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Judgment Summary: J.G. Finance Limited v. Jamna Auto Industries Ltd.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, M/s J.G. Finance Limited (a company incorporated under the Companies Act), filed a petition under Sections 433 and 434 read with Section 439 of the Companies Act seeking winding up of M/s Jamna Auto Industries Ltd. The petition arose out of a lease agreement dated 14.5.1992 by which the petitioner (lessor) leased certain equipment to the respondent (lessee) for 48 months at Rs. 1,94,067 per quarter, payable in advance from 14.5.1993 for 12 quarters. The petitioner alleged that the respondent defaulted in payment for five quarters (November 1995 to February 1997) amounting to Rs. 9,70,335 and that cheques issued by the respondent in relation to lease rent were dishonoured; the petitioner claimed Rs. 12,09,814 as on 31.3.1997 and served a statutory notice dated 14.5.1997 (copies annexed as Ex.P3 and Ex.P4), and then presented the winding up petition.

The respondent filed a detailed reply denying the petitioner's contentions, raising preliminary objections on maintainability, and advancing substantive defences including (i) that most cheques were honoured except one cheque the payment of which was stopped for reasons attributed to the petitioner, (ii) reliance on an arbitration clause (clause 10.8) in the lease agreement, and (iii) contention that clause 10.9 conferred jurisdiction on civil courts in Delhi. The Court directed the petitioner to produce disputed documents (photocopies of allegedly dishonoured cheques) and gave multiple opportunities for compliance. The petitioner failed to produce copies of most cheques and did not file any joinder to the respondent's written statement, despite opportunities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitration clause (clause 10.8) in the lease agreement ipso facto ousts the jurisdiction of the Company Court to entertain a winding up petition.
  2. Whether clause 10.9 (purporting to vest jurisdiction in the civil courts in Delhi) can oust the statutory jurisdiction of the Company Court under Section 10 of the Companies Act.
  3. Whether the petitioner’s claim constitutes an admitted or apparently recoverable debt such that a winding up petition is an appropriate remedy, given the respondent’s disputed factual contentions (including alleged short financing by the petitioner and the stoppage of a cheque).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner alleged that the respondent defaulted in payment of lease rentals for five quarters (Nov. 1995 to Feb. 1997) and that cheques issued by the respondent were dishonoured.
  • The petitioner claimed a total sum (including late charges) of Rs. 12,09,814 as on 31.3.1997 and served a statutory notice dated 14.5.1997 before presenting the winding up petition.
  • The petition was brought under Sections 433, 434 read with Section 439 of the Companies Act seeking winding up of the respondent company for non-payment of lease dues.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Denial that multiple cheques were dishonoured: the respondent stated that all cheques were honoured except one cheque of Rs. 1,94,067, which was stopped because of the petitioner's default.
  • Reliance on clause 10.8 of the lease agreement: disputes are to be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (arguing that arbitration clause should preclude the winding up petition).
  • Reliance on clause 10.9: parties agreed that civil courts in Delhi would have jurisdiction (arguing that this Court had no jurisdiction).
  • Substantive defence that the petitioner short financed the agreed purchase price (agreed price Rs. 16,40,000; petitioner financed only Rs. 14,65,000), which allegedly went to the root of the transaction and made the lease voidable; because of this short financing the respondent withheld payment of the cheque dated 14.11.1995 (eleventh quarter) for Rs. 1,94,067. This factual position was supported by letters and ledger extracts (Annexures R/5, R/6 and R/7).
  • Practical point: respondent asserted that account entries showed encashment of cheques up to 31.3.1996, and it explained reasons for stopping the one cheque in dispute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Goetze India Ltd. v. Pure Drinks (New Delhi) Ltd., (1993-2) 104 PLR 745 : 1994 (1) RRR 385 (P&H) Support for the proposition that an arbitration clause does not automatically oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court to entertain a winding up petition. The Court relied on this Division Bench decision as part of settled law to reject the contention that the existence of an arbitration clause ipso facto precludes the Company Court from entertaining a winding up petition.
Haryana Telecom Limited v. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., Company Appeal No. 1 of 1998, decided 7.1.1999 Reiterates that arbitration clause does not by itself oust Company Court jurisdiction; the party invoking arbitration must show a bona fide dispute that should be referred to arbitration. The Court treated this later Division Bench decision as confirmation that a party seeking referral to arbitration must satisfy the Company Court that a bona fide dispute exists; the Court applied this principle when assessing whether the respondent's dispute was genuine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis follows a sequence addressing jurisdictional objections, factual controversies and the appropriate use of winding up petitions.

  1. Jurisdiction and arbitration clause:

    The Court acknowledged clause 10.8 providing for arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940, but held that an arbitration agreement by itself does not oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court. The Court observed that whether the Company Court should entertain a winding up petition is a matter requiring examination on the merits: the party seeking referral to arbitration must demonstrate a bona fide dispute that justifies arbitration rather than the Company Court proceeding. The Court applied earlier Division Bench decisions (Goetze India and Haryana Telecom) as settled authority for this proposition.

  2. Clause 10.9 and choice of forum:

    The Court rejected the respondent's contention that clause 10.9 (conferring jurisdiction on civil courts in Delhi) deprived the Company Court of jurisdiction. The Court explained the settled legal principle that parties cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction on a court that otherwise lacks statutory jurisdiction. Under Section 10 of the Companies Act, a winding up petition must be presented in the court within whose jurisdiction the respondent company's registered office is situated; thus clause 10.9 could not oust the Company Court's statutory jurisdiction.

  3. Factual contest on merits and evidentiary timeline:

    The Court reviewed the factual matrix: the petitioner alleged multiple dishonoured cheques and outstanding lease dues; the respondent denied widespread dishonour and admitted only one cheque was stopped, asserting it was due to the petitioner's short financing (a shortfall of Rs. 1,75,000 against the agreed price of Rs. 16,40,000). The respondent produced correspondence (Annexures R/5, R/6) and a ledger (R/7) showing encashment up to 31.3.1996.

    The Court noted procedural history where it repeatedly directed the petitioner to produce photocopies of dishonoured cheques and to address the respondent's written statement; the petitioner failed to produce such cheques (except one) and did not file any joinder to the reply despite opportunities. The Court considered that it could draw an adverse inference from the petitioner's failure to controvert or produce documents relating to the respondent's contentions.

  4. Appropriateness of winding up as remedy:

    The Court applied the settled principle that winding up petitions should not be used as an ordinary mode of recovery of disputed claims or counterclaims. It emphasized that the Company Court's jurisdiction is limited and that the court is generally reluctant to resolve disputed factual questions requiring detailed evidence and investigation in the course of a winding up petition, especially when the dispute arises out of alleged breaches of contract.

    Given the existence of genuine disputed issues (short financing, the reason for stopping the one cheque, and the ledger entries), and the petitioner's inability to show the debt as admitted or apparently recoverable, the Court concluded that the petition was not an appropriate vehicle for recovery.

  5. Conclusion of analysis:

    On the cumulative basis of (a) the settled law on arbitration clauses and Company Court jurisdiction, (b) the statutory allocation of venue under Section 10 of the Companies Act, (c) the respondent's credible factual defence supported by annexures, and (d) the petitioner's failure to produce key documentary evidence or to join issue, the Court held that a bona fide dispute existed and that the winding up petition could not be maintained.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The winding up petition filed by M/s J.G. Finance Limited against M/s Jamna Auto Industries Ltd. is dismissed.
  • The parties are left to pursue other remedies available to them in law (the Court explicitly leaves the parties to take recourse to other legal remedies).
  • There shall be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Broader implications: The opinion applied and treated as settled the proposition (supported by prior Division Bench authorities) that an arbitration clause does not ipso facto oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court; additionally, the Court reaffirmed that a winding up petition is not to be used as an ordinary mode of recovery where bona fide disputes of fact exist. The judgment itself does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying the established principles; its immediate effect is limited to dismissal of the petition and leaving the parties to other remedies.

Petition dismissed.

    J.G Finance Ltd. v. Jamna Auto Industries .

    Swatanter Kumar, J.:— M/s. J.G Finance Limited, have filed this petition under Sections 433, 434 read with Section 439 of the Companies Act, hereinafter called the Act, praying for an order of winding up against M/s Jamna Auto Industries Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the respondent company.

    2. In order to examine the sustainability of the claim of the petitioner reference to some basic facts would be necessary. The petitioner which itself it is limited company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Act had filed this petition through its Managing Director and constituted attorney in furtherance to the resolution of the Board of Directors of the petitioner company dated 28.2.1997 A lease agreement dated 14.5.1992 was entered into between the petitioner as lessor and the respondent company as lessee. Under the terms of the said lease, list of equipment was granted in favour of the lessee in relation to the equipment machinery etc. described in the schedule of agreement. The period of lease being 48 months at the rate of Rs. 1,94,067/- per quarter continuously for 12 quarters payable in advance at Delhi commencing from 14.5.1993 The lease charges were in addition to the other charges and expenses payable in terms of the agreement between the parties. Initially the respondent company was paying the amounts, but it is averred that it fell in default in relation to five quarters from November, 1995 for the period May, 1996 to February, 1997 amounting to Rs. 9,70,335/-. It is averred in paragraph No. 11 of the petition that the cheques issued by the respondent company in relation to lease rent were dishonoured. For default thereto and on account of late charges, the petitioner company claimed a sum of Rs. 12,09,814,00 as on 31.3.1997 The petitioner served a statutory notice dated 14.5.1997 through its counsel claiming the said amount. Copy of the notice is annexed hereto along with acknowledgement receipts Ex.P 3 and Ex.P 4 to this petition. Having failed to recover the amount, the petitioner filed the present winding up petition.

    3. Upon notice the respondent filed detailed reply, took preliminary objections in regard to maintainability of the petition and also repudiated the claim of the petitioner and any part thereof. The respondent company stated that none of its cheques had been dishonoured and in fact all cheques have been honoured except for one cheque the payment of which was stopped because of default on the part of the petitioner company. As such the claim was without any merit.

    4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent company firstly relied upon clause 10.8 of the lease agreement dated 14.5.1992 to contend that there is an arbitration clause in the agreement itself and as such the winding up petition is not maintainable as parties had agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration. Clause 10.8 of the agreement reads as under:—

    “1. The respondent submits that as per clause 10.8 of the lease agreement dated 14.5.92 it has been expressly agreed upon by and between the parties:

    Any dispute or difference arising out or in relation to, or under this agreement shall be referred to the arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1940. The seat of arbitration proceedings shall be in New Delhi.”

    5. No doubt the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement to refer their disputes to the arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. An arbitration agreement per se would not oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court to entertain a petition for winding up. It is only upon examination of the dispute on merits that Court would be required to decide whether such a petition should be entertained by the Company Court or the party should be directed to take recourse to the arbitration proceedings. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner need not detain me any further as this question is no more res integra as far as this Court is concerned, as it stands settled by two different Division Benches of this Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. v. Pure Drinks (New Delhi) Ltd., (1993-2) 104 PLR 745 : 1994 (1) RRR 385 (P&H) prior to the amendment took this view while after the amendment of the Arbitration Act another Division Bench of this Court in a recent judgment titled Haryana Telecom Limited v. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., Company Appeal No. 1 of 1998, decided on 7.1.1999 took the same view and held as under:—

    “Therefore, it must be treated as a settled proposition of law that the arbitration clause does not ipso facto oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court to entertain a winding up petition and the party invoking the arbitration clause for making a request to the Company Court to refer the matter to arbitration must satisfy the said Court that there is a bona fide dispute between the parties to the agreement which requires reference to the arbitrator and it is not sufficient for the applicant to say that the Court should refer the matter to the arbitration because there is a clause in the agreement for making reference to the arbitrator.”

    6. Secondly, the learned counsel for the respondent company relied upon Clause 10.9 of the agreement to contend that this Court had no jurisdiction. As per this clause the jurisdiction is vested in the civil Courts in Delhi to the exclusion of other courts. This contention again is without any merits. The parties can elect the Court by mutual agreement only amongst the Courts which otherwise have jurisdiction to entertain and decide a particular proceeding. It is a settled rule of law that parties cannot vest jurisdiction in a Court by consent if the Court otherwise has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit or other proceedings. A jurisdiction conferred by a statute on a specific Court can neither be altered nor substituted by the consent of the parties. Under Section 10 of the Act a winding up petition can only lie to the Court in whose jurisdiction the registered office of the respondent company is located. Thus, clause 10.9 can no way affect the jurisdiction of this Court vested by virtue of Section 10 of the Companies Act. Resultantly, this contention deserves nothing but rejection.

    7. In regard to the merits of the case, at the outset I would like to notice the stand taken by the respondent company in its reply. Para No. 4 of the reply in fact is the complete answer given by the respondent company to the claim of the petitioner, which reads as under:—

    “The respondent submits that vide lease agreement dated 14.5.1992, the lessor (petitioner company herein) had agreed to finance equipment and Machinery on behalf of the lessee (respondent herein) for an agreed purchase price of Rs. 16,40,000/- (Rupees Sixteen Lads and Forty Thousand only). The aforesaid lease agreement commenced from 14.5.1992 and under the lease instalments @ Rs. 1,94,067/- (One Lac Ninety Four Thousand Sixty Seven only) were to be paid for a total of 12 quarters w.e.f 14.5.1993 and thereafter on payment of the final 12th quarter instalment the agreement would expire by efflux of time. That as agreed upon by and between the parties, the total value of the assets was Rs. 16,40,000/- (Rupees Sixteen Lacs and Forty Thousands only) which was the agreed purchase price by and between the parties in respect of the aforesaid transaction. It is pertinent to mention here that out of the aforesaid purchase price of Rs. 16,40,000/- (Rupees Sixteen Lacs and Forty Thousands only) the petitioner company financed an amount of only Rs. 14,65,000/- (Rupees Fourteen Lacs Sixty-five thousand only) which is a default on the part of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the short financing of the agreed purchase price of Rs. 16,40,000/- (Rupees Sixteen lacs and Forty Thousands Only) goes to the very root of the transaction and such default on the part of the petitioner has resulted in the lease agreement becoming voidable at the option of the respondent company. Since there was short financing of the agreed purchase priced by the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 1,75,000/- (Rupees Once Lac Seventy-five thousand only) the respondent company withheld an amount of Rs. 1,94,067/- (Rupees One Lac Ninety-four thousand Sixty-seven only) by not permitting the encashment of cheque dated 14.11.1995 amounting to Rs. 1,94,067/- (Rupees One Lac Ninety-four thousand and Sixty-seven only) which amount was the lease rental fee for the eleventh quarter which became due and payable on 14.11.1995 Photocopy of letters dated 24.4.1996 and 6.5.1996 are annexed hereto and marked as Annexures R/5 and R/6.”

    8. In order to substantiate its stand in the reply the learned counsel for the respondent Company relied upon the letter dated 6.5.1996 (Annexure R. 6 to the reply). In this letter the respondent Company had written to the petitioner company that the petitioner had not shown the entry of cheque No. 269131 dated 14.6.1996 for Rs. 1,94,067/- while the cheque had been encashed in the account of the petitioner company. In regard to the stoppage of payment of the cheque due on 14.11.1995 it was averred as under:—

    “Regarding instalment which had fallen due on 14.11.95, we had instructed our bankers to stop the payment against the said cheque because in-spite of our numerous telephone calls, we were not paid Rs. 1,75,000/- which are still recoverable from you as per our books of accounts, neither were we provided with any relevant details in this regard.

    Kindly revert back on the matter with details of deduction, for needul action at your end.”

    9. The statement of ledger account showing the encashment of the cheques upto 31.3.1996 was also enclosed to this letter (copy thereof Annexure R. 7).

    10. It is strange enough that the petitioner company did not react to Annexures R. 6 and R. 7 and no reference was made to this letter in the statutory notice served upon the respondent company on 14.5.1997 It must be noticed that no joinder was filed on behalf of the petitioner company to the written statement/reply filed by the respondent company despite opportunities. The Court, therefore, will be justified in drawing an inference that the petitioner company does not deny the averments made in this reply.

    11. As already noticed, a specific case has been pleaded by the petitioner that all the post-dated cheques issued by the respondent company had been dishonoured on presentation. This fact was disputed in the reply and during the course of hearing the learned counsel for the respondent company upon instructions from his clients reiterated the stand. According to them all other cheques have been honoured on time except for cheque for a sum of Rs. 1,94,067/- the payment of which was stopped for the reasons afore-stated by the respondent company itself. Keeping in view this controversy, on 14.5.1998 Court had granted opportunity to the petitioner to controvert this fact. The order dated 14.5.1998 reads as under:—

    “Learned counsel for the petitioner may file on record photostat copy of dishonoured cheque. Authorised signatory of the respondent company shall be present in Court. List the matter, on 16.7.1998”

    12. As the petitioner failed to comply with the directions contained in the order dated 14.5.1998 another opportunity was granted for this purpose vide order dated 24.9.1998, which reads as under:—

    “Learned counsel appearing for respondent prays for time to comply with the order dated 14.5.1998 Let needful be done now positively before the next date of hearing.

    List on 29.10.1998

    No further time for the said purpose would be granted.”

    13. After few dates on 2.11.1998 it was confirmed that the stand of the respondent company was correct. The order dated 26.11.1998 reads as under:—

    “Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Company submits that except one cheque there is no photocopy or copy of the cheques which are alleged to have been dishonoured, available with the petitioner company.

    List this matter for hearing on 3.12.1998”

    14. From the above orders of the Court it is clear that there is a bona fide and genuine dispute raised by the respondent company in relation to stoppage of payment of one cheque for Rs. 1,94,067/- while all other payments have been made as per the terms of the agreement. As a result of alleged default on the part of the petitioner, whether respondent company is entitled to claim damages or is entitled to the disbursement of the amount of Rs. 1,75,000/- or whether the petitioner company is entitled to the late charges as claimed in terms of the agreement, is not a question which would fall squarely within the scope of the winding up petition.

    15. It is a settled principle of law that a petition for winding up cannot be permitted to be used as an ordinary mode of recovery of claims and counter claims. The jurisdiction of the company Court while entertaining and deciding the company petition is a limited one and the company court would normally be reluctant to go into disputed questions of facts requiring detailed evidence and investigation and more so when such claims are based upon the alleged breach of terms of an agreement. The petitioner company has miserably failed to satisfy that their claim in the petition can be termed as an admitted debt or a debt which is apparently recoverable from the respondent-company. Furthermore, they have failed to show that the dispute raised by the respondent company is not genuine and bona fide.

    16. For the reasons aforestated I am of the considered view that this winding up petition merits dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss this petition leaving the parties to take recourse to such other remedies as are permissible to them in law. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    J.G Finance Ltd. v. Jamna Auto Industries .
    (Feb 10, 1999)