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  • provisions of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940.
  • Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, I940,
  • Control) Act 1949.
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  • provisions of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940.
  • Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, I940,
  • Control) Act 1949.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 29, 1976 Kanwar Pal, son of the appellant, died of injuries sustained while travelling in Truck No. HYB 5137 driven by Mahavir (respondent 2). A claim petition was filed against the owners of the truck, the driver and the Insurance Company. The claim petition resulted in an award of Rs. 5,000 to the appellants, with Mahavir alone being held responsible for payment. The owner was exonerated on the ground that the deceased had been carried as an unauthorised passenger in contravention of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940; the Tribunal relied on the Division Bench decision in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh (AIR 1980 Punj & Har 167). On appeal, one judge (Sodhi, J.) considered that the Jiwan Dass decision required reconsideration in view of the Supreme Court decision in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (AIR 1977 SC 1735) and referred the matter to a larger Bench. This opinion results from that reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the owner of a goods vehicle can be held vicariously liable for negligence of the driver when the driver has carried a passenger in contravention of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940.
  2. Whether the Division Bench decision in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh should be reconsidered or overruled in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant/Appellant (as reflected in the record)

  • A claim petition was filed against the owners, the driver and the Insurance Company seeking compensation for the death of the deceased. (The record shows the appellants were awarded Rs. 5,000.)
  • The factual record establishes that the deceased was travelling in the truck at the time of the accident; the petition sought relief from the owner as well as from the driver and insurer.

Respondents (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The Tribunal and respondents relied on Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh to contend that the owner should be exonerated because the deceased had been carried unauthorisedly in contravention of Rule 4.60, and therefore the driver acted outside the scope of employment.
  • Respondents' counsel relied on decisions such as Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt to argue that the owner is not liable when the vehicle is being used outside master's employment (example: lending a vehicle after work for personal use by the driver).
  • Cited authorities (as relied on by respondents) included cases that were interpreted to support the proposition that express prohibition by the owner or contravention of rules could absolve the owner of vicarious liability in certain circumstances (examples discussed in the opinion include Krishna Ramayya Gouda v. C.P.C. Motor Co. and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Munaf).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh, AIR 1980 Punj & Har 167 Held owner not vicariously liable where passenger was carried in direct contravention of statutory provision (as applied by the Tribunal). The court found this decision was not correctly decided and overruled it; it cannot be the basis for absolving the owner simply because the driver carried a passenger contrary to Rule 4.60.
Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., AIR 1977 SC 1735 Expanded vicarious liability: even if a passenger was not authorised (a "trespasser" as to the employer), if the driver was acting in the course of his employment, the employer could be held liable (drawing on Young v. Edward Box). The court relied on this Supreme Court decision as the principal authority requiring reconsideration of Jiwan Dass and as supporting broader vicarious liability of owners.
Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd., (1951) 1 TLR 789 Lord Denning's formulation: even if passenger was a trespasser, the driver acting in course of employment can make employer liable; test involves whether the servant's act and employer's responsibility align. Adopted in reasoning (via Pushpabai) to support the proposition that a driver giving a lift while acting in course of employment can render the employer liable despite lack of authority to carry the passenger.
Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt, AIR 1966 SC 1697 Owner not liable where vehicle was used outside master's employment (example: driver using vehicle after work for personal purposes). The court noted that the rule in that case (no liability when journey was not on master's business) did not help respondents in the present matter because the determining factor remains whether the act was in the course of employment.
Ormrod v. Croaville Motor Services Ltd., (1953) (2) All ER 753 English authority cited for extending employer liability when driver with owner's consent drives for owner's business or purposes. Referenced in discussion (via Sitaram Motilal Kalal and Pushpabai) as part of the trend to widen the scope of "course of employment".
Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd., 1951 (2) TLR 674 Extended meaning of "in the course of employment" to include wrongful or illegal acts done in the course of conducting entrusted business (example: an agent acting illegally while conducting letting business). Cited as an example of extending the scope of course of employment; the court referenced it when discussing the modern trend in vicarious liability.
Barker v. Levinson, 1950 (2) All ER 825 Authority where it was stated master may be responsible for criminal act of servant if done within general scope of employment (an expansive view). Noted in the opinion; Lord Denning did not accept this expansive view and the present court agreed that it "went a bit too far".
Stavelay Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones (1956 AC 627) and ICI Ltd. v. Shatwell (1965 AC 656) English authorities referred to in relation to the test for employer's liability for servants' acts. Quoted in the Supreme Court's analysis (Pushpabai) referenced by the court here to explain accepted legal tests concerning vicarious liability.
State Bank of India v. Mrs. Shyama Devi, AIR 1978 SC 1263 Further enlarged the ambit of vicarious liability of the owner for acts of a servant committed in the course of employment. Relied upon by the court to show the trend of Supreme Court decisions broadening vicarious liability.
United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Saka Owoade, 1955 AC 130 Privy Council decision: master liable for servants' frauds perpetrated in the course of master's business even if fraud was not for master's benefit; question of fact whether act was in the course of employment. Accepted by the court as authority supporting liability of masters for wrongs committed in the course of employment whether lawful or unlawful in character.
Narayanlal v. Rukhmanibai, AIR 1979 Madh Pra 74 Took view, relying on Pushpabai, that act of servant giving a lift in disregard of statutory rule while driving in execution of owner's business is an act for which owner is vicariously liable; overruled prior Division Bench of that High Court. Used as an example of High Court adopting Pushpabai's approach and overruling contrary local precedent.
Bhaiyalal v. Rajrani, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 147 Earlier authority referenced as being not correct in light of Pushpabai and subsequent reasoning. The court stated that the proposition in Bhaiyalal did not lay down correct law in light of more recent authorities.
Krishna Ramayya Gouda v. C.P.C. Motor Co., AIR 1983 Kant 176 Bench relied on Pushpabai but held owner not vicariously liable because deceased was carried in direct contravention of R.161. The present court expressed disagreement with the interpretation in that case and declined to follow the rule laid down therein.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Munaf, 1984 Acc CJ 653 Bombay High Court: where there was express prohibition by owner against taking passengers, the conveyance of passengers by the driver was held not to be in the course of employment. The present court respectfully disagreed with that proposition, holding that express prohibition by the master does not absolve the owner if the act was committed in the course of employment.
Britt v. Galmoye and Nevill, 1928 (44) TLR 294 English case noted in Sitaram Motilal Kalal concerning journeys outside master's employment. Noted by the court as background authority in the discussion of when a journey is outside master's business.
Law Reports (1951) 1 KB 342 (passage referenced in discussion of Barker v. Levinson) Referenced in connection with the debate over the extent of employer liability for criminal acts of servants. Referenced as part of the historical discussion about the proper limits of vicarious liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from a review of Supreme Court authority and related decisions showing a judicial trend to broaden the scope of vicarious liability beyond a narrow, literal conception of "in the course of employment."

  1. The court relied principally on the Supreme Court's decision in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi (AIR 1977 SC 1735). That decision, applying Lord Denning's reasoning in Young v. Edward Box, held that even if a passenger was technically unauthorised (a "trespasser" as to the employer), the employer could nonetheless be liable if the driver (manager) was acting in the course of his employment in giving the lift. The Pushpabai Court accepted an extended scope of employer liability.
  2. The Bench (Kailasam, J., speaking for Pushpabai) observed a recent trend to make masters liable for acts not strictly within the traditional meaning of "in the course of employment" and cited supporting authorities (Sitaram Motilal Kalal, Navarro, Ormrod decisions). The present court treated that trend as authoritative on the issue before it.
  3. The court considered authorities (State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi; United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Saka Owoade) establishing that a master may be liable for wrongs (including fraud) perpetrated by a servant in the course of business, whether or not the wrong was for the master's benefit, and that such liability is a question of fact in each case.
  4. The court rejected the reasoning in Jiwan Dass that an employer could be absolved simply because the servant acted in direct contravention of a statutory provision — the Bench held that contravention punishable with fine under rules does not necessarily convert the act into one outside the scope of employment for purposes of civil liability. The court pointed out that many statutory contraventions are punishable with fine and have not been treated as criminal acts that remove civil liability of the master.
  5. The court addressed other decisions relied upon by respondents (e.g., Sitaram Motilal Kalal, Krishna Ramayya Gouda, United India Insurance) and distinguished or disagreed with them where they suggested that express prohibition or contravention of rules conclusively established that the servant was acting outside the course of employment. The court reaffirmed that the determining factor is whether the driver was acting in the course of his employment; if so, the owner is vicariously liable even if the driver acted against express instructions or in violation of statutory rules.
  6. On these bases, the court concluded that Jiwan Dass was incorrectly decided and answered the reference by overruling its principle that a driver’s contravention of Rule 4.60 necessarily absolves the owner from vicarious liability.

The Bench therefore determined that the owner cannot be absolved merely because the driver carried the deceased in contravention of Rule 4.60, and directed that the case be sent back to the learned single Judge for disposal on merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Bench held that Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh was not correctly decided and that the owner of the truck cannot be absolved of vicarious liability simply because the driver carried the deceased as a passenger in contravention of the provisions of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940. The reference was answered accordingly and the case was remitted to the learned single Judge for disposal on merits.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence for the parties is that the earlier exoneration of the owner based solely on contravention of Rule 4.60 is set aside for the purpose of further adjudication; the case returns to the single Judge to determine liability on the merits in light of this holding.
  • The court expressly disapproved the view that contravention of statutory rules (punishable with fine) automatically places the servant's conduct outside "the course of employment" for purposes of civil vicarious liability; accordingly, owners may remain vicariously liable even when a servant violates such rules while otherwise acting in the course of employment.
  • The opinion overrules the specific precedent of Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal (AIR 1980 Punj & Har 167) to the extent it held that an owner could be absolved merely because a passenger was carried in breach of the rule; the Bench followed and applied the principles as stated in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi (AIR 1977 SC 1735) and related authorities.

    Prithi Singh And Another v. Binda Ram And Others

    1. Kanwar Pal son of the appellant died of the injuries received by him on Nov. 29-11-1976 while travelling in Truck No. HYB 5137 driven by Mahavir respondent 2. In the claim petition filed against the owners of the truck, driver and the Insurance Company, the appellants were awarded Rs. 5,000/- as compensation and Mahavir alone was held responsible for its payment. The owner of the truck was exonerated on the ground that as the deceased was carried as a passenger unauthorisedly in contravention of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, I940, he could not be fastened with vicarious liability for the tortuous act committed by the rash and negligent driving of the truck by his employee. Reliance for this view was placed by the Tribunal on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh, I980 Acc CJ 445: (AIR 1980 Punj & Har 167). When the matter came up in appeal before my learned brother Sodhi, J. he thought that the decision in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal's case (supra) required reconsideration in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. 1977 Acc CJ 343: (AIR 1977 SC 1735) and referred the case to the larger Bench. This is how we are seized of this matter.

    2. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case (supra) Purshottam Tulsidas met with his death in a motor car accident when he was travelling in the car which was driven by Madhavjibhai, Manager of the opponent company, Messrs Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Private Limited, in a rash and negligent manner. The heirs of the deceased claimed compensation from the owner as well as the Insurance Company. One of the pleas raised in defence was that the deceased was travelling in the said vehicle on his own responsibility, for his own purpose and absolutely gratis and not on behalf of or at the instance of the owner or the driver of the vehicle and, therefore, the respondents could not be made vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of the driver. The High Court found that the car was going on the business of the Company and so was Madhavjibhai but further held that there being no pleading or the material on the record to establish that Purshottam Tulsidas was travelling in the vehicle either for some business of the owner or under any ostensible authority from them, the accident could not be said to have taken place in the course of the employment of Madhavjibhai or under the authority of the company. Relying on the statement of law expressed by Lord Justice Denning in Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd. (1951) 1 TLR 789, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court observing thus:--

    "Lord Justice Denning concluded by observing that the passenger was, therefore, a trespesser, so far as the employers were concerned; but nevertheless the driver was acting in the course of his employment, and that is sufficient to make the employers liable. It will thus be seen that while two of the learned Judges held that the right to give the plaintiff leave to ride on the lorry was within the ostensible authority of the foreman and the plaintiff was entitled to rely on that authority as a licensee, Lord Denning based it on the ground that even though the plaintiff was a transpasser so far as the defendants were concerned, as the driver was acting in the course of his employment in giving the plaintiff a lift it was sufficient to make the defendants liable. Applying the test laid down there can be no difficulty in concluding that the right to give leave to Purshottam to ride in the car was within the ostensible authority of the manager of the company who was driving the car and that the manager was acting in the course of his employment in giving leave to Purshottam. Under both the tests the respondents would be liable."

    After discussing the case law, Kailasam, J. who spoke for the Bench in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case (AIR I977 SC 1735) summed up the law concerning the vicarious liability of the master for the acts of the servant as under (at P. 1744):--

    "Before we conclude we would like to point out that the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term "in the course of the employment" as ordinarily understood. We have referred to Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhati (AIR 1966 SC 1697) where this Court accepted the law laid down by Lord Denning in Ormrod v. Croaville Motor Services Ltd. ((I953) (2) All ER 753) (supra) that the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owner's consent, driving the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes. This extension has been accepted by this Court. The law as laid down by Lord Denning in Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd. (1951) 1 TLR 789) already referred to i.e. the first question is to see whether the servant is liable and if the answer is yes, the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the servant's liability, has been uniformally accepted as stated in Salmond Law of Torts l5th Ed. p. 606 in Crown Proceeding Act 1947 and approved by the House of Lords in Stavelay Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones (1956 AC 627) ICI Ltd. v. Shatwell (1965 AC 656). The scope of the course of employment has been extended in Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd., (1951 (2) TLR 674) where the plaintiff who wanted to acquire the tenancy of a certain flat applied to the second defendant, a person with ostensible authority to conduct the business of letting the particular flat for the first defendant, the landlord. The second defendant demanded from the plaintiff a payment of £ 225 if he wanted the flat and the plaintiff paid the amount. The plaintiff sought to recover the sum from the landlord under the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act 1949. The Court of Appeal held that the mere fact that the second defendant was making an illegal request did not constitute notice to the plaintiff that he was exceeding his authority and that; though the second defendant was not acting within his actual or ostensible authority in asking for the premium as the landlord had entrusted him with the letting of the flat, and as it was in the very course of conducting that business that he committed the wrong complained of; he was acting in the course of his employment. Lord Denning took the view that though the second defendant was acting illegally in asking for and receiving a premium and had no actual or ostensible authority to do an illegal act, nevertheless he was plainly acting in the course of his employment, because his employers, the landlords, had entrusted him with the full business of letting the property, and it was in the very course of conducting that business that he did the wrong of which complaint is made. This decision has extended the scope of acting in the course of employment to include an illegal act of asking for and receiving a premium though the receiving a premium was not authorised. We do not feel called upon to consider whether this extended meaning should be accepted by this Court. It appears Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, had gone further in Barker v. Levinson (1950 (2) All ER 825) and stated that the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant's employment. Lord Justice Denning would not go to this extent and felt relieved to find that in the authorised Law Reports (1951) 1 KB 342, the passage quoted above was struck out. We respectfully agree with the view of Lord Denning that the passage attributed to Lord Chief Justice Goddard went a bit too far."

    The ambit of the vicarious liability of the owner for the acts of the servant committed in the course of the employment was further enlarged by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Mrs. Shyama Devi, 1979 Acc CJ 22: (AIR 1978 SC 1263) and the law laid down by the Privy Council in United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Saka Owoade 1955 AC 130 that a master is liable for his servant's fraud perpetrated in the course of master's business, whether the fraud was for the master's benefit or not, if it was committed by the servant in the course of his employment approved. There is no-difference in the liability of a master for wrongs whether for fraud or any other committed by a servant in the course of his employment, and it is a question of fact in each case whether it was committed in the course of the employment. In the case before the Privy Council the appellant company had expressly committed to servants of the respondent a transport contractor, at his request goods for carriage by road, and the servants stole the goods. From the evidence it was established that the conversion took place in the course of their employment. The respondent on these facts was held liable to the appellant for the value of the goods. From the principle enunciated in the above noted two decisions of the Supreme Court on the question of vicarious liability of the master, it is evident that it does not depend on the lawful or unlawful nature of the acts of the servant and the master would be liable for the alleged act of the servant which had taken place in the course of his employment even though the servant may have acted in contravention of some of the provisions of' the statute or the Rules made thereunder. Relying on Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case (AIR 1977 SC 1735) (supra), the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Narayanlal v. Rukhmanibai, 1979 Acc CJ 261: (AIR 1979 Madh Pra 74) took a similar view and overruled the previous Division Bench decision of that court holding thus (at p. 76 of AIR):--

    "Now, a statutory rule providing that no person should be carried in a goods vehicle other than a bona fide employee of the owner or hirer of the vehicle deals with the conduct of the driver within the sphere of employment. The sphere of employment of appellant 2 is to drive the vehicle in execution of the master's business from Udaigarh to Indore. That sphere is not in any manner limited by the prohibition contained in the statutory rule in question.

    For all these reasons it must be held that the proposition enunciated in Bhaiyalal v. Rajrani (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 147) does not lay down correct law and; in our opinion, the answer to the question referred, to us is that the act of a servant employed to drive a vehicle, in giving lift to a person in disregard of a statutory rule or prohibition while driving the vehicle in execution of the owner's business is an act for which the owner is vicariously liable."

    The view expressed in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal's case (AIR 1980 Punj & Har 167) (supra) that acting in direct contravention of a statutory provision which is made an offence by an employee cannot be easily conceived as in the normal course of employment because no employer can be deemed or assumed to authorise the contravention of law or the commission of an offence, therefore, cannot be sustained and has to be overruled. Moreover, though the contravention of the Rules framed under the Act is punishable with fine but such a contravention cannot be termed a criminal offence. Under a large number of statutes the contravention of the Rules or the provisions of the statute are punishable with fine but such a contravention has never strictly been taken to be a criminal act or offence. Again, suppose a driver of the vehicle disobeys the driving regulations contained in the Seventh Schedule and thereby causes an accident resulting in the death of some person lawfully travelling in the truck, can in such a case it be said that the owner of the vehicle would not be liable vicariously because the accident was caused by disobeying the traffic regulation which is punishable under S. 12 of the Act. The answer obviously has to be in the negative.

    3. Now, we may notice the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. In Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt 1966 Acc CJ 89: (AIR 1966 SC 1697), the Supreme Court referred to the English case, Britt v. Galmoye and Nevill (1928 (44) TLR 294) in para 27 and pointed out that the owner of the car will not be liable for the accident caused by his employee if it was caused outside master's employment. What happened there was that the owner lent the van to his driver after day's work was over to take his friends to a theatre and the driver by his negligent driving injured the plaintiff. On these facts it was held that the journey was not on the master's business and, therefore, he was not liable for the servant's act. The rule laid down in this case obviously is of no help to the respondents. In Krishna Ramayya Gouda v. C.P.C. Motor Co., AIR 1983 Kant 176, the Bench relying on the observations quoted Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi (AIR 1977 SC 1735) held that the owner was not vicariously liable because the deceased was carried in the truck in direct contravention of R. 161. The Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi's case only disapproved the observation of Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, in Barkar v. Levinson (1950 (60) TLR (Pt. 2) 717) to the effect that the master is responsible for the criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant's employment. The disapproval of the said observation cannot be interpreted to mean that the master would not be liable for the civil consequences of the act of his employee done in the course of his employment because in doing so, he has contravened some rule or the provision of the Act. Causing the death by rash and negligent driving by an employee of the master is also a criminal act punishable under the law of crimes. Even though the act of the employee amounts to a criminal act still the master is liable for the civil consequences of the act of his employee. With due respect to the learned Judges, we feel that the observations of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi's case (supra) were not correctly interpreted in Krishna Ramayya Goude's case (supra) and are, therefore, unable to subscribe to the rule laid down therein. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Munaf 1984 Acc CJ 653, the Bombay High Court on appreciation of the evidence took the view that the driver was expressly prohibited from taking the passengers in the vehicle and as such it was held that the conveyance of the passengers by the driver was not during the course of his employment. With due respect to the learned Judges we are unable to accept the proposition that if the driver had been expressly prohibited not to take passengers in the truck, the owner would be absolved of his liability. The express prohibition by the master cannot have better sanction than the provisions of the rule framed under the Act which prohibites the carrying of passengers in a truck. The determining factor as already stated above so far as the liability of the owner is concerned is whether the act was committed by the driver in the course of his employment or not. If the driver was acting in the course of his employment then the owner would be liable even though acted against the express instructions of the owner or in violation of the Rules framed under the Statute.

    4. On consideration of the two decisions of the Supreme Court and the other cases discussed above, we hold that Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal's case (AIR 1980 Punj & Har 167) (supra) was not correctly decided and that the owner of the truck cannot be absolved of his vicarious liability simply because the driver, his employee, carried the deceased as passenger in the truck in contravention of the provisions of Rule 4.60, Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940. This reference is answered accordingly and the case sent back to the learned single Judge for disposal on merits.

    G.C. Mital, J.

    5. I agree.

    S.S. Sodhi, J.

    6. I too concur.

    7. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Prithi Singh And Another v. Binda Ram And Others
    (May 30, 1986)