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  • 1877 and sub-section 3 of sec. 35 of the Registration Act
  • sec. 12 of the Specific Relief Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • 1877 and sub-section 3 of sec. 35 of the Registration Act
  • sec. 12 of the Specific Relief Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Hazarimal, sued the appellant, Jetharam, for specific performance of a contract of sale (Ex. P-1 dated 29 January 1941) concerning a house at Jodhpur. Rugnath Das and his three sons were impleaded as defendants nos. 2–5 as mortgagees. Laduram and Jaitulal (sons of Jetharam) and their minor sons were impleaded as defendants nos. 6–12 on their own application. Defendant no. 1 (Jetharam) and defendants nos. 6–12 filed written statements raising identical pleas contesting the suit on three main grounds: (1) that Jetharam was of weak intellect and had been induced to sign the agreement by misrepresentation, (2) that the sale was conditional on the consent of Jetharam's sons and grandsons which was not obtained, and (3) that the house was ancestral/joint family property belonging to Jetharam and his descendants and thus Jetharam alone lacked authority to sell.

The mortgagees denied knowledge of the sale agreement and stated their only interest was under the mortgage(s) executed by Jetharam and his sons. The trial court accepted the defendants' three defenses and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court reversed, finding (inter alia) that the house was acquired and built by Jetharam (not ancestral), that Jetharam understood and freely executed Ex. P-1, that no consent of sons was required, and that even if the property were joint family property the sale for payment of antecedent debts bound the sons and grandsons. The High Court decreed specific performance with directions for execution and registration of the sale-deed, delivery of possession to the plaintiff, possession against mortgagees on payment of their mortgage amounts, and payment of any surplus to Jetharam.

The present appeal to this Court was brought by Jetharam and defendants nos. 6–12 (his sons and grandsons). By the time of this appeal the mortgagees had apparently been paid off and were not parties. The appeal was dismissed by this Court with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale agreement Ex. P-1 was vitiated by misrepresentation or by Jetharam's alleged weak intellect, or whether the absence of consent of his sons rendered the agreement unenforceable.
  2. Whether the house in dispute was ancestral/joint family property of Jetharam and his sons and grandsons, and if so, whether Jetharam alone could validly enter into the sale.
  3. If the property were joint family property, whether a sale by Jetharam to pay antecedent debts would bind his sons and grandsons (i.e., whether the obligations were antecedent debts binding on coparceners).
  4. Whether the mortgage documents and the presence of the sons' names (including a minor's) in title documents or mortgages established joint ownership or otherwise affected the enforceability of the sale.
  5. Whether specific performance should be refused on discretionary grounds (e.g., inadequacy of consideration, unconscionability, or concerns about the vendor's mental capacity).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Jetharam lacked sufficient mental capacity (was of weak intellect) and his signatures on Ex. P-1 were obtained by misrepresentation; thus the agreement was unenforceable.
  • The completion of sale required consent and willingness of Jetharam’s sons and grandsons; since that consent was not secured the agreement was not enforceable.
  • The house was built by Dalla (Jetharam’s father) and was joint family/ancestral property; Jetharam alone had no authority to sell.
  • There was an initial presumption (argued) that because the family was joint, the property in their possession was joint family property; patta allegedly in the names of Jetharam and his sons was relied upon to support joint ownership.
  • The mortgages (Exs. P-10, P-11, P-12 and Ex. D-1) were executed by Jetharam and his two sons, showing joint dealing with the property and indicating joint ownership or at least joint liability.
  • If the property were joint family property, the debts evidenced by the mortgages were family debts and not antecedent debts of Jetharam alone; consequently the sale could not be held binding on the sons solely as payment of antecedent debts without proof of legal necessity or pressure on the family.
  • Specific performance is discretionary; the consideration (Rs. 31,000) was inadequate compared to the property's value and combined with alleged weak intellect this could justify refusal of specific performance.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Assertions

  • The sale agreement Ex. P-1 dated 29 January 1941 was validly executed by Jetharam with understanding and free consent (as accepted by the High Court).
  • The house was acquired and built by Jetharam, not by his father Dalla, and there was no sufficient evidence to establish that it had been converted into joint family property or that Jetharam had thrown it into the common stock.
  • The mortgagees had no interest beyond their mortgage; the mortgages did not prevent specific performance by reason of their discharge or the directions in the decree concerning payment to mortgagees and possession on payment.
  • The plaintiff had seen the patta but did not remember in whose name it was; the patta was in defendants' possession and they did not produce it to substantiate their claim.
  • Specific performance was appropriate because damages would be inadequate for breach of contract for sale of immovable property (relying on the explanation to sec. 12 of the Specific Relief Act).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shadilal v. Lalbahadur (A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 85) There is no presumption that a joint family possesses joint property; burden lies on those who allege coparcenary/ancestral ownership. Applied to require defendants to prove that the property was joint family property; court held defendants did not discharge that burden.
Janakiamma v. Shri Inuganti Venkata Bajgopala Chinnarao (I.L.R. Madras 1945, 378) Before shifting burden to a person claiming separate ownership, respondent must show the family had property from which disputed property could have been acquired. Cited to support the proposition that mere assertion of separate ownership by a family member is insufficient without evidence of family funds or property enabling such acquisition.
Mt. Brij Kunwar v. Sankata Prasad (A.I.R. 1930 Oudh 39) No presumption in Hindu law that any property is ancestral; persons alleging ancestry must prove it. Relied upon to reinforce that defendants had the onus of proving ancestral character of the property, which they failed to do.
Kamlakant Gopalji v. Madhavji Vaghji (A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 343) Joint worship or joint living does not give rise to a presumption of joint family property; claimant must prove existence of joint family funds/property. Used to negate any presumption of joint ownership from the mere fact of joint residence or worship.
Naginbhai v. Abdulla (VI Bom. 717); Gopal Trimbak Bhate v. Kesheosa Vishnoosa Lad (A.I.R. 1936 Nag. 185); Nga Tin Gyi v. Nga Twe Aung (35 I.C. 12) Inclusion of a minor's name in a title document (patta) does not, by itself, confer title on the minor unless it is shown the minor had independent funds used for acquisition. Applied to reject the significance of the patta obtained in the minor son's name as establishing joint ownership without evidence of the minor's funds being used.
Rajkishore v. Madangopal (A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 636); Govind Prasad v. Shanti Swarup (A.I.R. 1935 All. 778); Gopal Trimbak Bhate v. Kesheosa Vishnoosa Lad (A.I.R. 1936 Nag. 185); A.L.P.R. Periakaruppan Chetti v. R.M.A.R. Arunachalam Chetti (A.I.R. Mad. 582) To establish that self-acquired property has been thrown into common stock, a clear intention to waive separate rights must be shown; mere joint use is insufficient. Relied upon to hold that no evidence showed Jetharam intended to abandon his separate ownership by throwing the property into the family common stock.
Md. Ewaz v. Brijlal (Privy Council decision) Where a document is executed by several persons but only some admit execution before the Registrar, registration is effective as to the person(s) admitting execution and the document is operative against them. Applied to conclude Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12 were operative only against Jetharam because only he appeared to admit execution at registration; supported the assessment that the sons' names in earlier mortgages did not establish their effective liability/title.
Bandhuram v. Ram Kishun Sonar (A.I.R. 1923 All. 535); Chiranjilal v. Bankeylal (A.I.R. 1933 All. 273) When an alienation is by a manager other than the father, to bind the family it is necessary to show pressure on the family or lack of other means to discharge the debt (legal necessity). Distinguished and applied: court held that where the alienator is the father (and manager) and the debt is one of the father (even if sons are co-debtors), antecedent debt doctrine and pious obligation may bind sons; therefore the sale to pay antecedent debts was binding here.
Explanation to Section 12, Specific Relief Act (statutory principle) Presumption that breach of contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by monetary compensation, unless contrary is proved. Applied to support grant of specific performance; inadequacy of consideration alone is not ground for refusal unless shown to make the bargain unconscionable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by accepting that several factual findings made by the High Court (notably that Ex. P-1 was executed freely by Jetharam and that he was not of weak intellect, and that no consent clause of sons was required) were findings of fact which could not be re-opened in the present appeal. The Court then engaged in a legal analysis focused on the character of the property and the consequences of the mortgages and debts.

On the question whether the house was ancestral/joint family property, the Court reiterated established principles that there is no legal presumption that any property in possession of a joint family is joint family property. The party alleging joint/ancestral character bears the burden of proof. The Court cited multiple authorities supporting that burden and applied them to the record facts, finding that the defendants did not produce the patta or evidence of family funds to show acquisition out of joint resources or joint labour; the alleged proof that the land was acquired by Dalla was found not established on the evidence.

Regarding the patta and the inclusion of a minor's name, the Court observed that the patta was not produced and that the mere inclusion of a minor’s name when the minor had no independent means does not establish title; Indian law does not follow the doctrine of advancement. The Court therefore rejected any contention that the patta (as described in argument) proved joint ownership.

The Court examined the mortgage deeds (Exs. P-10, P-11, P-12 and Ex. D-1). Noting registration practice and appearances before the Registrar, it applied the principle from Md. Ewaz v. Brijlal to hold that the earlier mortgages (Exs. P-10–P-12) were operative only against Jetharam because only he had appeared to admit execution during registration proceedings for those deeds; the sons' inclusion in the earlier deeds did not on the record establish their effective obligation or title. The later deed (Ex. D-1) involved admission by all three, but the consideration comprised earlier mortgage money and interest, and thus did not alter the central conclusions on ownership.

On the contention that even if the property were joint, the sale could not bind the sons because the debts were not antecedent debts or legally necessary, the Court analysed the doctrine of antecedent debts and the "pious obligation" of male issue to pay untainted debts of an ancestor. The Court accepted the High Court's reasoning that the sale was effected to pay antecedent debts and that such debts (especially where the father is one of the debtors and manager) may bind the sons; the Court rejected the submission that the absence of proof of "pressure" on the family negated the binding character of the sale in the present factual matrix.

On discretionary relief and adequacy of consideration, the Court noted the statutory explanation to Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act that generally damages are inadequate for breach of contract to transfer immovable property. The Court observed there was no evidence to establish Jetharam's weak intellect (no medical evidence; the trial court finding against defendants on this point), and held that mere inadequacy of consideration is not a ground to refuse specific performance unless it combines with other circumstances to render the bargain unconscionable; no such combination was proved here.

Given these conclusions — lack of proof of joint/ancestral character, limited effect of earlier mortgages against the sons, binding nature of the sale to pay antecedent debts, and sufficiency of plaintiff's case for specific performance — the Court found no merit in the appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Direct consequences of the decision:

  • The decree of the High Court in favour of the plaintiff (Hazarimal) for specific performance is affirmed.
  • The directions made by the High Court — that Jetharam execute a sale-deed, have it registered, deliver possession to the plaintiff, that mortgagees be paid their mortgage amounts and that any surplus be paid to Jetharam — remain effective as the High Court’s decree was upheld.

The opinion does not announce any new legal principle; it applies established authorities concerning the burden of proof for joint family property, the effect of registration/appearance for executed documents, the doctrine regarding minor names in title documents, the doctrine of antecedent debts/pious obligation, and statutory presumption under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act. The decision's implications are primarily interlocutory and dispositive for the parties in this case rather than setting a novel precedent.

    Jetharam v. Hazarimal

    Bapna, J.:— This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of the former covenanting State of Jodhpur, and was filed before the Ijlas-i-khas and transferred to this Court by virtue of the provisions of Ordinance No. XL of 1949 read with Ordinance No. XII of 1950.

    2. The respondent Hazarimal sued the appellant Jetharam for specific performance of a contract of sale of a house situated at Jodhpur and more particularly described in the plaint, on the basis of an agreement of sale Ex. P-1 dated 29th January 1941. Rugnath Das and his three sons were impleaded as defendants Nos. 2 to 5 as mortgagees of the property. Laduram and Jaitulal, sons of Jetharam defendant, and their minor sons were impleaded defendants Nos. 6 to 12 on their own application. Defendant No. 1 and defendant Nos. 6 to 12 filed separate written statements but have taken identical pleas. They contested the suit on the following grounds:—

    (1) that Jetharam was a person of weak intellect and his signatures had been secured on Ex. P.-1 under a misrepresentation and he did not fully understand the nature of the transaction at the time;

    (2) that the completion of the sale had been made dependent upon the consent and willingness of the sons and grand-sons of Jetharam and as the same had not been secured, the agreement was not enforceable;

    (3) that the house in dispute had been built by Dalla, father of Jetharam, and was the joint family property of Jetharam and his sons and grand-sons., and Jetharam alone had no authority to enter into an agreement for sale which was thus unenforceable.

    3. The mortgagees denied any knowledge of the agreement of sale and expressed that they had no interest except under the mortgage which, they said, had been executed by Jetharam and his sons. The trial court accepted, the defence on all the three points and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Judges of the High Court of the former covenanting State of Jodhpur reversed those findings and held on a discussion of the evidence and circumstances of the case that it had not been established that the house had been built by Dalla and was ancestral property in the hands of Jetharam. It was held that the land had been acquired and built upon by Jetharam himself. The contention that Jetharam had since the acquisition of the property thrown it into the common stock and made it joint family property belonging to his sons and grand-sons was negatived. It was also held that even on the assumption that the house was joint family property, the agreement to sell had been made for payment of his antecedent debts and was binding on his sons and grand-sons. It was further held that it had not been proved that Jetharam was a person of weak intellect; but on the other hand it had been fully proved that he had executed Ex. P-1 of his own free will after understanding its implications and no misrepresentation had been made to him, and further that there was no stipulation for obtaining the consent of the sons of Jetharam before the agreement of sale was to become complete. The suit was accordingly decreed for specific performances of the contract of sale against Jetharam, with directions that he should execute a sale-deed and have it duly registered and also deliver possession to the plaintiff, and for possession against the mortgagees on receipt of their mortgage amount and for possession against defendants Nos. 6 to 12 as well, as they stated that they had got into possession by redeeming the mortgage. A further direction was made that if any amount was left over after payment of the mortgage debt, it was to be paid to Jetharam.

    4. The present appeal has been filed by Jetharam and defendant Nos. 6 to 12 who are his sons and grand-sons, and it appear, that the mortgagees having been paid off were not made parties to this appeal. The finding that Ex. P-1, the contract of sale, was not vitiated by any mis-representation or lack of understanding by the executant or by absence of consent of the sons of Jetharam is one of fact and cannot be raised in this appeal and the learned counsel for the appellants very rightly did not address any arguments on these points. It was, however, contended for the appellants that it was the case of both parties that Jetharam and his sons were members of a joint Hindu family and therefore, there was an initial presumption that the house property which was in possession of the members of the family was joint family property. The law is, however, well settled that there is no presumption that a family, because it is joint, possesses joint property or any property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenary property Shadilal v. Lalbahadur (A.I.R 1933 P.C 85). The mortgagee in that case brought a suit to enforce the mortgage by sale of the property mortgaged by the father, and the sons pleaded that the mortgaged property was ancestral and that there was no necessity for the loan. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that there was no presumption that a family, because it is joint, possesses joint property, and it was for the sons of the mortgagee to allege and prove that those properties were joint family properties. Shadilal's case was referred to by the Madras High Court in Janakiamma v. Shri Inuganti Venkata Bajgopala Chinnarao (I.L.R Madras 1945, 378, at 384). It was there contended by the respondent that if any member of a Hindu joint family claimed any property in his possession to be his separate property, the onus was on him to prove that it was acquired by him out of his own funds and without the aid of the family estate. Their Lordships observed that before the appellant could be called upon to assume such burden, it was incumbent on respondent to show that the family was possessed of some property with the aid of which the property in dispute could have been acquired.

    5. In an Oudh case: Mt. Brij Kunwar v. Sankata Prasad (A.I.R 1930 Oudh 39), a suit was brought by the mortgagee after the death of the mortgagor against his son and grandsons. It was pleaded that the property was ancestral and the mortgage was not binding as it was not for legal necessity or antecedent debt. It was held that there was no presumption in Hindu Law about any property being ancestral and it was for the persons alleging that it was so to prove their contention.

    6. In Kamlakant Gopalji v. Madhavji Vaghji (A.I.R 1935 Bom. 343) it was held that merely from the fact that the father and the son are joint in food and worship, there is no presumption that they hold joint family property. It is for the plaintiff to show that the family possessed some joint or ancestral property from which the presumption could be drawn that all the property possessed by the family was joint family property.

    7. The principles which have now been well established are that to render the property joint, the person claiming such interest in the property must prove tat the family was possessed of some property with the income of which the property could have been acquired or from which the presumption could be drawn that all the property possessed by the family is joint family property or that it was purchased with joint family funds or acquired by joint labour. None of these alternatives is a matter of legal presumption. It can be only be brought to the cognisance of the court in the same way as any other fact, namely, by evidence.

    8. It was contended that the ‘patta’ of the property was in the name of Jetharam and his sons. It may be pointed out that the defence in the trial court was that the plot had been purchased and built upon by Dalla; father of Jetharam, but that fact was held not proved. The patta itself was not produced by the defendants. It was argued that the plaintiff in his statement admitted having seen the patta and did not deny Laduram's name being in it. What the plaintiff stated was that he had seen the patta but did not remember in whose name it was. The statement of the plaintiff need not be considered incorrect since it is possible that he may not have remembered in whose name the patta was. The patta was in possession of the defendants themselves and they could have very easily produced it if they wanted to rely upon it. It is, however, conceded that the patta of this property was obtained in S. 1969 when Laduram, the eldest son of Jetharam, was not more than 12 years old. The mere fact that Jetharam thought it proper to add his minor son's name does not prove that the property was acquired jointly by Jetharam and his son. Some proof should have been adduced as to the source from which the money was forthcoming not only for the purchase of the land but for the construction of the property thereafter. There is no evidence on the record in this respect. The doctrine of advancement is not followed in India and the fact that a minor's name is included in the document of title does not confer any title in him unless of course it is proved that the minor had any independent source of income and the minor's money was utilized in the acquisition of the property. Reference may be made to Naginbhai v. Abdulla, (VI Bom. 717), Gopal Trinbak Bhate v. Kesheosa Vishnoosa Lad, (A.I.R 1936 Nag. 185) and Nga Tin Gyi v. Nga Twe Aung (35 I.C 12.)

    9. It was next contended that even if the property was the self-acquired property of Jetharam, it had been blended with the joint family property and was thrown in the common stock of the family and Jetharam and his two sons Ladhuram and Jaitulal dealt with the property as if it belonged to them jointly. For the last contention reliance was placed on Exs. P-10, P-11, P-12, and D-1. Ex. P-10 is a mortgage deed purporting to have been executed by Jetharam and his two sons Ladhu and Jaitulal for a sum of Rs. 22,000/- on 9th of October, 1929 in favour of Raghunath. P-11 is another mortgage deed dated 7th May, 1935 executed by the aforesaid three persons in favour of Raghunath for a sum of Rs. 1999/-. This was a second mortgage and the amount of consideration was the interest which had fallen due on the first mortgage. Ex. P-12 is dated 17th May, 1939 and is a third mortgage in lieu of Rs. 1999/- due on account of interest on Ex. P-10 and purports to have been executed by Jetharam and his two sons Ladu and Jaitu in favour of the same mortgagee Raghunath. Ex. D-1 is the last mortgage-deed executed by Jetha, Ladu and Jaitulal for Rs. 25,998/- in supersession of Ex. P-10, P-11 and Ex. P-12, earlier mortgages. All these mortgages are in favour of the same mortgagee Raghunath.

    10. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Division Bench of the High Court had committed an error in so far as it observed that these were mortgages executed by Jetharam or by Jetharam and his two sons. As a matter of fact, all the four mortgages were executed by Jetharam and his two sons Ladu and Jaitulal but the observation of learned Judges of the Division Bench was made while discussing whether the property had been acquired by Dalla. He was alive when two of the mortgages had been executed, and the fact that he was not a party to the transactions was held to be inconsistent with the case set up by the defendants. The present argument is that the owners were Jetharam, Laduram and Jaitulal. In the first place, it is rather curious that while the documents were purported to be executed by Jetharam and his two sons Laduram and Jaitulal, the sons never appeared in the course of the registration proceedings in respect of the three deeds Ex. P-10, P-11 and P-12. The person who appeared, before the Registrar was only one and he was Jetha. Only in the last deed of mortgage Ex. D-1 did all the three executants appear in registration proceedings and admit the mortgage. This Ex. D-1 is dated 14th Feb., 1941 and was executed not only after the agreement of sale had been executed by Jetharam on 29th January, 1941 but after the plaintiff had given him notice on 10th Feb., 1941 to execute the deed of sale and convey the property. By this time, obviously, the defendants had made up their mind to make out a case that Jetharam alone had no authority to alienate the property. It was at one stage argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that if only one of several executants appeared to admit the mortgage before the Registrar and the deed was registered, it was invalid even as against the person on whose admission the deed was registered. The argument, however, was not supported by any authority. On the other hand, the case of Md. Ewaz v. Brijlal is an authority to contrary. It was held in that case that where the document was executed by two or more persons, and some of them admitted execution while others denied it, the document should be registered as to the person admitting the execution and it would be effective against the person on whose instance the document was registered. This decision was given by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 1877 and sub-section 3 of sec. 35 of the Registration Act was amended to bring it in accordance with that decision. The law of registration in Marwar on the point was not different. The mortgages Ex. P-10, P-11, and P-12 were thus operative only against Jetharam. The inclusion of the name of his sons Laduram and Jaitulal has, therefore, no significance beyond giving some sort of satisfaction to the mortgagee that the sons of the mortgagor will not perhaps question the mortgage later on. Ex. D-1 which was executed by Jetha, Ladu and Jaitu, and got registered by all the three of them, does not carry the matter further as the consideration was entirely composed of the mortgage money of Ex. P-12 and interest thereon.

    11. There is no proof also as to any express act by Jetharam which may show that he had given up his sole ownership of this property. The fact that his sons and grand-sons lived with him in the same house is not sufficient for any presumption or finding that Jetha had voluntarily thrown the property in the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claim upon it. It has been held that a clear intention to waive the separate rights of the person who acquired the property must be established and that it will not be so inferred from the mere fact of his allowing the other members of his family to use it conjointly with himself. Reference may be made to Rajkishore v. Madangopal (A.I.R 1932 Lah. 636), Govind Prasad v. Shanti Swarup (A.I.R 1935 All. 778), Gopal Trimbak Bhate v. Kesheosa Vishnoosa Lad (A.I.R 1936 Nag. 185), and A.L.P.R. Periakaruppan Chetti v. R.M.A.R. Arunachalam Chetti (A.I.R Mad. 582).

    12. It was contended that the consideration of the first mortgage was utilized, as mentioned in the deed to pay off a debt of Rs. 14,000/- incurred in connection with the motor business and Rs. 8,000/- were payable to the Jodhpur State in connection with certain contracts. No evidence has been produced to show as to who were carrying on this motor business or the contract business, and there can be no presumption that this was the business of the family. In any case, if Jetharam had become indebted along with his sons, he was jointly and severally liable and he might have thought it prudent to raise a loan on his property in order to wipe off his liability which would incidentally wipe off the liability of his sons as well.

    13. An important feature in this case is that Jetharam himself has not come in witness box and the defendants have, therefore, kept back the circumstances with respect to the acquisition or enjoyment of the property which could throw considerable light on the fact whether it was the property of Jetharam alone or was that of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons and grand-sons. It was argued that the creditor Raghunath had stated that the debts were of Jetha and his sons in lieu whereof he had mortgaged the property. He appears on the scene when taking the first mortgage on 9th October, 1929. He has no knowledge of the debt for payment whereof the mortgage had been executed. His statement can only be of the fact in corroboration of the mortgage deed itself that the three persons Jetha, Ladu and Jaitu had executed the mortgage and they were his debtors. Beyond that fact, the statement of Raghunathdas is of no value.

    14. It was next contended that the lower court was not right in holding that the sale was valid even on the assumption that the property was joint family property. It has been observed by the High Court that the sale had been made in order to pay off the mortgage money and its interest which was an antecedent debt and was, therefore, binding on the sons and grand-sons. It was contended that if the property was joint family property and the debts evidenced by Ex. P-10, P. 11 and P. 12 were the debts outstanding against the family as a whole, the debts were not the antecedent debts of Jetharam alone. The debts were of the family the payment thereof was not due to legal necessity as it had not been shown that there was any pressure on the family for repayment. The distinction is sought to be made on the ground that when the alienation is for family necessity, it must be proved that there was pressure for repayment of debt (Bandhuram v. Ram Kishun Sonar, (A.I.R 1923 All. 535), Chiranjilal v. Bankeylal (A.I.R 1933 All. 273). There is no doubt that if an alienation is made by a manager other than the father, it is not enough to show merely that the debt is a pre-existing debt but it must be proved that there was pressure on the family and that there were no other means to repay the debt. In the present case, Jetharam was not only the manager but the father of the sons and the debt was such that he was one of the debtors, assuming that the loan had been obtained jointly by the father and the sons. While a debt contracted by the father alone which is not for illegal or immoral purpose becomes an antecedent debt, it is none the less antecedent because his sons are jointly debtors with him. According to the doctrine of pious obligation, the male issues of a Hindu are under a pious obligation or duty to pay the debts—even the personal debts—of the ancestor, provided the debt is untainted, i.e, not of an illegal or immoral nature. The emphasis is on the fact that in such cases, the debt may be one contracted for his own benefit by the debtor. It does not mean that if the debt contracted by the father is such that his sons are co-debtors with him, such debt will not become an antecedent debt, ofcourse, when it is antecedent in fact as well as in time. There is no force in this contention either.

    15. It was finally argued that specific performance of the contract may not be granted as it was a discretionary relief. It was argued that property was of a much higher value than the amount of consideration viz., Rs. 31,000/-, and Jetharam may have agreed to sell in an unguarded moment and there is something to show that he was a person of weak intellect. The contention that Jetharam was a person of weak intellect is not borne out on the record. He himself did not come into witness-box and there is no medical evidence on the subject. The explanation to sec. 12 of the Specific Relief Act is, however, clear that unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately received by compensation in money. A contract to sell immovable property is, thus, one where a grant of pecuniary compensation is not an adequate relief. It may be pointed out also that there is no evidence as to the value of property in 1941 when the contract was made. In any case, the inadequacy of the consideration is no ground for refusing enforcement of the contract unless that fact, taken with other circumstances, makes out a case for holding that the bargain was an unconscionable one. There is no proof in this case for any such finding specially when the finding of the lower court as to Jetharam being of weak intellect has been given against the defendants.

    16. The appeal has, therefore, no force, and is dismissed with costs.

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    Jetharam v. Hazarimal
    (Aug 28, 1951)