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Case Number

S.B Civil Misc. II Appeal No. 28 of 1951

Advocates

Makhtoormal, for respondent
Magraj and Kistoormal, for applicant;

Judges

Kailash Wanchoo

Acts

Section 26, Rajasthan Premises (Control of Bent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act 17 of 1950).
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. 17 of 195D)
provision similar to Section 11 (d), Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949,
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
provisions of the Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949,
Section ll(d), Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949,
U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act.
provisions of the Rent Control Act
Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949
Section 13 of the Rajasthan Act
Section 26 of the Rajasthan Act.
Section 14 of the U. P. Act
Rent Control) Act.
Section 13 (h).
Section 11 (d)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Decree-holder Sitaram sued tenant Jagjivan Singh for ejectment, alleging arrears of rent and that the house was required by the landlord for his own personal use. The trial Court dismissed the prayer for ejectment, and on appeal to the Additional District Judge the parties reached a compromise. On the basis of that compromise a decree was passed on 30-9-1950 in which Jagjivan Singh agreed to hand over possession within ten months.

When the ten-month period expired, Sitaram applied for execution of the decree by ejectment. Jagjivan Singh objected, contending that the decree was not executable and relying on Section 26 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court held the decree executable. The present appeal challenges those conclusions and raises the scope and application of Section 26 of the Rajasthan Act.

Legal Issues Presented

What is the scope and extent of Section 26 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, particularly whether an executing Court must satisfy itself that one or other of the grounds in Section 13 exists before executing a decree for eviction passed before the Act came into force.
If the executing Court must so satisfy itself under Section 26, whether it may rely on a prior decision (res judicata) by the trial Court that a Section 13 ground (specifically Section 13(h), landlord's personal need) existed.
Whether a compromise decree (entered into before the Act came into force), or the tenant's agreement to vacate on a fixed date, binds the tenant and prevents him from claiming protections subsequently provided by the new Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Jagjivan Singh)

The decree passed before the Rajasthan Act came into force is not executable under Section 26 unless the executing Court first ensures that one of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 exists.
Reliance on Section 26: the executing Court has a duty to examine the existence of Section 13 grounds prior to execution.

Respondent's Arguments (Sitaram, decree-holder)

The executing Court should accept the earlier decision inter partes (res judicata) that the house was needed by the landlord for his own use (Section 13(h)), because that issue was raised in the trial Court and determined against the tenant.
Even if it was a compromise decree, it should be held that by implication the Court decided that the landlord needed the house for his own use.
Alternatively, the tenant had agreed to leave the house by a specified date; therefore he is bound by that agreement even if the law later changed to afford him more protection. The respondent relied on prior decisions (e.g., Raja Chetty v. Jagannathadas and Sahabuddin v. Mohan Lal) to support the proposition that parties can waive an advantage given by a rent control statute or that a consent decree should not be invalidated by subsequent statutory protections.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Chand Shankar v. Sukh Lal, AIR 1951 All 383	Interpretation of a provision (Section 14 of the U.P. Act) with wording almost exactly similar to Section 26; that provision was read to require the executing Court to satisfy itself about statutory grounds before execution.	The Court relied on this decision to fortify its view that under Section 26 the executing Court must satisfy itself that one or other of the conditions in Section 13 exists before executing a decree passed before the Act came into force.
Bhaishanber Nanabhoy v. Morarji Keshavji & Co., 36 Bom 283	Established that matters directly decided by compromise (consent) decrees are covered by the principle of res judicata and bind parties and their successors.	The Court acknowledged the principle but observed that only matters directly decided by compromise decrees attract res judicata; it used the precedent to frame the limited proposition that compromise decrees can, in some cases, produce res judicata effects for matters directly decided.
Manick Chandra v. Hari Pada, AIR 1949 Cal 151	Under a provision similar to Section 11(d) of the Marwar Act, a court could pass a decree for ejectment where the tenant agreed by compromise — but such a decree does not necessarily show that the court decided other grounds raised in the case.	The Court cited this case to support the conclusion that a consent decree under a provision like Section 11(d) does not necessarily imply that the court decided other substantive grounds (e.g., landlord's personal need) in the landlord's favour.
Raja Chetty v. Jagannathadas, AIR 1950 Mad 284	Held that a party can waive an advantage given by a law enacted for the benefit of an individual if such waiver does not infringe public right or public policy (example: landlord could waive statutory minimum arrears requirement under a lease provision conferring a longer period).	The Court distinguished this precedent: there the landlord waived a statutory advantage; in the present case it would be contrary to public policy to permit a tenant to give up protections newly afforded by the Act.
Sahabuddin v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1951 All 227	Contains a judicial remark that a tenant could forego protection under the Act and agree to vacate on a fixed date, and that a consent decree might not be invalidated by the Act.	The Court noted this authority but expressed reservations regarding the Chief Justice's extra remarks, indicating that the question whether tenants can validly agree to decrees not covered by statutory provisions deserved closer consideration; the Court did not accept that a tenant's prior agreement necessarily defeats later statutory protections.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court embarked on a textual and purposive interpretation of Section 26 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The section provides that no decree for eviction passed before the Act's commencement shall be executed "in so far as it relates to the eviction" except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. From this wording the Court concluded that the executing Court has a duty to satisfy itself that one or other of the Section 13 conditions exists before executing such a pre-Act decree.

The Court set out two permitted modes by which the executing Court may be satisfied:

If the question whether any Section 13 condition existed was agitated in the trial Court and decided in favour of the landlord, the executing Court may accept that decision inter partes on the principle of res judicata (i.e., treat the matter as already adjudicated).
If no question under Section 13 was raised at trial, or if it was raised but not decided, then the executing Court must itself decide whether any of the Section 13 grounds exists before carrying the decree into effect.

The Court explained the legislative rationale: the Rajasthan Act applies to the whole State and was enacted to establish a uniform principle regulating evictions; Section 26 ensures that post-enactment statutory protections operate even in respect of pre-enactment decrees by conditioning execution on Section 13 grounds.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court examined whether the earlier proceedings produced res judicata on the point that the landlord needed the house for his own use (Section 13(h)). The appellate Court had passed a compromise decree on 30-9-1950. The Court analysed the Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949 (specifically Section 11(d)), which permitted a court to pass a decree for ejectment for any other reasons the court might consider sufficient, including a tenant's consent. On that basis, the Court held that the mere passage of a consent/compromise decree did not necessarily imply that the court decided the landlord's pleaded ground (personal need) in the landlord's favour. The Court relied on Manick Chandra v. Hari Pada to illustrate that a decree passed because of tenant compromise does not necessarily show that other grounds were adjudicated.

Consequently, the Court found that the Section 13(h) question was not finally decided so as to attract res judicata. The executing Court must therefore decide for itself whether any of the Section 13 grounds exists.

The Court also addressed the respondent's contention that a tenant's prior agreement to vacate should bind him even after a change in law that affords him more protection. The Court distinguished Raja Chetty (where a landlord waived a statutory advantage) and expressed skepticism about the broad remarks in Sahabuddin (that a tenant could forego statutory protection by compromise). The Court concluded that it would be against public policy to permit a tenant to abandon the statutory protections conferred by the Rajasthan Act; where Section 13 imposes a duty on the court not to pass an ejectment decree unless one of its conditions is satisfied, a mere agreement between parties is not a substitute for such statutory conditions. The Court noted that the compromise in this case was reached before the Rajasthan Act came into force, and if the Act confers a new benefit on the tenant there is no reason to deny him that benefit.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The order of the lower Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the executing Court with directions to satisfy itself whether one or other of the conditions under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 exists, and thereafter to proceed as provided by Section 26.

Direct Consequences and Costs:

The executing Court must independently determine whether any of the Section 13 grounds exist before executing the pre-Act decree.
The appellant (Jagjivan Singh) is awarded his costs of this Court and of the lower appellate Court to be paid by the respondent (Sitaram), irrespective of the final result on remittal. The costs of the executing Court are ordered to abide the event.

Implications beyond this case: The opinion interprets Section 26 as imposing an active duty on executing Courts to check statutory grounds under Section 13 before executing pre-Act decrees. The opinion does not purport to state broader precedent beyond the immediate interpretation and application of Sections 13 and 26 in the facts before it.

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Jagjiwan Singh v. Sitaram

1. This is an appeal by Jagjivan Singh, judgment-debtor, in execution proceedings and arises in the following circumstances:

2. Sitaram, decree-holder, brought a suit for ejectment of Jagjivan Singh from a house of which Jagjivan Singh was a tenant. The ground on which the ejectment was prayed was that arrears of rent were due and the house was required by the landlord for his own personal use. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court so far as the prayer for ejectment was concerned. Thereupon there was an appeal to the Additional District Judge and a compromise was arrived at between the parties. On the basis of this compromise, Jagjivan Singh agreed to hand over possession of the house within ten months and a decree was passed accordingly on 30-9-1950.

At that time, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. 17 of 195D) was not in force; but the Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949 was in force. When the period of ten months came to end, the decree-holder Sitaram applied for execution of the decree by ejectment. Thereupon an objection was taken by the judgment-debtor Jagjivan Singh that the decree was not executable and reliance was placed on Section 26 of the Rajasthan Act. It seems that that section, was not mentioned in the application of objection; but the case for the judgment-debtor rested both in the first Court and before the lower appellate Court on Section 26. Both the Courts have held that the decree was executable. Hence this second appeal.

3. The main question that arises for determination now is the scope and extent of Section 26, Rajasthan Premises (Control of Bent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act 17 of 1950). That section reads as follows:

"No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any premises in areas to which this Act extends for the time being, passed before the date of commencement of this Act, shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force therein, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in this Act."

4. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that it was the duty of the executing Court to see whether any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 existed before putting this decree, which had been passed before the Act came into force in December 1950, into execution. Leaving out the unnecessary words, the section would read like this.

"No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any premises..... shall..... be executed against him..... except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13....."

The section, therefore, clearly casts a duty on the executing Court, before it proceeds to execute a decree passed before the Act came into force, to see that, one or the other of the conditions mentioned in Section 13 is satisfied. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that if the executing Court has to see to this, it will create a rather curious situation and the executing Court may come to a conclusion which might be different from that to which trial Court had come on any of the conditions mentioned in Section 13. I do not think, however, that there would be any conflict between the trial Court and the executing Court on this point.

Under Section 26 it would be for the executing Court to satisfy itself that one or the other of the conditions mentioned in Section 26 is present before it executes any decree passed before the Act came into force. It can satisfy itself on this point in one of two ways. If the question, whether any of the conditions mentioned in Section 13 exists, was agitated in the trial Court and decided in favour of the landlord, the executing Court will, on the principle of 'res judicata', accept that decision 'inter partes' and be satisfied that decree could be executed. If on the other hand, no such question under Section 13 was raised or if any such question was raised but never decided, it would be for the executing Court to decide that question for itself.

The reason for this provision under Section 26 appears quite obvious. This Act applies to the entire State of Rajasthan as it now exists and repeals earlier laws on the subjects in the Covenanting States. It may well have been thought by the present State while enacting this law that the same principle should apply in the matter of eviction all over Rajasthan and, therefore, this provision was mads under Section 26 even in cases of decrees passed before this Act came into force.

I am, therefore, of opinion that it is the duty of the executing Court to satisfy itself under Section 26 that one or the other of the conditions mentioned in Section 13 is satisfied before it executes the decree passed before the Act came into force. I am fortified in this view by a decision of Seth J. in -- 'Chand Shankar v. Sukh Lal', AIR 1951 All 383 (A) where also Section 14 of the U. P. Act which was almost exactly similar in words was interpreted in the same way.

5. Learned counsel for respondent then urges that in this case the first method, which I have pointed out should be applied and the principle of 'res judicata' is clearly applicable as it has been decided 'inter partes' that the house was needed by the landlord for his own use which is the condition mentioned in Section 13 (h). It is further urged that even though it was a compromise decree, it must be held that by implication the Court decided that the landlord needed the house for his own use.

It is not necessary for the purpose of decision of this question to enter into a discussion as to how far compromise decrees can be the basis of 'res judicata'. There is no doubt that any matters which are directly decided by compromise decrees, the principle of res judicata would apply and parties and their successors in interest would be bound, vide -- 'Bhaishanber Nanabhoy v. Morarji Keshavji & Co.', 36 Bom 283 (B). It may also be that in certain cases inferences by necessary implication may arise on account of the passing of consent decrees and give rise to application of the principle of 'res judicata'.

The argument on behalf of the respondent is that in this case necessary implication arises from the fact that the decree was passed in his favour, namely that the house was needed by the landlord for his own use. If that were so, there might be a case for the application of the principle of 'res judicata'. The learned District Judge seems to have though that this was so. But a perusal of the provisions of the Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949, which was in force when this decree was passed, shows that no such necessary implication can arise in this case.

Under Section ll(d), Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949, it was open to the Court to pass a decree for ejectment of a tenant for any other reasons which the Court might consider sufficient. There was no mention in the compromise which was filed that the tenant admitted that the landlord needed the house for his own use. The Court was, however, entitled to pass a decree even though there was no admission of this point which had been raised by the landlord and which had been decided against him by the trial Court, for Section 11 (d) obviously empowered it to treat the consent of the tenant to ejectment as any other reason sufficient for the purposes of eviction.

Therefore, when the consent decree was passed on 30-9-1950, there was no necessary implication by the mere passing of that decree that the tenant admitted that the landlord needed the house for his own use. In this connection, I may refer to -- 'Manick Char.dra v. Hari Pada', AIR 1949 Cal 151 (G). That is a case about the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. It seems that in that order also there was a provision similar to Section 11 (d), Marwar House Rent Control Act, 1949, entitling the Court to pass a decree if the landlord showed any cause which the Court considered satisfactory. It was held that under that provision if the tenant agreed by compromise that a decree for ejectment be passed, the Court was entitled to pass a decree. But that would not necessarily show that a decree was passed on account of any other ground that might have been raised but not decided in the case.

I am, therefore, of opinion that though one of the grounds which now appears in Section 13 (h) was raised in this case in the trial Court, it was never decided finally and the decree that was passed in the appellate Court on compromise does not necessarily lead to the inference that this point was decided in favour of the landlord. Therefore, this is not a case where the executing Court is to accept the decision of the trial Court on the principle of 'res judicata'. The executing Court will have in this case to decide for itself whether any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 exist.

6. The last point that was urged on behalf of the respondent was that inasmuch as the judgment-debtor had agreed to leave the house by a certain date, he should be held bound by that agreement even though later on the law might have been changed. Reliance has been placed on two cases in this connection. The first is -- 'Raja Chetty v. Jagannathadas', AIR 1950 Mad 284 (D). That was also a case under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It provided among other things that there should be arrears for at least two months before a tenant could be ejected for arrears of rent. In a particular lease, the period was, however, fixed at more than two months. It was then held that in view of the provision under the lease, the landlord could not take advantage of the period of two months fixed by the Act on the ground that

"every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy."

Obviously, the law was made for the protection of tenants though it gave a certain advantage to the landlord also. It was held that the landlord could waive that advantage and give more protection to the tenant and that would not be against public right or public policy. That case, therefore, hag no application to the facts of this case. Here it is the tenant who is supposed to give up the protection which the law gave him. It would be against public policy to permit him to do. The next case is -- 'Sahabuddin v. Mohan Lal', AIR 1951 All 227 (E). That was also a case under the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The learned Chief Justice at the end of the judgment remarked as follows:

"It was open to a tenant to forego the protection given under the Act and to agree to vacate the premises on a fixed date. In the case before me the tenant entered into a compromise and he agreed to vacate the premises on 7-5-1947. The decree of the Court is based on this compromise. I do not see how the provisions of the Act can invalidate the consent decree."

7. It may be mentioned that, earlier, the learned Chief Justice had decided that the case was covered by the provisions of the Rent Control Act and the tenant could be ejected. It was, therefore, not necessary for him to make these remarks. With all due respect to the learned Chief Justice, I feel that he has not considered the question whether it would be consistent with public policy for tenants to agree to decrees which are not covered by the provisions of the law and whether it will be possible for the Courts at all to pass a decree which is not covered by the provisions of the law.

So far as Rajasthan is concerned, the duty is cast on the Court under Section 13 not to pass a decree for ejectment unless it is satisfied that one or the ;pther of the conditions mentioned in that section is satisfied. In the face of that provision, it would, in my opinion, not be open to a Court to pass a decree for ejectment merely because the parties agree that a decree be so passed. Of course, if a tenant does not want to continue in the house, he can always leave it and then it would be unnecessary for the parties to go to Court.

But short of that, if the parties come to Court, the Court is bound to see whether one or the other of the conditions under Section 13 is satisfied. An agreement of parties is not one such condition. It may also be mentioned that the agreement in the present case was arrived at before the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 came into force, and if the new Act has given any benefit to the tenant, there is no reason why he should not be allowed to get it.

8. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court below and send the case back to the executing Court to satisfy itself whether one or the other of the conditions under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Act exist or not and thereafter proceed to decide the matter as provided under Section 26 of the Act. The appellant will get his costs of this Court and the lower appellate Court from the respondent irrespective of the final result. The costs of the executing Court will abide the event.

Jagjiwan Singh v. Sitaram

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Jagjivan Singh)

Respondent's Arguments (Sitaram, decree-holder)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Jagjiwan Singh v. Sitaram

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