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    Chhota Singh Etc. v. Union Of India .

    G.R Majithia, J. — This order disposes of C.M No. 100 of 1992 in L.P.A No. 1122 of 1987, C.M No. 101 of 1992 in L.P.A No. 1129 of 1987 and C.M No. 275 of 1992 in L.P.A No. 1220 of 1987.

    2. Land measuring 733.725 acres was acquired for a public purpose, viz. for raising of local Cantonment at Bathinda. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) was issued on May 30, 1979 and it was followed by a declaration under Section 6 cf the Act dated August 27, 1983. The Special Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation for different categories of land vide award dated March 31, 1984. The landowners dissatisfied with the award of the Special Land Acquisition Collector got the references made to the Land Acquisition Court under Section 18 of the Act. The Land Acquisition Court enhanced the compensation. The landowners still dissatisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Court moved this Court in first appeals and the judgment of the learned single Judge in the first appeals were challenged in the Letters Patent Appeals and those Letters Patent appeals were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated January 30, 1989 and the compensation was enhanced.

    3. These applications purporting to be under Section 149 read with Section 151 of the Civil P.C for making up deficiency in Court-fee were filed in this Court on July 14, 1991. It is stated in C.M No. 100 of 1992 in L.P.A No. 1122 of 1987 that the appellants-applicants had claimed compensation @ Rs. 1.50 lacs per acre but affixed the Court-fee at a lesser amount. The delay in filing the application is unintentional and that they may be allowed to make up the deficiency in Court-fee. Indisputably, this Court had enhanced the compensation for the land acquired as under:—

    i) For the land within the abadi and abutting the National Highway on either side up to the depth of 500 metres. Rs. 90,000 per acre.

    ii) For Chahi/Wehri or Chahi, Nehri Land Rs. 50,000 per acre.

    iii) For Barani land Rs. 38,000 per acre.

    iv) For Banjar Kadim or Gair Mumkin land Rs. 30,000 per acre.

    No request was made at the time of hearing of the appeals or even at the time of pronouncement of the judgment for permission to make good the deficiency in Court-fee. The applicants had claimed less amount of compensation than the one awarded by the Letters Patent Bench.

    4. This matter is squarely covered by a decision of this Court rendered in Banta Singh v. Union of India, 1988 (2) PLR 49 : 1988 (2) RRR 515 (P&H) (FB) : 1988 P&H 308. In that case, the facts are pari materia with the facts of the instant cases. In that case, the land was acquired for the establishment of a military cantonment at Bathinda. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the Punjab Govt. Gazette on October 9, 1974 and the declaration under Section 6 on October 10, 1974. The Land Acquisition Collector rendered the award on June 11, 1975. On a reference under Section 18 of the Act got made by the landowners against the award of the Collector, the Land Acquisition Court enhanced the compensation. The landowners aggrieved against the award of the Land Acquisition Court challenged the same in first appeal in this Court and in Para 4 of the grounds of appeal it was stated thus:—

    “That though the appellants are entitled to claim much higher amount, but they on their own accord are filing this appeal only for Rs. 1,60,000.- (Rs. One lac sixty thousand only) more than the amount allowed by the learned Additional District Judge vide the impugned judgment. Hence, court-fee in this appeal is being paid on the amount of Rs. 1,60.000/-.

    It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the appeal be accepted, judgment of the learned Addl. District Judge be modified and the appellants be awarded Rs. 1,60,000/- (Rs. one lac sixty thousand only) more as compensation than allowed by the learned Additional District Judge.’

    The Appeal was disposed of by the learned single Judge on November 10, 1981. The landowners challenged the award of the learned single Judge in Letters Patent Appeal and in grounds of Appeal No. 9 it was stated thus:—

    “That although the appellants are entitled to more compensation yet they on their own accord are filing this appeal for Rs. 85,000/- (Rs. eighty five thousand only) more than the amount of compensation allowed by the learned single Judge. Hence court-fee in this appeal is being paid on the amount of Rs. 85,000/-. It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the appeal be accepted, judgment/order of the learned single judge be modified and the appellants be awarded Rs. 85,000/- (Rs. Eighty five thousands only) more as compensation than allowed by the learned single Judge.”

    The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge. The appeal was allowed in toto and the amount of compensation as claimed in the appeal with interest was directed to be paid. An application was moved for making up the deficiency in Court-fee since higher compensation was allowed by the Letters Patent Bench with regard to certain categories of land and that prayer was rejected by a Full Bench holding thus “—

    “The learned counsel relying on the words ‘at any stage’ contended that he could ask for permission to pay the deficiency of court-fee even after the disposal of the appeal. We are unable to agree with this contention. Section 149 applies only to a pending case where the relief asked for is not properly valued and court-fee paid of that court-fee under the provisions of the Court-fee Act has not been properly calculated and paid. Though it may be open to a Court, when the case is pending before it to permit an amendment of the claim by increasing or varying it and pay the court-fees or if there is any mistake in the payment of the court-fee to permit payment of the deficit court-fee, it is not open to him to ask the court to permit an amendment of the claim after the case has been finally disposed of by that Court. It may be, if the party had preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree, the appellate Court may permit an amendment which will have the effect of both amending the trial Court pleadings as also the grounds of appeal. The appellate Court also cannot do it after it had disposed of the matter finally. ‘At any stage’ in Section 149 of the Code would only mean at any stage when the matter is pending disposal before the court where the deficit court-fee is sought to be paid. In fact, subject to the review power referred to in Order 47 and the amendment of judgments, decrees or orders as provided under Section 152, the court becomes functus officio, so far as the appeal, which has already been finally disposed of, in respect of the subject-matter which had been dealt with in that appeal.”

    5. The afore-mentioned judgment of the Full Bench of this Court was approved by the apex Court in the Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bathinda v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 730 : 1990 (2) RRR 492 (SC), wherein it was observed thus (at page 734):—

    “The Full Bench of the High Court, therefore, rightly held that to permit payment of deficit court-fee for recovering enhanced compensation after a lapse of almost six years under its inherent jurisdiction would encourage the practice of not paying the court-fee in the hope that as and when the valuation is determined in appeal the jurisdiction of the court can be invoked under Section 151 of the Code and the benefit of enhanced compensation can be reaped by making good the deficit court-fee. We think in the facts and circumstances of the case this view taken by the full Bench of the High Court cannot be assailed.”

    In the light of this, we find that these applications are lacking in substance.

    6. For the reasons aforesaid, these applications are dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Chhota Singh Etc. v. Union Of India .
    (Sep 2, 1992)