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  • Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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  • Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-section(2) of Section 15
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Smart Summary

Concise, Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs-respondents No.1 and No.2 (initially Rajinder Kumar, later substituted by Devinder Kumar and Savitri Rani) filed a suit for possession of a shop (described as shop No.B.I.X.1719, Saban Bazar, Ludhiana). The trial court (Sub Judge I Class, Ludhiana) decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 24.02.1994. Defendants No.1 to 3 and 11 (including Harbans Lal and his sons) appealed; the District Judge, Ludhiana dismissed that appeal by judgment and decree dated 22.09.1995. The defendants then preferred the present (second) appeal.

Core factual assertions (as recorded by the lower appellate court): Faqir Chand purchased the property by sale deed dated 14.1.1971 and later executed a registered Will dated 29.3.1971 in favour of his son Rajinder Kumar. Faqir Chand died on 22.7.1978. Rajinder Kumar (said owner) had been residing in England and had authorised his sister Amra Wati to manage and use the shop but not to let it out. It was alleged that Naresh Kumar (Amra Wati's son) inducted Harbans Lal and others into possession and that parts of the building collapsed in Sept. 1988; after collapse, Harbans Lal and his sons allegedly took possession of terrace and stairs. Rajinder Kumar (through power of attorney to Pawan Kumar) sought possession from alleged unauthorized occupants.

Defendants contested ownership, validity of the Will, authority of Amra Wati/Naresh Kumar to create tenancy, and the authority of Pawan Kumar to file the suit. On the pleadings, the trial court framed issues (including ownership, tenancy/possession, maintainability, valuation, locus standi, estoppel, and relief), and an additional issue regarding whether the first floor had fallen down.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs (originally Rajinder Kumar) are owners of the disputed property. (Issue 1 framed by the trial court.)
  2. Whether defendants Nos.1 to 3 and 11 are tenants and are in possession of the ground floor as alleged, and, if so, what is the effect. (Issue 2.)
  3. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form. (Issue 3.)
  4. Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction. (Issue 4.)
  5. Whether the plaintiffs have locus standi to file the suit. (Issue 5.)
  6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the present suit. (Issue 6.)
  7. The relief(s) to which the plaintiffs are entitled. (Issue 7.)
  8. Additional issue framed later: Whether the total first floor of the disputed property has fallen down, and if so, its effect. (Issue 1-A.)

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The Will dated 29.3.1971 was not duly proved; the original Will "had not seen the light of the day," and thus Amra Wati was (allegedly) a co-owner who could lawfully rent the property.
  • Because Amra Wati (or her heirs) could rent the property, the Rent Controller had jurisdiction and the suit before the civil court was an attempt to circumvent the Rent Act.
  • The power of attorney authorising Pawan Kumar to act for Rajinder Kumar was invalid; thus Pawan Kumar had no authority to file or verify the plaint.
  • The appellants were in possession (claimed tenancy), had been in possession for a long period, and had paid rent (receipts were produced showing payments, e.g., Rs.500/month).
  • The District Judge incorrectly dismissed the appellants' application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence.
  • Reliance was placed on two authorities: Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane v. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (2002) 6 SCC 404 (regarding interference in second appeal where findings are based on misinterpretation or inadmissible evidence or when admissions are ignored) and Ghanshyamdas Badrilal v. State of M.P. & another (AIR 1969 Madhya Pradesh 186) (principles concerning the scope of administrative powers and enforcement of rules/orders by a Market Committee) to support their contentions.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The trial court's decree was correct: Rajinder Kumar became owner by virtue of the registered Will dated 29.3.1971 executed by his father Faqir Chand; the Will was not challenged by other legal heirs and was proved by leading secondary evidence and by examining attesting witnesses (Kashmiri Lal and Harnam Singh).
  • The sale deed transferring the property from Rajinder Kumar to Devinder Kumar and Savitri Rani (sale deed dated 20.3.1990) was duly proved; Amra Wati was an attesting witness to that sale deed, indicating she had no objection to the Will.
  • Pawan Kumar was authorised by Rajinder Kumar by special power of attorney (Ex.PW4/1 and PW4/3) to take steps to secure eviction/possession and to maintain the suit property; thus he had authority to file the suit.
  • Amra Wati had initially filed a suit claiming co-ownership but that suit was withdrawn after she learned of the Will; this supports the plaintiffs' position that she accepted the Will in favour of Rajinder Kumar.
  • Naresh Kumar (Amra Wati's son) and others who purported to create tenancy had no authority to do so; receipts showing rent paid to Naresh Kumar do not prove lawful tenancy or payment to the owner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane Vs. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (2002) 6 SCC 404 Principle that a higher court in appeal can interfere with a trial court's factual findings if those findings are based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence, on consideration of inadmissible evidence, or on ignoring material evidence; admissions of parties/witnesses are relevant and must be given due weight. The appellants relied on this authority in support of their contention that documentary and admission evidence was misapplied. The court noted the reliance but held that the judgments relied upon by the appellants did not advance their case on the facts of the present matter.
Ghanshyamdas Badrilal Vs. State of M.P. & another (AIR 1969 Madhya Pradesh 186) Principles concerning the scope of administrative/managerial power (example given: Market Committee's duty to enforce rules and carry out government orders, and the extent of management/control including regulatory direction over market yards). The appellants invoked this authority as part of their submissions. The court recorded the reliance but ultimately found that the judgments cited did not help appellants' case on the differing facts before the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a stepwise analysis grounded in the documentary and oral evidence placed on record:

  1. Ownership by Will: The court noted that Faqir Chand executed a registered Will dated 29.3.1971 in favour of his son Rajinder Kumar and that this Will had not been challenged by other legal heirs. The execution of the Will was proved by leading secondary evidence and by examining the attesting witnesses (Kashmiri Lal and Harnam Singh). On these facts the courts below correctly concluded Rajinder Kumar became owner by virtue of the Will.
  2. Sale Deed and Acceptance by Co-heir: The sale deed (Ex.PW-1/1-B) by which Rajinder Kumar sold the disputed property to Devinder Kumar and Savitri Rani was proved; an attesting witness (Amra Wati) to that sale deed indicated she had no objection to the Will. This supported the conclusion that Amra Wati accepted the Will and was not asserting co-ownership.
  3. Authority of Power of Attorney: The power of attorney executed in favour of Pawan Kumar (Ex.PW4/1 and PW4/3) authorised him to take possession and to pursue eviction from trespassers and forcible occupants. The court found that Pawan Kumar, as a special power of attorney holder, was authorised to file the suit and take necessary steps to secure possession.
  4. Validity of purported tenancy: The court examined the contention that appellants were tenants who had paid rent. It concluded that Naresh Kumar (who received rent according to receipts) had no authority to create tenancy because he was neither the owner nor authorised to let out the premises. As such, receipts showing payments to Naresh Kumar did not establish a lawful tenancy in favour of the appellants or payment to the owner.
  5. Effect of prior suits and admissions: The court observed that Amra Wati had instituted a suit claiming co-ownership but that suit was dismissed as withdrawn upon her learning of the Will; this supported the conclusion she did not contest the Will's validity and did not treat herself as co-owner once informed.
  6. Application for additional evidence: The court upheld the District Judge's dismissal of the appellants' application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence, noting there was no material pointed out by appellants that would alter the conclusions on ownership or tenancy.
  7. Conclusion drawn: On the combined weight of the proved Will, the sale deed, the attesting witnesses, the valid power of attorney, and lack of authority in those who purported to create tenancy, the court concluded that the courts below were justified in decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal was dismissed. The opinion states the final disposition as follows:

DISMISSED — the courts below had rightly decreed the plaintiffs' suit for possession and no substantial question of law arises in this regular second appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs for possession was affirmed; the appellants' claims of tenancy and their challenges to the Will and the attorney's authority were rejected on the evidence before the court.
  • Procedural/precedential effect: The court expressly noted that no substantial question of law arises from this second appeal, and the opinion records that the precedents relied upon by the appellants did not advance their case on the particular facts. The decision therefore resolves the dispute between the parties on the facts presented but does not establish a broader legal precedent beyond affirming the application of ordinary principles of probate/transfer evidence and agency/power-of-attorney authority in the factual matrix of this case.

Judge: (SABINA) — Judgment dated November 23, 2009. This summary is strictly limited to the matters and findings recorded in the provided opinion; no information beyond the text of the opinion has been added.

    Harbans Lal And Others v. Devinder Kumar And Others

    Plaintiffs-respondents No.1 and 2 filed a suit for possession, which was decreed by the Sub Judge Ist Class, Ludhiana, vide judgment and decree dated 24.02.1994. Aggrieved by the same, defendants No. 1 to 3 and 11 preferred an appeal, the same was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Ludhiana, vide judgment and decree dated 22.09.1995. Hence, the present appeal by the defendants.

    Brief facts of the case, as noticed by the lower Appellate Court in paras 1 to 5 of its judgment read as under:

    "1. Rajinder Kumar son of Shri Faqir Chand, instituted suit for the possession of shop No.B.I.X.1719, situated in Saban Bazar, Ludhiana, shown as red in plan attached to the plaint against, Harbans Lal and others. It is alleged in the plaint that Faqir Chand was the owner of this property. He was father of Rajinder Kumar plaintiff. Earlier this building was bearing no.B.VII.1384. Shri Faqir Chand had purchased this property vide sale deed dated 14.1.1971. Shri Faqir Chand died on 22.7.1978. Shri Rajinder Kumar, plaintiff, is the owner of this property(shop) as late Shri Faqir Chand had executed a legal and valid will in favour of Rajinder Kumar. Rajinder Kumar was residing in England. He had asked his sister Shrimati Amra Wati to manage to this property on his behalf. She was allowed to use the shop, but she had no right to let out the property or to transfer its possession to anybody. Naresh Kumar is the son of Shrimati Amra Wati. Naresh Kumar alleges that he had put Harbans Lal and his two sons in possession of the shop. It is a double storeyed building. Madan Lal, Brij and Kewal are the sons of Parduman Lal, who was a tenant on the first floor. Madan Lal, Brij and Kewal, were in occupation of the first floor. Building was an old construction and was in dilapidated condition. In the month of Sept.1988, the property fell down during rains. Shrimati Darshana D/o Parduman Lal died as a result of the collapse of the first floor during rains in Sept.1988. Whole of first floor caved in. Roof of the ground floor also gave way and there does not exist any first floor now and the ground floor is also in a dilapidated condition. Sons of Parduman Lal are thus not in possession of the first floor as there is no first floor in existence. Parduman Lal's sons have been impleaded as defendants so that no complication arose at later stage. Harish Kumar was also impleaded as defnedant as a measure of caution as he is the son of Harbans Lal. He might set up that he is in possession of the shop.
    2. Harbans Lal and his sons Ashok Kumar and Amarjit took possession of the terrace and stairs after the first floor had caved in. It is alleged in the plaint that he(Rajinder Kumar) is entitled to possession as he is owner. Harbans Lal and his sons are in unauthorized possession of the shop. Amra Wati had been authorized only to manage and use the property. She had not been authorized to let out the shop. If she or her sons had let out the shop-, the tenancy created by them was illegal. If Naresh kumar had created any tenancy in favour of Harbans Lal and his sons that is of no consequence and is not binding upon him(Rajinder Kumar). Tenancy of the first floor has come to an end with the collapse of the first floor. Rajinder Kumar is residing in England. Harbans Lal and his sons are trying to take advantage of his absence and are threatening to raise construction. It is alleged in the plaint that he has appointed Shri Pawan Kumar Puri as his attorney vide power of attorney dated 20.12.88 to take possession and to file suit. Amra Wati and Kanta are his sisters. Sarswati is his mother. They have been impleaded being proper parties. In nut-shell Rajinder Kumar claimed possession of the shop on account of his being owner and on account of Harbans Lal and his sons, being in unauthorized possession theref having been inducted by one, whose authority did not extend to the creation of tenancy.
    3. During the pendency of he suit property was purchased by Devinder Kumar and Sawitri Devi, as such they were substituted in place of Rajinder Kumar.
    4. Harbans Lal and his sons contested the suit of the plaintiffs urging that Ashok Kumar and Amarjit sons of Harbans Lal are in possession of the shop as tenants inducted by Rajinder Kumar. Harbans Lal had nothing to do with the shop. It was denied that Rajinder Kumar was the owner of the shop. Factum of Will set up by Rajinder Kumar was denied. Its validity was also denied. It was denied that Shrimati Amra Wati was managing the property on behalf of Rajinder Kumar. It was denied that she was allowed to use the shop. It was urged that they were not aware if Naresh Kumar Amravati had no right to let out the property or to transfer its possession or that defendant no.3 was the son of defendant no.7 i.e. Naresh Kumar was the son of Shrimati Amra Wati. Parduman Lal was a tenant of the first floor. After his death, his sons are tenants, qua the first floor. It was denied that Amra Wati was allowed to use the shop as a licensee or that she or her son had no right or interest in the property or that they could not create any right or interest in the person inducted by them to the property. It was denied that the plaintiff had every right to take possession of the shop stairs and terrace. It was denied that portion of the first floor had fallen and had ceased to exist or that the right of tenancy of the heirs of Parduman Lal in the first floor had come to an end. It was denied that Pawan Kumar was appointed as attorney by Rajinder Kumar to take possession or to file the suit. Alleged power of attorney is illegal. Pawan Kumar had no right to sign and verify the plaint. It was admitted that Rajinder Kumar has sold the property to the plaintiffs vide registered sale deed.
    5. Harish Kumar, defendant, also contested the suit. Shrimati Amra Wati was one of the co-owners of the property. She was managing the property in her own right and so was Shri Naresh Kumar who was letting out the property some times on behalf of his mother and some times on behalf of Shri Rajinder Kumar. He is in possession of the property as of right along with his brothers Ashok Kumar and Amarjit who are tenants. Terrace and stairs form part of tenancy premises and as such there could be no question of possession having been taken by them on the collapse of the first floor.

    On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial court:

    1.Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the property in dispute?OPP.
    2. Whether the defendant nos.1 to 3 and 11 are tenants and are in possession of ground floor as alleged, if so, its effect?OPD.
    3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?OPD.
    4. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?OPD.
    5. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit?OPD.
    6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the present suit?OPD.
    7. Relief."
    The following additional issue was framed later on :-

    "1-A Whether the total first floor of the disputed property has fallen down ? If so its effect ? OPP Learned senior counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Will dated 29.3.1971 had not been duly proved on record. The original Will had not seen the light of the day. Hence, Amra Wati was also a co-owner of the suit property. Amra Wati or her heirs could rent out the property in dispute to the appellants. Hence, the Rent Controller was the appropriate authority to decide the dispute. The present suit had been filed by a person, who was not having a valid power of attorney in his favour. The suit had been filed with a view to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The litigation was mala fide. The effort of the plaintiffs was to evict the appellants by bypassing the provisions of the Rent Act. Assuming that Naresh Kumar and Amra Wati had been allowed to maintain the property, the same had been rightly let out to the appellants. The application filed by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been dismissed without giving any reason. It was established on record that the appellants were in possession of the suit property. In support of his arguments, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane Vs. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (dead) and others (2002)6 Supreme Court Cases 404, wherein, it has been held as under:

    " 31. From the discussions in the judgment, it is clear that the High Court has based its findings on the documentary evidence placed on record and statements made by some witnesses which can be construed as admissions or conclusions. The position is well settled that when the judgment of the final court of fact is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material evidence the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere wit the judgment. The position is also well settled that admission of parties or their witesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weightage by courts. A finding of fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is vitiated in law and can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. Since the parties have been in litigating terms for several decades, the records are voluminous. The High Court as it appears from the judgment, has discussed the documentary evidence threadbare in the light of law relating to their admissibility and relevance."

    Learned senior counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Ghanshyamdas Badrilal Vs. State of M.P. & another AIR 1969 Madhya Pradesh 186, wherein, it was held as under:

    "9. In regard to the contention that the Market Committee is under an obligation to carry out only those directions of the State Government which deal with the matter of providing reasonable facilities in the market yard and consequently the Government could not issue an order to the Committee saying that transactions in sale and purchase of cotton shall be effected only in the Laxmibai Nagar principal market yard, it is no doubt true that sub-section(2) of Section 15 lays down that the Committee shall carry out any directions of the Government for providing reasonable facilities in the market area and restricting of trading in a particular commodity at a particular market area is not making a provision for reasonable facilities in the market area. But the sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Market Committee is enjoined to enforce the provisions of the Act and the Rules and bye-laws made thereunder in the market area. Now,Rule 54 gives to the Market Committee absolute control over the market yard or yards. But this control of the Committee over the market yard or yards has been made subject to the Rules and to the general or special orders of the State Government. With these limitations a Market Committee is required to manage the market yard in the best interests of the trade having regard to the convenience of the trade in the notified agricultural produce and the purposes for which the control is vested in the Market Committee.
    In the management of the market yard, the Market Committee has to carry out the general or special orders of the State Government, for it is one of the duties of the Market Committee to enforce the provisions of the Rules. Now, management of the market yard does not mean merely the administrative management or superintendence of the market yard. It includes directing and controlling in a particular manner the use of the market yard. It has been stated in Browne's Judicial Interpretation of Common Words and Phrases that "management means administration, control etc., and one of the synonyms of 'management is' government', which means control so that under a power to provide for the management of slaughter-houses a city has power to prohibit the operation of slaughter-houses within the city."
    If then the Market Committee has the power of controlling and managing a market yard and this power of management is subject to any general or special orders of the State Government, then it is clear that where there is one principal market yard and several sub-market yards in a market area, the Market Committee has the power to prohibit trading operations in a notified agricultural produce at the sub-market yards and to restrict them at the principal market yard. Likewise, the Government has overriding power of asking the Market Committee to impose such a restriction. That the power of management includes the power to impose such restriction is clear also from the fact that under Rule 54 the Market Committee is required to manage the market yard in the best interests of the trade, having regard always to the convenience of the trade in a notified agricultural produce. The power of management of the Market Committee is, therefore, not confined merely to administrative matters but extends to the regulation of trade in a notified agricultural produce keeping in mind the best interests of the trade and the convenience of the trade in the produce. The State Government, therefore, acted within its rights in issuing the order to the Market Committee directing that transaction in the sale and purchase."

    Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiffs had been rightly decreed by the trial Court. Rajinder Kumar had become owner of the suit land on the basis of Will dated 29.3.1971 executed by Faqir Chand in his favour. The said Will had not been challenged by the sisters and mother of Rajinder Kumar. The Will had been duly acted upon. The suit filed by Amra Wati was got dismissed as withdrawn on her coming to know about the execution of the Will. The sale deed executed by Rajinder Kumar had been witnessed by Amra Wati. The property in dispute had been given to Amra Wati for her use. Amra Wati or her sons could not let out the property in dispute to any person.

    After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

    Faqir Chand was owner of the property in dispute. He died on 22.7.1978. He was survived by his wife Saraswati, son Rajinder Kumar and daughters Amra Wati and Kanta. Initially the suit was filed by Rajinder kumar and later on Devinder Kumar and Savitri Rani were substituted as plaintiffs being purchasers from Rajinder Kumar. The case of Rajinder Kumar was that he was owner of the property in dispute on the basis of registered Will executed in his favour by his father Faqir Chand on 29.3.1971. The Will in question was never challenged by the other legal heirs of Faqir Chand. The Will in question was proved by leading secondary evidence. Kashmiri Lal and Harnam Singh, attesting witnesses of the Will, were examined by the plaintiffs to prove the due execution of the Will. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Courts below rightly held that Rajinder Kumar had become owner of the property in dispute on the basis of the Will executed by Faqir Chand as the Will in question was a registered Will and the same had not been challenged by the other legal heirs of Faqir Chand and its execution was proved by examining the attesting witnesses .

    The suit property was purchased by Devinder Kumar and Savitri Rani from Rajinder Kumar vide sale deed dated 20.3.1990 through his attorney Pawan Kumar. A perusal of the sale deed Ex.PW-1/1-B shows that Amra Wati was one of the attesting witness of the sale deed. Hence, this also shows that Amra Wati had no objection to the Will executed by Faqir Chand in favour of her brother Rajinder Kumar. The sale deed was duly proved by examining the attesting witness Sudarshan Pal and Mukand Lal by the plaintiffs.

    The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellants that Pawan Kumar had no authority to file the suit is also without any basis. The power of attorney had been executed by Rajinder Kumar in favour of Pawan Kumar to maintain the suit property and to rent out the same to secure eviction or secure possession from tress passers and from forcible occupants Naresh Kumar and Harbans Lal . The said power of attorneys are Ex.PW4/1 and PW4/3. Thus, Rajinder Kumar had authorised Pawan Kumar to evict persons who were in an unauthorised possession of the property in dispute. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Pawan Kumar was not authorised to file the suit in question as Pawan Kumar being special power of attorney holder of Rajinder Kumar could do all the acts necessary for securing possession for trespassers and forcible occupants.

    Amra Wati had filed a suit for permanent injunction against Harbans Lal and others claiming herself to be co-owner of the property in dispute. It was averred by the learned counsel for the appellants that in case the Will dated 29.3.1971 had been a genuine Will, then Amra Wati would not have filed the suit. However, a perusal of the statement made by counsel for Amra Wati in the suit filed by her Ex.PX-2 reveals that the said suit was got dismissed as withdrawn as applicant Amra Wati, after filing of the suit, had come to know that Faqir Chand had executed a Will in favour of Rajinder Kumar on 29.3.1971. Plaintiff Amra Wati did not want to challenge the Will and did not want to claim any interest in the property. At the time of filing of the suit she was not aware of the existence of the Will. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Amra Wati was co-owner of the property in dispute as Amra Wati herself had admitted the due execution of the Will by Faqir Chand in favour of her brother.

    Amra Wati had been allowed to use the shop in dispute. However, Naresh Kumar, son of Amra Wati, rented out the property in dispute to the appellants. Naresh Kumar had no authority to rent out the property in dispute to the appellants as he was not owner of the property in dispute nor had been authorised by the owner to rent out the same to the appellants. So long as the property was being managed by Naresh Kumar on behalf of his mother, apparently Rajinder Kumar had no grievance but on coming to know the fact that Naresh Kumar had rented out the premises in dispute to the appellants, he filed the present suit through his attorney. Learned senior counsel for the appellants has failed to point out any material on record that Rajinder Kumar had created the tenancy in favour of the appellants. Before Amra Wati, Ditt Ram, her husband was in possession of the property and after his death, Amra Wati came in possession of the suit property. Learned senior counsel for the appellants has also failed to point out any material on record that Amra Wati or her son Naresh Kumar had any authority to create tenancy. There is also no force in the submission made by learned senior counsel for the appellants that since the appellants were in possession of the suit property since long, their possession was liable to be protected. Since the possession of the plaintiffs was not legal, the same could not be protected.

    The receipts placed on record to substantiate the plea by the appellants that they were in possession of the suit property on the basis of tenancy and had been paying rent @ Rs.500/- per month fail to advance the case of the appellants. Since the appellants had been put in possession by the persons, who were not authorised to do so, the receipts regarding payment of rent also fail to advance the case of the appellants. Moreover, from the receipts, it cannot be said that the rent had been received by Rajinder Kumar. As per the receipts, the rent had been paid to Naresh Kumar, who had no authority to rent out the premises in dispute. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge had rightly dismissed the application for additional evidence.

    Thus, the Courts below had rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for possession. The property in dispute had merely been given to Ditt Ram and then Amrawati/Naresh Kumar for their personal use and not for letting out the same to anybody else. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellants fail to advance the case of the appellants as these are on different facts.

    No substantial question of law arises in this regular second appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.

    (SABINA) JUDGE November 23, 2009 anita

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    Harbans Lal And Others v. Devinder Kumar And Others
    (Nov 23, 2009)