Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Wanchoo, C.J.: Appeal in Suit for Partition

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by Sambhudutt and others (appearing for Harnarayn, who died during trial) against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jodhpur, in a suit for partition. The suit was brought by Srinarain (the plaintiff-respondent) against his three brothers — Laxmi Narayan, Harnarayn and Pyarelal — for partition of the plaintiff's one-fourth share in certain properties in Jodhpur listed in Schedule 'A' to the plaint. The plaintiff's case was that although the brothers had separated long before (severance of status), immovable properties that had accrued in the family from ancestors had not been divided by metes and bounds, and the plaintiff sought division of his one-fourth share.

The defendants resisted the suit. One objection (raised by Harnarayn, now represented by the appellants) was that the suit was bad for partial partition because some properties were not included in the plaint — described as certain movables and cash said to be with the plaintiff and some other defendants, and some land in village Sogawas in District Nagaur.

A preliminary issue was framed whether the suit was maintainable because it was for partial partition; the District Judge decided that issue against the present appellants. The court then proceeded on other issues and passed a preliminary decree for the plaintiff's one-fourth share and gave any of the four brothers or their descendants the right to apply for a final decree. The appellants appealed, seeking remand for enquiry into and inclusion of all properties of Dhanraj (the parties' father) in the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge was incorrect in concluding that the brothers had separated prior to the suit and that the suit was one for division between co-tenants (tenants-in-common) rather than between coparceners.
  2. Whether the rule applicable to partition between coparceners — that all family property should be included in the partition suit (hotchpot rule) subject to limited exceptions — also applies fully to partition between co-tenants (tenants-in-common), thereby rendering a suit defective for partial partition if not all common property is included.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The District Judge erred in finding that the brothers had separated long before the suit; accordingly, the suit was actually between coparceners and should have included all family property (i.e., the suit was bad for being a partial partition).
  • Even if the brothers had separated, the legal principle applied to partitions among coparceners (that the whole family property should be included) should also apply to partitions between co-tenants; appellants relied strongly on Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojendra Kumar (AIR 1923 Cal 501) to support this proposition and urged remand for inclusion of all properties of Dhanraj.

Plaintiff-Respondent / District Judge's Position (as described)

  • The plaintiff and at least one defendant (Laxminarayan) stated that the brothers had been living separately for years and that severance of status had occurred long prior to the suit; a third brother also admitted long separate living. Harnarayn's written statement likewise said they had been living separately and earning their livelihood, i.e., they were not joint at that time.
  • The District Judge held the suit to be for partition of property held in common by separated brothers (tenants-in-common), not for partition of coparcenary/joint family property; consequently it was not necessary that every piece of common property be included in the suit.
  • With respect to the properties said to be omitted: land in Nagaur could not be included in this suit because it lies outside the jurisdiction of the Court; the plaintiff denied that any movable property remained undivided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojendra Kumar, AIR 1923 Cal 501 (A) States the general rule that all property held in co-tenancy should be included in a partition suit and that practically the same principles which apply to partition between coparceners should apply to co-tenants. The Court observed that this decision "goes too far" in making the same principles applicable to co-tenants as to coparceners and therefore did not accept its strictness as binding in the present case.
Pakkiri Kanni v. Haji Mohammed Manjoor Saheb, AIR 1924 Mad 124 (B) Held there is no authority that a suit for partition of common property (as distinguished from joint/coparcenary property) is liable to dismissal for not including all common property; plea of partial partition not available for common property. The Court cited this case in support of the proposition that suits between co-tenants for common property need not be dismissed simply because all common property was not included.
Thakar Singh v. Sant Singh, AIR 1933 Lah 465 (C) Held that a suit for partition of common properties (not joint properties) is not liable to dismissal on the ground that it did not include all the common properties available for partition. The Court relied on this precedent to reinforce its conclusion that the present suit (being one for common property among separated brothers) need not embrace every common item.
Sitaram v. Narayan, AIR 1943 Bom 216 (D) Explains the ordinary rule for coparcenary partitions (a member suing must bring into hotchpot all property in his possession for complete and final partition), and notes there is no such basis for applying that rule to property held in common though special circumstances may sometimes require it. The Court used this distinction to support the view that the hotchpot rule for coparceners does not automatically apply to tenants-in-common; it acknowledged exceptions but treated them as exceptional and fact-specific.
Hemanta Kumar v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1941 Cal 635 (E) The Calcutta High Court (Mukherjea J.) departed from the strict view in Rajendra Kumar Bose's case and held that the rule against partial partition is not inelastic and may be relaxed depending on circumstances and interests of justice. The Court cited this decision to show that even courts which previously adopted the strict approach have allowed flexibility; it relied on this to justify not dismissing the present suit for partial partition and to permit case-specific discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked stages: a factual assessment of whether the brothers had severed joint status, and then legal analysis of whether a partition suit among co-tenants must include all common property.

Factual assessment: The Court accepted the District Judge's factual finding that the brothers had been living separately for years and that severance of status had occurred. This finding was supported by sworn statements and admissions from multiple brothers (the plaintiff Srinarain and defendant Laxminarayan, plus an admission by a third brother and Harnarayn's written statement). On these facts the Court concluded the suit was one for division of property held in common by tenants-in-common (co-tenants), not a suit between coparceners of a joint Hindu family.

Legal analysis: The Court explained the established rule under Hindu law that, for partition among coparceners (joint family), the suit should embrace the whole family property (hotchpot rule), subject to certain well-recognized exceptions (property not available for actual partition, property held jointly with a stranger, property lying outside the court's jurisdiction). However, the Court distinguished tenants-in-common: where property is held in common (co-tenants), the cause of action for partition of different items may arise at different times, so it is not essential that every item be included in a single suit.

The Court examined precedent. While it noted that Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojendra Kumar applied coparcenary rules strictly to co-tenants, the bench considered that decision too strict and not fully persuasive. The Court relied on other authorities (Pakkiri Kanni, Thakar Singh, Sitaram v. Narayan) that support the view that suits for partition of common property need not be dismissed merely because they do not include all common property. It also relied on Hemanta Kumar v. Satish Chandra as demonstrating that the strict rule may be relaxed where justice or circumstances require.

Application to present facts: The Court considered the specific properties said to be omitted. The land in Nagaur could not be included in the present suit because it lay outside the jurisdiction of the Court; immovable property outside jurisdiction requires a separate suit in the appropriate forum. As to the alleged movable property (ornaments and cash), the plaintiff denied that any movable remained undivided. Given these facts, the Court concluded it was not desirable to order inclusion of every disputed item into the present suit. The defendants-appellants retained the right to file separate suits if they believed other property remained undivided.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. The District Judge's conclusion that the suit was properly maintainable as a partition suit between tenants-in-common (co-tenants) and that it was not necessary to include every common item in the suit was affirmed. The Court ordered the dismissal of the appeal with costs to the plaintiff-respondent.

Implications and consequences:

  • The preliminary decree for the plaintiff's one-fourth share (as passed by the subordinate court) stands.
  • The defendants-appellants were not entitled, on the facts of this case, to a remand to include all properties of their father Dhanraj in this suit; the land in Nagaur must be dealt with in the appropriate jurisdictional court, and the movables were contested facts denied by the plaintiff.
  • The Court indicated that where appropriate a party may file separate suits for other items of common property; the decision does not rigidly apply the coparcenary requirement of including all property to cases of tenants-in-common.
  • The opinion clarified (on the facts before it) a flexible approach: while it is desirable to include all common property where practicable (to avoid multiplicity of suits), a suit among co-tenants should not be dismissed merely because some common items were not included. The Court relied on existing authorities and did not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying those authorities and principles to the present facts.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to plaintiff-respondent.

    Sambhudutt And Others v. Srinarain And Others

    Wanchoo, C.J:— This is an appeal by Shambhudutt and others against the judgment and decree of the District Judge Jodhpur in a suit for partition.

    2. The suit was brought by Srinarain plaintiff against Laxmi Narayan, Harnarayn and Pyarelal who were brothers of the plaintiff for partition of his one-fourth share in certain properties situate in Jodhpur and mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ annexed to the plaint, which were claimed to be joint properties of the four brothers. The case of the plaintiff respondent was that though he and his brothers had separated long before and there had been severance of status, yet immovable properties which were coming on in the family from the time of their ancestors were not divided by metes and bounds. The plaintiff, therefore, wanted his one-fourth share to be so divided.

    3. The suit was resisted by Harnarayan defendant who died during the course of the trial and is now represented by Sambhudutt and others — appellants. Among other pleas, one of the objections of Harnarayan was that the suit should be thrown out as it was bad for partial partition for some properties had not been included in the list of properties. These properties were said to be certain movables and cash with the plaintiff and certain other defendants and some land in village Sogawas in District Nagaur.

    4. A preliminary issue whether the suit was not maintainable because it was for partial partition of the property was framed and decided against the present appellants. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to decide the other issues and eventually a preliminary decree for his one-fourth share was passed in favour of the plaintiff and the Court gave the right to any of the four brothers or their descendants to apply for final decree.

    5. The appellants have come up to this Court and urge that the case be remanded for enquiry, into and inclusion of all the properties of Dhanraj (who was father of the parties) in this suit.

    6. The District Judge decided the preliminary issue against the present appellants holding that the suit was for partition of property belonging to tenants-in-common and in such a suit, it was not necessary that every bit of property in common should be included in one suit.

    7. Two points have been urged on behalf of the appellants before us. The first is that the District Judge was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the brothers had divided long before the suit had been filed and that this is really a suit for partition between coparceners.

    8. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention and the District Judge was right in the view that he took. There is the definite statement of two of the brothers, namely, Srinarayan plaintiff and Laxminarayan defendant, to the effect that all the brothers had been living separately for years before the suit was filed and severance of status had taken place long ago. The third brother also admitted that all of them had been living separately for a long time. Harnarain, contesting defendant, said in his written statement that the brothers had been earning their livelihood and living separately for a long time and that they were not joint at that time. Therefore, the suit was only for division of property held in common by the brothers who had separated long before and not for a division between coparceners of a joint Hindu family.

    9. The next point that is urged is that even if the brothers had separated before the suit was filed and the suit was for division of property held in common, the principle which was applicable to partition between coparceners also appleid to partition between co-tenants.

    10. The general rule of Hindu Law is that where a suit for partition is brought by a coparcener against the other coparceners it should embrace the whole family property. This rule is subject to certain exceptions, e.g, where a portion of the property is not available for actual partition, or where it is held jointly by the family with a stranger, or where part of the joint property consists of land situated outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit for partition is brought. This principle however, has not been applied with full force to the case of partition oetween co-tenants.

    11. In — ‘Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojendra Kumar’, AIR 1923 Cal 501 (A), on which learned counsel for appellants strongly relies, it is certainly laid down that the general rule was that all property held in co-tenancy and nothing but property held in co-tenancy should be included in a partition suit, and practically the same principles which applied to partition between coparceners were applied in this case to a partition between co-tenants. We may, however, say with respect that this case goes too far when it makes the same principles applicable to cases of co-tenants as are applicable to coparceners.

    12. The reason why in the case of partition between coparceners all the property must be thrown in the hotchpot except for certain well recognised exceptions is that where a member of a joint Hindu family, who broke up the joint status, wants the joint family property to be divided, the cause of action arises at one time, and he must therefore include every item of property in the suit. But in the case of tenants-in-common, it is not necessary that the cause of action for partition of every item of the property which is held in common must arise at the same time. Therefore, it may be possible in cases of co-tenants that a suit may lie for one item if property at one time and for another item at another time.

    13. The objection that there would be multiplicity of suits will not be insuperable because suits may have to be filed at different times if cause of action for division arises on different occasions. It is of course desirable in the case of co-tenants that, if possible, all the property in common may be included in one suit, provided if they are immovable properties, they all lie within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is brought. But the suit cannot be dismissed simply on the ground that all the common property has not been included in it.

    14. We may in this connection refer to certain cases in support of the view that we have taken. In — ‘Pakkiri Kanni v. Haji Mohamrrcd Manjoor Saheb’, AIR 1924 Mad 124 (B), it was held that there is no direct authority that a suit for partition of common property, as distinguished from joint property, is liable to dismissal on the ground that all the common property in respect of which it might have been brought has not been included. The plea of partial partition is not available when the suit is for division of common property, and not joint property.

    15. In — ‘Thakar Singh v. Sant Singh’, AIR 1933 Lah 465 (C), it was held that

    “a suit for partition of common properties and not joint properties is not liable to be dismissed on the ground that the suit did not include all the common properties available for partition.”

    16. In — ‘Sitaram v. Narayan’, AIR 1943 Bom 216 (D), it was held that:

    “The ordinary rule applicable to suits for coparcenary property is that when a suit for partition is between coparceners, it should embrace the whole family property, and a member of a joint family suing his coparceners for the partition of joint family property is bound to bring into hotchpot all the property that may be in his own possession in order that there may be a complete and final partition. The rule is subject 1 to exceptions arising out of conveniences and from other causes. But there is no such basis for the application of the rule to property which is held in common although special circumstances do sometimes exist which make it necessary or desirable to apply the rule to suits relating to land held in common.”

    17. The strict view taken by the Calcutta High Court in — ‘Rajendra Kumar Bose's case (A)’ was departed from even in that Court in — ‘Hemanta Kumar v. Satish Chandra’, AIR 1941 Cal 635 (E). Mukherjea J. referred to — ‘Rajendra Kumar Bose's case (A) in his judgment and observed as follows at page 638:

    “But even assuming that the present suit, in substance, is one for partition, I do not think that it should fail on the ground that it did not embrace all the joint properties of the parties. The rule that there cannot be a partial partition of a joint estate is not an inelastic rule which admits of no exception. It has been held that the application of this rule may be relaxed, if the circumstances of a particular case or the interests of justice so require.”

    18. In that case three brothers had a number of properties. One of these properties was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and as it was in the name of one brother only, the compensation money was taken away by that brother. The other brothers sued for refund of their two-third share. The suit was dismissed by the subordinate Courts but the High Court allowed the second appeal.

    19. It is clear, therefore, that in the case of tenants-in-common it is not essential that all the property held in common should be brought into hotchpot though it is desirable that as far as possible, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, all the property should be included in one suit. It is, however, for the Court in each case to decide whether the case is of such a nature that the plaintiff should be ordered to include the remaining property also in the suit for division, provided of course the property is within the jurisdiction of the Court in case it is immovable property. But the suit, in our opinion, cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that all the property which is capable of partition was not included.

    20. Let us now look to the facts of this case and see how far the defendants-appellants have made out a case for inclusion of other properties in this suit.

    21. The other properties, as we have already pointed out, consist of certain movables said to be in possession of the plaintiff and certain defendants and some land in Nagaur District. So far as the land is concerned, it is not disputed that it cannot be included in this suit and a separate suit will have to be filed in another Court having jurisdiction with respect to that land.

    22. There only then remains the question of certain movable property which consists of ornaments and cash. So far as that is concerned, the plaintiff does not admit that any movable property has remained undivided. Under these circumstances, it is, in our opinion, not desirable that the Court should order that every disputed item of property should be included in this suit for division. If the defendants-appellants feel that other property has really not been divided between themselves and their co-tenants, they can file a separate suit. In this view of the matter, this is one of those cases where the Court was right in proceeding to divide the properties in suit only. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the plaintiff-respondent.

    M.K.S

    23. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sambhudutt And Others v. Srinarain And Others
    (Dec 9, 1953)