S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— The meaningful question whether a society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Soceities Act, 1961, is amendable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been reagitated before the Full Bench.

2. In view of the pristinely legal nature of the issue aforesaid, it is unnecessary to recount the facts in detail. Suffice it to mention that the petitioner Ajmer Singh was employed as a Field Inspector in the Punjab State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. (hereinafter called Markfed) which admittedly is registered under the Cooperative Societies Act. The Managing Director of the Markfed by his order dated the 13th of November, 1978 (Annexure P. 2) dismissed the petitioner from service and his appeal against the said order was in turn dismissed by its Administrator vide annexure P/5. The writ petition sought to challege the order of dismissal and its affirmance in appeal. At the motion stage, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent Markfed that no writ petition was maintainble against a Cooperative Society. On behalf of the petitioner, however, reliance was firmly placed on the D.B judgment in Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab . 1972 P.L.J 399.. The Motion Bench, apparently discerning some conflict of authority admitted the present petition for a hearing by a Full Bench.

3. Now it appears to me that within this jurisdiction there is such a long line of unbroken precedent covering the legal issue before us that it would be apparently wasteful to launch on a digression on first principles. The matter had first come up directly for decision before Tuli, J in Dharam Pal Soni v. State of Punjab . 1969 S.L.R 349. and after exhaustively examining the point both on principle and precedent the learned Judge concluded that a Cooperative Society being a non-statutory body a writ petition against it was not mantinable. The aforesaid view was strenously challenged in a letters Patent Appeal but was conclusively repelled by the Bench in Dharam Pal Soni v. State of Punjab . 1973 2 Serv. L.R 845 Subsequently Dharam Pal Soni's case (supra) has been unreservedly followed by learned single Judge of this Court in Krishan Lal Pahwa v. State of Haryana . 1974 S.L.W.R 298., Dilavar Singh v. Administrator, Khanna Co-op. Marketing Society Ltd,5 and Anup Singh v. State of Punjab . 1975 S.L.W.R 27 Punj. Lastly directly covering the issue is the Division Bench judgment in P.S Saini v. State of Punjab . C.W P. No. 4410 of 1979, C.W.P No. 4410 of 1979 decided on the 23rd of February, wherein it has been specifically held that Markfed being a Cooperative Society a writ petition against it was not maintainable and the same was consequently dismissed in limine.

4. Now the reliance of Mr. Khoji on Kulwant Singh's case, (supra) both before the Motion Bench as also before us for holding a contrary view does not appear to me as at all well concieved. A close analysis of the said Division Bench judgment would plainly indicate that the learned Judges did not at all dissent from the view consistently held within this Court Indeed therein expres reference has been made to Dharam Pal Son's and it was distinguished specifically on the ground that the observations made therein were not applicable to the facts of the case. On an in-depth examination of the judgment, it appears to us that it is no authority whatsoever for the proposition that writ petition would be maintainable against a co-operative Society. Indeed it is evident that the learned Judges allowed the writ petition primarily and indeed solely on the ground that the case disclosed a flagrant and blatant violation of the statutory provision of Section 26(B) of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter called the Act). It is elementary that where the infraction of a statutory provision arises, the writ jurisdiction provides an obvious remedy therefor. We must, therefore, conclude that Kulwant Singh's case is wholly distinguishable and in no way detracts from the consistent line of precedent within this Court which stands noticed above. It called for the pointed notice that Mr. Khoji, learned counsel for the petitioner, conceeded before us that he could note cite any other judgment whatsoever for a contrary view.

5. However, the matter does not appear to us as resting on the judgments of this Court alone. It only deserves highlighting that in Dharm Pal Soni's case (1973-2 Serv. L.R 845) and the other judgments of the Court reliance was heavily placed by way of analogy on the observations of the final Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.B Imanual . 1969 1 SCC 585, and Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh AIR 1970 SC 245. Subsequent judgments of their Lordships seem to further buttress the aforesaid view. In Sabhijit Tewari v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 1329, the basic distinction of a statutory Corporation created by an Act and Society merely incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Socities Registration Act was highlighted and it was held that despite the factors of an overwhelming governmental interest and control over such a society it was neverthless not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and no writ was maintainable against the same.

6. What then calls for pointed notice is that a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Narayan Rath v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Orissa . I.L.R 1970 Cut. 437, took the view that an employee of a Cooperative Society can maintain a writ petition against it for the enforcement of its service conditions. On appeal, their Lordships repelling such a view in Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Naryan Rath . 1977 3 SCC 576, have observed as follows:—

“The High Court has dealt with the question whether a writ petition can be maintained against a Co-operative Society, but we are inclined to the view that the observations made by the High Court and its decision that such a writ petition is maintainable are not strictly in accordance with the decisions of this Court”

“We would like to observe that the judgment of the High Court should not be treated as an authority for the proposition that a writ petition is maintainable against a Co-perative Society. That question shall have to be decided by the High Court as and when it arises in the light of the decisions of this Court”

7. In view of the above, affirming the earlier judgments of this Court, we would answer the question posed at the outset in the negative to the effect that a Society merely registered under the Act is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. What perhaps deserves notice is that when with the afore quoted unsurmountable wall of precedent, Mr. B.S Khoji the learned counsel for the petitioners had ultimately to concede that he was unable to sustain his proposition that a writ petition was maintainable against a Co-operative Society. Consequently he fairly stated that he would abandon all challenge to annexure F/2 which is the order of dismissal passed by the Managing Director of the Markfed and in express terms stated that he claims no relief against the same.

9. However, beating a tactical retresat, Mr. Khoji then submitted that neverheless within the writ jurisdiction he could still maintain his challenge to annexure P/5 as against respondents Nos. 1 to 4. It was submitted by him that now, in essence, he was only assailing the order passed by the Registrar or the Additional Registrar of the Co-operative Societies in patent infraction of the provisions of Section 26(ID) of the Act. That provision runs as under:—

“Where any committee has ceased to held office and committee has not been constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules and bye-laws, made thereunder, the Registrar may, by an order in writing, appoint Government servant as an administrator for such period as may from time to time, be specified in the order and the Administrator shall before the expiry of the period of his appointment, arrange for the constitution of a new committee in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules and bye-laws made thereunder.

10. In the light of the above, it was contended that herein an administrator had been appointed for the Markfed but this appointment suffers from a patent illegality because the law requires an order in writing by the Registrar himself, whereas, in the present case admittedly the order had been passed by an Additional Registrar appointing the Registrar in reverse as the Administrator of Society. Counsel submitted that for this glaring violation of Section 26(ID) of the Act the order of appointment of the Administrator was wholly illegal and as a necessary consequnce, annexure P/5 passed by the purported Administrator was a nullity.

11. On the aforesaid ground the learned counsel for the petitioner seems to us as being on a plausible footing in so far as the challenge to annexure P/5 alone is concerned. In view of the stand now taken before us this writ petition is directed only against respondents Nos. I to 4 and 6. For this limited purpose the petitioner would appear to us as entitled to sustain his challenge to annexure P/5 alone and maintain the writ against the State as also the public and statutory functionaries like Registrar and the additional Registrar. This aspect of the case is well supported on plain principle as also on precedent. Indeed in Kulwant Singh a case (1972) Punjab L.J 399) (supra), the writ was allowed to be main tained because of the fact that it sought to challenge a glaring infraction of Section 26(B) of the Act. as already notices, in essence, now the case of the petitioner is confined to the violation of Section 26(18) of the Act. Where a relief is sought primarily against the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, a writ would be plainly maintainable and this view is further strengthened by the following observations of their Lordships in Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd's case (1977) 3 SCC 576 : AIR 1977 SC 112) (supra).

“We would have liked to go into the question for ourselves but it is unnecessary to do so as respondent No. 1. by his writ petition was asking for relief not really against a Co-operative Society but in regard to the order which was passed by the Registrar, who was acting as a statutory authority in the purported exercise of powers conferred on him by the Co-operative Societies Act. The writ petition was in that view maintainable.”

12. In view of the above, we hold that only to the limited extent of the challenge to annexure P/5 as being violative of the provisions of Section 26(ID) of the Act the writ would be maintainable against respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and 6. Admittedly, however, the merits of this case involve neither any conflict of precedent nor any exceptional difficulty and can aptly be disposed of by a learned single Judge. Having settled the basic question of law which had necessitated this reference we direct that this case be placed for decision on merits before a single Bench.

P.C Jain J.:— I agree

J.M Tandon J.:— I agree.

R.M.S

Order accordingly.