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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Messrs Innosearch Ltd. petitioned for the winding-up of Messrs Stephen Chemical Ltd. under section 439 read with sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, alleging that they had supplied goods worth Rs. 48,308 under an order dated 18 December 1979 and bill dated 25 December 1979, which remained unpaid despite reminders. On 18 November 1981 Innosearch issued a demand under section 434 for Rs. 50,842.05 plus Rs. 200 towards costs of notices; the demand was not complied with. Before the company judge Stephen Chemical Ltd. admitted liability for the principal amount and paid the principal, but disputed liability for interest. By order dated 31 May 1984 the company judge directed Stephen Chemical Ltd. to pay 12% interest on the principal. Stephen Chemical Ltd. (the appellant) challenged that order by way of appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where the company sought to be wound up admits and pays the principal debt before the company judge, the company judge is the appropriate forum to determine whether interest is payable on that principal amount.
  2. Whether a bona fide dispute as to entitlement to interest (in the absence of an agreement or trade custom) necessarily requires determination by a civil court rather than the company judge.
  3. Whether the appellant's company appeal should be admitted as a matter of routine (i.e., admitted as of course) or may be dismissed at the admission stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • There was no agreement between the parties for payment of interest and no trade custom providing for interest on the debt.
  • Where a company whose winding up is sought raises a bona fide dispute regarding liability to pay, the appropriate forum for resolving that dispute is the civil court and not the company judge; a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means to enforce payment of a bona fide disputed debt (relying on Amalgamated Commercial Traders (P.) Ltd. v. A.C.K. Krishnaswami).
  • The company's appeal should be admitted as a matter of routine, relying on authorities concerning the admission of appeals under the Bombay High Court Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amalgamated Commercial Traders (P.) Ltd. v. A.C.K. Krishnaswami [1965] 35 Comp Cas 456 (SC) The principle that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means to enforce payment of a debt which is bona fide disputed by the company; a petition used to exert pressure will be dismissed as an abuse of process. The court held this ratio inapplicable to the present facts because the principal debt was not disputed and had been paid; only entitlement to interest remained for decision, a matter appropriate for the company judge.
Unisystems (P.) Ltd. v. Stepan Chemical Ltd. [1985] 58 Comp Cas 875 (P&H) Observation (by Goyal J.) that where no agreement for payment of interest existed and the creditor claimed interest, no winding-up order could be passed. The court declined to accept that the observation, if extended to cases like the present where principal is admitted/paid before the company judge, should bar the company judge from deciding entitlement to interest.
Golcha Investment (P) Ltd. v. Shanti Chandra Bafna [1970] 40 Comp Cas 1128; AIR 1970 SC 1350 Interpretation of Bombay High Court Rules holding that appeals other than those specifically required to be placed for admission are to be admitted as of course; the appellate bench erred in summarily dismissing such an appeal. The court held these decisions not to be in pari materia with the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules and therefore not applicable to the present matter regarding admission of the appeal.
Shanta Genevieve Pommerat v. Sakal Papers P. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 269; [1985] 57 Comp Cas 469 (SC) Also concerned with interpretation/application of the Bombay High Court Rules regarding admission of appeals. The court found this authority likewise not attracted because the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules differ from the Bombay Rules relied upon in those decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court distinguished the Amalgamated Commercial Traders decision on the ground that that case involved a bona fide dispute as to liability for the debt itself; by contrast, in the present case the principal debt was admitted and paid by the company sought to be wound up, leaving only the question of entitlement to interest. Given that the company judge was already seized of the winding-up petition and the principal debt had not been disputed (payment having been made to avoid winding-up), the court considered the company judge to be the appropriate forum to determine entitlement to interest. The court emphasized the policy against multiplicity of litigation.

The court also considered the Unisystems decision (Goyal J.'s observations) and refused to extend those observations to the present factual scenario where the principal was admitted and paid before the company judge. The court explained that the Unisystems observations might correctly apply to a case where the winding-up itself was sought on the basis of unpaid interest and the company raised a bona fide dispute about interest, but not where the principal was admitted and paid.

On the procedural point of admission of appeals, the court analyzed the relevant rules. It found that the Bombay High Court Rules (central to Golcha and Shanta Genevieve Pommerat) are not in pari materia with the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules. The court quoted and applied the relevant amended Rule 1(i) of Chapter 3B, Volume V, of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules and its Explanation, which provide that motions for admission of company appeals are to be placed before a Bench of two judges (Division Bench). Consequently, the court held that the authorities about admission as of course under the Bombay Rules were not applicable to the present case.

On that basis and for the reasons stated, the court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed at the admission stage ("in limine") rather than admitted as a matter of routine.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed in limine.

Direct effect: The company judge's order directing Stephen Chemical Ltd. to pay twelve per cent interest on the principal amount stands (the appellant's challenge to that order was unsuccessful and the appeal has been dismissed at the admission stage).

Broader application: The court distinguished earlier Supreme Court and High Court authorities relied upon by the appellant and applied the provisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules to the question of admission. The decision explains the court's view on the proper forum for deciding entitlement to interest where the principal has been admitted and paid, and on the procedural rule governing admission of company appeals in the Punjab & Haryana High Court. The court's reasoning is applied to the facts of this case.


Order pronounced by Surinder Singh, J.; concurrence indicated in the opinion (paragraph 14: "I agree").

    Stephen Chemical Ltd. Chandigarh v. Innosearch Ltd., New Delhi .

    1. Messrs Innosearch Ltd., 2E/25, Jhandewalan Extension, New Delhi, petitioned this court under section 439 read with section's 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", for winding-up Messrs Stephen Chemical Limited, Flat No. 119-120, sector 17-B, Chandigarh, with the allegations that the former company supplied goods worth Rs. 48,308 to the latter company against order No. 572/211, dated December 18, 1979, under the petitioning company's bill No. B/A-III/5, dated December 25, 1979 ; that despite reminders, the said company did not clear the bill; that on November 18, 1981, the petitioning company issued demand under section 434 of the Act, requiring the other company to pay Rs. 50,842.05, together with a sum of Rs. 200 towards the costs of notices within the specified period; and that in spite of the said notices, the other said company failed to make payment.

    2. Messrs Stephen Chemical Ltd. before the company judge admitted its liability regarding the price of the goods in question and paid up the principal amount. It, however, disputed its liability regarding the payment of interest on the said amount. The learned judge, vide his order dated May 31, 1984, directed Messrs Stephen Chemical Ltd. to pay the petitioning company twelve per cent. interest on the principal amount.

    3. Messrs Stephen Chemicals Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as " the appellant") have challenged the said order of the company judge. The stand taken on behalf of the appellant is that there was no agreement between the parties regarding the payment of interest nor there existed any trade custom providing for the payment of interest. It is also the stand of the appellant that in case the company whose winding up is sought raises a bona fide dispute regarding its liability to pay to the creditor company, then the appropriate forum for determining that dispute is the civil court and not the company judge. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Amalgamated Commercial Traders (P.) Ltd. v. A.C.K. Krishnaswami [1965] 35 Comp Cas 456 (SC), and drew pointed attention to the following observations of their Lordships made therein (at p. 463):

    " It is well settled that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means of seeking to enforce payment of a debt which is bona fide disputed by the company- A petition presented ostensibly for a winding-up order but really to exercise pressure will be dismissed and under such circumstances, may be stigmatised as a scandalous abuse of the process of the court."

    4. In our opinion, the ratio of the Amalgamated Commercial Traders (P.) Ltd.'s case [1965] 35 Comp Cas 456 (SC), is not attracted to the facts of the present case. That was a case where a bona fide dispute was raised regarding the liability of the company sought to be wound up to the creditor to pay any debt and their Lordships felt that the creditor had initiated winding-up proceedings to put pressure upon the said company. In the present case, the principal amount of debt is not only not disputed but, in fact, had been paid to the creditor after the winding-up proceedings ' had been initiated before the company judge. The only question that remains is as to whether the creditor was also entitled to interest upon that amount and whether the creditor should take proceedings in the civil court to recover the interest or the company judge was competent to go into that question.

    5. In our opinion, where the company judge was seized of the matter and when the liability to pay the principal debt had not been disputed by the company sought to be wound up and, in fact, paid up the debt in order to avoid winding-up, the forum of the company judge is the appropriate forum for determining as to whether the creditor was entitled to interest on the amount in question or not. The basic policy of law is to avoid multiplicity of litigation.

    6. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred us to the order of Goyal J. rendered in C. P. No. 77 of 1983--decided on July 20, 1984, Unisystems (P.) Ltd. v. Stepan Chemical Ltd. [1985] 58 Comp Cas 875 (P&H), wherein Goyal J. had observed that where no agreement for the payment of interest existed and the creditor had claimed interest, no winding-up order could be passed.

    7. With respect, if the said observations are intended to cover the cases of the present kind, then we find ourselves unable to concur in that view. The said observations may be correctly applicable to a case where winding-up initially is sought by a party on the ground that certain amount by way of interest was due from the other party which the other party had failed to pay up despite demand notice and the other party raises a bona fide dispute as to the right of the creditor to claim interest in the absence of any agreement regarding payment of interest or any other plausible ground, but the position would be entirely different where the amount alleged to be due from the company sought to be wound up included the principal amount of debt and the liability to the principal amount has been accepted before the company judge and the creditor is sought to be relegated to the civil remedy for getting the interest on the said principal amount.

    8. Lastly, the learned counsel argued that the company's appeal should be admitted as a matter of routine. In support of his contention, he relied upon Golcha Investment (P) Ltd. v. Shanti Chandra Bafna [1970] 40 Comp Cas 1128 ; AIR 1970 SC 1350, and Shanta Genevieve Pommerat v. Sakal Papers P. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 269 ; [1985] 57 Comp Cas 469 (SC).

    9. These decisions relate to the interpretation of the Rules and Orders of the Bombay High Court. Chapter XLII of the Bombay High Court Rules provides for appeals to the appellate court. Rule 965 thereof prescribes the form of memorandum of appeal. Rule 966 prescribes what documents should be filed along with the memorandum. Rule 966A prescribes :

    " 966A. In the following cases the appeal shall be placed, in the first instance, for admission before a Bench of the High Court to be appointed by the Chief Justice :

    (1) An appeal from an order summarily rejecting a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution;

    (2) An appeal from an order on an interlocutory application by way of notice of motion or chamber summons ; and (3) An appeal from an order on a summons for judgment in a summary suit.

    If the appeal is admitted, then the provisions hereinafter contained with regard to appeals shall apply to such appeal. "

    10. Their Lordships interpreting Rule 966A held that (at p. 1130 of 40 Comp Cas):

    " from this rule it is clear that appeals other than those mentioned therein are not to be placed for admission. In other words, they are entitled to be admitted as a matter of course. Therefore, the appellate Bench erred in summarily dismissing the appeal. It was bound to entertain the appeal and dispose of the same on merits."

    11. The Bombay High Court Rules are not in pari materia with the Rules of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and, therefore, the ratio of Golcha Investment (P.) Ltd. [1970] 40 Comp Cas 1128 (SC), and Shanta Genevieve Pommerat's cases, AIR 1983 SC 269 ; [1985] 57 Comp Cas 469 (SC), is not attracted to the facts of the present case. The relevant amended Rule 1(i) of Chapter 3B, Volume V, of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules reads as under :

    " 1. Subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth, the following classes of cases shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a judge sitting alone : (i) a motion for the admission of first appeal against decree of subordinate court, regular first appeal under the Land Acquisition Act, regular second appeal, first appeal against orders, first appeal against order under Central or State Acts, unless otherwise provided in the Act, execution first appeals, execution second appeals, second appeal against orders, second appeal against order under Central or State Acts unless otherwise provided in the Act, civil revision petitions and any other application or petition under the Code of Civil Procedure or under any other Central or State Act, unless otherwise provided in the Code or Act.

    Explanation.--The preliminary hearing for the admission of appeal against award rendered by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, appeal against the decree or order passed under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Letters Patent Appeals, civil appeals (contempt), company appeals, sales tax cases and gift-tax cases shall be before a Bench of two judges. "

    12. Rule 1 above stated clearly provides that a motion for the admission of matters mentioned in Clause (i) thereof shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a judge sitting alone. The Explanation is an exception to Clause (i) and by virtue of the Explanation, in matters including company appeals for the above purpose, that is, a motion for the admission, be set down before a Bench of two judges instead of a judge sitting alone. It would thus be evident that the relevant rules of this court expressly envisage a company appeal to be listed for motion hearing before a Division Bench. Once a matter comes up for admission purposes, it would be for the Division Bench while hearing the matter either to admit it for final hearing or to dismiss it, if it finds no merits therein.

    13. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed in limine.

    Surinder Singh, J.

    14. I agree.

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    Comments

    Stephen Chemical Ltd. Chandigarh v. Innosearch Ltd., New Delhi .
    (Jul 25, 1984)