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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Ram Saran, the father of the plaintiff, died on 8-11-1966. The defendant obtained mutation of the disputed land on the basis of a will alleged to have been executed by Ram Saran in his favour. The plaintiff challenged the execution and validity of that will and filed a suit for possession. The defendant contested the suit, alleging the will had been duly executed in his favour in lieu of services.

At trial the Court held the will valid and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The first appellate Court affirmed that judgment and decree. On second appeal to the High Court a compromise was effected: the respondent (defendant) agreed to pay Rs. 15,000 to the appellant (plaintiff) in three instalments of Rs. 5,000 each by specified dates, with an express clause that failure to pay any instalment would result in the appeal being accepted and the suit being decreed; full payment would result in dismissal of the appeal. The compromise was made part of the judgment and decree.

The respondent failed to pay the last instalment in time and moved an application under Section 148 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking extension of time to make the third instalment. The application alleged the respondent was seriously ill (age stated as 80) and that a late paddy crop delayed funds; it also alleged a bank draft for the instalment was sent on 25-10-1983 but was refused by the plaintiff. The plaintiff opposed the application, disputing the illness and seeking dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when a conditional decree awards possession on payment of a specified sum within a specified period, the Court has power under Section 148, Civil Procedure Code, to enlarge the time for payment for sufficient cause after the prescribed period has expired?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The Court has power under Section 148, Civil Procedure Code, to enlarge time for doing an act prescribed or allowed by the Code, and this power should permit extension for payment of the instalment.
  • The respondent was seriously ill around the time the last instalment fell due (age stated as 80 years), which caused the delay and was beyond his control.
  • The paddy crop was late due to late sowing, making it difficult to arrange funds in time.
  • The respondent arranged the amount and sent a bank draft dated 25-10-1983 to the plaintiff, who refused to accept it.
  • Precedents were cited in support, including Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das; Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani; Jadabendra Nath Mishra v. Smt. Manorama Debya; Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati; New Bangesree Bastralaya v. Ramanlal Phurma Karta.

Respondent to the Application (Plaintiff)'s Arguments

  • The plaintiff controverted the respondent's allegations of serious illness and other reasons for delay.
  • The plaintiff refused to accept the bank draft and opposed the application, praying that it be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 Observation that Section 148 applies to procedural orders; courts cannot extend time in the case of conditional decrees (conditional decrees are apart from procedural orders). Relied upon to support the proposition that Section 148 does not empower the Court to extend time for compliance with a conditional decree.
Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428 Illustrates a compromise in execution proceedings (not a decree) where parties agreed to deposit an amount by a date; the order did not amount to a decree. Distinguished by the Court as not laying down a principle applicable to conditional decrees in suits (case concerned execution proceedings, not a decree).
Jadabendra Nath Mishra v. Smt. Manorama Debya, AIR 1970 Cal 199 Compromise in the context of setting aside an ex parte decree — arrangement that payment within time would lead to setting aside the decree; the order did not constitute a decree. Distinguished by the Court as not constituting a decree and therefore not controlling on the present question of enlarging time for a conditional decree.
Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, AIR 1972 All 246 (FB) Example where the relevant orders did not constitute decrees. Distinguished by the Court for being inapposite to conditional-decree situations.
New Bangesree Bastralaya v. Ramanlal Phurma Karta, AIR 1976 Cal 335 Another instance where the orders under consideration did not amount to decrees. Distinguished on the basis that those cases did not involve conditional decrees requiring enlargement under Section 148.
P. K. Sukumaran v. Sulaiman Khan, AIR 1971 Mad 454 Held that where a suit is decreed on condition that a sum be paid within a specified time, on expiry of the time the Court loses seisin and cannot extend the time. Followed by the Court as supporting the proposition that Section 148 cannot be used to enlarge time for compliance with conditional decrees.
S. Mahalinga Bhatta v. Assanare Beary, AIR 1973 Ker 185 Supports the view that Section 148 applies to procedural orders and not to conditional decrees. Placed alongside other authorities as reinforcing the Court's interpretation that conditional decrees are not enlarged under Section 148.
Bhujangrao Ganpati v. Sheshrao Rajaram, AIR 1974 Bom 104 Similar authority indicating Section 148's application to procedural orders but not to conditional decrees. Cited as part of a line of cases the Court respectfully agreed with in concluding Section 148 does not apply to conditional decrees.
Kumari Sushila Devi Jain v. Mohammad Shafi, 1982 All LJ 478 Express statement that time under Section 148 can only be enlarged for procedural orders, not for conditional decrees which are self-operative. Quoted and expressly agreed with by the Court to reinforce the legal principle barring enlargement of time for conditional decrees under Section 148.
Jodhayan v. Babu Ram, AIR 1983 SC 57 Supreme Court accepted a bona fide mistake (short deposit of twenty-five paise) as excusable in peculiar circumstances; judgment must be read in its peculiar factual context. Distinguished by the Court as being based on peculiar facts (a bona fide mistake) and therefore not a controlling authority for enlarging time under Section 148 in conditional-decree situations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the language of Section 148, which permits the Court to enlarge, in its discretion, any period fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. From this textual reading the Court concluded that Section 148 applies to procedural orders (acts prescribed or allowed by the Code) and not to conditional decrees, which are self-operative.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Mahanth Ram Das (AIR 1961 SC 882) to show that procedural orders permit enlargement while conditional decrees do not. The Court considered a line of authorities (including P. K. Sukumaran; S. Mahalinga Bhatta; Bhujangrao Ganpati; and Kumari Sushila Devi Jain) that express the same legal principle — that once the time fixed by a conditional decree expires, the Court loses seisin and cannot enlarge time under Section 148.

The Court then examined the cases cited by the applicant and found them distinguishable on their facts: several (Smt. Periyakkal; Jadabendra Nath Mishra; Gobardhan Singh; New Bangesree Bastralaya) involved compromises or orders in execution or miscellaneous proceedings that did not amount to decrees; consequently, the legal principle in those cases did not apply to the present question. The Court also treated Jodhayan v. Babu Ram as a decision driven by peculiar facts (a bona fide oversight amounting to a short deposit), and therefore not generally applicable to conditional-decree situations.

Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, the Court held that the compromise-turned-judgment was a conditional decree requiring payment of instalments within specified times, and that Section 148 could not be invoked to extend the time for performance of that condition after expiry. On the facts, the respondent admitted he had no money to deposit the last instalment on time; the Court found it unnecessary to probe the reasons further because, as a matter of law, the delay could not be condoned under Section 148 for a conditional decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the application for extension of time. The operative ruling as to the application is Application dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondent's application for enlargement of time to pay the third instalment was refused; the conditional clause in the compromise-judgment operates according to its terms (the Court found the delay could not be condoned under Section 148).
  • The judgment records "No order as to costs."
  • The opinion distinguishes various authorities and aligns with a line of cases holding that Section 148 applies to procedural orders and not to conditional decrees. The Court did not indicate that it was creating any broader new precedent beyond applying this established principle to the facts before it.

Final Disposition: The application under Section 148 read with Section 151 Civil P.C. was dismissed.

    Parmeshri Appellent v. Naurata .

    1. Briefly the facts are that Ram Saran, the father of the plaintiff, died on 8-11-1966. The defendant got the mutation of the land sanctioned in his favour on the basis of a will alleged to have been executed by Ram Saran in his favour. The plaintiff challenging the execution and validity of the will, filed a suit for possession which was contested by the defendant. He controverted the allegations of the plaintiff and alleged that the will was duly executed by Ram Saran deceased in his favour in lieu of services.

    2. The trial Court held that Ram Saran executed a valid will in favour of the defendant. Consequently it dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff the first appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the same. In second appeal to this Court a compromise was effected between the parties according to which it was agreed that an amount of Rupees 15,000/- would be paid by the respondent to the appellant in instalments and in case he failed to pay any of the instalments, the suit of the plaintiff would stand decreed. The matter was listed before me and I, in accordance with the compromise, passed the following judgment:

    "A compromise has been effected between the parties according to which it has been agreed that the respondent shall pay Rs. 15,000/- to the appellant by Bank drafts against receipts in three equal instalments of Rs. 5,000/- each. The first instalment is to be paid on or before 15-10-1982, the second on or before l5th June, 1983, and the third on or before 15-10-1983. In case the respondent fails to pay either of the said instalments, the appeal shall stand accepted and the suit of the plaintiff decreed. However, if the respondent pays a1l the instalments as stated above, the appeal shall stand dismissed. The compromise, Exhibit C. I., be deemed to be part of the judgment and decree. The parties are left to bear their own costs."

    The respondent failed to pay the last instalment in time. Consequently he moved an application under S. 148 read with S. 151, Civil P. C. for extension of time in making payment of the third instalment. It is stated in the application that the applicant, who was 80 years of age, fell seriously ill on 5-10-1983 and remained on the verge of death during that period. As soon as he started moving he arranged for the amount of Rs. 5,000/- and sent the money vide Bank draft dt. 25-10-1983 to Smt. Parmeshwari Devi plaintiff who refused to accept the same. It is alleged that the delay in tendering the third and last instalment was due to illness of the applicant which was beyond his control. It is further alleged that the paddy crop was late due to late sowing in the village and, therefore, it became difficult for him to make arrangement for the balance amount. The application has been opposed by the plaintiff who controverted his allegations. She also denied the allegation that the applicant suffered from a serious ailment. Consequently it is prayed that the application be dismissed.

    3. The main question for determination is that if a conditional decree for possession on payment of certain amount within a specified period is passed in favour of a party and it fails to pay the amount within that time, whether the Court is entitled to extend time for payment under S. 148, Civi1 P. C., for sufficient cause? The learned counsel for the applicant submits that the Court has the power to extend time under S. 148 of the Code. In support of his contention he made reference to Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das., AIR 1961 SC 882, Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428, Jadabendra Nath Mishra v. Smt. Manorama Debya, AIR 1970 Cal 199, Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, AIR 1972 All 246 (FB) and New Bangesree Bastralaya v. Ramanlal Phurma Karta, AIR 1976 Cal 335.

    4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and given my thoughtful consideration to their arguments. Section 148 says that where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.

    5. From a reading of the section it is evident that the Court has power to extend time for doing such acts which are prescribed or allowed by the Code. In other words it applies to procedural orders and not to conditional decrees. In the above view I am fortified to some extent by the observations of the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ram Das's case (supra). It was observed by Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) as follows (at p. 883):

    "How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed."
    (emphasis supp1ied by underlining).

    It is evident from the above observations that in the ease of conditional decrees the Courts cannot extend time though in other cases it can do so. Following the above case, similar view was taken in P. K. Sukumaran v. Sulaiman Khan, AIR 1971 Mad 454, S. Mahalinga Bhatta v. Assanare Beary, AIR 1973 Ker 185, Bhujangrao Ganpati v. Sheshrao Rajaram, AIR 1974 Bom 104 and Kumari Sushila Devi Jain v. Mohammad Shafi, 1982 A11 LJ 478. It was held in P. K. Sukumaran's case (supra) where a suit is decreed on condition that a certain amount is paid within a specified time and in default that suit will stand dismissed, the Court, after the expiry of the fixed time, loses seisin over the matter and therefore cannot extend the time. While interpreting S. 148 the following observations were made in Kumari Sushila Devi Jain's case (at pp. 479-80):

    "It is only procedural orders in respect of which time for compliance can be enlarged. It is not in respect of conditional decrees, which are self-operative, that time can be enlarged under this provision."

    I am in respectful agreement with the above observations.

    6. Now I advert to the cases referred to by the learned counsel for the applicant. Mahanth Ram Das's case (AIR 1961 SC 882) (supra) has already been referred to above. In Smt. Periyakkal's case (AIR 1983 SC 428) (supra), a property was auctioned in pursuance of a decree which was purchased by the decree-holder. The legal representatives of the judgment-debtor filed objections against the sale. A compromise was arrived at between the parties by which the legal representatives agreed to deposit certain amount by a particular date. From the above facts it is evident that the compromise was not in a suit but in execution proceedings. Thus the order did not amount to a decree. In Jababendra Nath Mishra's case (AIR 1970 Cal 199) an ex parte decree was passed against the defendant who made an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. During the pendency of the application a compromise was arrived at between the parties according to which it was agreed that if the defendant deposited certain amount within a certain period, the ex parte decree would be set aside and the suit restored. There was also a default clause providing that if the amount was not paid within the specified period, the miscellaneous application would stand dismissed. This order too was not a-decree. Similarly in Gobardhan Singh's (AIR 1972 All 246) (FB) and New Bangesree Bastralaya's case (AIR 1976 Cal 335) (supra) the orders did not constitute decrees. Mr. Chaudhary then made reference to another Supreme Court case reported as Jodhayan v. Babu Ram AIR 1983 SC 57. In that case a decree for possession in a preemption suit was passed in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 17,936.25P. The decree-holder deposited the amount of Rs. 17,936/- but through oversight did not deposit twenty five paise. Later, he deposited the said amount but beyond time. Thereafter he was directed to deposit another Rs. 500/- in second appeal which he did within the time prescribed. In execution an objection was taken by judgment-debtor that the decree could not be executed as full amount had not been deposited by the decree holder. The executing Court held that the mistake was bona fide and consequently overruled the objection. In lst appeal the order of the executing Court was reversed and in second appeal the view of the Ist appellate Court was affirmed. The Supreme Court on further appeal by the decree holder, held that the short deposit was due to the bona fide mistake of the appellant. It, therefore, accepted the appeal and restored the order of the executing Court. In my view the above observations are to be read in the context of the peculiar circumstances of that case. It is thus evident that all the above cases are distinguishable and the ratio therein will not apply to this case. I am, therefore, of the view that in the case of conditional decree for possession on payment of some amount by a party within specified period, the Court is not entitled to extend time for payment under S. 148 of the Code for sufficient cause, if the amount is not deposited within the specified time.

    7. In the present case the last instalment was not deposited by the applicant in time. It is admitted by him that he had no money to deposit it within the specified period. It is not necessary to go into the question as to why he could not deposit the amount as I am of the opinion that the delay in the present case cannot be condoned in depositing the amount under S. 148 of the Code. Consequently the application is liable to be dismissed.

    8. For the aforesaid reasons I do not find any merit in the application and dismiss the same. No order as to costs.

    9. Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Parmeshri Appellent v. Naurata .
    (May 10, 1984)