarly, occupation by tenants according to law, even against the will of the landholder, or taking of new tenants on terms and conditions permissible by law but not in excess thereof would also be full enjoyment of the property. We respectfully agree with this view, and hold that the two impugned Acts are valid as the restrictions provided are reasonable and not more than the necessities of the case require. There is, therefore, no force in this contention.

30. The last point, that is urged, is that the fixation of rent rates under the Land Revenue Act was a quasi-judicial proceeding, and inasmuch as the procedure prescribed under the Act and principles of natural justice were not followed, the rent rates fixed should be set aside. Section 81, Land Revenue Act provides what the Settlement Officer will do when any local area has been brought under settlement operations for the settlement of rents or of land revenue. The Settlement Officer or his Assistant is required (1) to inspect every village in the local area, (2) to divide the local area into soil-classes and assessment circles, (3) to select rent-rates for the determination of rent, (4) to publish such rent-rates in such manner as may be prescribed, and (5) to amend his proposals in such manner as he thinks fit after considering objections if any Section 82 provides for the matters which the Settlement Officer shall take into account in arriving at fair and equitable rent rates, and the rent rates proposed are not to exceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands, and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands. Then under Section 84, the Settlement Officer has to determine rents, whether by way of abatement, enhancement or commutation, payable for all holdings in the occupation of tenants.

31. So far as Section 84 is concerned, it may be accepted that the proceedings for determination of rents of individual tenants by abatement, enhancement, or commutation, are quasi-judicial proceedings to which landholders as well as tenants are parties. But, in the present applications, the proceedings of the Settlement Officer under Section 84 are not being called in question. What the applicants are calling in question is the fixation of rent rates in accordance with Sections 81 and 82, Land Revenue Act. The argument is put in two ways. In the first place, it is alleged that the Settlement Officer did not act according to the provisions of sections 81 and 82. The reply to this is that he did. This Court in these proceedings is not acting as a Court of appeal from the Settlement Officer fixing rent rates, and cannot be expected to go into the matter in minute detail. There is no reason not to accept the affidavit on behalf of the State that the Settlement Officer did act in accordance with the provisions of sections 81 and 82. This finishes this part of the argument.

32. The other argument in this connection is that Section 81 contemplates objections by landholders or tenants to the rent rates, and the decision of such objections by the Settlement Officer and the amendment of rent rates, if necessary. This is clearly so in view of Section 81(1)(e), Land Revenue Act. In order to enable landholders and tenants to make objections, Section 81(1)(d) provides that the Settlement Officer shall publish rent rates in such manner as may be prescribed. It is urged that no rules for the manner in which rent rates would be published have been prescribed. But that, in our opinion, would make no difference so long as it is admitted that rent rates were published, and the applicants had knowledge of them.

What is, however, said is that the mere publication of rent rates is not enough, and the material, on which the rent rates are based, should also be published, as otherwise it is not possible for tenants or landholders to make effective objections to the proposed rent rates. In this connection, our attention is drawn to s, 112, U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, Subjections (1) and (2) of that Act are as follows:

"(1) The rent-rate officer shall publish in such manner as may be prescribed the proposals and records made by him under Section 110 and Section 111 and shall receive and consider any objections which, may be made to them. (2) When such objections, if any, have been considered and disposed of according to the prescribed procedure the rent-rate officer shall submit the proposals and records made by him after such modification if any, as he may think fit to the Board."

Rules have been made in Uttar Pradesh to carry out the purpose of this provision of the law. It is urged that unless the proposals and the records made by the Settlement Officer under Sections 81 and 82 are published, it is not possible to make appropriate objections. It is further urged that the Settlement Officer is acting as a quasi-judicial Tribunal in fixing rent rates, and as such even if the law does not require it, the principles of natural justice require that the proposals and records should be published to enable tenants and landholders to make appropriate objections.

33. It will be noticed that there is one very Important difference between Section 112, U. P. Act and Section 81, Land Revenue Act. The U. P. Act provides for publication not only of the rent rates, but of the proposals and records, while the Land Revenue Act only provides for the publication of the rent rates and nothing else. It is said on behalf of the applicants that they wanted inspection of the records, but even that was not allowed, and therefore they were not in a position to make effective objections to the rent rates proposed. The reply to this is that the old records were all with the jagirdars, and therefore they could have made effective objections based on their own records, even if the Settlement Officer did not allow them to inspect the records which he had prepared, and the proposals which he was making. It is well to remember, however, that, under the law, the Settlement Officer was not bound to publish anything except the rent rates. He was also not bound to allow inspection of his records and proposals, though it must be conceded that if such. inspection had been allowed, the objections might have been more to the point.

The question, however, is whether the Settlement Officer was acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal in fixing rent rates, or was merely acting as an executive officer, for principles of natural justice would apply if he was acting in the former capacity, but not in the latter. See -- 'Madhoram v. The State', AIR 1953 Raj 149 (G). Learned counsel for the applicants urges that the Settlement Officer had to come to a decision about rent rates after considering certain matters, and on certain principles. He was also expected to hear objections after the rent rates were published, and if he thought fit to amend them. Under these circumstances, he was acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, and should have given full opportunity to the applicants by allowing them inspection of records, if necessary, to show to him that the rent rates arrived at by him required amendment.

The distinction between the nature of the two acts was brought out in -- 'Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani', AIR 1950 SC 222 (H)' and it was pointed out that the main thing, which distinguished a judicial or quasi-judicial act from an executive act, was whether the law required that the person making the decision had the duty to act judicially. If there was such a duty, the act would be quasi-judicial; but if no such duty was cast on the person acting under the law, the act would only be executive. We have therefore to see whether Ss, 81 and 82 cast a duty on the Settlement Officer to act judicially, we find it impossible to hold that these sections cast a duty on the Settlement Officer to act judicially in arriving at rent rates, though they certainly lay down that he should have regard to certain principles in arriving at a decision. But many executive decisions are also arrived at on certain principles, and that alone should not, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion that the officer concerned had the duty to act judicially.

34. Learned counsel for the applicants relies on a number of cases in this connection. The first case is -- 'Bathnamala Pattamahadevi v. Raiyats of the Mandasa Zamindari', AIR 1934 Mad 231 (I).

In that case, it was held that the settlement of rent by a revenue officer or finally by a Revenue Board is a judicial act, and the High Court can issue a writ in a proper case. The parties to that case were the Zamindars on one side and the tenants on the other. The proceedings, therefore, that came for consideration before the Madras High Court, were in the nature of proceedings under Section 84, Land Revenue Act, and those proceedings, we have already said, are quasi-judicial in nature.

There are, however, certain observations in this case, which are relied upon to suggest that even the determination of rent-rates would be a judicial or quasi-judicial act. The Act under consideration in that case was the Madras Estates Land Act. It is unfortunately not available to us, but the following observations at page 234 are relied upon;

"Now, coming to Ch. 11, up to Section 167, it may be that the functions are purely executive. But, when we come to Section 168, it deals with the settlement of a fair and equitable rent; the executive act of settlement may also be said to partake of a judicial character. One has only to look at Clause (2) which speaks of determining the rates of rent and to Clause (4) which refers to the duty of the Revenue Officer to satisfy himself that the amount of rent even when agreed upon between the landlord and tenant is fair and equitable. Section 169(2) refers to "any party aggrieved" and provides that entries shall not be revised until reasonable notice is given to the parties concerned to appear and be heard in the matter. Section 170(2) also provides that no entry shall be amended, or omission supplied, until reasonable notice has been given to the parties concerned to appear and be heard in the matter. In my opinion, though the main purpose of the functions of the Revenue Officer is to carry out an executive act, namely, the preparation of the Record of Rights, including settlement of rent, parts of them undoubtedly are of a judicial character so as to make those functions acts of a tribunal."

35. Emphasis is laid particularly on the words "rates of rent" appearing in the above quotation. In the absence of the relevant Act, it is difficult to say whether the words "rates of rent" mean the same thing as rent rates, and whether the learned Judges held that fixation of rent rates was also a quasi-judicial act. Reading the passage as a whole, it would appear that the proceedings referred to in it by the learned Judges were of the nature of proceedings under Section 84, Land Revenue Act .

36. The next case relied upon is -- 'Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi', AIR 1943 PC 164 (J). In that case, what had happened was that in proceedings for settling fair and equitable rent under Chapter 11, Madras Estates Land Act, the Special Revenue Officer of the district of Ganjam in the Northern Circars doubled the previous rents in respect of the land situate in the district of Ganjam. That case was between the ryots of certain villages and the Zamindars. There was an appeal by the ryots to a single' member of the Board of Revenue which varied the order of the special Officer in favour of the tenants. There was then a revision to the Collective Board of Revenue by the Zamindars, which increased the rent somewhat, though not to the extent allowed by the Special Revenue Officer. Then there was a writ application to the Madras High Court, in that case, the case reported in -- 'AIR 1934 Mad 231 (I)' was approved, and it was held that the Board was acting in a judicial character in those proceedings. Here again, those proceedings were of the nature of proceedings under Section 84, Land Revenue Act.

37. We do not think, therefore, that these cases lay down that the mere fixation of rent rates envisaged by Sections 81 and 82 was a judicial act. The act seems to us to be part of the duties of the Settlement Officer as an executive officer carrying out settlement operations. In this view of the matter, there is no question of the application of principles of natural justice, and we have to see only whether the provisions of the law, under which the settlement officer acted, were complied with. Those provisions, as contained in Section 81(1)(d), only required him to publish the rent rates. It did not require him to publish his proposals or the records prepared by him, and if he did not do so, it cannot be said that he failed in carrying out the provisions of the statute.

Finally, the fact also remains that settlement was being held, for the first time in this area, and the records, on which the Settlement Officer relied, must have been obtained from the jagirdars, and, as such, it cannot be said that they could not make appropriate objections before the Settlement Officer for want of publication of his proposals and records. We are, therefore, of opinion that the settlement officer acted as an executive officer and not as a quasi-judicial tribunal in fixing rent rates. There is therefore no question of the application of the principles of natural justice, when we find that the provisions of the statute were complied with. The rent rates having been fixed after full compliance with the provisions of the statute governing the action of the settlement officer, they cannot be quashed on the ground that certain principles of natural justice were not applied, even if that was correct.

We also find that, in the circumstances of this case, the records, on the basis of which the settlement officer acted, having been obtained, in the very nature of things, from the jagirdars, there was no question of any serious impediment to them in making objections to the rent rates published. We, therefore, see no reason to quash the rent rates on this ground.

38. We, therefore, dismiss the applications with costs to the State.