I.S Tiwana, J.:— The petitioner impugns the order of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab, dated 14th August, 1985, Annexure P.1, whereby her prayer under under section 111 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act for partition of the land in question has been rejected on the ground that since there was a question of title involved the subordinate revenue authorities should stay their hands till that question of title was settled either by the Assistant Collector First Grade himself constituting into a Court or by the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, the following facts deserve to be noticed.
2. On 19th March, 1958, the petitioner agreed to purchase the share of Kartar Singh son of Mit Singh in the suit land which he was holding jointly with Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh sons of Phula Singh in equal shares, i.e, one-third. As prior to the date of the performance of this agreement Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh purchased the share of Kartar Singh (one-third share in the joint holding), the petitioner filed a suit against them all, i.e, Kartar Singh, Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh for the specific performance of the agreement dated 19th March, 1958. Though she failed in the trial Court yet she succeeded in this Court on 27th April, 1977, when a decree for specific performance was granted in her favour. During the pendency of this litigation Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh transferred the very land which they had purchased from Kartar Singh in favour of respondents Nos. 5 to 10. Having succeeded in the civil litigation referred to above and a sale-deed having been executed in her favour as a consequence of the same, the petitioner filed the present application for partition of her share in that land. In these proceedings a plea was taken by respondents Nos. 5 to 10 that they were bona fide purchasers without notice and were, therefore, not bound by the decree passed in favour of the petitioner by this Court on 27th April, 1977. This plea of theirs was consistencly negatived by this Assistant Collector, First Grade, the Collector and the Additional Commissioner, but as already indicated above, it was accepted by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals).
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find that the petitioner must succeed. By now it is well laid down that in the case of a transfer which is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act the question of good faith which is essential to be established before an equitable relief can be granted in favour of a subsequent vendce under section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act is irrelevant (see Shanu Ram v. Brsheshar Nath . 1966 68 P.L.R.D 44.). In the face of this settled legal position, the plea raised on behalf of respondents Nos. 5 to 10 that they were bona fide purchasers without notice from Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh was obviously of no consequence. Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 having purchased the property from these two vendors during the pendency of the civil litigation against them are bound by the decree passed against them, i.e, the vendors and, in view of that, no question of title remained to be settled between the parties, i.e, the petitioner and the subsequent vendees.
4. At this stage it is urged by Mr. Ashok Bhan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, that subsequent to the passing of the impugned order by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) the Assistant Collector First Grade as a matter of fact passed an order on 3rd October 1985, directing the petitioner to go to the civil Court to establish her right vis-a-vis respondents Nos. 5 to 10. He urges that since this later order of the Assistant Collector has not been impugned in this petition, the petitioner deserves to be non-suited on that score alone. I, however, see no merit in this stand of the learned counsel. It is not disputed that the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 3rd October, 1985, is only a consequential or resultant order passed in the light of the direction contained in the order of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Annexure P1. The moment the order of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Annexure P1, is set aside all subsequent proceedings including the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 3rd October, 1985, stand annuled. The learned counsel for the respondents is not in a position to refer to any principle or precedent to show that in the instant case the order of the Assistant Collector dated 3rd October, 1985, can stand on its own or that after the setting aside of order Annexure P.1 the order passed by the Assistant Collector pursuant thereto will not go therewith.
5. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that while setting aside order Annexure P1 the case be remitted back to the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) for decision of the case afresh. His plea is that besides the question which has been decided by the Financial Commissioner some more points had been raised by the respondents in the revision petition before him. This plea of the learned counsel, again, does not appeal to me. The order, Annexure P1, does not show that any contention other than the one adjudicated upon therein was raised before the Final Commissioner. It was only in view of the contention raised by the respondents that there was a question of of title involved in the case that their revision petition was allowed by the Financial Commissioner. As per the order passed by him no other plea appears to have been raised before him.
6. For the reasons recorded above, I allow this petition and while setting aside order Annexure P1 direct the authorities to proceed to decide the application of the petitioner under section 111 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act in accordance with the law and the observations made above. The petitioner is also held entitled to the costs of litigation which I determine at Rs. 500.
R.M.S
Petition allowed.