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  • Sections 148 and 151 of the Code read with Order 21 Rule 12 A of the Code and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act
  • sub-rule 2 and sub-rule 3 of the said section of the specific relief Act, 1963.
  • provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and specific Relief Act, 1963.
  • provisions of Rule 14 of order 21 of the Code, rule 12-A of Order 21
  • SECTION 28 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
  • section 148 of the Code of Civil procedure Section 148 of CPC
  • provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of Rule 14 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of order 20 rule 14 of the Code
  • provisions of Section 151 of the Code
  • provision of Section 151 of the Code
  • provisions of Section 148 C.P.C.
  • rule 1 of Section 28
  • Section 151 C.P.C.
  • Section 148 C.P.C.
  • Section 115 C.P.C.
  • 22 rule 4 of CPC
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 148 and 151 of the Code read with Order 21 Rule 12 A of the Code and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act
  • sub-rule 2 and sub-rule 3 of the said section of the specific relief Act, 1963.
  • provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and specific Relief Act, 1963.
  • provisions of Rule 14 of order 21 of the Code, rule 12-A of Order 21
  • SECTION 28 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
  • section 148 of the Code of Civil procedure Section 148 of CPC
  • provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of Rule 14 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of order 20 rule 14 of the Code
  • provisions of Section 151 of the Code
  • provision of Section 151 of the Code
  • provisions of Section 148 C.P.C.
  • rule 1 of Section 28
  • Section 151 C.P.C.
  • Section 148 C.P.C.
  • Section 115 C.P.C.
  • 22 rule 4 of CPC
Smart Summary

Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit for specific performance and possession in respect of 8 Kanals of land in Village Marajwala, Tehsil Nakoder, District Jalandhar was filed by Gurdial Singh on the basis of an agreement dated 5.12.1985. The agreement provided for sale at the rate of Rs. 20,000 per acre by Mohinder Singh and others. At the time of the agreement Rs. 13,000 was paid; the balance consideration was payable on execution and registration of the sale-deed, which was to be executed by 30.5.1986.

The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance on 19.1.1991 and directed the decree-holder (plaintiff) to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 47,000 within two months (the period expiring on 20.3.1991). The decree-holder deposited the balance in Court and filed an application dated 12.4.1991 seeking condonation of delay and extension of time; that application was allowed by order dated 20.4.1991.

The judgment-debtor failed to execute the sale-deed and the decree-holder moved Execution No. 4 of 1993 (filed 18.3.1993). In that execution proceeding the judgment-debtor filed objections, contending that the court had no power to grant the extension of time and that, because the balance was not paid within the period directed by the decree, the decree had become unexecutable. Those objections were dismissed by the Civil Court (Junior Division), Nakodar by order dated 6.1.1996. That dismissal was impugned by the present revision petition.

Additional procedural events: an appeal by the judgment-debtor against the decree was filed on 22.2.1991 and dismissed on 14.4.1993, making the decree final. An application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC was later allowed to bring the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor Mohinder Singh on record (order dated 19.8.1996).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court which passed a decree for specific performance has the power to extend the period fixed in the decree for payment of the balance sale consideration.
  2. Whether the answer to the first question depends on the nature of the decree — specifically, whether the decree contains a peremptory condition that on default the suit shall stand dismissed automatically (i.e., distinguishing decrees that impose a peremptory dismissal consequence from those that merely fix a time without such automatic consequence).

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment-Debtor / Petitioner's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor argued that upon passing of the decree (dated 19.1.1991) the trial court became functus officio and therefore had no authority to grant any extension of time for payment.
  • The petitioner relied on precedents (e.g., Resham Singh and Parmeshri decisions as cited) where peremptory decrees resulted in automatic dismissal on non-payment and where extension was held impermissible.

Decree-Holder / Plaintiff's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The decree-holder deposited the balance sale consideration in Court and applied for condonation of delay and consequential extension of time; the court allowed that application by order dated 20.4.1991.
  • It is recorded that the order granting extension was not assailed by the judgment-debtor in the period following its grant; the judgment-debtor later filed objections in execution which were dismissed. The decree-holder relied on statutory provisions (Sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act) and the discretion of the court to grant extension when the decree did not contain peremptory dismissal terms.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Bindu v. Kirku, AIR 1988 J. & K. 1 (Full Bench) Section 151 CPC can be invoked when Section 148 CPC is not attracted; the court may take note of events preventing compliance with a peremptory order passed in the proceedings and can, in appropriate circumstances, enlarge time under its inherent powers. The opinion relies on the principle that Section 151 CPC supplements Section 148 CPC and can justify extension of time where Section 148 is not directly applicable.
AIR 1961 SC 882 Authority for the proposition that a Court is not powerless to enlarge time where sufficient cause is shown. The judgment is cited as Supreme Court authority supporting the proposition that courts can enlarge time when sufficient cause is established.
AIR 1977 J. & K. 36 Example of a case where an extension was granted after the period fixed by a peremptory order, with aid of Section 151 CPC. Cited to illustrate that courts have in past exercised inherent powers (Section 151) to extend periods even when peremptory orders were earlier made (where those peremptory orders were not statutorily mandated).
Harbans Singh Grewal v. Puran Singh, (1990-2) 98 P.L.R. 267 Where a decree grants time for deposit and there is no peremptory dismissal-direction, the Court may extend the period by exercising power under Section 148 CPC. The opinion applies this precedent to support the proposition that, in absence of a peremptory dismissal-term in the decree, time granted may be extended under Section 148 CPC.
Surai Singh v. Rajnarain Lal and Anr., A.I.R. 1984 Patna 155 Held that Section 148 CPC empowers the Court to extend time granted in a decree where the decree does not provide that non-payment within time will result in dismissal. Used to reinforce the position that Section 148 CPC authorizes extension of time when the decree lacks peremptory consequences for non-payment.
Resham Singh and Ors. v. Manmohan Singh Kent, (1985-1) 87 P.L.R. 278 Where the decree contained a peremptory order that non-deposit within the time allowed would result in automatic dismissal, the executing court could not execute the decree and the suit stood dismissed; the court had become functus officio. This precedent was relied upon by the petitioner but distinguished by the court as inapplicable to the present case because the present decree did not contain such a peremptory automatic-dismissal term.
Smt. Parmeshri v. Naurata, (1984) 86 P.L.R. 591 Example of a conditional decree where consequences of default were provided in the decree itself; such decrees operate differently from non-peremptory decrees. Distinguished by the Court on the ground that the present decree did not contain consequences of default in the decree itself.
Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and Ors., (1989-2) 96 P.L.R. 617 (Supreme Court) Supreme Court held that where a short inadvertent deficiency in deposit occurs and the default is not wilful or due to negligence, the trial Court may, on sufficient cause being shown, extend time under Section 148 CPC; the trial court had jurisdiction to extend time and High Court could not interfere in revisional jurisdiction absent error. The opinion cites this Supreme Court authority to indicate that even in some peremptory-decree situations the trial court may, in rare or exceptional circumstances, grant extension where justice requires it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the central question: whether the court that passed a decree for specific performance has power to extend the period fixed in the decree for payment of the balance sale consideration. It classified such cases into two categories:

  1. Decrees that fix a period for payment but do not impose any peremptory consequence on default (i.e., no automatic dismissal is provided in the decree).
  2. Decrees that impose a peremptory term that the suit shall stand dismissed automatically on default of payment.

The court reasoned that the classification determines whether the decree-bearing court retains jurisdiction to enlarge time:

  • For decrees of the first class (no peremptory consequence in the decree), the court concluded that the court which passed the decree retains the power to enlarge the period. That power is available under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which expressly permits the court to enlarge any period fixed or granted by the court for doing anything under the Code) and, where Section 148 is not directly attracted, under the inherent powers in Section 151 CPC.
  • For decrees of the second class (peremptory dismissal-term in the decree), the court observed that it may not be possible for the court to grant extension because the decree's terms operate to terminate the lis automatically and the trial court may become functus officio; in such cases an appeal court may have primary jurisdiction to deal with consequences. However, the court noted (citing Johri Singh) that even in some peremptory cases, in rare and exceptional circumstances (for example an inadvertent shortfall), a court may, within narrow limits and on well-established principles, exercise discretion to grant relief.

The court relied on Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which expressly contemplates that where a purchaser does not within the period allowed by the decree, or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money, the vendor may apply to have the contract rescinded; subsection (1) explicitly recognises that the court may allow a further period. The Court interpreted this as legislative recognition that the court which passed the decree has the power to allow further time.

The court also emphasized that Section 151 CPC is available to prevent injustice where the strict terms of statutory provisions do not cater to particular circumstances. Section 151 was described by the court as being in aid of specific statutory provisions, not derogatory to them, enabling the court to pass such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the court observed that the decree in the present case did not contain any peremptory condition that would result in automatic dismissal upon default. The decree-holder had deposited the balance and moved for extension, which the trial court granted on 20.4.1991; that order was not challenged by the judgment-debtor and remained unassailed. The judgment-debtor's subsequent objections in execution, raised long after deposit and long after the extension order, were dismissed as without merit. Given the absence of a peremptory dismissal term, the exercise of discretion by the trial court to allow the extension was held to be within jurisdiction and lawful.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The revision petition is DISMISSED. The court held that where a decree for specific performance does not contain a peremptory term providing for automatic dismissal on non-payment, the court which passed the decree retains jurisdiction to enlarge the time for payment (by applying Section 148 CPC and, where appropriate, Section 151 CPC and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act). The trial court's order granting extension of time (order dated 20.4.1991) and the dismissal of the objections in execution (order dated 6.1.1996) stand affirmed.

Implications for the parties:

  • The decree-holder's extension of time and deposit of the balance sale consideration is upheld; the executing court correctly proceeded in execution and dismissed the judgment-debtor's objections.
  • The revision petition by the judgment-debtor (legal representative) fails; the court found no jurisdictional or other error requiring interference in revisional jurisdiction.
  • There shall be no order as to costs in the facts of the case (as recorded by the court).

Broader implications: The opinion elaborates and applies existing statutory provisions and precedents concerning the court's power to enlarge time under Sections 148 and 151 CPC and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. The decision is an application of those principles to the facts before the court; the opinion does not purport to announce a novel or overriding precedent beyond applying settled principles to the present facts.

    Mohinder Singh v. Gurdial Singh And Anr

    1. The suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 5.12.1985 and for possession in respect of the land measuring 8 Kanals in Village Marajwala, Tehsil Nakoder, District Jalandhar was filed by Gurdial Singh. As per terms of the agreement, the land was to be sold to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per acre by Mohinder Singh and others. A sum of Rs. 13,000/- was paid towards sale consideration at the time of execution of the agreement. The remaining sale consideration was payable on execution and registration of the sale-dead. The sale-dead was to be executed by 30.5.1986. This suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the trial court on 19.1.1991. The Court had directed the decree-holder plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 47,000/- within a period of two months from the date of the decree. The period expired on 20.3.1991.

    2. The plaintiff had deposited the balance sale consideration in Court and filed an application dated 12.4.1991 praying for condonation of delay and consequential extension of time for deposit of the amount directed under the decree of the Court. This application was allowed vide order dated 20.4.1991.

    3. As the judgment-debtor-defendant failed to execute the sale-deed, the decree-holder was compelled to execute the decree by filing Execution No. 4 of 1993 dated 18.3.1993. It is in this execution that the judgment-debtor filed objections raising the plea that the court could not have granted extension of the lime to the decree-holder vide its order dated 20.4.1991. According to these objections, the decree-holder had failed to deposit the balance amount within the stipulated period, as such, the decree had become unexecutable. These objections of the judgment-debtor were dismissed by civil court (Junior Division), Nakodar vide order dated 6.1.1996, which is impugned in this revision petition.

    4. The basic question that arises for consideration in this revision, therefore, is, whether the court which had passed the decree for specific performance has any power to extend the period for payment of balance sale consideration as indicated in the decree, or not. These cases may be classified in two following classes:-

    (i) Where the Court passing the decree imposes a condition for payment of balance sale consideration within the prescribed period, but decline to impose any condition in the event of default.

    (ii) Where the court passing the decree imposes a condition that in the event of default of payment of balance sale consideration, the suit shall stand dismissed automatically.

    Which out of two above classes, the case falls, would primarily be determining factor, whether the court should or should not extent time. It the case falls in the first category, then undoubtedly the court would have power to extend time while in other class of cases, it may not be possible for the court to grant extension of time, for depositing the balance sale consideration in terms of the decree in the face of peremptory condition in the decree.

    5. If the court while decreeing the suit does not impose the condition that on happening of an event or default of terms of the decree by the plaintiff, the suit of the plaintiff would stand dismissed automatically, then the power of the court to enlarge the time itself is indicated in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court in its discretion if stipulates the time for payment of balance sale consideration without imposing any peremptory condition which shall follow in the event of default, then it is an order of the court to do an act within the scope of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as such the Court would have the power to extent the period under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure Section 148 of CPC reads as under-

    "Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for doing of any act prescribed or allowed under this Code, the Court may in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired"
    .

    The bare reading of this provision indicates that where the time have been granted by the court to do an act prescribed or allowed by the court, the court has discretion to enlarge such period in spite of the fact that the period granted has already expired. In contrast to the provisions of Rule 14 of Order 21 of the Code, rule 12-A of Order 21 which are the provisions dealing with the passing of the decree for specific performance of the contract relating to transfer of the immovable property, does not postulate that the court must pass peremptory order or impose such conditions in the decree. The provisions of Rule 14 of Order 21 of the Code, itself provide the consequences which shall follow from non-compliance of the conditions stipulated in the decree passed in a pre-emption suit. While in the provisions governing passing of a decree for specific performance, no such mandate has been provided, the passing of such peremptory order in such decree is not absolutely essential. This aspect has been left to the discretion of the Court that the Court may or may not impose such conditions the default of which would result, in dismissal of the suit, restoration of property, of grant of possession of subject matter of the suit.

    6. At this stage it also becomes relevant to refer to the provisions of section 28 of Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 28 reads as under:-

    "Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed-(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the suit in which the decree is made, to nave the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require.

    (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court-

    (a) shall direct the purchaser or lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and (b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and if the justice of the case so requires , the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract.

    (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely-

    (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor;

    (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease.

    (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at instance of a vendor, a purchaser, I lessee, as case may be.

    (5) The costs of any proceedings Under this section shall be in the discretion of the court.

    The bare reading of this provision indicates the intention of the legislature that if the purchaser or lessee does not deposit the amount within the specific period granted by the court, the court has discretion to grant further time for such payment or to pass any further orders as provided under sub-rule 2 and sub-rule 3 of the said section of the specific relief Act, 1963. It is the court which passed the decree for specific performance that has to deal with an application by either party under rule 1 of Section 28 of the said act.

    8. In addition to these specific provisions, the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can always be invoked in cases belonging to earlier class mentioned above. The provision of Section 151 of the Code neither restricts nor otherwise effects the powers of the Court to do justice between the parties, on the contrary empowers the Court to pass such orders as it may deem necessary keeping in view the facts of the case and to meet ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court. The provisions of Section 151 of the Code are in aid to the specific provisions and are no way derogatory to such powers. It would be unfair to a party which had paid substantial consideration and have waited for years to succeed and the court had not impose any condition the default of which would be fatal to the decree passed. There in few days' delay in depositing the balance sale consideration by the decree-holder. In this case the decree-holder first had deposited the balance sale consideration then had moved the court for extension of time, which was allowed vide order dated 20.4.1991. This order was not assailed by the judgment-debtor for all this period. In fact, this order has not even been assailed in this revision petition and even now. The judgment-debtor had filed an appeal against the decree on 22.2.1991 which was dismissed on 14.4.1993, upholding the judgment and decree for specific performance passed by the trial court. The decree between the parties has become final The order granting extension of time to deposit balance of money was not assailed in any proceedings till today and the fact that judgment debtor enjoyed the part of the sale consideration for all. these years. All this brings the case of the decree-holder within the ambit and scope of the class of cases where grant of such extension would only be not fair but would be the proper course to adopt even in law.

    9. An application under order 22 rule 4 of CPC was filed before this Court for bringing on record the legal representative of deceased-defendant Mohinder Singh. It was stated in that application that Mohinder Singh died unmarried and intestate. This application was allowed by the Court vide its order dated 19.8.1996 and arguments were concluded on the same day. Consequently, Mr. Baljit Singh was brought on record without prejudice to the rights of the parties.

    10. Learned counsel appearing for legal representative of deceased-defendant-petitioner argues that upon passing of the decree dated 19.1.1991, the trial Court had become functus officio and as such, was not entitled to grant any extension of time. This argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not well-founded in view of the above provisions and settled position of law as would be clear from the judgments referred here-in-after. In this class of cases, the Court does not become functus officio, rather the Court continues to have specific and as well as inherent jurisdiction to deal with the matter of present kind. One of the basic distinction between these two classes is that in case where conditional decree is passed which is peremptory in nature, default or non-fulfillment of such condition results in automatic dismissal of the suit and consequently gives a valuable right to the other party. According of such rights becomes an impediment in the ways of defaulting party to apply to the same Court. The suit stands automatically dismissed and the decree already stands drawn up in terms thereof. Obvious result of above is that the proceedings would deem to have culminated in instant finality to the determined rights of the party resulting in loss of jurisdiction to the trial Court. In these cases after expiry of stipulated period, the suit stands dismissed automatically and no lis remains pending before the trial Court. If an appeal is pending, it is for the Appellate Court alone to adjudicate upon such questions but the trial Court itself becomes functus officio in regard to the lis between the parties. However, in the case of preemption suit, the Court would not have such power to enlarge the time for deposit of purchase money. Hon'ble Chief Justice Dr. A.S. Anand (as his Lordship then was) speaking for himself and Shah, J. in Bindu v. Kirku, A.I.R. 1988 J. & K. 1 (F.B.) held as under:-

    "However, powers under Section 151 C.P.C. can be exercised in such cases where the provisions of Section 148 C.P.C. are not attracted. Those would, for example be the cases where the time is fixed by the Court, not under any statute, but with a view to avoid dilatory tactics of a litigant. Therefore, in cases where the Court, during the pending proceedings, passes a peremptory order, it would not completely estop the Court from taking note of such events and circumstances which happened within the time fixed by the Court and prevented by the party from complying with the directions of the Court within the specified time. In such cases, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 882, the Court is not powerless to enlarge the time with a view to do complete justice to the parties provided the party seeking extension of time is able to show sufficient cause for grant of such extension after the original period has expired. AIR 1977 J&.K 36, was a case dealing with such a situation and extension was granted after the period fixed by the peremptory order with the aid of Section 151 C.P.C. The preemptory order in that case, facts whereof have been given by brother Bhat, J. was not passed under any statute, but under the general powers of the Court. The Court was satisfied about the cause for delay in complying with its order and extended the period to comply with its earlier order."

    The Bench of this Court in the case of Harbans Singh Grewal v. Puran Singh, (1990-2)98 P.L.R.267 held as under:-

    "At no stage, the judgment-debtor moved the Court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescinding the contract for sale on account of non-payment . of the sale consideration or the sale expenses. The Court having granted time for deposit of balance of the sale consideration and expenses for the sale deed within a specific period, could order to extend the period while exercising power under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, there was no direction in the decree that on failure to deposit the balance of the sale consideration of Rs. 36,000/- or a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards expenses, the suit of the plaintiff was to be dismissed. In the absence of any such directions time granted in the decree could be extended having resort to the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In a such like matter Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Surai Singh v. Rajnarain Lal and Anr., A.I.R. 1984 Patna 155 held that power of Court under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be there to extend the time granted in the decree when there was nothing in the decree that non-payment of the amount within the time allowed would result in dismissal of the suit. As a matter of fact no time was fixed for deposit of expenses in the decree."

    Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Resham Singh and Ors. v. Manmohan Singh Kent, (1985-1)87 P.L.R. 278 to argue that no extension of time could be granted by the Court below in this case. In that case there was peremptory order that if the amount was not deposited within the time allowed as per terms of the decree, the suit would stand dismissed automatically and that period had admittedly expired. And learned counsel relied upon the following observations made in Resham Singh's case (supra) :-

    "That the executing Court would not execute the decree as the amount was not deposited within the time allowed according to the terms of the decree, the suit stood dismissed automatically. The extension of the time for depositing the sale price would be varying the decree of the trial Court which could not be done as the Court has become functus officio after passing the said decree. Thus the High Court declined to interfere with the order of lower Court, in its revisional jurisdiction."

    This case is of no help to the petitioner because admittedly, no peremptory order had been passed by the trial Court in the present case. Similar is the position with regard to the other case relied upon by the learned counsel titled as Smt. Parmeshri v. Naurata, (1984)86 P.L.R. 591. In this case also, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed subject to payment of the amount agreed to be paid by the defendant, as such, it was conditional decree in which consequences of default were duly provided for in the decree itself.

    12. The Legislature has provided powers to the Court under sections 148 and 151 of the code to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties. The powers of the Court under these provisions are not merely declaratory or regulatory, but in fact are substantive powers which have been vested in the Court by the Legislature with definite intention in mind. These provisions have been worded widely by the Legislature to enlarge the scope of powers vested in the Court under other specific provisions. The purpose of giving over-riding effect to the powers vested in the Court under section 151 of the code over specific provisions of the statute is sufficient indication that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and in consonance with the settled principles of law, the Court can pass such orders or directions which would be necessary for achieving the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The powers of the Court under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code read with Order 21 Rule 12 A of the Code and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act constitute the class of cases where the Court would have the power to enlarge the time for depositing the decretal amount in terms of the decree. While on the other hand another class of cases is indicated under the provisions of order 20 rule 14 of the Code where the Court may not have the power to enlarge the time. Under these provisions the Court is expected to apply its mind upon application by a party and pass such orders as may be called for keeping in view the parameters prescribed within the scope of above provisions. The views expressed by different Courts in their pronouncements and well defined wide scope of these provisions, leads to one basic and inevitable conclusion that where a decree does not contain peremptory terms, which in the event of default provides for automatic dismissal of the suit, the Court does not loose its jurisdiction to entertain an application for extension of time, though it has already passed the decree. The Court in that case does not become functus officio in that sense of term, debarring entertainment of an application for extension of time by the Court which passed the decree.

    13. In the recent development of law, the class of cases indicated in latter category (supra), the Court has even gone to the extent of holding that in some cases where there is an error of the Court and in rare of rarest and exceptional cases, the Court may even grant extension of time in such cases where decree or order is peremptory one. In Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and Ors., (1989-2)96 P.L.R. 617 (S.C.), the Supreme Court held as under:-

    "From the above provisions there is no doubt that where the entire purchase money payable has not been paid and there is no order from any Court to justify or excuse non-payment, the suit shall be dismissed with costs. This shall be done by virtue of the above provisions. But when the decree-holder deposits into Court what he believes to be the entire purchases money but due to inadvertent mistake what is deposited falls short of the decretal amount by a small fraction thereof and the party within such time after the mistake is pointed out or realized, as would not prove wilful default or negligence on his part, pays the definite amount into the court with its permission, should the same result follow?"

    Thus, in accordance with the law laid down by the Highest Court of the Land in cases of above kind, the trial Court would be well within its jurisdiction to exercise discretion on well settled principles and grant extension of time even where a peremptory decree has been passed by that Court. Such exercise of powers by the trial Court if exercised within above limited scope could hardly be interferred with in revisional jurisdiction by this Court. In the case of Johri Singh (supra) while reversing the view of Punjab and Haryana High Court, the Supreme Court further held as under:-

    "The trial Court had jurisdiction to extend the time under Section 148 C.P.C. on sufficient cause being made out. The first condition precedent to enable the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. was, therefore, lacking. Likewise, there was nothing that has been brought on the record on the basis of which it could be said that the discretion exercised by the trial Court was in breach of any provision of law or that the trial Court committed any error of procedure which was material and may have affected the ultimate decision. That being so, the High Court had no power to interfere with the order of the trial Court, however, profoundly it may have differed from the conclusions of that Judge on questions of fact or law."

    14. Reverting back to the facts of the present, the trial Court had exercised its discretion and extended the period for deposit of money. The discretion exercised by the learned trial Court is on well-founded principles and in no way the trial Court has acceded its jurisdiction while granting such relief. Admittedly, there was no peremptory condition or term in the decree, which would have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the trial Court in this case. However, the order allowing the application of the decree-holder has become final much before the filing of this revision petition. The appeal preferred by the judgment-debtor against the decree has already been dismissed and the judgment-debtor did not pursue the matter any further. The judgment of the Appellate Court confirming the decree has also become final. The objections filed by the judgment-debtor after a considerable delay and long after deposit of entire purchase money were found to be without any merit and have rightly been dismissed by the trial Court.

    15. I find no jurisdictional or any other error apparent on the face of record, which calls, for any interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently this petition is dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Mohinder Singh v. Gurdial Singh And Anr
    (Aug 29, 1996)