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  • provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution.14.
  • provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution
  • Section 96-B (of the Govt.) of India Act, 1919
  • provisions of Article 311(1)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution.14.
  • provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution
  • Section 96-B (of the Govt.) of India Act, 1919
  • provisions of Article 311(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion (Falshaw, C.J.; Tek Chand, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Gurmukh Singh, was originally appointed as an Assistant Sub Inspector in the Punjab Police (Multan District) on 24 July 1945 and placed on two years' probation as from 1 April 1947. After Indian independence he was absorbed into the Delhi State Police and appointed there as Assistant Sub Inspector by the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) on 22 September 1947; he was later confirmed in that rank by the Inspector General of Police on 29 November 1948 with effect from 1 April 1948.

An allegation of corruption was made against him in 1949. An inquiry was held by Diwan Chand Bhatia (described as holding the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement) at the time) and, on 11 May 1950, the Senior Superintendent of Police (S.S.P.), Delhi, dismissed the appellant. The Inspector General of Police dismissed the appellant's departmental appeal.

The appellant instituted suit in April 1953 seeking a declaration that his dismissal was illegal and inoperative, a declaration that he continued to be a member of the Delhi Police holding the rank he had on 11 May 1950, and Rs. 336 for arrears of salary.

The trial court framed six issues (set out in the trial court's list) addressing: (1) whether the dismissal was effected by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority; (2) adequacy of opportunity to defend; (3) competence of the inquiring officer; (4) whether the inquiry and dismissal were wrongful or malicious; (5) limitation; and (6) relief.

The trial court held in favour of the plaintiff on limitation and on the ground that the dismissal had been made by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority, and against the plaintiff on opportunity, competence of the inquirer, and malice; it granted the declaration and Rs. 336. The Government appealed. The District Judge (S.B. Capoor) in May 1956 reversed the trial court on the key point (holding the dismissal was not bad as having been made by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority) and dismissed the suit. A Single Judge later referred the second appeal to a larger Bench (order dated 25 August 1960). The larger Bench (Falshaw, C.J., with Tek Chand, J. concurring) heard the appeal and allowed it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff was dismissed from service by an officer subordinate in rank to the appointing authority, and the legal effect of that (trial Court's Issue 1).
  2. Whether reasonable opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff to defend himself in the departmental inquiry (trial Court's Issue 2).
  3. Whether the officer who held the inquiry was competent to hold it (trial Court's Issue 3).
  4. Whether the departmental inquiry against the plaintiff and his dismissal from service were wrongful and malicious (trial Court's Issue 4).
  5. Whether the suit was within time (trial Court's Issue 5).
  6. How Article 311(1) of the Constitution operates where the appointing officer does not at the relevant time have an officer of equal rank available to exercise disciplinary power (central constitutional question addressed by the Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant argued (and advanced before the Single Judge) that his appointment as Assistant Sub Inspector in Delhi was effectively by the Inspector General because his September 1947 appointment by the Deputy Inspector General was only probationary and his confirmation by the Inspector General (29 November 1948, with effect from 1 April 1948) represented the true appointment; this argument was advanced to strengthen his contention under Issue 1 that his dismissal by a Senior Superintendent was made by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority.
  • Implicit in the appellant's case is the contention that dismissal by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed would be invalid under Article 311(1) of the Constitution.

Respondent's (State/Government) Arguments

  • The Government's principal position (as accepted by the District Judge) was that because of the peculiar organization and administrative arrangements in Delhi during the material period, the Senior Superintendent of Police had been vested (by earlier orders and practice) with powers ordinarily exercisable only by a Deputy Inspector General, and therefore the Senior Superintendent was not effectively subordinate to the appointing Deputy Inspector General; accordingly the dismissal was not invalid under Article 311(1).
  • The Government also implicitly relied on the contention that the appellant had been validly appointed (and that confirmation by the IGP did not change the identity of the appointing authority in the way asserted by the appellant). The Single Judge also records that the District Judge found undisputed that the Senior Superintendent had the relevant powers vested in him, a point the Government relied upon and which the Court declined to permit to be re-litigated on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nand Shanker v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 148 Used by the appellant to support the argument that confirmation could be treated as appointment (i.e., that the IGP's confirmation made him the appointing authority). The Court doubted the correctness of the view in that case for the present purposes and held that confirmation to substantive rank is different from appointment; the precedent did not persuade the Court to treat confirmation as the appointing act here.
Dr. Ishwar Narain Sinha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 All. 439 Concerned whether an officer issuing general instructions or a subordinate implementing them constituted the appointing authority. The Court found that the decision did not help the appellant; in that case the Chief Medical Officer was the appointing authority despite a general letter from the General Manager.
R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 27 (Privy Council) Interpreted statutory proviso prohibiting dismissal by an authority subordinate to that by which the person was appointed and held that purported delegation of dismissal power to a subordinate could not validly abrogate the statutory protection. The Court relied on Rangachari to support the conclusion that dismissal by an authority subordinate in rank to the appointing authority is bad and inoperative, and that rules purporting to permit a subordinate to dismiss would be ultra vires to the extent they infringe Article 311(1).
North-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain, A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 112 Applied the Rangachari principle where dismissal by a lower officer was challenged despite later rule amendments purporting to change who could dismiss. The Court noted that Suraj Narain restated the Rangachari view and used it as supporting authority for the proposition that dismissal by a subordinate (in rank) cannot be validated by rules purporting to delegate the appointing authority's power.
Union of India v. Jagjit Singh, R.S.A. 205-D of 1957 (decided 22 Nov 1962) Considered whether an inquiry conducted by a person was validly conducted by a "police officer" within the statutory/rule requirement for departmental inquiries. The Court observed that in Jagjit Singh the appellate judge (Capoor, J.) found the inquiring officer was not a police officer and that concession had been made below; the present Court held that if not for the Article 311(1) point the appellant might have succeeded on this ground and relied on the reasoning in Jagjit Singh to support the competence objection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed and analyzed two principal legal strands: (A) whether the dismissal by the Senior Superintendent of Police contravened Article 311(1) of the Constitution because the appellant was appointed by a Deputy Inspector General; and (B) whether the officer who conducted the departmental inquiry (Diwan Chand Bhatia) was competent as a "police officer" under the Police rules to conduct the inquiry.

A. Analysis under Article 311(1)

  • The Court accepted as undisputed the historical facts about the ranks and administrative arrangements in Delhi in the relevant period: prior to independence an order of 1933 had vested certain DIG powers in the Senior Superintendent; after independence, for a time the head of Delhi Police had the rank of DIG, and in February 1948 the post of Inspector General was instituted and the post of DIG ceased to exist for a period, so that the two senior-most officers at the relevant time were the Inspector General and the Senior Superintendent.
  • The District Judge had held that because the Senior Superintendent had been vested with the powers ordinarily exercisable by a Deputy Inspector General, the Senior Superintendent could not be regarded as subordinate to the appointing Deputy Inspector General and therefore his dismissal of the appellant did not violate Article 311(1).
  • The larger Bench rejected that functional approach. The Court held that Article 311(1) protects against dismissal by an authority subordinate in rank to the appointing authority and that “subordinate” must be understood with reference to rank, not merely to functions or powers temporarily vested.
  • The Court observed that to permit a subordinate (in rank) to dismiss where rules or orders purport to vest that subordinate with the superior's powers would effectively nullify the protection in Article 311(1); it referred to Privy Council authorities (Rangachari and Suraj Narain) which rejected attempts to validate dismissal by lower officers by reference to delegated rules.
  • The Court concluded that where an officer of superior or equal rank to the appointing authority is unavailable, an order of dismissal must be passed by an officer of superior rank (not by an officer of lesser rank), and that any rule or statute permitting a subordinate officer to dismiss someone appointed by a superior rank must be treated as ultra vires so far as it infringes Article 311(1).

B. Competence of the Inquiring Officer

  • The Police rules required departmental inquiries to be carried out by a police officer. The inquirer in this case, Diwan Chand Bhatia, had been a regular police officer but had retired and been re-employed in the Civil Supplies Department; the Chief Commissioner had ordered that the Enforcement staff of that Department be regarded as a branch of the Police organisation and designated Bhatia Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement).
  • The Court noted that a similar point had arisen in Union of India v. Jagjit Singh, where the inquiring officer was held not to be a police officer within the relevant meaning and that this ground could have supported the appellant if the Article 311(1) point had not succeeded.
  • Although the Court accepted the appeal primarily on the Article 311(1) ground, it expressly recorded that the competence of the inquirer presented a viable independent ground on which the appellant might have prevailed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed; the decree of the trial court was restored with costs to the appellant throughout.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's declaration that the dismissal was illegal and inoperative was restored and the award of Rs. 336 as arrears of salary was reinstated; costs were awarded in favour of the appellant.
  • Constitutional principle reaffirmed: The Court reaffirmed the principle that Article 311(1) bars dismissal by an authority subordinate in rank to the appointing authority; functional vesting of powers in a subordinate does not suffice to overcome the rank-based protection in Article 311(1). Any rule or statute purporting to permit dismissal by a subordinate (in rank) of a person appointed by a superior rank must be read as ultra vires to the extent it conflicts with Article 311(1).
  • Alternative ground preserved: The Court observed that the competence of the inquiring officer (a procedural defect under the Police rules) constituted an independent ground on which the appellant might have succeeded, and this reinforces the availability of procedural safeguards in departmental inquiries.
  • Precedential effect: The decision applies established Privy Council authorities (Rangachari; Suraj Narain) to the constitutional setting of Article 311(1); the Court expressed doubt about the approach in Nand Shanker with respect to equating confirmation with appointment and declined to adopt that approach in this case. The opinion does not claim to set a novel broader precedent beyond applying and reaffirming the existing principle that rank (not mere functional delegation) determines the protections of Article 311(1).

Disposition: Appeal allowed. (Tek Chand, J. concurred.)

    Gurmukh Singh v. Union Of India .

    Falshaw, C.J:— This second appeal which has been referred by a Single Judge to a larger Bench has arisen in the following circumstances:—

    2. Gurmukh Singh appellant was apointed as an Assistant Sub Inspector in the Punjab Police in Multan District on the 24th of July 1945. His appointment was made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Multan Range. He was placed on two years' probation as from the 1st of April 1947. After independence in 1947 he was absorbed into the Police Force of Delhi State in which he was appointed as Assistant Sub Inspector by the then Deputy Inspector General on the 22nd of September 1947. He was confirmed in this rank by the Inspector General of Police on the 29th of November 1948 as from the 1st of April 1948.

    3. It ssems that an allegation of corruption was made against him in 1949 and after an inquiry had been held against him by an officer named Dtwan Chand Bhatia with the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police has was dismissed from service by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Delhi, on the 11th of May 1950. His appeal was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police.

    4. He instituted the suit from which this appeal has arisen in April 1953 claiming a declaration that his dismissal was illegal and inoperative on certain grounds and that he was therefore a member of the Delhi Police Force holding the rank which he held on the 11th of May 1950. He also claimed Rs. 336/- on account of arrears of salary.

    5. The nature of the grounds on which the suit was based can be seen from the issues framed by the trial Court as follows:—

    1. Whether the plaintiff was dismissed from service by an officer subordinate in rank to the appointing authority? If so, to what effect?

    2. Whether reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the plaintiff to defend himself in the inquiry which resulted in his dismissal?

    3. Whether the officer who held the inquiry was not competent to hold the same and to what effect?

    4. Whether the departmental inquiry against the plaintiff and his dismissal from service were wrongful and malicious and to what effect?

    5. Whether the suit is within time?

    6. Relief.

    6. The three points decided against the plaintiff by the trial Court were on issues (2), (3) and (4). It being held that he had reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the inquiry, that the officer who held the inquiry was competent to do so and that the inquiry and his dismissal were not malicious. It was, however, held in his favour that the suit was within time and that his dismissal could not stand because the order dismissing him was passed by an officer subordinate to the officer who had appointed him. He was accordingly granted a decree for the declaration prayed for and for Rs. 336/- on a account of salary.

    7. The Government's appeal against this decree was decided in May 1956 by the learned District Judge Mr. S.B Capoor (now a Judge of this Court). He upheld the findings of the lower court which were against the plaintiff, but reversed the finding on the first issue and held that the dismissal was not bad as having been made by an officer subordinate to the officer who had appointed the plaintiff. He accordingly accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit. It is unfortunate that although the learned Single Judge who thought it necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench passed his order on the 25th of August 1960, the matter has taken so long to reach the Division Bench.

    8. One of the grounds which impelled the learned single Judge to refer the matter was a new point raised before him in the form of an argument that in fact the appointment of the petitioner as an Assistant Sub Inspector in the Delhi Police Force had not been made by the Deputy Inspector General, but by the Inspector General. This point was raised to strengthen the plaintiff's argument on the first issue and perhaps to meet the grounds on which the learned District Judge had decided the case against him. The argument is that although he was appointed as an Assistant Sub Inspector at Delhi by the order of the Deputy Inspector General, dated the 22nd of September 1947, this was really only a probationary appointment and his real appointment only began when he was confirmed by the Inspector General in 3948. This argument undoubtedly receives some support from the decision in Nand Shanker v. State of Rajasthan . A.I.R 1957 Raj. 148. where the facts were that the petitioner in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution had been appointed on probation as a Sub Inspector of Police by the Inspector General and later confirmed in his appointment by the Deputy Inspector General who later dismissed him. The view was taken that his appointment wag made by the Deputy Inspector General in these circumstances and his dismissal was therefore held not to be bad as having been made by an officer subordinate to the officer who had appointed him. With doe respect I doubt the correctness of this view and I am of the opinion that confirmation to substantive rank is something quite different from appointment. I do not consider that there is any doubt in the present case that the officer who appointed the plaintiff as an Assistant Sub Inspector in the Delhi Police was the Deputy Inspector General. The other case cited in support of this argument. Dr. Ishwar Narain Sinha v. Union of India . A.I.R 1957 All 439., does not in my opinion help, the plaintiff. In that case a letter containing certain instructions, but not relating to individuals, had been issued by the General Manager of the Railway, but the appellant was actually appointed in his post in the medical service of the Railway in accordance with the principles contained in the letter by the Chief Medical officer and it was held that the latter was the appointing officer.

    9. The main question is whether the plaintiff, having been appointed as an Assistant Sub Inspector by the Deputy Inspector General, could be dismissed by an order of the Senior Superintendent of Police in view of the words of Article 311(1) of the Constitution which reads: “No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.” There can be no doubt on the point that in the Police Force a Superintendent of Police, even where he is designated Senior Superintendent of Police posted in the same place, is subordinate to a Deputy Inspector General and at first sight there appears to be a plain infringement of the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution in the dismissal of the plaintiff by the Senior Superintendent of Police after he had been appointed by the Deputy Inspector General. The matter, however, was decided in favour of the Government by the learned District Judge on account of the peculiar state of affairs in the Police Force which obtained in Delhi during the material period.

    10. It is not in dispute that before it dependence the senior officer in the Delhi Police Force was the Senior Superintendent of Police who, by an order of the Chief Commissioner passed in the year 1933, had been vested with certain powers ordinarily exercisable only by the Deputy Inspector General in the matter of appointment and punishment. After India became independent in August 1947 for a time there ceased to be a Senior Superintendent of Police and the officer who was at the head of the Delhi Police was given the rank of Deputy Inspector General. In February 1948 a further change was made and an officer of the rank of Inspector General was put in charge of the Delhi State Police. The post of Deputy Inspector General then ceased to exist the post of S.S.P being revived instead and at the relevant period the two senior most officers in the police Force were the Inspector General and the Senior Superintendent of Police. It seems to be agreed that at no stage throughout that period, though the position may now have changed, did officers of the rank of Deputy Inspector General and Senior Superintendent of Police co-exist.

    11. The view taken by the learned District Judge was that in these circumstances, since there was no Deputy Inspector General and the Senior superintendent of Police had been vested with the powers of the Deputy Inspector General with regard to appointments and punishments, the Senior Superintendent of Police who passed the order of dismissal could not be said to be subordinate to the Deputy Inspector General who had appointed the plaintiff. There were in fact two officers with different ranks both exercising the same powers at different times, but never together.

    12. Some attempt was made to argue before us that it was not even proved that the Senior Superintendent of Police was vested with the powers of the Deputy Inspector General in these matters at the material time, but it is recorded by the learned District Judge in this judgment that this was not disputed and I therefore do not think the point should be allowed to be raised now.

    13. There is no doubt that there is a certain amount of plausibility about the argument which was accepted by the learned District Judge, but I am nevertheless of the opinion that there has been a violation of the provisions of Article 311(1) in this case. To put the matter in another way, I am of the opinion that although a Senior Superintendent of Police may be competent under rules vesting in him certain powers of the Deputy Inspector General to dismiss some officers with the ranks of Assistant Sub Inspector or Sub Inspector whom be nevertheless cannot pass an order dismissing such an officer who had been appointed by an officer of the rank of Deputy Inspector General i.e of definitely a higher rank and so far as any rule or statute permits such an action, that rule or statute must be held to be ultra vires as infringing the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution.

    14. This point was considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in R.T Rangachari v. Secretary of State . A.I.R 1937 P.C 27., as follows:—

    “There is, however, another point raised and in the Courts below decided adversely to the plaintiff which has given their Lordships considerable anxiety. Section 96-B (of the Govt.) of India Act, 1919 contains the following proviso:

    “But no person in that service (the Civil Service of the Crown) may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed”

    The purported dismissal of the appellant on the 28th of February 1928 emanated from an official lower in rank than the Inspector General who appointed the appellant to his office. The courts below held that the power of dismissal was in fact delegated and was lawfully delegated to the person who purported to exercise it. Counsel for the respondent candidly expressed a doubt as to the possibility of maintaining this view and indeed it is manifest that if power to delegate this power could be taken under the rules, it would wipe out a proviso and destroy a protection contained not in the rules but in the section itself. Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the dismissal purporting to be thus ordered in February was by reason of its origin bad and inoperative.”

    The same matter came up against in North-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain . A.I.R 1949 P.C 112.. In that case the plaintiff had been appointed as a Sub Inspector of Police by the Inspector General, N.W.F.P, but he was dismissed by a Deputy Inspector General. The Government relied on an amendment of the rules inserted in January 1934 by which the Deputy Inspector General was substituted for the Inspector General as the person entitled to dismiss a Sub Inspector. The view taken in Rangachari's case was again restated.

    15. In my opinion the only proper course when the question of dismissing the plaintiff in this case came up was that if there was no officer of the rank of Deputy Inspector General, then the order of dismissal should have been passed by the Inspector General himself. In my opinion the meaning of Article 311(1) is that if there is no officer of equal rank to the appointing officer available then the order will have to be passed by an officer of superior rank. In no circumstances can such an order be passed by an officer of lesser rank. What in effect the learned counsel for the State is asking us to do in this case is to read Article 311(1) as if it had been amended so as to read ‘No person who is a member of a civil service…………Shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed unless such subordinate authority has by rule or otherwise been vested with powers of superior rank”. There is no dearth of authorities on the point that in this context ‘Subordinate’ means subordinate in rank and not with reference to functions exercised. I am therefore of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court in this matter was correct.

    16. There is one other point on which the plaintiff appears to have a good case although it was decided against him by both the Courts below. This relates to the third issue whether the officer to whom the task of conducting the inquiry against the plaintiff was entrusted was competent to carry on his functions. The Police rules require that a departmental inquiry must be carried out by a police officer. The position in the present case was that Diwan Chand Bhatia had been a regular Police officer, but had retired from the police service and at the time of the inquiry he had been re-employed in the Civil Supplies Department. The Chief Commissioner of Delhi however, had ordered that the Enforcement staff of that Department should be regarded as a branch of the Police organisation and Diwan Chand Bhatia was given the designation of Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement).

    17. This very same point arose in the case of another police officer who was dismissed as the result of an inquiry conducted by that officer. This is Union of India v. Jagjit Singh, R.S.A 205-D of 1957, decided as recently as the 22nd of November 1962 by Capoor, J., who as I have said decided the first appeal in the present case when he was District Judge he fully considered the position in that case and found that the Inquiring Officer was not a police officer within the meaning of the Police Act and the rules and in fact he has observed that it had been conceded before the lower appellate Court that he was not a police officer when he conducted the inquiry. It is thus clear that if the plaintiff had not succeeded on the man point in the present appeal he might have succeeded on that ground alone. The result is that I would accept the appeal and restore the decree of the trial Court with costs to the plaintiff throughout.

    Tek Chand, J.:—I agree.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Gurmukh Singh v. Union Of India .
    (Mar 26, 1963)