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  • Sections 324, 325, 148 and 149. Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 7 of the Indian Evidence
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 324, 325, 148 and 149. Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 7 of the Indian Evidence
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions arise from a trial of the respondent Raj Pal and others charged under Sections 324, 325, 148, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. During the trial, two prosecution witnesses, Ujagar Singh and Ram Lal, testified. The defence alleged that the voices of these witnesses had been previously tape-recorded and played in Court during their evidence. Both witnesses denied that the voices were theirs. Subsequently, on 16 January 1968, the respondents Rattan Chand and Raj Pal applied for the recording of the witnesses' voices for comparison purposes, and these applications were allowed by the Judicial Magistrate on 15 January 1968 in the interest of justice. The complainant, Dial Singh, challenged these orders before the Court of Session at Amritsar, but the revisions were declined on 25 June 1968. The petitioner now challenges the orders of the lower courts by way of revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether tape-recordings are admissible as evidence under the Indian Evidence Act given the absence of an express provision regarding their admissibility.
  2. Whether the trial court has the authority to order and conduct a comparison of two tape-recorded voices for purposes of identification.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • There is no express provision in the Indian Evidence Act allowing the admissibility of tape-recordings, rendering them inadmissible as evidence.
  • There is no statutory provision permitting the comparison of two tape-recorded voices, and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to undertake such a comparison.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • No patent illegality or impropriety was demonstrated in the impugned orders that would justify interference by revision at an interlocutory stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad, A.I.R 1956 Punj. 173 Admissibility of tape-recordings; tape-recordings are admissible evidence if relevant. The Court relied on this precedent to affirm that tape-recordings are admissible and can be used to confront witnesses and challenge their credibility.
S. Partap Singh v. State Of Punjab, A.I.R 1964 S.C 72 Recognition of tape-recordings as self-evidently admissible evidence. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of tape-recorded evidence supported the Court’s conclusion on admissibility.
Rex v. Maqsud Ali and Ashiq Hussain, 1965 2 All. E.R 464 Analogy between tape-recordings and photographs; admissibility contingent on proof of accuracy and proper identification. The Court quoted this decision extensively to emphasize that tape-recordings are admissible provided relevance, accuracy, and proper identification are established.
Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State Of Maharashtra, A.I.R 1968 S.C 147 Accuracy and identification of taped voices required; tape-recordings are relevant facts under Section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court relied on this precedent to underline the necessity of proving the time, place, accuracy of recording, and proper voice identification for admissibility.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by affirming the admissibility of tape-recordings as evidence, citing authoritative precedents which establish that despite the absence of explicit statutory provisions, tape-recorded conversations are admissible if relevant and properly identified. The Court noted that the law has evolved to accept new technologies for evidence, drawing an analogy between photographs and tape-recordings, both being mechanical reproductions admissible when properly authenticated.

The Court emphasized that the identification of the taped voice is a sine qua non for its use in trial, particularly when the witness denies the voice is theirs. The Court found no statutory prohibition against comparing tape-recorded voices and held that such comparison is a matter of detail and procedural practice. The Court also observed that the trial Court’s order allowing the recording of voices for comparison was sustainable, given the absence of any patent illegality or impropriety.

Holding and Implications

The petitions are dismissed.

The Court upheld the orders permitting the recording of witnesses’ voices for comparison and confirmed the admissibility of tape-recordings as evidence, provided proper identification and relevance are established. The decision directly affects the parties by allowing the use of tape-recordings for identification and impeachment purposes but does not establish any new precedent beyond affirming existing legal principles.

    Dial Singh v. Rajpal And Others

    S.S Sandhawalia, J.:— An interesting question of law regarding the mode of proof and the admissibility of a tape-recording arises in these two connected petitions which will be disposed of by this order.

    2. The facts giving rise to the petitions are that during the trial of the respondent Raj Pal and others on a charge under Sections 324, 325, 148 and 149. Indian Penal Code, two witnesses Ujagar Singh and Ram Lal were examined on behalf of the prosecution. It was alleged on behalf of the defence that the voices of both these witnesses had been earlier tape-recorded and the same were played in the Court and put to the witnesses when they gave their evidence. Both the witnesses, however, denied that the voices were theirs. Rattan Chand and Raj Pal, respondents, on the 16th of January, 1968, then moved two applications in the Court for the recording of the voices of the witnesses so that it could be used for the purpose of comparison. Both these applications were allowed in a short order by R.D Singla, a Judicial Magistrate on the ground that the same was in the interest of justice on 15th January, 1968. The present petitioner Dial Singh who is the complainant in the said case then challenged the orders granting the application before the Court of Session at Amritsar, but his revisions were declined by the orders of Shri J.S Chatha dated the 25th of June, 1968, on identical grounds. The petitioner now challenges the orders of the Courts below by way of revision.

    3. Mr. V.K Ranade, the learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned orders on the ground that there exists no express provision of law in the Indian Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of a tape-recording and he, therefore, argues that they are inadmissible and cannot be brought on the record. In the alternative it has been argued that in the statute there exists no provision for the comparison of two tape-recorded voices and in any case the trial Court cannot embark upon such a comparison.

    4. It is too late in the day to challenge the admissibility of a conversation which has been tape-recorded earlier if the same is relevant. As early as 1956, Bhandari, C.J in Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad . A.I.R 1956 Punj. 173., had categorically laid down that such a tape-recording was clearly admissible. The learned Chief Justice had relied on a number of American and English cases in support of his decision. In S. Partap Singh v. State Of Punjab. . A.I.R 1964 S.C 72., the learned Judges of the Supreme Court relied heavily on the tape-recording which had been put on the record by the petitioner. In fact the admissibility of the same was considered self-evident. Their Lordships expressly adverted to the admissibility and the evidentiary value of the tape-recorded talk which had been produced as part of the supporting evidence produced by Dr. Partap Singh, the petitioner in that case. A clear and unequivocal enunciation of that law is made, however, by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Maqsud Ali and Ashiq Hussain . 1965 2 All. E.R 464., in the following terms:—

    “We think that the time has come when this Court should state its views of the law on a matter which is likely to be increasingly raised as time passes. For many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording, conversations. We can see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. There can be no question of laying down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be judged.”

    Lastly in Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State Of Maharashtra. . A.I.R 1968 S.C 147., the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in expressly considering this case have observed as follows:—

    “The process of tape recording offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds. The imprint on the magnetic tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under Section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

    Their Lordships in this case noticed the reasoning of Rup Chand's case with approval. In this context it is futile now to argue that a tape-recording is not admissible in evidence.

    5. Once it is held that a tape-recording is admissible, the manner and mode of its proof and the use thereof in a trial is a matter of detail. That it can be used for the purpose of confronting a witness with his earlier tape-recorded statements admits hardly of any doubt. That it may also be legitimately used for the purpose of shaking the credit of a witness was laid down in clear terms by Bhandari, C.J in Rup Chand's case in the following terms:—

    “I am aware of no rule of evidence which prevents a defendant who is endeavouring to shake the credit of a witness by proof of former inconsistent statements, from deposing that while he was engaged in conversation with the witness a tape-recorder was in operation, or from producing the said tape-recorder in support of the assertion that a certain statement was made in his presence.”

    That being so, for a use of an earlier tape-recorded statement, the identification of the taped voices is hence a crucial matter and indeed such proper identification is the sine-qua non for the use of the earlier tape-recording. The relevant authorities are all unanimous on the necessity of such proper identification of the taped voice. In Yusufalli Esmail Nagree's case it was observed as follows:—

    “If a statement is relevant an accurate tape record of the statement is also relevant and admissible. The time and place and accuracy of the recording must be proved by a competent witness and the voices must be properly identified.”

    6. The cases where the taped voice is admitted thus present no difficulty. However, where the voice is denied by the alleged maker thereof, a comparison of the same becomes inevitable. As observed by the Supreme Court the proper identification must be proved by a competent witness. Learned counsel has been unable to point out anything in the relevant statute which expressly or impliedly may tend to prohibit such a comparison. At the present stage the nature of the evidence that would be brought forward for this purpose, and whether the Court can itself compare the admitted and the disputed tape recording is not yet in issue. I am, therefore, inclined to the view that the orders of the Courts below are thus clearly sustainable.

    7. Mr. Gandhi on behalf of the respondents points out that no patent illegality or impropriety in the impugned orders has been pointed out which would merit interference by way of revision even at an inter locutary stage. I thus see no force in these petitions which fail and are dismissed.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Dial Singh v. Rajpal And Others
    (Feb 4, 1969)