Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Revn. No. 2740 of 1980

Advocates

R.L. Sarin
Ravinder Chopra

Judges

S.S Sandhawalia, C.J
Bhopinder Singh Dhillon, J.

Acts

S. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act)
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,
provisions of S. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956.
S. 10(8) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
S. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949,
DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT 1949
Section 13(1)(f).

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Mathura Dass, who was one of the co-owners of the demised premises, filed an ejectment application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 before the Rent Controller at Fazilka. The primary grounds pleaded were non-payment of rent and that the premises were required for the personal occupation of the landlord. The Rent Controller framed three issues: (1) whether the respondent was liable to ejectment on the grounds taken; (2) whether the application was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties; and (3) relief.

The Rent Controller found the tenant in arrears of rent but held that the petitioner had not established bona fide need for personal occupation. On issue No. 2 the Rent Controller held that one landlord of several could alone maintain an ejectment application, and the ejectment application was allowed with costs.

On appeal, the Appellate Authority primarily attacked the view on non-joinder and, relying chiefly on Bir Bhan v. Kuldip Parkash ((1979) 1 Rent LR 312), held that one co-owner could not maintain the application without impleading other co-owners and dismissed the ejectment application.

A revision petition came before a single judge (Dhillon, J.) who referred the question of law—whether one of the co-landlords alone can maintain an ejectment application under Section 13—to a Division Bench for a larger decision because of conflicting precedents.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether one of the co-landlords alone can maintain an application for ejectment against his tenant under Section 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Whether, on the facts of the case, the respondent was liable to ejectment on the grounds pleaded (non-payment of rent and requirement for personal occupation).
Whether the ejectment application was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties (i.e., omission to implead other co-owners).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335	Holds that a co-owner is an owner for the purposes of eviction statutes; it is not necessary to be the sole owner to maintain an ejectment action.	Treated as a binding and directly analogous Supreme Court precedent supporting the proposition that a co-owner can singly maintain an ejectment application; cited as a principal authority.
Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599	Holds that the ratio in Sri Ram Pasricha applies under the Delhi Rent Control Act; absence of other co-owners does not disentitle a single landlord from suing for eviction.	Relied on as confirming Sri Ram Pasricha and as supporting the view that a single co-landlord can maintain an ejectment application under statutes in pari materia.
Ram Piari v. Dr. Kesho Ram, (1980) 2 Ren CR 137	Division Bench decision of this Court resolving earlier conflict among single Bench decisions, overruling contrary authorities.	Cited to show that internal conflict of precedent in this Court has been resolved in favour of the view allowing a single co-owner to sue; used to support overruling of contrary single-Bench cases.
Agya Ram v. Amrik Singh, C.R. No. 326 of 1965 (decided Mar. 10, 1966)	Represents a contrary single-Bench view (that one co-owner could not alone maintain the application).	Not followed; specifically noted as one of the single-Bench cases overruled by Ram Piari.
Birbhan / Bir Bhan v. Kuldip Parkash (C.R. No. 1990 of 1978; (1979) 1 Rent LR 312)	Single-Bench authority on which the Appellate Authority primarily relied — held that one co-owner could not maintain ejectment without impleading other co-owners.	The appellate court relied on this case to dismiss the ejectment application; the Division Bench held that this line was contrary to binding Supreme Court authority and to the later Division Bench (Ram Piari) and thus not to be followed.
Shiv Devi v. Firm Maharaj Parshad Piara Lal, C.R. No. 630 of 1964 (decided Apr. 30, 1965)	Represents a contrary single-Bench view (that one co-owner could not alone maintain the application).	Not followed; specifically noted as one of the cases overruled by Ram Piari.
A. Alagiyanathan v. M. Swaminatha Pillai, (1980) 2 Rent LR 752	Madras High Court single-Bench judgment supporting the view that a single co-owner could not maintain eviction — relied on by respondent's counsel.	Not followed; the Division Bench recorded its inability to agree with that reasoning, considered the statutory provisions there to be not in pari materia, and noted that later Supreme Court authority was inadequately distinguished or missed.
Ehasan Bivi v. Nagalakshmi Ammal, (1981) 1 Mad LJ 240	Madras High Court decision holding that an eviction application by one of the co-owners was maintainable and that written consent under the Tamil Nadu Act was not required.	Noted as supporting the view adopted by the Division Bench; shows that Madras High Court itself had later reached the same conclusion in a subsequent decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench's reasoning proceeded in the following principal steps, based only on materials and reasoning contained in the opinion:

Statutory language analysis:
- The Court examined the definition of "landlord" in Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, noting that the definition is broad and includes persons entitled to receive rent "whether on his own account or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person" and that it "includes" various classes (trustees, guardians, receivers, tenants who sublet, and persons deriving title under a landlord).
- From this language the Court concluded that the statute contemplates the possibility of plurality of landlords and that a person who is a co-owner may nevertheless be a "landlord" within the meaning of the Act.
Construction of Section 13(3)(a):
- The Court quoted Section 13(3)(a), which begins "A landlord may apply to the Controller..." and reasoned that the statutory phrase is singular ("a landlord") rather than requiring that "all the landlords" or "the landlord" (read as a unitary, sole owner) must move an application.
- Accordingly, the Court concluded that, under the specific statutory language, it suffices that "a landlord" (i.e., one of the landlords) makes the application.
Precedential support:
- The Court relied on binding Supreme Court authorities (Sri Ram Pasricha and Smt. Kanta Goel) that, in analogous statutory contexts, held that a co-owner is an owner for the purpose of eviction provisions and that it is not necessary to be the sole owner to maintain the suit for ejectment.
- The Court observed that a Division Bench of this Court (Ram Piari) had resolved internal conflict and overruled earlier single-Bench decisions that had taken a contrary view (including Birbhan/Bir Bhan and others).
Treatment of conflicting authorities:
- The Court explicitly rejected a Madras single-Bench decision (A. Alagiyanathan) that supported the contrary view, noting that it inadequately distinguished binding Supreme Court precedents and that the statutory provisions considered there were not in pari materia with those under the present Act.
- The Court noted a subsequent Madras decision (Ehasan Bivi) that aligned with the Court's view and held a written consent requirement under a Tamil Nadu provision was unnecessary.
Application to the facts:
- Applying these legal conclusions to the facts, the Court observed that both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had found the tenant in arrears and that the Appellate Authority had reversed only on the basis of the single-Bench Birbhan decision, which the Division Bench considered overruled and not to be followed.
- Therefore, the Court concluded that the petitioner (one of several co-owners) was entitled to succeed on the ejectment application and that the Appellate Authority's reversal on issue No. 2 should be set aside, restoring the Rent Controller's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition allowed; it is held that even one of many co-landlords can singly maintain an application for ejectment against his tenant under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

Direct consequences and orders made:

The Division Bench reversed the Appellate Authority's finding on issue No. 2 (non-joinder) and set aside the appellate order dismissing the ejectment application.
The Rent Controller's original order allowing the ejectment application (which had been based on findings including arrears of rent) was restored.
Because of the earlier conflict of precedent within this Court, there was no order as to costs.

Broader implications:

The decision affirms and applies the principle established by Supreme Court authorities (Sri Ram Pasricha and Smt. Kanta Goel) that a co-owner is an owner for the purposes of eviction statutes and need not be the sole owner to maintain an ejectment proceeding.
The Division Bench expressly identifies and refuses to follow contrary single-Bench decisions (including Birbhan / Bir Bhan and others) insofar as they conflict with binding Supreme Court authority and a subsequent Division Bench ruling of this Court (Ram Piari).
No novel statutory principle beyond the application of existing authorities was articulated; rather, the Court resolved conflicting lower-court decisions and confirmed the maintainability of a single co-landlord's ejectment application under the Act.

Disposition

Petition allowed.

Show full summary ...

Mathura Dass v. Smt. Ram Piari .

S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:—Can one of the co-landlords alone maintain an application for ejectment against his tenant under S. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, is the significant question which has been re-agitated in this reference to the Division Bench.

2. Mathura Dass petitioner who admittedly was one of the co-owners of the demised premises had preferred an ejectment application under S. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act) before the Rent Controller at Fazilka. The primary ground on which it was sought to be pressed was the non-payment of rent by the tenant and that the premises were required for the personal occupation of the landlord. The ejectment application was resisted on behalf of the respondent-tenant and on the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:—

1. Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the grounds taken in the application?

2. Whether the application is bad on account of non-joinder of necessary parties?

3. Relief.

On issue No. 1 the Rent Controller came to the finding that the tenant was in arrears of rent but held that the petitioner had failed to establish that he needed the demised premises for his bona fide use and occupation. Issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the petitioner with the observations that it was well-settled that one of the landlords of the demised premises can by himself make an application for ejectment without making the other landlords a party thereto. In view of the finding on the two issues, the ejectment application was allowed with costs.

3. On appeal the finding on issue No. 1 was virtually not challenged and only that on issue No. 2 was assailed. The learned Appellate Authority relying primarily on the recent judgement in Bir Bhan v. Kuldip Parkash, (1979) 1 Rent LR 312, held that only one of the co-owners could not maintain an ejectment application without impleading the other co-owners as well and consequently reversed the finding on issue No. 2 and dismissed the ejectment application.

4. The present revision first came up before my learned brother Dhillon, J. sitting singly. Noticing some conflict of precedents on the question whether one of the many co-landlords alone could maintain the ejectment application he referred the matter for decision by a larger Bench.

5. As would appear hereinafter there is no paucity of precedents both direct and by way of analogy on the point. Nevertheless it is refreshing to examine the matter on principle and on the particular language of the statute because this aspect does not seem to have been adequately considered in some of the judgements relied upon by the parties.

6. What first meets the eye herein is the definition of the word ‘landlord’ under Section 2(c) of the Act which is in the following terms:—

“2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.—

(a) and (b)…. … …

(c) ‘landlord’ means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land, whether on his own account or on behalf of for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord:

(d) to (g)………….”

It seems manifest from the above that the definition is a wide ranging one including within its sweep a number of persons. Particularly noticeable in the fact that the ‘landlord’ under the Act is not necessarily confined to the owner or the owners of the premises. Persons who may lay no claim of title to the property would nevertheless come within the wide amplitude of the definition. Equally patent it is that the statute herein does not necessarily visualise a single landlord but also plurality thereof. Once that is so one can now turn to S. 13(3)(a) of the Act which is in the following terms:—

“13(3)(a). A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession—

(i) in the case of residential building if—

(a) ……

(b) he is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;

(d) …….”

A plain reading of the above would also indicate that the Act visualises the filing of an application by a landlord. This is of particular significance in the context that the definition of ‘landlord’ positively visualises a plurality thereof. The requirement of sub-sec. (3) above is not that the ‘landlord’ should move an application or ‘all the landlords’ should do so. It suffices if ‘a landlord’ does so. It would thus appear that on the particular provision of the present Act an ejectment application by one of the many landlords would be maintainable, apart from any other considerations.

7. Two binding precedents of the final Court though under different Rent Acts are equally a pointer to the aforesaid view. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335, their Lordships were considering the analogous provisions of S. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956. Therein also an identical issue was raised that the application for ejectment having not been made by all the co-owners was, therefore, not competent. Repelling such a contention their Lordships concluded as follows (at p. 2339):—

“Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a partowner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of S. 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants.”

8. In Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599, their Lordships were construing the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, which are virtually in pari materia with the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. Therein also the identical objection that one of the many co-owners could not maintain the eviction application was pointedly raised. Rejecting this contention and holding that the ratio in Sri Ram Pasricha's case (supra) was equally applicable under the context of the Delhi Act also, it was held that the absence of the other co-owners on record does not disentitle only one of the landlords from suing for eviction.

9. Though the matter would be plainly concluded by the aforesaid judgements even within this Court also there is now no room for discordance. Undoubtedly there was previously some conflict of opinion betwixt single Bench judgements of this Court which has been set at rest by the Division Bench in Ram Piari v. Dr. Kesho Ram, (1980) 2 Ren CR 137. In the said case the contrary view in Agya Ram v. Amrik Singh, C.R No. 326 of 1965 decided on Mar. 10, 1966; Birbhan v. Kuldip Parkash, C.R No. 1990 of 1978 decided on 25th Jan. 1979, and Shiv Devi v. Firm Maharaj Parshad Piara Lal, C.R No. 630 of 1964 decided on Apr. 30, 1965 was expressly overruled.

10. In fairness to Mr. Chopra the learned counsel for the respondent, we must notice his reliance on a single Bench judgement of the Madras High Court in A. Alagiyanathan v. M. Swaminatha Pillai, (1980) 2 Rent LR 752. This judgement undoubtedly lends some support to the stand taken on behalf of the respondent. However, with the greatest respect we are unable to agree with the line of reasoning therein. The judgement of their Lordships in Sri Ram Pasricha's case, (AIR 1976 SC 2335) (supra) though referred to was sought to be distinguished for what appears to us as inadequate reason. The later judgement of their Lordships in Smt. Kanta Goel's case, (AIR 1977 SC 1599), however, seems to have missed notice altogether. With due deference, therefore, I would wish to record my dissent from the line of reasoning in A. Alagiyanathan v. M. Swaminatha Pillai (supra). Even otherwise it calls for notice that the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which fell for consideration there, are certainly not in pari materia with those in the Act. It bears repetition that I have also rested my view on the particular provisions of the present Act as well.

11. It would appear that a touch of discordance within the Madras High Court itself is disclosed by the subsequent judgement in Ehasan Bivi v. Nagalakshmi Ammal, (1981) 1 Mad LJ 240. Therein it has been held that an eviction application by one of the co-owners was maintainable and the written consent envisaged by S. 10(8) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, was not required.

12. To conclude, both on principle and precedent the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that even one of the many co-landlords can singly maintain an application for ejectment against his tenant under the Act.

13. Applying the above rule to the facts of the present case would make it plain that the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have taken the consistent view that the respondent was in arrears of rent and he had not tendered the same for payment to the applicant on the first date of the hearing and was, consequently, liable to be evicted. The appellate court had reversed the trial court, only on the basis of the single Bench judgement in Birbhan's case, ((1981) 1 Mad LJ 240) (supra), which, as has been noticed above, now stands already overruled. The finding of the appellate court on issue No. (2) has, therefore, to be reversed and as a necessary consequence the order of the appellate authority dismissing the application is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is hereby restored.

14. In view of the earlier conflict of precedent in this Court, there will be no order as to costs.

Petition allowed.

Mathura Dass v. Smt. Ram Piari .

Judgment Summary — S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Disposition

Mathura Dass v. Smt. Ram Piari .

Comments