1. The following question which has been referred by the Tribunal at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Jullundur, for the opinion of this court pertains to the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to decide the question of penalty and the consequent imposition of penalty of Rs. 58,000 by him, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act :

"Whether the Tribunal has been right in law in holding that the penalty amounting to Rs. 58,000 imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, in pursuance of a reference admittedly made under Section 274(2) on December 23, 1976, was without jurisdiction in view of the fact that Sub-section (2) of Section 274 had been omitted by Section 65 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976?"

2. Mr. Ashok Bhan, appearing for the petitioner, has canvassed that the order dated December 13, 1979, of the Tribunal holding that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to deal with the question of imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), on the date he passed the order imposing penalty, i.e., February 25, 1978, because as a result of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "the Amending Act"), which took effect from April 1, 1976, the Income-tax Officer alone was competent to deal with the question of imposition of penalty and the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 271 of the Act stood abolished as a result of the deletion of Sub-section (2) of Section 274 with effect from April 1, 1976, as a result of the Amending Act, ran counter to the Division Bench decisions of this court in CIT v. Raman Industries [1980] 121 ITR 405, CIT v. Sadhu Ram [1981] 127 ITR 517, CIT v. Mela Ram Jagdish Raj & Co. [1981] 132 ITR 897 and Telu Ram Raunqi Ram v. CIT [1984] 146 ITR 401, besides the decisions of other High Courts, namely, CIT v. R. Ochhavlal & Co. [1976] 105 ITR 518 (Guj), CIT v. Royal Motor Car Co. [1977] 107 ITR 753 (Guj), Laltaprasad Goenka v. CIT [1983] 143 ITR 924 (Bom), Continental Commercial Corpn. v. ITO [1975] 100 ITR 170 (Mad), CIT v. Eastern Development Corpn. [1982] 135 ITR 516 (Cal), Addl. CIT v. Dr. Khaja Khutabuddinkhan [1978] 114 ITR 905 (AP) and CIT v. Balabhai & Co. [1980] 122 ITR 301 (Guj).

3. Perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal dated December 13, 1979, would show that the Tribunal, inter alia, has based its decision on the Allahabad High Court judgment in CIT v. Om Sons [1979] 116 ITR 215, which view has been reiterated by the same High Court in a judgment in CIT v. Pearey Lal Radhey Raman [1979] 117 ITR 319.

4. Mr. Gupta, appearing for the respondent, has added to the above list, the Karnataka High Court judgment in R. Abdul Azeez v. CIT [1981] 128 ITR 547 and later the Allahabad High Court judgments in Ganesh Dass Ram Gopal v. IAC of I.T. [1983] 142 ITR 101 and Mohd. Oais & Co. v. CIT [1983] 142 ITR 104 (All).

5. From the above, it is clear that the various High Courts have taken a contrary view in regard to the existence of jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on the date he passed the order if before that as a result of the provision giving him jurisdiction in the matter has been amended in a way depriving him of the jurisdiction to deal with the question of imposition of penalty.

6. There is also difference of opinion as to whether the relevant date is the date on which the Income-tax Officer has made a reference to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or the date on which he had initiated penalty proceedings on his file for the purpose of seeing as to whether on the date on which the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner passed the order, he had the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the matter or not.

7. Mr. Gupta on behalf of the respondent, has questioned the basic postulate that the right to have a cause tried in a given forum is not a vested interest. Mr. Gupta asserts that what is a vested right is a right to the remedy. The forum where the right is to be asserted or remedy is to be sought pertains to the procedure. Since the procedural law is admittedly given retrospective effect in that it applies even to pending cases, the forum where the right to a remedy can be pursued is the one which is described in the procedural law of the day. Mr. Gupta sought support for his above submission from Maria Christine De Souza v. Soddar Maria Zurna Pereiro Pinto, AIR 1979 SC 1352, and drew pointed attention to the following observations of their Lordships (p. 1354):

"The contention that since the right of appeal had been conferred by the Portugese Code, the forum where it could be lodged was also governed by the Portuguese Code cannot be accepted. It is no doubt well-settled that the right of appeal is a substantive right and it gets vested in a litigant no sooner the lis is commenced in the court of the first instance, and such right or any remedy in respect thereof will not be affected by any repeal of the enactment conferring such right unless the repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication takes away such right or remedy in respect thereof. This position has been made clear by Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of the Central Act XXX of 1956 which substantially corresponds to Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This position has also been settled by the decisions of the Privy Council and this court (vide Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [1905] AC 369 and Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [1957] SCR 488 ; AIR 1957 SC 540), but the forum where such appeal can be lodged is indubitably a procedural matter and, therefore, the appeal, the right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the repealing Act. That the forum of appeal and also the limitation for it, are matters pertaining to procedural law will be clear from the following passage appearing at page 462 of Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th edn.):

'Whether I have a right to recover certain property is a question of substantive law, for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice ; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions.' It is true that under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of the Central Act, XXX of 1956 (which corresponds to Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897), it is provided that a remedy or legal proceeding in respect of a vested right like a right to an appeal may be instituted, continued or enforced as if this Act (meaning the repealing Act) had not been passed. But this provision merely saves the remedy or legal proceeding in respect of such vested right which it is open to the litigant to adopt notwithstanding the repeal but this provision has nothing to do with the forum where the remedy or legal proceeding has to be pursued. If the repealing Act provides a new forum where the remedy or the legal proceedings in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act."

8. Mr. Gupta also referred us to the Karnataka High Court decision in R. Abdul Azeez's case [1981] 128 ITR 547, which had followed the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court.

9. If there is no vested right to a forum for trying a case or for hearing an appeal or revision, the forum being a part of the procedural law, then we are afraid, the decisions relied upon by Mr. Ashok Bhan, including those which have been rendered by this court, do not appear to lay down the correct law. Since the Division Bench decisions of this court are binding upon us, the appropriate course available to us is to refer the reference for decision to a larger Bench. We, therefore, direct the office to place the papers of this case before the Acting Chief Justice for constituting the larger Bench.

JUDGMENT OF FULL BENCH S.P. Goyal, J.

10. The following question which has been referred by the Tribunal at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Jullundur, for the opinion of this court, pertains to the juri-

diction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to decide the question of penalty and the consequent imposition of penalty of Rs. 58 000 by him, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 :

"Whether, the Tribunal has been right in law in holding that the penalty amounting to Rs. 58,000 imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, in pursuance of a reference admittedly made under Section 274(2) on December 23, 1976, was without jurisdiction in view of the fact that Sub-section (2) of Section 274 had been omitted by Section 65 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 w.e.f. April 1,"

11. The respondent is a Hindu undivided family with its business head office at Kotkapura and a branch at Baja Khana. The business is stated to be purchase and sale of petroleum products. Return for the assess-

of Rs. 13,330 The case was fixed for hearing before the Income-tax Officer on June 27, 1975, on which date the assessee filed a revised return declaring an income at Rs. 21,430. The Income-tax Officer, however completed the assessment on March 10, 1976, under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on a total income of Rs. 48,880.

12. While processing the assessment, the Income-tax Officer noticed wrong totalling in the account books maintained by them in the head office and the branch office. By wrong totalling, as per the Income-tax Officer, the assessee concealed its income by Rs. 29,100. In the assess-ment framed the Income-tax Officer recorded the charge that the assessee had concealed its income to the tune of Rs. 29,100 and that penal action

13. Though Sub-section (2) of Section 274 of the Act was deleted from the statute book by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 274 read with Section 271(1)(c) of the Act on December 23, 1976, intimating to the assessee that the case for levy of penalty was being referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and that further proceedings with regard to the levy of penalty would take place before the said officer as provided under Sub-section (2) of Section 274 of the Act. The assessee raised a preliminary legal objection before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that after the deletion of Sub-section (2) of Section 274 of the Act with effect from April 1, 1976, the reference made on December 23, 1976, was not valid and that he had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, however, imposed the penalty by stating that the return having been filed before April 1, 1976, the provisions of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, were not attracted. The assessee also contested the levy of penalty on merits. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, however, imposed a penalty of Rs. 58,000, vide order dated February 25, 1978, with reference to the addition of Rs. 29,100 made in the assessment.

14. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty on the preliminary legal objection that both at the time when the penalty proceedings were referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and he assumed the jurisdiction and also at the time when the order was passed, that is, on February 25, 1978, he had no valid jurisdiction in law in view of the deletion of subsection (2) of section 274 with effect from April 1, 1976.

15. Finding that a question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Jullundur, filed an application under Section 256(1) of the Act, praying that the question of law as framed be referred to this court for its opinion. As earlier observed, the Tribunal agreed with the prayer made by the Commissioner and consequently referred the question which has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment for our decision.

16. The matter came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this court. Mr. Ashok Bhan, senior advocate, appearing for the Revenue, had canvassed before the Bench that the order dated December 13, 1979, of the Tribunal holding that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to deal with the question of imposition of penalty under sec-tion 271(1)(c) of the Act on the date he passed the order imposing penalty, that is, on February 25, 1978, because as a result of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which took effect from April 1, 1976, the Income-tax Officer alone was competent to deal with the question of imposition of penalty and the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 271 of the Act stood abolished, as a result of the deletion of Sub-section (2) of Section 274 of the Act, by the Amending Act with effect from April 1, 1976, was patently illegal. In support of his contention, decisions of various High Courts taking one or the other view were cited. Finding that there was difference of opinion amongst the High Courts as to whether the relevant date is the date on which the Income-tax Officer has made the reference to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or the date on which he has initiated the penalty proceedings on his file for the purpose of seeing as to whether on the date on which the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner passed the order, he had the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the matter or not. Finding that the question posed for decision was of considerable importance, the matter was referred to be decided by a larger Bench.

17. This is how we are seized of the matter.

18. The question which needs determination has two facets, viz, as to when can the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner be said to have been seized of the matter, and having once been seized of it would he be divested of the same on his jurisdiction having been taken away by the subsequent amendment of the law. The answer to the first query depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274(2) of the Act. The relevant portion of the said Section pro-

vides that if the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty... Sub-section (2) of Section 274 when it was deleted with effect from April 1, 1976, read as under :

" Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 271, if in a case falling under Clause (c) of that sub-section, the amount of income (as determined by the Income-tax Officer on assessment) in respect of which the particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished exceeds a sum of twenty-five thousand rupees, the Income-tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under this Chapter for the imposition of penalty."

19. The underlined* words in the said section were introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, enforced with effect from April 1, 1971, and prior thereto, the said sub-section read as under :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 271, if in a case falling under Clause (c) of that sub-section, the minimum penalty imposable exceeds a sum of rupees one thousand, the Income-tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under this Chapter for the imposition of penalty."

20. From a combined reading of the provisions noticed above, it is evident that the first step towards the imposition of penalty is recording of the satisfaction by the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the course of any proceedings that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The moment the satisfaction is recorded by the Income-tax Officer/Appellate Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, penalty becomes imposable subject to the provisions of Sections 274 (1) and (2). Sub-section (1) of Section 274 provides that no order imposing a penalty under this Chapter shall be made unless the assessee has been heard or has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (2) prior to April 1, 1971, provides that where the minimum penalty imposable exceeds the sum of rupees one thousand, the Income-tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who alone was competent to pass any order. So, the proceedings for the imposition of penalty were to be initiated by the Income-tax Officer even when the penalty imposable was more than Rs. 1,000, and the case was to be referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner only at the stage when the Income-tax Officer was of the opinion that the penalty imposable exceeded the said sum. It is not necessary to notice the various decisions cited by learned counsel for the parties on the interpretation of the said provision of law because suffice it to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this regard in D. M. Manasvi v. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 557, wherein the law with regard to the initiation of the penalty proceedings was settled thus (headnote):

"Proceedings for the imposition of penalty under Section 271(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, have necessarily to be initiated by the Income-tax Officer or by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The fact that the Income-tax Officer has to refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner if the minimum penalty imposable exceeds Rs. 1,000 in a case falling under Section 271(1)(c) does not show that the proceedings in such a case cannot be initiated by the Income-tax Officer. It is the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment proceedings regarding the concealment of income which constitutes the basis and foundation of the proceedings for levy of penalty. What is contemplated by Section 271(1)(c) is that the Income-tax Officer should have been satisfied in the course of assessment proceedings regarding matters mentioned in the clauses of that sub-section. It is not essential that the notice to the person proceeded against should have also been issued during the course of the assessment proceedings. Satisfaction, in the very nature of things, precedes the issue of notice and it would not be correct to equate the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer with the actual issue of notice."

21. The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, enforced with effect from April 1, 1971, brought about very significant and material changes in the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 274 inasmuch as under the new provision, the Income-tax Officer was required to refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner the moment he finalised the assessment and recorded a finding that the amount of income in respect of which particulars had been concealed or inaccurate particulars furnished exceeded the sum of '-wenty-five thousand rupees. So, under the amended provision, the Income-tax Officer was not to initiate any penalty proceedings or issue any notice in this regard to the assessee. The case, therefore, would be deemed to have been referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on the recording of the conclusion by the Income-tax Officer that the amount of the concealed income exceeded Rs. 25,000 and the actual reference of the case would be only a ministerial act to be performed by the office. The natural corollary to this finding would be that tH Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will be deemed to have been seized of the penalty proceedings the moment the said finding is recorded by the Income-tax Officer and that the law applicable at that moment has to be applied to determine as to who has the jurisdiction to impose penalty. If the concealed income is found to be less than Rs. 25,000, the Income-tax Officer would be entitled to take proceedings for the imposition of penalty and if it exceeded the said amount, it would be the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner only who would be competent to do so.

22. Learned counsel for the assessee, however, relying on CIT v. Daropdi Devi [1984] 149 ITR 178 (Delhi), CIT v. Gangadas Topandas [1984] 150 ITR 437 (Bom) and CIT v. S. Sardar Singh [1978] 113 ITR 541 (Gauhati), contended that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner would be seized of the matter only when the reference is made to him by the Income-tax Officer and not when the assessment is completed and the amount of income concealed is found to be more than twenty-five thousand rupees. In all the three decisions relied upon by him, the assessments had been completed and the penalty proceedings initiated before the 1970 Amendment Act, but it was after the enforcement of that Act with effect from April 1, 1971, that the Income-tax Officer came to be of the opinion that the penalty imposable was more than Rs. 1,000 and, therefore, referred the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. By the time he took the decision to refer the case, his jurisdiction had been enlarged and the reference could be made only if the concealment of income was found to be more than twenty-five thousand rupees. On these facts, it was held that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner gets the jurisdiction only when a reference is made to him and if by that time the Income-tax Officer got the jurisdiction to impose penalty, the reference was bad in law and so was the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Obviously, these cases have no bearing on the cases arising after the enforcement of the 1970 Act with effect from April 1, 1971, because prior thereto, the penalty proceedings were to be initiated in all cases by the Income-tax Officer, whether the penalty imposable was one thousand rupees and more. It was only when the Income-tax Officer, during the penalty proceedings, was of the opinion that the penalty imposable was more than Rs. 1,000 that he was required to refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Obviously, according to the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 274, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner could get jurisdiction only when the Income-tax Officer recorded the order for making the reference. Actual sending of the reference even at that time was only a ministerial act to be performed by the office and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was deemed to have been seized of the matter when the Income-tax Officer ordered the reference to be made. After the 1970 Amendment Act, on the other hand, the Income-tax Officer is duty bound to make a reference the moment he completes the assessment and comes to the conclusion that the amount of income, particulars of which have been concealed, exceeds the sum of Rs. 25,000. He is not to initiate proceedings or to issue any notice in this regard to the assessee, A reference to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, therefore, would be deemed to have been made the moment a finding is recorded that the income concealed exceeds Rs, 25,000 and a reference is ordered to be made and not when the ministerial act of sending of the reference by the office is actually done. In the present case, the Income-tax Officer on the completion of the assessment on March 10, 1976, recorded the finding that the amount of income concealed was Rs. 29,100. As soon as this finding was recorded, he was bound to order the case to be referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for taking penalty proceedings. He did not do so and instead ordered a notice to be issued to the assessee to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed and referred the case thereafter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on December 23, 1976. Even on these facts, there is no escape from the conclusion that the penalty proceedings shall be deemed to have been initiated and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner seized of the matter on March 10, 1976. As already stated above, the Income-tax Officer had no option but to refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, the moment he had completed the assessment proceedings and come to the conclusion that the amount of income, particulars of which had been concealed, was more than twenty-five thousand rupees. The reference, therefore, would be deemed to have been made and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner seized of the matter on March 10, 1976, and not on December 23, 1976, when the reference was actually sent.

23. The second facet of the question as to whether the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner having once been seized of the matter of imposition of penalty would be divested of the same after the amendment of Section 271 whereby the jurisdiction of the assessing authority was enlarged and extended up to Rs. 25,000 does not present much difficulty. The law in this regard stands settled by the Supreme Court in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin, AIR 1975 SC 1843, in the following terms (para 28 at p. 1849):

"Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well-established principles. The first is that 'while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment' (See Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITC, 54 Ind App 421; AIR 1927 PC 242). The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right, the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule, viz., (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (See Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [ 1957] SCR 488 ; AIR 1957 SC 540 and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [ 1905] AC 369)."

24. According to this decision, the party has a right to get a decision from the Tribunal who had jurisdiction before the amendment of the law but there are two well-recognized exceptions to this rule, viz., where the enactment has expressly or impliedly taken away that right with retrospective effect, (2) where the court to which the appeal lay at the commencement of the proceedings stands abolished. Similar was the rule laid down in Venugopala Reddiar v. Chidambara Reddiar, AIR 1943 FC 24. Reliance in both these cases was placed on the following observation of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [1905] AC 369 (at page 372):

"To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior Tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case, there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."

25. The matter was further elucidated in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 ; [1977] 47 Comp Cas 453 (SC), wherein the effect of the newly added provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act which ousted the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain claims arising out of motor accidents came up for consideration and after discussing the various implications of the provisions of section 110f, which ousted the jurisdiction of the civil courts, it was ruled that the suits which had been instituted prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal remained unaffected and had to proceed for disposal in civil courts.

26. Learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, strongly relied on Maria Christine De Souza Soddar v. Maria Zurma Pereira Pinto, AIR 1979 SC 1352. In that case, the earlier forum where the appeal lay had been abolished. So, it was held that the appeal was competent in the new forum. The observations made in this decision have to be understood in the context of the situation available here. This case, therefore, cannot be relied upon to contend that in the case of a change of forum by the Amending Act, pending cases would also stand transferred even if the earlier forum where the proceedings were instituted is still available. The other decisions relied upon by him were Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITC, AIR 1927 PC 242; Purshotam Singh v. Narain Singh, AIR 1955 Raj 203; K. Eapen Chako v. Provident Investment Company (P.) Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 2610 and Mst. Fazi v. Mohammad Bhat, AIR 1979 J & K 69 [FB].

27. In Delhi Cloth Mills' case, AIR 1927 PC 242, no right of appeal existed to the Privy Council when the judgment was rendered by the High Court. It was held that the later amendment would not confer such a right. In K. Eapen Ckako's case, AIR 1976 SC 2610, again, there was no question before the court similar to the one debated here. The general observations regarding the procedural law are well known and on their basis no support can be sought for the proposition canvassed by the assessee. In the Jammu and Kashmir High Court case, AIR 1979 J & K 69, reliance has been placed on Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin, AIR 1975 SC 1843, but that case does not warrant at all the conclusion which was arrived at on its basis by the learned judges. In the Rajasthan case, AIR 1955 Raj 203, succession to the jagir opened in September, 1952, and prior thereto, article VII(3) stood, repealed by the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950. So, no proceedings were pending when the forum was changed and the observations made in paragraph 11 are in the nature of obiter dicta.

28. Learned counsel for the assessee also relied on various High Court decisions in CIT v. Om Sons [1979] 116 ITR 215 (All); CIT v. Pearey Lal Radhey Raman [1979] 117 ITR 319 (All); Ganesh Dass Ram Gopal v. IAC of I.T. [1983] 142 ITR 101 (All); CIT v. Dhadi Saher [1976] 105 ITR 56 (Orissa) and Radheshyam Agarwalla v. CIT [1978] 113 ITR 196 (Orissa). Reliance in all these decisions has been placed on the Supreme Court decisions referred to above. As none of the Supreme Court decisions supports the view that the judicial authority, once seized of the matter, would be divested of the same by the later amendment of the law taking away its jurisdiction, they all have to be dissented from.

29. For the reasons recorded above, the question is answered in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. No costs.