R.L Anand, J.:— This is a civil revision and has been directed against the order dated 17.12.1981 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, who affirmed the order dated 16.1.1980 passed by the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class, Kurukshetra who dismissed the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree passed in civil suit No. 298 of 1972 on 20.10.1972
2. The facts of the case can be described in the following manner:
3. Earlier Smt. Bhagwan Kaur filed a suit for possession of the agricultural land situated in village Haripur, Tehsil Thanesar, District Karnal against her three sons on 10.5.1972 and she obtained an ex parte against defendant No. 3 Ram Narain and others. For setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 20.10.1972 applicant Ram Narain who was defendant No. 3 in the main suit first filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 7.6.1973 in the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class, Karnal and he averred that he was not duly served in the main suit and as such the ex parte order passed during the pendency of the suit and the ex parte decree are illegal. He was not duly served for 17.6.1972 or for 17.8.1972 Accordingly, he did not know about the institution of the suit filed against him and others and he came to know about the institution of the execution of the decree on 4.5.1973 when the Patwari Halqa went to the land in suit to deliver the possession to Smt. Bhagwan Kaur plaintiff of the civil suit. After obtaining the knowledge of the ex parte decree, he went to the Copying Agency, Kurukshetra and obtained a copy of the decree sheet on 26.5.1973 It has been further alleged by the petitioner Ram Narain Singh that after inspecting the file he came to know that fraud had been played on him as the attesting witness on the summons was highly interested in the plaintiff Smt. Bhagwan Kaur. Wrong report was obtained by the decree holder in connivance with the attesting witness and process server. There was no order or affixation for 17.6.1972 nor any affidavit had been attached along with the summons of the process server regarding the affixation proceedings. It may be mentioned here that in fact, Ram Narain Singh filed two applications under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C First on 7.6.1973 which was dismissed by the Sub Judge vide his order dated 24.9.1973 with the following orders:
“This application has been moved by Ram Narain wherein the heading of the application, the case has been shown as Bhagwan Kaur v. Kuldip Singh, Harchand Singh and said Ram Narain. The applicant has himself made himself as respondent in this application, so the application does not lie in the present form and the same is rejected.”
4. Still another application after due correction was moved by the petitioner on the same date i.e 24.9.1973 for setting aside the ex parte decree. Same grounds were taken in the application dated 24.9.1973 which were earlier taken in the application dated 7.6.1973 It was repeated in the application dated 24.9.1973 that the applicant came to know about the institution and execution of the suit on 4.5.1973 when Patwari Halqa went to the land for the delivery of possession to Smt. Bhagwan Kaur.
5. Notice of the application dated 24.9.73 was given to the respondent Bhagwan Kaur who filed reply and denied the averments. She took preliminary objections that the application is liable to be dismissed as time barred. On merits, respondent Smt. Bhagwan Kaur took the objection that the applicant-petitioner was duly served and he was fully aware of the proceedings. It was denied by Smt. Bhagwan Kaur that any fraud was played on the petitioner either by her or by the Court. Other defendants, who were added as proforma in the application did not give any contest to the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC dated 24.9.1973
6. From the above pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues for disposal of the application:—
(1) Whether there are sufficient grounds to set aside the ex parte decree? OPA
(2) Whether the application is within time? OPA
(3) Relief.
7. The parties led evidence before the trial Court and on the conclusion of the proceeding, issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the applicant-petitioner and it was held by the trial Court that there was no proper service. The operative portion of the order of the trial Court while disposing of issue No. 1 in favour of the applicant runs as follows:—
“It was further contended that he has produced one of the attesting witneses on summons Ex. R.1 Paras Ram AW-6 to establish that no service was effected on any of the defendants proceeded ex parte by the court even on 17.6.1972 The learned counsel for Smt. Bhagwan Kaur respondent No. 1 frankly conceded that there is no document on record to show that two defendants proceeded ex parte vide order dated 17.8.1972 were either served personally or refused to accept the summons. He has happily admitted that order dated 17.8.1972 proceeding ex parte against two defendants was totally wrong and illegal order firstly on the ground that no summons at all was issued to any of the two defendants i.e Kuldip Singh and Ram Narain Singh and secondly, no due service was effected on any of them even if the report of Process Server made on summons issued for 17.6.1972 (Ex. R.1) was taken into consideration. No further research is required to be made on this point because, I am fully satisfied from the record that no summons or registered A.D was at all sent to any of the two defendants proceeded ex parte for 17.8.1972 It seems that the then learned Sub Judge, proceeded ex parte against defendants No. 1 and 3 in civil suit on the basis of the report dated 17.6.1972 made on summons Ex. R.1 In my earnest view, the learned Sub Judge even could not proceed ex parte on the basis of the report Ex. R.1 because it was not due service in the eyes of law. It has nowhere been stated by Jagdish Chander Process Server who appeared as PW-1 and made report Ex. R.1 on the summons dated 17.6.1972 that summons delivered to one of the defendants was accompanied by a copy of the plaint or a memorandum of statement of the alteration. He has also not stated that there was any order of affixation of the summons on the house of defendants who refused to accept service and further that copy of the summons was also affixed on the house of the defendants who refused to accept the service. It has been held in case (Jagan Nath etc. v. Tek Chand etc.) 1974 Current Law Journal 328 that “a summons shall be deemed to have been duly served only if the summons along with the copy of the plaint or a concise statement thereof, if permitted, is served on the defendant or tendered to him. If only summons is tendered to him or served on him, it cannot be said that there has been due service of the summons on the defendant. Even if, it is presumed that the petitioner has been served with the summons because of his refusal to accept the registered envelope, all that can be deemed is that he was served with the summons of the suit under Order V, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code, but without a copy of the plaint, which was necessary to be sent to him along with the summons under Rule 2 of Order V, in order to constitute due service. Mere service of the summons is not synonymous with due service, as used in Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
10. In view of the above stated authority, there is no manner of doubt in my mind that order dated 17.8.1972 proceeding ex parte against defendants No. 1 and 3 in civil suit No. 298 of 1972 was illegal, void and not binding on the petitioner. Thus there are sufficient grounds to set aside the ex parte decree passed against the petitioner. This issue is accordingly decided in favour of the petitioner against the respondents.
8. However, issue No. 2 was decided against the applicant and on the strength of the findings given under issue No. 2 application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C was dismissed.
9. Aggrieved by the order, the present petitioner Ram Narain Singh filed appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, who vide order dated 17.12.1981 dismissed the appeal by passing the following operative order as contained in paras No. 7 and 8 of his judgment:—
“7. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not barred by time, inasmuch as, it was filed on 7.6.73 whereas the appellant had learned about the passing of the said decree a few days after 4.5.73 There is no force in this submission of the learned counsel. In the application which was filed on 7.6.1973, for setting aside ex parte decree, it was specifically mentioned that the applicant had come to know about the said decree on 4.5.1973, when the Patwari Halqa had gone to the land in suit to deliver the possession of the same to the plaintiff. Again, in the application, which was filed on 24.9.73, the said fact was reiterated. The applicant cannot now be permitted to take up the stand that he had learnt about the passing of the said decree a few days after 4.5.73 No amount of evidence can be looked into beyond the pleadings. Even if the first application dated 7.6.1973 is taken into consideration for the purposes of counting the limitation, the said application was clearly barred by time, as the limitation for setting aside the ex parte decree is thirty days.
10. It has thus been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the said delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree could have been condoned by the trial Court on the oral prayer of the appellant. It is true that the learned trial court could have condoned the delay in filing the said application, on the oral prayer of the appellant u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, but what is required for condoning the delay under the said provision is that it could be done only if the party would show sufficient cause for the same, and would explain each day's delay. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to indicate if the appellant had any ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the application within 30 days of the date of the knowledge i.e 4.5.73, nor there is anything on the record to explain each day's delay in not filing the application within limitation. Accordingly, the trial court was perfectly justified in deciding issue No. 2 against the appellant.
11. Aggrieved by the said order, the present revision which is being disposed of with the assistance of Shri V.K Jain, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Shri Raman Sharma, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Deepak Agnihotri, Advocate who appeared on behalf of the respondent.
12. For brevity sake, it may be mentioned that ex parte decree was passed on 20.10.1972 Issue No. 1 has been decided in favour of the applicant. As per Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, application for setting aside the ex parte decree could be made within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the decree. It is the specific case of the applicant in both the applications dated 7.6.73 which was dismissed on 24.9.1973 and in the application dated 24.9.73 that he came to know about the institution of the suit and execution of the decree on 4.5.73 when the Patwari Halqa went to the suit land in order to deliver the possession to the decree holder. In these circumstances, the period of limitation of 30 days would run from 4.5.73 and not from any subsequent date as argued by Shri Jain before this Court.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that his client came to know about the decree on 28.5.73/31.5.73 when his client obtained the copies of roznamcha and when he inspected the file of the main case. This submission of Shri Jain cannot be accepted in view of the categorical averments made by the applicant on two occasions while giving two applications under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C Even the oral statement of the applicant which is against the pleadings cannot be looked into on account of the settled law that no amount of evidence can be waived which is beyond the pleadings of the parties. This Court has the occasion to have a glance to both original applications dated 7.6.73 and 24.9.73 In fact, application dated 7.6.73 was typed out on 4.6.73 as it would be evident from seeing the date, which was typed as 4.6.73 This date 4.6.73 has been corrected with hand so as to be read as 7.6.73 This clearly suggests that even on 4.6.73, the petitioner was aware that the ex parte decree has been obtained by the decree holder against him on 22.10.1973 It is a settled law that each day of the limitation is to be explained. However, if any law is required on this point, 1973 P.L.J 611, Charanjit Singh v. The Sub Divisional Officer is an authority which can be read with advantage. It has been held in this situation that if the period of limitation expires each day's delay has to be explained. The application could be filed under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C according to Article 123 of the Limitation Act on 4.6.73 In the first application dated 7.6.73 there is no averment why the application was filed after two days' delay on 7.6.1973 Even in the supporting affidavit attached with that application no sufficient cause has been shown. In fact, the petitioner had prepared himself to file the application on 4.6.1973 yet he did not bother that in case he did not file the application on that day, he would be losing a very valuable right. When a litigant is negligent and is not bothered about his rights, for such a litigant the law cannot come to the rescue because law always helps vigilant litigant and not otherwise. The application dated 7.6.1973 continued up to 24.9.1973 At no point of time the applicant thought proper to make an application before the Court for the amendment. He allowed this application to be dismissed on 24.9.1973 by filing a fresh one. Even if, it is assumed for the sake of argument that the 2nd application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C was in continuation of the first one yet the petitioner has to explain why he could not file the first application within the statutory period of 30 days which must be calculated w.e.f 4.5.1973
14. Faced with the above situation, the learned counsel for the petitioner raised manifold arguments and the first in time was that it has been admitted by the trial Court itself while returning findings under issue No. 1 that there was no due service. In these circumstances, the ex parte order was void and there is no limitation for setting aside a decree the foundation of which was a void order. The argument is not appealable because the challenge given in the application is to the decree dated 20.10.1972 regarding which; as per the case of the applicant, he got knowledge 4.5.73 The second submission of Shri Jain was that the mistake was on the part of the court when it proceeded with the suit against the applicant in spite of the fact that he was not duly served for that date as conceded by the contesting respondent. Therefore, it was the duty on the part of the Court to rectify its own mistake by setting aside the ex parte decree. It was also submitted by Shri Jain that irrespective of the fact that the applicant did not file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay of 2 days in filing the first application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C, the delay could be condoned even on the oral prayer which was made before the trial Court and the trial Court could act upon the affidavit which was attached with the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C I have considered all the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant and have come to this conclusion that none of his contentions cuts ice. The Legislature in its wisdom while prescribing limitation under Article 123 had gathered both the eventualities when a defendant is duly served and when a defendant is not duly served. In the present case it is the finding of the trial Court that there was no service upon defendant No. 3 (present petitioner) and for this reason the petitioner could file the application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C within 30 days from the date of the knowledge. It is immaterial when the petitioner gets the knowledge of the decree but once he conceals the knowledge, he has to come within limitation. It is the case of the petitioner himself that he got the knowledge on 4.5.73 and in these circumstances he cannot put blame upon the Court that it proceeded upon a wrong report or that it committed illegality in proceeding ex parte. No doubt even on oral prayer relief can be granted whether in a main suit or in the application provided the ingredients of the section for which the relief has been claimed must be made out. A perusal of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C filed on 7.6.73 does not indicate that the applicant gave any sufficient reasons for the delay of even 2 days as to what prevented him from not filing the application on 4.6.73 when it was, in fact, typed out on the same day. In the absence of any case made out, even on the oral prayer the relief could not be granted as claimed by Shri Jain before this Court.
15. Now I proceed to discuss with the case law which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first citation relied upon by the learned counsel is (1990-1) PLR 152 Sarwan Kumar v. Shyam Mangla. This judgment lays down that order having been passed at the back of the petitioner without summoning him would be void order and in these circumstances the question of limitation does not arise. I am not in a position to persuade mycelf with the ratio of this authority in the light of the authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Singh's case reported as AIR 1992 Supreme Court 111, State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh-and Ashok Kumar where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that even void order can only be set aside within the statutory period of limitation. If there was no due service, the interim order proceeding ex parte against the present petitioner had merged into the decree which was being sought to be set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C
16. The 2nd authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is AIR 1959 Punjab 646 in which it was held that formal application for a relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not necessary. I have already stated above that even on oral request the relief can be granted by the Court provided the applicant must make out a case. In the present case, there is not an iota of averments in the main application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C why the application was filed on 7.6.73 instead of 4.6.73 My attention has also been invited to AIR 1977 Allahabad 551 Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. Banwari Lal. It is always a question of fact whether in a particular case sufficient cause is made out or not. No doubt, the provisions of Limitation Act especially Section 5 should be read liberally so as to advance the cause of justice but this Court cannot forget that when a litigant does not bother for the agitation of his rights within the prescribed period. In the cited case sufficient case was made out in the affidavit so as to set aside the abatement proceedings. The record of the present case is barren to that effect. Shri Jain also drew my attention to AIR 1977 Delhi 7 Devi Dayal Textile Company v. Nand Lal; 1979 P.L.J 48 Partap Singh v. State of Haryana; AIR 1988 Kerala 257 Unniraman v. Padmanabhan; AIR 1989 Allahabad 45 Rajiv Lochan Pandey v. Madan Gopal Sharma
17. All these authorities are beyond the issue to the proved facts, which are that the petitioner got the knowledge of the decree on 4.5.73 He moved his first application on 7.6.73 though it was prepared on 4.6.73, the application was barred by time. The petitioner could not explain why he did not file the application on 4.6.73 within limitation. His first application dated 7.6.73 was dismissed on 24.9.73 on which date he filed the 2nd application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C though legally not maintainable.
18. In this view of the matter, I do not see any infirmity in the impugned orders of the trial Court and of the first appellate court who vide their well reasoned orders dismissed the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C Resultantly, this Court is also of the view that there is no merit in the present revision which is also hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Revision dismissed.