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  • clause (c) of sub-section (1) of that section
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act.12.
  • Article 142 of Limitation Act 1908
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 100(1)(c) of the CPC,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • clause (c) of sub-section (1) of that section
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act.12.
  • Article 142 of Limitation Act 1908
  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 100(1)(c) of the CPC,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letters Patent Appeal by Lila Ram)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Lila Ram, instituted a suit on 27 January 1954 for possession of 1,893 square yards of land in Mubarakpur Kotla, alleging the land formed part of an area of 6 bighas and 8 biswas included in Khasra No. 525/283 and that he was owner by a registered deed of gift dated 3 July 1947 executed in his favour by Durga (defendant No. 8).

The defendants (Mehar Chand and others) opposed the suit, claiming continuous possession since about 1921, asserting they had built a boundary wall, sunk a well and constructed buildings. They also relied on an earlier suit by Dal Singh (in 1934) for part of the land, in which Dal Singh obtained a decree but then accepted Rs. 800 and allowed the contesting defendants to retain possession; subsequently revenue records showed the land to be part of Khasra No. 525/283. The defendants claimed title by adverse possession for more than 12 years.

The trial Court framed five issues (see Legal Issues Presented) and held that the plaintiff was the owner but had failed to prove possession within 12 years of the suit; the defendants were held to have had adverse possession for over 12 years and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.

On first appeal the Additional District Judge reversed the trial Court and held that the plaintiff had proved possession of his predecessor up to 1944 and granted the decree to the plaintiff.

On second appeal to the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice found that the first appellate Court (Additional District Judge) had misdirected itself on the question of onus and had not adequately discussed the evidence relied on by the trial Court; after reviewing the evidence the Chief Justice agreed with the trial Court that the plaintiff failed to prove possession and that defendants had possessed the land for more than 12 years. The Chief Justice reversed the Additional District Judge, accepted the defendants' appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

This Letters Patent Appeal by the plaintiff (Lila Ram) challenges the Chief Justice's reversal of the first appellate finding on possession.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the plaintiff the owner of the land in suit?
  2. Was the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest in possession of the suit land within 13 years of the institution of the suit?
  3. Is the plaintiff estopped from filing the present suit?
  4. Whether the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 have acquired title by adverse possession?
  5. In case of decree for possession, are the defendants entitled to any compensation? If so, how much?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Lila Ram)

  • Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Bhagwat Dayal) argued that the learned Chief Justice erred in reversing the finding of the first appellate Court on the question whether the plaintiff and his predecessor had been in possession of the land within 12 years of the suit; this was submitted to be a pure finding of fact and therefore not open to review in a second appeal regardless of how erroneous it might be.

Respondents' Contentions (Mehar Chand and others)

  • Respondents alleged possession of the land since about 1921 with boundary wall, well and buildings constructed; they relied on continuous possession, the prior suit by Dal Singh (1934) and subsequent arrangements (payment of Rs. 800) and revenue records (Khasra entries) to establish title by adverse possession for over 12 years.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 Interpretation of Section 100(1)(c) CPC: distinction between an error in appreciation of evidence (not a procedural defect) and an error in procedure (including placing onus on wrong party or wrongly excluding admissible evidence), which can justify interference in a second appeal. The Court relied on this authority to explain that misplacing onus or excluding admissible evidence by a lower appellate Court constitutes a procedural defect under Section 100(1)(c) and justified reversal of the first appellate Court's finding.
Kallu Mal v. Maman, AIR 1933 Lah 721 Authority relied upon by the Additional District Judge to support the view that where plaintiff proves title it is not for him to show possession within 12 years. The Court noted that the Additional District Judge relied on this case, but observed that subsequently it was considered by a Full Bench and that reliance on it alone was incorrect in the circumstances of this suit.
Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (Full Bench) Held that where a suit is based on title together with prior possession and dispossession, Article 142 of the Limitation Act governs the suit (not necessarily Article 144), and the plaintiff must show possession within the prescribed period. The Court applied this Full Bench view to conclude that the present suit was governed by Article 142 and therefore the plaintiff bore the onus of proving possession within 12 years; the Additional District Judge's contrary approach on onus was vitiated.
Santa Singh Gopal Singh v. Rajinder Singh Bur Singh, AIR 1965 Punj 415 (Full Bench) Affirmed the view that suits based on title plus prior possession and dispossession are governed by Article 142; supported the proposition that Article 142 applied to similar pleadings. The Court cited the Full Bench reasoning (including quoted paragraph) to support the application of Article 142 to the present suit and to justify requiring proof of possession within 12 years.
Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 Applied Article 142 of the Limitation Act to hold that where plaintiffs alleged possession and dispossession within 12 years and failed to establish it, the suit was barred by Article 142. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to reinforce that the present suit, being governed by Article 142, was barred if the plaintiff failed to prove possession within 12 years.
Daya Shanker v. Debi Din, AIR 1937 All 238 Illustrates a factual scenario where temporary occupation did not constitute adverse possession because occupier admitted another's title and situation of land made notice unlikely; used to consider commencement and nature of adverse possession. The Court considered this authority but distinguished it on its facts and held it was of no assistance to the appellant in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step legal analysis grounded in (a) the statutory framework governing second appeals (Section 100 CPC), (b) limitation principles (Article 142 of the Limitation Act), and (c) the admissibility and weight of particular pieces of evidence on the record.

1. On the scope of second appeal (Section 100 CPC): The Court explained, following V. Ramachandra Ayyar, that a second appeal is competent where there is a substantial procedural error (Section 100(1)(c)), but not merely where the appreciation of evidence is erroneous. However, where a first appellate Court places the onus on the wrong party or excludes admissible evidence, that constitutes a defect in procedure permitting interference in a second appeal.

2. On the question of onus and limitation: The Court examined the Additional District Judge's reliance on Kallu Mal v. Maman to avoid requiring the plaintiff to prove possession within 12 years. The Court observed that Full Bench authorities (Behari Lal v. Narain Das and later Santa Singh) establish that where a suit pleads title and prior possession followed by dispossession, Article 142 of the Limitation Act governs and the plaintiff must show possession within the 12-year period. The Court applied those authorities and the Supreme Court decision in Ambika Prasad Thakur to conclude that the present suit was governed by Article 142 and therefore the plaintiff bore the onus to prove his or his predecessor's possession within 12 years of the suit. Because the Additional District Judge proceeded on a wrong notion about the onus, its finding on limitation was vitiated as a procedural error.

3. On exclusion of evidence (the plan): The Court found that the Additional District Judge wrongly excluded a plan relied upon by the defendants that had been filed in the earlier Dal Singh suit. The judge had discounted the plan on the basis it was prepared by the defendants, but the Court held that because the plan pre-dated the present dispute and related to the earlier suit, it was relevant and admissible to show whether constructions existed at that earlier time. Excluding this evidence was therefore a procedural defect.

4. On the factual matrix and documentary entries: The Court reviewed material record entries relied upon by the trial Court and Chief Justice: (a) the deed of gift (1947) admitted that part of the gifted land was in possession of Mehar Chand and others, who had built wall and buildings; (b) the 1944 Khasra Girdawari and 1944-45 Jamabandi showed Mehar Chand and others in possession, with the notation "Qabza Darina". The Additional District Judge's characterization that the patwari's entry was a result of "patwari's mischief" was not supported; the Court found there was no warrant for that observation and that the entries and other material clearly supported the trial Court's finding of long possession by the defendants.

5. On commencement of limitation and identity of owner: The Court explained the legal principle that limitation for a suit for dispossession begins from the time of dispossession and does not generally depend on the plaintiff's knowledge of the true owner (except in special fiduciary situations). Therefore, the appellant's contention that limitation should start only when the plaintiff learned the encroached land was part of Khasra No. 525/283 was rejected. The Court distinguished Daya Shanker v. Debi Din on its specific facts and found it inapplicable.

6. Conclusion of analysis: Because the first appellate Court (Additional District Judge) had improperly shifted the onus and excluded admissible evidence, its finding of fact was vitiated by procedural defects within the meaning of Section 100(1)(c) CPC. The Chief Justice correctly re-examined the evidence and restored the trial Court's conclusion that the plaintiff had not proved possession within 12 years and that defendants had adverse possession for more than 12 years.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. The Chief Justice's reversal of the first appellate Court was upheld and the trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit was restored. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the plaintiff's suit for possession remains dismissed and the defendants' title by adverse possession (as found by the trial Court and affirmed on second appeal) stands.
  • The Court's decision turned on application of established principles: (a) where a suit pleads title together with prior possession and dispossession Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies and the plaintiff must prove possession within the prescribed period; and (b) a first appellate Court's procedural missteps (wrongly placing onus or excluding admissible evidence) can justify interference in a second appeal under Section 100(1)(c) CPC.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent; it applies and distinguishes existing authorities and confirms that misapplication of onus or exclusion of admissible evidence amounts to a procedural defect permitting appellate interference.

End of summary — all content strictly reflects the facts, reasoning and citations contained in the provided opinion.

    Lila Ram v. Mohar Chand

    1. This appeal under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent filed by Lila Ram is directed against the judgment of learned Chief Justice by which he accepted the regular second appeal of Mehar Chand and other respondents, set aside the judgment and decree of Additional District Judge, Delhi, and restored those of the trial Court dismissing the suit for possession of land brought by Lila Ram appellant. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant brought the present suit for possession of 1,893 square yards of land, situated in Mubarakpur Kotla, on the allegation that the same formed part of an area of 6 bighas and 8 biswas included in Khasra No. 525/283 of which the plaintiff was the owner by means of a registered deed of gift dated the 3rd of July 1947 in his favour from the previous owner Durga, defendant No. 8. The suit was instituted on 27th of January 1954. According to the plaintiff, Mehar Chand and other respondents had encroached upon the land in dispute about nine years before the institution of the suit.

    2. The suit was contested by Mehar Chand and other respondents who alleged that they had been in possession of the land in suit since about 1921. According to them they had built a boundary wall round the area of land including the land in dispute since a long time and had also sunk a well and constructed certain buildings thereon. They further alleged that in 1934 one Dal Singh instituted a suit against them for possession of 4 bighas and 4 biswas of land including the land in dispute by claiming that the same formed part of Khasra No. 290. A decree was awarded in favour of Dal Singh in that suit but he gave up his rights in the decree and allowed the contesting respondents to retain possession of the same on their making payment of Rs. 800 to him. Sometime later it was realised by the Revenue authorities that the land in dispute was really part of Khasra No. 525/283 and not Khasra No. 290. The respondents thus claimed to be the owners of the land in dispute by adverse possession for more than 12 years.

    3. Following issues were framed:—

    (1) Is the plaintiff the owner of the land in suit?

    (2) Was the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest in possession of the suit land within 13 years of the institution of the suit?

    (3) Is the plaintiff estopped from filing the present suit?

    (4) Whether the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 have acquired title by adverse possession?

    (5) In case of decree for possession, are the defendants entitled to any compensation? If so, how much?

    4. The trial Court held that though the plaintiff was the owner of the land, he had failed to prove his possession within 12 years of the institution of the suit and that the defendants had been in adverse possession for a period of more than 12 years. The plaintiff was held to be not estopped from filing the suit. The issue with regard to compensation was held not to arise. The plaintiffs suit was, accordingly, dismissed.

    5. On first appeal the learned Additional District Judge held that the plaintiff had proved the possession of his predecessor up to 1944 and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the decree prayed for.

    6. On second appeal the learned Chief Justice found that the Additional District Judge had clearly misdirected himself on the question of onus and had hardly, discussed the evidence at all on which the decision of the trial Court was based. The learned Chief Justice then dealt with different pieces of evidence on record and came to the conclusion, in agreement with the trial Court, that the plaintiff had hopelessly failed to prove his possession or that of his predecessor within 12 years of the date of the suit. It was further held that the defendants had conclusively established their possession of land in suit for a period of more than 12 years. The judgment of the Additional District Judge, which was considered to be perverse by the learned Chief Justice, was reversed. In me result the appeal of Mehar Chand and other defendants was accepted and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed.

    7. In Letters Patent Appeal Mr. Bhagwat Dayal on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant had at the outset argued that the learned Chief justice was in error in reversing the finding of the first Appellate Court on the point as to whether the plaintiff and his predecessor had been in possession of the land in dispute within 12 years of the institution of the suit. This was, according to the learned counsel, a pure finding of fact and it could not be set aside in second appeal, however grossly erroneous it may be. In this respect we find that Section 100 of the CPC gives the grounds on which a second appeal is competent and according to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of that section one of the grounds on which a second appeal can lie is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code, or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. The proposition can hardly be denied that if the appreciation of evidence made by the first appellate Court has resulted in an erroneous finding of fact, however grossly erroneous it may be, it would not justify interference in second appeal. At the same time it has to be borne in mind that if in dealing with a question of fact the Erst appellate Court places the onus wrongly on a party and this approach substantially affects the finding of fact, the finding would be liable to be quashed because the above approach can be considered to be defect in procedure. Likewise, if in dealing with the question of fact the first appellate Court excludes from consideration some evidence on the ground that the same was inadmissible, and if the High Court is satisfied that the aforesaid evidence was admissible, that act would vitiate the finding of fact.

    8. We may in this context refer to the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court, while dealing with Section 100(1)(c) of the CPC, observed:—

    “The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to, the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact, the lower appellate Court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure; if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure.”

    9. In the present case we find that the findings of the first appellate Court were liable to be reversed boil because they had been arrived at by a wrong approach on the question of onus as well as by excluding from consideration admissible evidence.

    10. So far as the onus is concerned, the Additional District Judge took the view that when a plaintiff comes on the basis of title it is not for him to show that he had been in possession within 12 years. In taking this view he relied upon the case of Kallu Mal v. Maman, AIR 1933 Lah 721. It does not, however, seem to have been brought to his notice that subsequently the matter had been considered by a Full Bench of Lahore High Court in Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB), wherein it was held that where in a suit for possession, plaintiff pleads possession and dispossesion, the suit is governed by Article 142 of Limitation Act 1908 and that it cannot be said that in all cases Article 144 is to govern the case once the plaintiff has proved a title to the property. The same view was affirmed by the majority in another Full Bench case, Santa Singh Gopal Singh v. Rajinder Singh Bur Singh, AIR 1965 Punj 415 (FB), and it was observed as under:

    “(7) The pleadings of the parties to which reference has been made leave no room for doubt that the suit instituted by the respondents in the present case for possession was based on an allegation of title as also prior possession in the year 1947 and dispossession and discontinuance of possession subsequently. There is thus a good deal of substance in the argument of Mr. D.N Aggarwal that the suit was governed by Article 142 and that the decision of the Full Benches of the Lahore and Patna Courts were fully applicable. On this view of the matter the decision of the trial Court must be regarded as having been correctly given with regard to the applicability of Article 142.”

    11. The matter also came up recently before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605, and it was observed—

    “The plaintiffs were out of possession of the lands in suit continuously from November 30, 1915 up to May 27, 1925 and again from May 27, 1925, up to the date of the suit. The Dumraon Raj and the pattadars were in possession of the lands in suit continuously from May 27, 1925 up to the date of the suit. In the revisional survey of 1937, the defendants' first party are shown to be in possession of these lands. The plaintiffs alleged possession and dispossession within 12 years. Assuming that Article 47 does not apply, the suit is governed by Article 142. The plaintiffs have failed to establish their possession within 12 years of the suit, and the suit is barred by Article 142 of the Limitation Act.”

    12. We are, therefore, of the view that as the plaintiff in the present case based his claim on tide and alleged previous possession of his predecessor & subsequent dispossession by the respondent, it was for him to show that he or his predecessor had been in possession of the property within 12 years of the institution of the suit, and that the suit was governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of limitation was thus vitiated because it proceeded upon a wrong notion about the onus of proof.

    13. The additional District Judge, in oui view, was also wrong in excluding from consideration the plan which had been relied upon by the defendants-respondents. The aforesaid plan had been filed in the earlier case brought by Dal Singh against the defendants and the defendants wanted to rely upon the same in order to show that the property in dispute had been partly built upon even when the earlier suit was brought. The learned Additional District Judge took the view that the aforesaid plan had been got prepared by the defendants and as such it was not desirable to look at it. This approach was legally not correct because the aforesaid plan, which had been prepared long before the dispute between the present parties, would be a relevant piece of evidence to show as to whether there was some construction upon the land in dispute at the time of the filing of suit by Dal Singh.

    14. The Additional District Judge also took no note of material pieces of evidence which were on the record and which clearly went to show that the contesting defendants had been in possession of the land in dispute for more than 12 years before the filing of the suit. These pieces of evidence have been discussed by the learned Chief Justice and in our opinion they clearly establish that the plaintiff or his predecessor were not only not in possession of the property in dispute within 12 years but that the same was in possession of the contesting defendants. In the deed of gift executed by Durga in favour of the plaintiff in 1947 it was admitted that part of the gifted land was in possession of Mehar Chand and other defendants who had built a wall and some buildings thereon. In the Khasra Girdawari of 1944 and the Jamabandi of 1944-1945 Mehar Chand and other defendants were shown in possession of the property in dispute since a long time. The words used are “Qabza Darina” Although the Additional District Judge took the view that the above entry was the result of patwari's mischief, we agree with the learned Chief Justice that there is no warrant or basis for this observation. After giving the matter our consideration we are of the view that there was ample ground for the learned Chief Justice to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Additional District Judge.

    15. Argument has also been advanced that when the defendants took possession of the property in dispute the parties were under the impression that the said property was part of Khasra No. 290, which belonged to Dal Singh, and not of Khasra No. 525/283 which belonged to Durga predecessor of the plaintiff. It is urged that the starting point of limitation for the plaintiff and his predecessor would be when they came to know that the encroachment was of land which was part of Khasra No. 525/283. This contention, in our opinion is not well-founded because the limitation for such a suit starts from the time of dispossession and not unless it be a case like that of a co-sharer from the date when the plaintiff comes to know of the ouster. Further the commencement of adverse possession is not affected by the fact as to who owns the property except in some special cases like that of persons standing in fiduciary relationship qua the actual owner. Reference has been made on behalf of the appellant to the case of Daya Shanker v. Debi Din, AIR 1937 All 238. In that case a person occupied certain plot of land for about 16 years by building a structure upon it. When the plaintiff's agent objected to the structure being built, the person in occupation did not deny plaintiff's title but averred that the plot belonged to another person & that he was prepared to hand it over to the rightful owner. The situation of the plot was such that it was isolated from the plaintiff's mahal by the Trunk Road intervening and being an uncultivated piece of land it did not much attract the attention of the plaintiff it was held that taking into consideration the peculiar situation of the plot, the mere non-interference with the temporary occupation of the plot in suit by the defendant, who was a tenant of the other landlord in the adjacent fields, would not constitute any adverse possession. It is obvious that the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable and can be of no assistance to the appellant in the present case.

    16. The appeal, consequently, fails and is dismissed with costs.

    AGJ/D.V.C

    17. Appeal dismissed.

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    Lila Ram v. Mohar Chand
    (Jul 13, 1966)