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  • Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act,
  • Valuation Officer." 7. Rule 3B of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957,
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • WEALTH TAX ACT 1957
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A.
  • Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972,
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act,
  • Valuation Officer." 7. Rule 3B of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957,
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • WEALTH TAX ACT 1957
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A.
  • Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, referred the following question to the Court:

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that a reference to the Valuation Officer by the Wealth-tax Officer under Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, was discretionary and not mandatory, even when the difference in wealth returned by the assessee and the wealth assessed by the Wealth-tax Officer was more than the limit prescribed under Rule 3B of the Wealth-tax Rules?

Relevant admitted facts:

  • Assessment years: 1971–72 (valuation date 31.3.1972) and 1972–73 (valuation date 31.3.1973).
  • Assets: (a) one-third share in a house on Rani Jhansi Road; (b) a property/plot on Sohan Lal Lane exclusively owned by the assessee.
  • For Rani Jhansi Road: the assessee returned a value of Rs. 35,000; the Wealth-tax Officer (WTO) accepted the construction value but valued the plot at Rs. 80 per sq. yd., estimating the 1/3 share at Rs. 82,630.
  • For Sohan Lal Lane: the assessee returned Rs. 1,92,564 as of 31.3.1971; the WTO valued the plot at Rs. 80 per sq. yd., arriving at Rs. 3,08,160.
  • The WTO used the same valuations for the subsequent year (1972–73) and imposed wealth-tax accordingly.
  • The assessee appealed; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner adopted reduced rates (Rs. 51 and Rs. 46 per sq. yd. respectively) and reduced the estimated values. Both Revenue and assessee were dissatisfied and appealed to the Tribunal, which dismissed both appeals and maintained the status quo.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that a reference to the Valuation Officer by the Wealth-tax Officer under Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, is discretionary and not mandatory, even when the difference between the value returned by the assessee and the value estimated by the Wealth-tax Officer exceeds the limits prescribed under Rule 3B of the Wealth-tax Rules (i.e., 33 1/3% or Rs. 50,000)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • Once the estimate made by the Wealth-tax Officer exceeded the value returned by the assessee by more than what is prescribed in Rule 3B, the Wealth-tax Officer had no option but to make a reference to the Valuation Officer (i.e., the reference became mandatory).
  • The view conveyed by the Board of Revenue by Circular No. 96 (dated 25.11.1972) supports the contention that a reference is mandatory in such cases; counsel relied on this contemporaneous exposition.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The use of the word "may" in Section 16A indicates that the provision is directory and vests discretion in the Wealth-tax Officer; therefore a reference to the Valuation Officer is not mandatory even when the Rule 3B thresholds are exceeded.
  • Relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sharbati Devi Jhalani v. CWT, it was argued (following Kirpal J.'s view) that the Wealth-tax Officer is required to make a reference mandatorily only if the estimated value, after being notified to the assessee, was not accepted and the assessee requested a reference. Since the assessee did not request a reference here, the WTO was not bound to make one.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K. P. Varghese v. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC) Use of the rule of construction "contemporanea expositio" — weight given to contemporary exposition (e.g., circulars) in interpreting a statute; also held that certain circulars can be binding on Revenue. The Court relied on K.P. Varghese to support the proposition that the Board's contemporaneous view (Circular No. 96) is a relevant interpretative aid and to show that circulars have persuasive and, in some contexts, binding effect on the Revenue.
Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass [1908] ILR 35 Cal 701 Observation (quoted) that courts give weight to the interpretation put upon a statute by those charged with its execution and application. This passage was quoted approvingly (via K.P. Varghese) to justify giving weight to the Board's interpretation of the amended provisions.
Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K. K. Sen (AAC) [1965] Earlier authority, used with Ellerman Lines, to support the proposition that circulars may be binding on the Revenue. Referred to by the Court (through K.P. Varghese) as part of the line of decisions establishing that circulars can be binding on the Revenue even if the circulars do not accord with the best interpretation of the statute.
Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. C. (1971) 82 ITR 913 (SC) Another earlier decision supporting the legal effect of administrative circulars on Revenue practice. Similarly relied upon as part of the background authorities (via K.P. Varghese) to show the binding or strongly persuasive character of circulars issued by revenue authorities.
Sharbati Devi Jhalani v. CWT [1986] 159 ITR 549 (Delhi High Court) Held that a Wealth-tax Officer is required to make a reference mandatorily only if the estimated value (after notification to the assessee) was not acceptable and the assessee wanted a reference (Kirpal J.'s view included a rider). The Court noted this decision and Kirpal J.'s rider and described the Revenue's reliance upon it; the present Court rejected the limitation that the WTO must wait for the assessee's request before making a reference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of statutory interpretation and constitutional considerations:

  1. Statutory text and scheme: The Court examined Section 16A(1) (which uses the word "may" regarding reference to a Valuation Officer) and the specific contingencies set out in clauses (a) and (b)(i)-(ii). The Court also took Rule 3B into account, which prescribes threshold values (33 1/3% and Rs. 50,000) for the trigger contemplated in clause (b)(i).
  2. Effect of Rule 3B: The admitted facts showed that the WTO's estimated values exceeded the returned values by more than the Rule 3B thresholds; thus the statutory contingency in clause (b)(i) was triggered.
  3. Weight of contemporaneous exposition: The Court accepted the assessee's reliance on the Board's Circular No. 96 (25.11.1972) and invoked the principle in K.P. Varghese that contemporaneous administrative exposition is a legitimate and often important aid to statutory interpretation. The Court observed that earlier authorities treat such circulars as capable of being binding on the Revenue.
  4. Purpose and legislative intent: The Court reasoned that if the Legislature had intended to confer unfettered discretion on the Wealth-tax Officer in all cases covered by clauses (a) and (b), there would have been no need to specify the contingencies in those clauses. The presence of explicit contingencies indicates that where those contingencies are met, a reference is expected as a matter of statutory design.
  5. On the use of "may": The Court acknowledged that words like "may" and "shall" are indicators of legislative intent but are not decisive alone. Context and purpose must be considered.
  6. Constitutional avoidance: The Court emphasized that an interpretation that vests unchecked discretion in the administrative officer could render the provision arbitrary and susceptible to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution. Courts should avoid constructions that would make a statutory provision unconstitutional.
  7. Response to the Delhi High Court's narrower approach: The Court considered the Delhi High Court decision (Sharbati Devi Jhalani) and Kirpal J.'s rider that made a referral mandatory only if, after notification to the assessee, the assessee did not accept the estimate and requested a reference. The Revenue relied on this view to argue that no mandatory referral was required since the assessee did not request one.
  8. Final interpretive conclusion: The Court rejected the Revenue's position and the requirement that the WTO must notify the assessee and await a request. Reading Section 16A(1)(b) with Rule 3B, the Court concluded that a reference is mandatory where the statutory threshold exists; the WTO must make a reference once the estimated value exceeds the returned value by more than Rule 3B allows. The WTO need not first communicate the estimate to the assessee and wait for a written request. An exception exists only if the assessee, upon learning of the estimate (by any means), expressly and in writing accepts the estimated value as correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court answered the referred question in the negative — against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Immediate consequence:

  • The Court held that when the Wealth-tax Officer's estimated value of an asset exceeds the value returned by the assessee by more than the thresholds prescribed in Rule 3B (33 1/3% or Rs. 50,000), the Wealth-tax Officer is mandatorily required to refer the valuation to a Valuation Officer under Section 16A(1)(b) — he is not permitted to treat the reference as discretionary or to await a request from the assessee.
  • The case was remitted to the Tribunal to be dealt with in accordance with this legal conclusion.

Broader implications: The opinion grounds its ruling in statutory interpretation supported by contemporaneous administrative exposition and constitutional considerations (avoidance of arbitrariness under Article 14). The opinion itself does not purport to announce or describe additional, broader legal consequences beyond directing that a mandatory reference must be made under the stated statutory circumstances; it expressly remits the matter to the Tribunal for further proceedings consistent with the Court's interpretation.

    Raj Paul Oswal v. Commissioner Of Wealth Tax

    1. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, has referred the following question for the opinion of this court :

    " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that a reference to the Valuation Officer by the Wealth-tax Officer under Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, was discretionary and not mandatory, even when the difference in wealth returned by the assessee and the wealth assessed by the Wealth-tax Officer was more than the limit prescribed under Rule 3B of the Wealth-tax Rules ?"

    2. In order to appreciate the import of the question, only a reference to the admitted facts is necessary, which can be stated thus :

    3. The assessment relates to the year 1971-72 (with 31st March, 1972, as the valuation date) and the year 1972-73 (with 31st March, 1973, as the valuation date). The assets involved were a one-third share in a house situated at Rani Jhansi Road and another property situated at Sohan Lal Lane exclusively owned by the assessee. For the former asset, the value returned by the assessee was Rs. 35,000. The Wealth-tax Officer accepted the value of the construction as shown by the assessee. The Wealth-tax Officer assessed the value of the plot at Rs. 80 per square yard and consequently estimated the value of the 1/3rd share of the assessee at Rs. 82,630.

    4. The property situated in Sohan Lal Lane was a plot and the value returned by the assessee as obtaining on March 31, 1971, was mentioned as Rs. 1,92,564. The Wealth-tax Officer calculated the value of this plot at Rs. 80 per square yard which came to Rs. 3,08,160. The Wealth-tax Officer adopted for both the properties the same valuation for the subsequent assessment year 1972-73 and imposed wealth-tax accordingly for both the assessment years. The assessee challenged the said order in appeal. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, adopting the rate of Rs. 51 per sq. yd. for the plot at Rani Jhansi Road and Rs. 46 per sq. yd. for the property at Sohan Lal Lane, respectively, reduced the estimated value of the two assets. This order satisfied neither side and, therefore, both the Revenue and the assessee approached the Tribunal in appeal against that order. The Tribunal dismissed both the appeals and maintained the status quo.

    5. Before proceeding to examine the rival contentions, it would be appropriate at this stage to take notice of the relevant statutory provisions ;

    6. Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, reads :

    " 16A. (1) For the purpose of making an assessment (including an assessment in respect of any assessment year commencing before the date of coming into force of this section) under this Act, the Wealth-tax Officer may refer the valuation of any asset to a Valuation Officer--.

    (a) in a case where the value of the asset as returned is in accordance with the estimate made by a registered valuer, if the Wealth-tax Officer is of opinion that the value so returned is less than its fair market value ;

    (b) in any other case, if the Wealth-tax Officer is of opinion-

    (i) that the fair market value of the asset exceeds the value of the asset as returned by more than such percentage of the value of the asset as returned or by more than such amount as may be prescribed in this behalf ; or

    (ii) that having regard to the nature of the asset and other relevant circumstances, it is necessary so to do......

    (6) On receipt of the order under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (5) from the Valuation Officer, the Wealth-tax Officer shall, so far as the valuation of the asset in question is concerned, proceed to complete the assessment in conformity with the estimate of the Valuation Officer."

    7. Rule 3B of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957, reads as follows :

    " 3B. Conditions for reference to Valuation Officers.--The percentage of the value of the asset as returned and the amount referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 16a shall, respectively, be 33 1/3 percent, and Rs. 50,000."

    8. Admittedly, the estimated value of the assets exceeded the returned value of the said assets by more than what is envisaged by Rule 3B, ibid. The question, therefore, arises as to whether, in that eventuality, the Wealth-tax Officer had perforce to make a reference to the Valuation Officer for assessing the true value of the asset.

    9. It has been contended on behalf ot the assessee that once the estimated value exceeded the value returned by the assessee by more than what is envisaged in Rule 3B, then the Wealth-tax Officer had no option but to make a reference to the Valuation Officer.

    10. Learned counsel for the assessee sought to buttress the above contention with the view which the Board of Revenue itself had taken of the provisions which had been newly introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, with effect from January 1, 1973, and conveyed to all the Wealth-tax Officers in the country, through Circular No. 96, dated November 25, 1972 (as reproduced in [1973] 91 ITR (St) 1).

    11. In our opinion, counsel for the assessee is right in his submission. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. P. Varghese v. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597, had occasion to consider that aspect of the matter. Their Lordships held that the rule of construction by reference to contemporanea expositio is a well-established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it had received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute was plain and unambiguous. Their Lordships in this regard approvingly quoted the following lucid observation of Mookerjee J., in Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass [1908] ILR 35 Cal 701, 713 :

    " It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it."

    12. Their Lordships did not remain content by merely holding that the view expressed by the Board in regard to a given provision of the Act could be of help in interpreting the said provision, but went one step further and, basing themselves on two earlier decisions of that court in Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K. K. Sen, AAC [1965] 56 ITR J98 (SC) and Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. C/2^1971] 82 ITR 913 (SC), held that the circulars in question were legally binding on the Revenue even if they were found not in accordance with the correct interpretation of the given provision.

    13. It may be observed that if the legislative intent had been to accord total discretion to the Wealth-tax Officer to make a reference to the Valuation Officer or not, in cases which were covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, then there was no necessity of providing the guidelines in Clause (a) or in Sub-claues (i) and (ii) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A. The Legislature by prescribing the contingencies, in which, by implication, it would not be necessary to make a reference, must again, by necessary implication, be taken to have intended that the reference to the Valuation Officer was a must if the given contingencies did not exist.

    14. It has been canvassed on behalf of the Revenue that the use of the expression " may " would indicate that the provision regarding a reference to the Valuation Officer is directory and not mandatory.

    15. There is no doubt about the fact that the use of expressions " may " and " shall " to some extent serves as an indicium to the intention of the Legislature and helps in deciding whether the given requirement is directory or mandatory in character, but the use of the expression " may " or " shall " is never considered decisive in that regard.

    16. We may emphasise that if the provisions of Section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act are to be interpreted, as canvassed on behalf of the Revenue to mean that it vests a discretion in the Wealth-tax Officer to make a reference to the Valuation Officer or not even when the case is covered by Clause (a) or (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16A of the said Act, then it would invest the provision with the vice of arbitrariness and thus render it ultra vires the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

    17. The courts have to avoid a construction which may render a provision unconstitutional.

    18. The Delhi High Court in Sharbati Devi Jhalani v. CWT [1986] 159 ITR 549 also took the above view. Kirpal J., who delivered the opinion for the Bench, however, added a rider that the Wealth-tax Officer is required to make a reference mandatorily only if the estimated value after being notified to the assessee was not acceptable and the assessee wanted a reference to be made.

    19. Learned counsel for the Revenue, taking a cue from the aforesaid view of Kirpal J., contended that since the assessee in this case had not requested the Wealth-tax Officer to make a reference, the Wealth-tax Officer was not duty bound to make a reference.

    20. In our view, there is no merit in the stand taken on behalf of the Revenue. In our view, the provisions of section 16a(1), clause (b), when read with Rule 3B, ibid, mandatorily require the Wealth-tax Officer to make a reference. With due respect to Kripal J., in our opinion, the Wealth-tax Officer was not required to convey his estimated value to the assessee and wait for his reaction. In our opinion, the moment the estimated value exceeded the returned value of the asset by more than what is envisaged by Rule 3B, then he had no option but to make a reference and he is not to wait for a request from the assessee to make a reference. It would be a different matter if the assessee, on coming to know about the estimated value, whether as a result of the communication from the Wealth-tax Officer or on his own and, in writing, accepts the estimated value to be the correct value.

    21. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee and remit the case back to the Tribunal to deal with it in accordance with law.

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    Comments

    Raj Paul Oswal v. Commissioner Of Wealth Tax
    (Oct 1, 1987)