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  • provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963,
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  • sub-rule (5):(i) Murari
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  • provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • provisions of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code
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  • sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (5):(i) Murari
  • Order 21, Rule 32
  • 1974. Sub-rule (5)
  • sub-rule (5)
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (3),
  • sub-rule (4),
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 19 January 1974 a decree for permanent injunction was granted in favour of Bagicha Singh restraining Suba Singh and other judgment-debtors from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the agricultural land in dispute. In July 1974 the judgment-debtors dispossessed the decree-holder in violation of that injunction.

After unsuccessful criminal proceedings initiated by the decree-holder, the decree-holder filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code on 6 December 1977 to enforce the injunction-decree. On 26 May 1979 the Executing Court ordered enforcement by detention of the judgment-debtors in civil prison and by attachment of their properties; attachment was effected on 4 July 1979. The judgment-debtors avoided detention by pursuing revision in the High Court (interim stay of arrest on 17 July 1979; revision dismissed on 9 October 1979) and then by obtaining a stay from the Supreme Court on 15 November 1979. The Supreme Court ultimately (14 April 1980) set aside only the portion of the Executing Court's order directing detention in civil prison and directed that "the execution will now proceed further in accordance with law."

The decree-holder applied to revive execution proceedings on 15 May 1980. On 18 August 1980 the judgment-debtors objected that six months had elapsed since attachment and so the attached properties could not be sold. By order dated 25 August 1980 the Executing Court allowed those objections and held the attachment had ceased. The decree-holder filed the present revision petition against that order; the High Court heard the matter and the order under review is set aside (revision allowed) for reasons described below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How are the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 32 (sub-rules (1), (3), (4) and (5)) to be applied to enforcement of a decree for injunction where attachment was effected and subsequent court stays intervened?
  2. Whether the period during which the execution order was stayed by the Supreme Court must be excluded when computing the six‑month period for sale of attached property under Rule 32(3), having regard to Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963?
  3. Whether, in the facts of this case, the attachment had ceased before the decree-holder applied for sale, or whether the executing Court erred in holding that the six months had elapsed?
  4. Whether the Court can, under Rule 32(5) or on general principles, direct that possession of the land be restored to the decree-holder (including appointment of a local commissioner to take and deliver possession)?

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holder's Arguments

  • The decree-holder sought enforcement of the permanent injunction by execution proceedings initiated under Order XXI, Rule 32 (application filed 6-12-1977), including attachment effected on 4-7-1979 and further steps to restore possession or sell attached property if necessary.
  • After the Supreme Court's order of 14-4-1980 permitting execution to proceed, the decree-holder applied on 15-5-1980 to revive execution; he disputed the judgment-debtors' objection that six months had lapsed and maintained that the attachment remained in force and permitted sale because the stay period must be excluded.

Judgment-debtors' Arguments

  • They objected (18-8-1980) that the attached properties could not be sold because six months had elapsed since attachment (attachment effected 4-7-1979).
  • They relied on three earlier decisions (Murari Lal v. Nawal Kishore; Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh; Prithivi Singh v. Natha Ram) to argue that no order for delivery of possession could be passed under Rule 32(5).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Murari Lal v. Nawal Kishore, AIR 1961 Punj 547 Cited by judgment-debtors to support the contention that no order for delivery of possession could be passed under Order XXI, Rule 32(5). The High Court recorded that this decision (and two others cited for the same point) supported the judgment-debtors' contention, but held these authorities were no longer good law in view of later Supreme Court and Full Bench pronouncements.
Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh, AIR 1972 Delhi 142 Cited by judgment-debtors for the proposition that an order for delivery of possession could not be made under Rule 32(5). The Court treated this decision as earlier authority for the judgment-debtors' position but concluded it was superseded by later Supreme Court and Full Bench rulings and therefore not decisive.
Prithivi Singh v. Natha Ram, 1980 Pun LJ 199 Cited by judgment-debtors to oppose ordering delivery of possession under Rule 32(5). The Court observed that this case supported the judgment-debtors' view but held that later Supreme Court authority and a Full Bench decision changed the legal position.
Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal v. State of Punjab (Civil Misc. Petition No.10572 of 1978 in Civil Appeals Nos.1298 & 1299 of 1969) (decided 16-10-1978) Illustrates that a Court (including the Supreme Court) can order compliance of a declaratory decree by directing payment (implementation of declaratory decree); demonstrates broader principle that consequential relief necessary to make a decree effective may be directed and is executable. The High Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to support the proposition that, analogously, a decree for permanent injunction can be enforced by ordering restoration of possession (including by appointing a local commissioner) and that such directions are within the court's power to make a decree effective.
Radha Ram v. Municipal Committee, Barnala, Full Bench, 28-4-1982 (reported 1982 Lab IC 1857) Full Bench holding that in suits for declaration directions can be given for reinstatement and payment of back-salary etc., and such directions render the declaratory decree plainly executable. The High Court relied on this Full Bench decision to reinforce that courts should not force parties to initiate fresh proceedings for consequences that flow directly from a decree; it supported ordering possession restored under Rule 32(5) or general principles.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 288 : AIR 1977 SC 1466 One of the Supreme Court decisions noted as having changed the law on recovery of back wages/emoluments, showing the cause of action for such consequential relief is conterminous with the declaratory decree. The High Court cited this Supreme Court decision as part of the line of cases that justify awarding consequential relief in the original proceedings and to show that requiring separate litigation is disfavoured.
Maimoona Khatun v. State of U.P., (1980) 3 Serv LR (SC) 455 : AIR 1980 SC 1773 Supreme Court authority further clarifying entitlement to consequential relief (recovery of emoluments) flowing from a declaratory decree. The Court treated this authority as reinforcing the proposition that courts can and should grant consequential relief flowing from a primary decree, supporting the view that restoration of possession can be directed without a fresh suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reproducing Order XXI, Rule 32 (sub-rules (1)–(5)) and explaining their plain meaning: under sub-rule (1) a party who wilfully fails to obey a decree for injunction may be detained in civil prison and/or have property attached; under sub-rule (3) attached property which has remained in force for six months may be sold if the decree-holder has applied for sale and the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree; under sub-rule (4) attachment ceases where the judgment‑debtor obeys the decree and pays costs, or where at the end of six months no application for sale has been made or was refused; and under sub-rule (5) the Court may direct that the act required may be done, as far as practicable, by the decree-holder or some person appointed by the Court at the judgment‑debtor's cost, with expenses recoverable as if included in the decree.

Applying these provisions to the facts, the Court analysed chronology and the effect of interim stays:

  • Attachment was effected on 4 July 1979.
  • The judgment-debtors obtained an interim stay of arrest from the High Court on 17 July 1979 (revision) which was dismissed on 9 October 1979; subsequently they obtained a stay of the Executing Court's order from the Supreme Court from 15 November 1979 until 14 April 1980.
  • Using Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, the Court excluded the period during which the Supreme Court stay operated (15 November 1979 to 14 April 1980) from computation of the six‑month period for sale under Rule 32(3).
  • By excluding that stay period, the Court found that only four months and twelve days had elapsed between attachment (4 July 1979) and the commencement of the Supreme Court stay (15 November 1979). After the stay ended (14 April 1980) the decree-holder moved the Executing Court on 15 May 1980 (one month and one day later), bringing the total elapsed period to five months and thirteen days—i.e., less than six months.
  • The Court concluded that the Executing Court erred in holding that six months had elapsed by 15 May 1980 and therefore erred in holding the attachment had ceased.

The Court also addressed whether possession could be restored under Rule 32(5) or on general principles. It found:

  • Earlier authorities relied upon by the judgment-debtors to oppose restoration of possession were superseded by subsequent Supreme Court authority (Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal) and a Full Bench decision of the High Court (Radha Ram), which established that courts may give directions necessary to implement a declaratory decree and that consequential relief should not be left to fresh litigation.
  • By analogy and on the larger principles of justice exemplified in those authorities, a decree for permanent injunction should be enforceable by restoring possession (and not merely by payment of mesne profits), and Rule 32(5) expressly contemplates that the act required to be done may be carried out by a person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor.
  • The Court found that the judgment-debtors had wilfully disobeyed the decree over many years (dispossession since July 1974) and, after failing before the Supreme Court, did not take steps to surrender possession; instead they relied on technical objections to delay execution. Thus, sale of attached property plus ordering restoration of possession were appropriate remedies to give effect to the decree and to meet the ends of justice.

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: The revision petition is allowed; the order of the Executing Court dated 25-8-1980 is set aside and the attachment made on 4-7-1979 continues in force.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The attached property shall be sold. Out of the sale proceeds the decree-holder shall be paid compensation by way of mesne profits with effect from 1 July 1974 until possession is restored to the decree-holder.
  • An Advocate shall be appointed as Local Commissioner to take over and deliver possession of the land in dispute to the decree-holder as far as possible before 16 June 1982; if police assistance is necessary, the Executing Court may direct it.
  • The expenses of the Local Commissioner and the costs of the execution proceedings throughout shall be borne by the judgment-debtors; such amounts shall be recoverable from the sale proceeds as if included in the decree. The costs of execution are quantified at Rs. 2,000/-, and the expenses and costs shall be deducted from sale proceeds, with any balance payable to the judgment-debtors.
  • Parties (through counsel) are directed to appear before the Executing Court on 2 June 1982.

Implications as articulated by the Court:

  • The Court held that the stay period granted by the Supreme Court must be excluded when computing the six‑month period under Rule 32(3) in accordance with Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, and therefore the executing Court erred in holding that the attachment had lapsed.
  • The Court held that Rule 32(5) and the broader principles exemplified by later Supreme Court and Full Bench decisions permit the Court to direct compliance of a decree by ordering actions necessary to give effect to it, including restoration of possession, and that earlier contrary authorities are no longer good law.
  • The decision directly affects the parties in this litigation (attachment continued; sale authorized; possession to be restored; costs and expenses recoverable). The Court also expressed a broader enforcement principle that courts should not require fresh litigation to obtain relief that directly flows from an existing decree.

Revision allowed.

    Bagicha Singh v. Suba Singh And Others

    On 19-1-1974, a decree for permanent injunction was granted in favour of Bagicha Singh restraining Suba Singh and other judgment-debtors from interferng with the possession of the plaintiff on the agricultural land in dispute. In July, 1974, the judgment-debtors dispossessed the decree-holder and violated the injunction decree. Thereafter, there were two sets of criminal litigation between the parties at the instance of the judgment-debtors in both of which the judgment-debtors were not convicted for one reason or the other. On 6-12-1977, the decree-holder filed an application under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Civil P.C (hereinafter called the Code) for enforcing the decree of permanent injunction by the modes provided in the Code. On 26-5-1979, the Executing Court ordered the enforcement of the decree by detaining judgment-debtors in civil prison and attachment of their properties. On 4-7-1979, attachment of the properties of the judgment-debtors was effected. However, they were not detained in civil prison as in the meantime they had moved this Court by filing Civil Revision No. 1477 of 1979 against the order of the Executing Court in which interim order of stay of arrest was passed on 17-7-1979. Finally, by order dated 9-10-1979 the revision of the judgment-debtors was dismissed by this Court. Thereafter, the judgment-debtors moved the Supreme Court by filing a Special Leave Petition along with an application for stay of execution in which the operation of the order of the Executing Court was stayed on 15-11-1979. The matter finally came up before the Supreme Court on 14-4-1980, when the order of the Executing Court regarding detention of the judgment-debtors in civil prison was set aside and the remaining order was maintained and the execution was allowed to proceed further in accordance with law. The exact order of the Supreme Court was as follows:—

    “Heard learned counsel for the parties. On the facts and in the special circumstances of the case, we think that the order directing the petitioners to be detained in Civil Prison is not justified. We set aside that portion of the order and the execution will now proceed further in accordance with law.”

    On 15-5-1980, the decree-holder filed an application before the Executing Court to revive the execution proceedings in view of the Supreme Court order and to proceed with the Same in accordance with law. The matter was revived by the Executing Court and notice was issued to the parties. On 18-8-1980 the judgment-debtors filed objections that the attached properties could not be sold because six months' period from the date of attachment had already lapsed. The objections were disputed by the decree-holder. By order dated 25-8-1980, the Executing Court allowed the objections and came to the conclusion that the attachment ceased on the expiry of six months' period and the attached property could not be sold as no application was filed by the decree-holder for sale of the same within six months of the attachment. This revision petition has been filed by the decree-holder against the aforesaid order.

    2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that this revision deserves to succeed. Since various provisions of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code fall for consideration, therefore, it will be appropriate to reproduce the same:—

    “32. Decree for specific performance for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction :—

    (1) Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both.

    (2) Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance or for an injunction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and detention.

    (3) Where any attachment under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) has remained in force for six months, if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sold; and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the judgment-debtor on his application.

    (4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the same which he is bound to pay, or where, at the end of six months from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made or if made has been refused, the attachment shall cease.

    (5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor, and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree.”

    A reading of sub-rule (1) shows that to enforce a decree for injunction, an opportunity is to be granted to the judgment-debtor to obey the decree and in case he wilfully fails to do so, the decree can be enforced by detention in civil prison or by attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor or by both. Under sub-rule (3), if attachment made under sub-rule (1) remains in force for, a period of six months and if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and if the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, the same can be sold. Under sub-rule (4), where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and has paid all costs of executing the same or where at the end of six months from the date of attachment no application to have the property sold is made, or if made, has been refused, the attachment ceases. Under sub-rule (5), where a decree for injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all of the aforesaid processes, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor and upon the act being done, the expenses incurred may be recovered as if they were included in the decree. Therefore, it is clear that if time is allowed to the judgment-debtor to obey the decree of injunction and if he wilfully continues to defy, he can be detained in civil prison or his property can be attached or both steps can be taken against him and if in spite of that he does not obey the decree for a period of six months, then the attached property can be put to sale if so applied for by the decree-holder. It is further provided that the Court has power to have the compliance of the decree in lieu of other processes or in addition thereto by directing that the act required to be done by the judgment-debtor be done at his expense either by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court.

    3. In the present case, the judgment-debtors cannot be detained in civil prison as ordered by the Supreme Court, therefore, it is to be seen whether out of the remaining processes, which of them deserve to be followed. The decree of injunction was passed on 19th Jan., 1974 which they violated in July, 1974 by dispossessing the decree-holder. The decree-holder first resorted, to complaints before the Criminal Court and then moved the Civil Court on 6th Dec., 1977. It is not disputed even before me that all through the judgment-debtors have been in possession of the land in dispute since after the passing of the decree for permanent injunction. It is also not in dispute that the decree-holder is seeking compliance of the decree right from Dec., 1977 before Civil Court and yet the judgment-debtors have not complied with the same as they have not delivered back possession to the decree-holder.

    4. Once attachment was effected on 4th July, 1979, under sub-rule (1), the point which now falls for determination would be — when would it cease to operate and what would be its consequence? The resume of facts given in the opening part of the judgment clearly goes to show that 12 days later, on 17th July, 1979, stay of arrest was obtained from this Court in the revision filed by the judgment-debtors which was dismissed on 9th Oct., 1979. Thereafter, stay of operation of the order of the Executing Court was obtained by the judgment-debtors from the Supreme Court on 15th Nov., 1979, which continued up to 14th April, 1980, when it was finally ordered that the judgment-debtors shall not be detained in civil prison and the execution will proceed further in accordance with law. Therefore, if period between 15th Nov., 1979 and 14th April, 1980, during which the entire order of the Executing Court remained stayed, is excluded in accounting the period of six months of attachment, as provided by sub-rule (3), in accordance with the provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, I find that a period of four months and 12 days elapsed between the date of attachment and the stay granted by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court stay came to an end on 14th April, 1980 and the decree-holder moved the Executing Court for proceeding further with the execution on 15th May, 1980. The decree-holder spent one month and one day in doing so. So the total period of attachment in this manner comes to five months and thirteen days. It is clear that all through the execution proceedings remained pending and the decree-holder was wanting compliance of the decree by the judgment-debtors, which was not complied with and instead the judgment-debtors resorted to the remedy of revision in this Court and then appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he obtained stay. After they failed in the Supreme Court on 14th April, 1980 in getting the entire order of the executing Court set aside, they had opportunity to comply with the decree and their noncompliance till 15th May, 1980 clearly gave a cause to the decree-holder to move the executing Court for further proceedings with the execution in accordance with law in view of the Supreme Court order. On these facts ‘further proceedings in accordance with law’ meant that opportunity may be granted to the judgment-debtors through Court to once again comply with the decree and if they failed to do so then to proceed with the matter in accordance with law, namely, by selling the attached property and/or by directing the decree-holders to recover possession by issue of warrants or by appointing a local commissioner to get the possession of the land in dispute restored to the decree-holder. The executing Court issued notice of the execution to the judgment-debtor who instead of complying with the decree in spite of the dictum of the highest Court, filed objections on 18th August, 1980 to the effect that the attached properties could not be sold as the six months' period had elapsed. This further shows the wilful disobedience of the decree in the sense that they did not want to comply with the same in spite of failing up to the highest Court. As I have found above only 5 months and 13 days had gone by when the decree-holder moved the executing Court to further proceed with the execution in accordance with law in view of the Supreme Court order. Therefore, it cannot be said either that the six months' period had elapsed or that the decree-holder took no steps to have the attached property sold or to have further steps in getting compliance of his decree. Accordingly, I hold that the Executing Court clearly fell in error in coming to the conclusion that when the decree-holder moved application for execution on 15th May, 1980, the six months' period had elapsed. The period during which the order of the Executing Court remained suspended because of the stay order granted by the Supreme Court, that period has to be excluded in accounting six months' period under Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is clear that the judgment-debtors (decree-holder?) moved well within six months and since by the end of six months the judgment-debtors had not obeyed the decree, there was no other option with the Executing Court but to order the sale of the attached properties. In view of the above, I hold that the attachment continued till 15th May, 1980, when the decree-holder moved an application for proceeding further with the execution and after setting aside the order of the Court below, order that the attached property of the judgment-debtors be put to sale and from the sale proceeds to pay compensation to the decree-holder equal to the mesne profits which could accrue from the land in dispute from July, 1974 up to the date the possession of the land in dispute is restored to the decree-holder besides costs of the execution proceedings throughout.

    5. The facts of the case are so vocal that it is a fit case in which sub-rule (5) should also be resorted to. After the judgment-debtors failed in the Supreme Court in avoiding execution of the decree by any mode other than the detention in civil prison, they should have moved the executing Court for surrendering possession to it for being restored to the decree-holder. Instead of doing so, they filed objections to avoid/delay the execution of the decree which again has taken over two years since the Supreme Court decision. Therefore, I am of the view that the mere sale of the attached property of the judgment-debtors and payment of compensation in lieu of mesne profits, would not meet the ends of justice, until possession of the land in dispute is also restored to the decree-holder.

    6. Courts do not grant decrees either for the fun of it or for being violated in the manner it has been violated in this case. Violation has continued for almost for about eight years by now, because the decree-holder was dispossessed in July, 1974. sub-rule (5) clearly provides for this eventuality. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the executing Court should appoint an Advocate as Local Commissioner for taking over possession of the land in dispute and for delivering the same to the decree-holder. The expenses and costs of the same shall also be borne by the judgment-debtors. If these expenses are not paid by the judgment-debtors in Court, then the same would also be recoverable from the sale proceeds of the attached property, as if they were also included in the decree.

    7. On behalf of the judgment-debtors, the following three decisions have been cited for not issuing order for delivery of possession to the decree-holder under sub-rule (5):—

    (i) Murari Lal v. Nawal Kishore, AIR 1961 Punj 547; (ii) Sarup Singh… v. Daryodhan Singh…, AIR 1972 Delhi 142 and (iii) Prithivi Singh v. Natha Ram, 1980 Pun LJ 199.

    The aforesaid decisions do go to support the contention of the judgment-debtors that no order for delivery of possession could be passed under sub-rule (5), but these decisions are no longer good law in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Civil Misc. Petition No. 10572 of 1978 in Civil Appeals Nos. 1298 and 1299 of 1969** (Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal v. State Of Punjab) decided on 16-10-1978 and a latest Full Bench judgment of this Court in R.S.A No. 402 of 1973, Radha Ram v. Municipal Committee, Barnala dated 28-4-1982 : (reported in 1982 Lab IC 1857). In Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal's case (supra), the implementation of a purely declaratory decree was ordered as follows:—

    “Heard, counsel for the parties. This application is disposed of on a short ground. It has become necessary to clarify the order made by this Court allowing the appeals of the petitioner. According to the decision of this Court, the petitioner was given a declaration that he would be deemed to continue in service with effect from the date of the suit. As a logical consequence of this declaration, it is manifest that the petitioner would be entitled to back-salary right from 1st June, 1962 till 9th Feb., 1974. The only way in which the judgment of this Court can be implemented is to pay the aforesaid amount of salary to the petitioner. With these observations, this application is disposed of. The amount of the salary must be paid within two months from today.”

    8. A reading of the aforesaid shows that the Supreme Court ordered the compliance of a purely declaratory decree in a case where an employee was declared that he would be deemed to continue in service from the date of the suit, by ordering that not only he was entitled to be reinstated but also that he should be paid back salary for the period of about 12 years within two months of the date of order. On the basis of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision in Radha Ram's case, (1982 Lab IC 1857) (supra), the Full Bench of this Court ruled that in a suit for mere declaration, direction can be given for reinstatement and payment of back salary etc. and once that is done, the decree would be plainly executable. It deserves to be recalled that till before the decision of final Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 288 : (AIR 1977 SC 1466) and Maimoona Khatun v. State of U.P, (1980) 3 Serv LR (SC) 455 : (AIR 1980 SC 1773) the Courts had decided that the employees would be entitled to recovery of three years' salary from the date of filing of suit for recovery. Because of the aforesaid decisions it was ruled that the cause of action to claim recovery of the entire back wages accrued on the passing of decree for declaration that the order of termination of services, was illegal, without jurisdiction and void. The Full Bench also considered whether an employee who is able to successfully prove before the Court that the order of termination of his services was illegal, void and without jurisdiction should he be granted mere declaration to that effect and should be left with the remedy of filing of a second suit for relief which directly flows from the declaratory decree or the necessary direction should be granted in the same suit in which declaratory decree is passed. The relevant observations of the Full Bench deserve to be reproduced (at p. 1863):—

    “Once the relief of setting aside or quashing the order of termination has been granted, or a declaratory decree has been passed to the similar effect, it necessarily follows that the employee in the eye of law continues to be in service and as a necessary consequence thereof would be entitled to all the emoluments flowing from the status. He must be deemed to be in a position identical with that existing prior to the passing of the order of termination of his service. In the felicitous language of their Lordships the emoluments of the post are a logical consequence of setting aside the order of termination. In such a situation to insist upon the filing of a second suit for a relief which directly flows from the declaratory decree can hardly be warranted. The hallowed rule that the law disfavours multiplicity of proceedings would again require that the consequential relief should be recorded in the original proceedings itself. This seems to be the more so in view of the recent judgments of the final Court adverted to above holding that in essence the cause of action for the claim to salary and emoluments is conterminous with the decree setting aside the wrongful termination. Therefore, no issue or bar of limitation now raises any hurdle in this context. It deserves recalling that on the earlier view that the right to salary and emoluments was likely to become barred after a period of three years from the date of the order of termination itself there might have been some justification for the need of a separate suit for emoluments etc. to test it on the anvil of limitation. However, since such a view has now been given the go-by and its anomalous results have been authoritatively noticed by the final Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 288 : (AIR 1977 SC 1466) and Maimoona Khatun's case, (AIR 1980 SC 1773) it seems wholly wasteful to require a fresh spurt of litigation for the recovery of emoluments which necessarily flow from the quashing of the termination order or the grant of the declaratory decree.

    Particularly in this context it calls for notice that in Krishan Murari Lal's case, (AIR 1977 SC 1233) the direction had been given by their Lordships not even at the appellate stage when they decided to allow the appeals on the 9th Feb., 1977, but indeed it was so done in a Miscellaneous Petition No. 10572 preferred more than a year later in 1978. Now if such a direction can be given even years after the conclusion of the appellate proceedings I am unable to see why it cannot and should not be incorporated in the appellate or the original judgment itself and indeed it seems to be more appropriate that should be so.”

    9. A reading of the aforesaid leaves no manner of doubt that even in a declaratory decree, direction can be given for compliance of all matters which are necessary consequences of the declaratory decree. Even those directions have been held to be executable up to the highest Court, I fail to understand how a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants not to interfere in plaintiff's possession, cannot be executed by having possession delivered back to the decree-holder which in term flows from sub-rule (5). Here again if the Executing Court cannot have the possession restored, it means the remedy for getting back possession is by filing another suit for possession which practice has to be avoided by Courts under the rule laid down by the Full Bench as quoted above. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the three cases referred to on behalf of the judgment-debtors are no longer good law and I do not find any im-pediment is my way to order restoration of possession in the interest of justice even apart from sub-rule (5). The Supreme Court in Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal's case, (AIR 1977 SC 1233) (supra) ordered the compliance of declaratory decree without reference to any rule but on the larger principles of justice and compliance of a decree. Similarly, even if sub-rule (5) does not come to the aid of the decree-holder, on general principles, I am of the firm opinion that the Executing Court or this Court has the jurisdiction to order that the possession of the land in dispute be restored to the decree-holder.

    10. As already noticed above, mere payment of the mesne profits or the costs of execution to the decree-holder, would be no compliance of the decree because mesne profits would be equal to not more than 1/3rd of the produce of the land which even a tenant has to pay to his landlord. Therefore, virtually the judgment-debtor, who violated the decree, and got into illegal possession, would be allowed to continue in possession till another suit is filed by the decree-holder to regain possession because the Executing Court is helpless in this decree to get the possession restored to him. I am afraid, I cannot countenance this. Neither law nor larger principles of justice come in the way in getting the restoration of possession to the decree-holder in these proceedings. Accordingly, on this basis also, I am of the opinion that the possession of the property in dispute deserves to be restored to the decree-holder.

    11. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition is allowed; the order of the Executing Court dated 25-8-1980 is hereby set aside and it is ordered that the attachment made on 4-7-1979 continues to be in force and that the attached property be sold and out of the sale proceeds the decree-holder be paid compensation by way of mesne profits with effect from 1-7-1974 till possession is restored to the decree-holder. It is further ordered that an Advocate be appointed as a Local Commissioner to deliver possession of the land in dispute to the decree-holder as far as possible before 16-6-1982. In case the Local Commissioner or the decree-holder finds that police help is necessary, it will be open to the Executing Court to order for police help. The costs incurred in the appointment of the Local Commissioner etc. would be borne by the judgment-debtors. The costs of the execution proceedings throughout would also be borne by the judgment-debtors which are quantified at Rupees 2,000/-. The expenses of the Local Commissioner etc. and the costs would also be deducted from the sale proceeds of the attached property. The balance sale proceeds shall be paid to the judgment-debtors. The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the Executing Court on 2-6-1982.

    Revision allowed.

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    Bagicha Singh v. Suba Singh And Others
    (May 12, 1982)