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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Bishan Narain and Dua, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The disputed land originally belonged to Kallu Singh, who died around 1920. His widow, Smt. Makhman, succeeded to the estate. On 1 August 1930 Shiv Nath Lambardar reported to the Patwari that Smt. Makhman had died without issue and that Jiwan Singh was in possession; a suggestion was made that Jiwan Singh's name be entered in place of the widow. Subsequent proceedings (2 September 1930) recorded that Smt. Makhman, by interrogatories, admitted Jiwan Singh to be her heir and raised no objection to removal of her name from revenue papers. The pedigree-table was consulted and a mutation was ordered in favour of Shamilat Pana Ghatoli in proportion to Khewat money on account of a karewa marriage. The opinion notes the original report stating Makhman's death was likely incorrect and that she had perhaps only remarried.

On 28 April 1944 Jiwan Singh attempted to have mutation entered solely in his name but was unsuccessful; on 14 September 1944 mutation in his personal favour of the entire estate was rejected. In 1945 Smt. Man Bai (defendant No. 1 / respondent) applied for a review, asserting she was Kallu Singh's sister and the true heir; the Collector allowed the review on 12 October 1945 and the mutation in her favour was sanctioned on 13 June 1947. During these mutation proceedings objections by parties (including Shivnath Singh) were considered and rejected; Jiwan Singh expressly admitted that Smt. Man Bai was Mohar Singh's daughter and Kallu Singh's sister.

Plaintiffs Karori Mal and Sewa Ram instituted the present suit on 31 August 1951 seeking a declaration that Smt. Man Bai had no right of succession or ownership in respect of the land left by Smt. Makhman, and asserting ownership and possession themselves and with other parties in proportion to shares of the Khewat money regarding Pana Ghatoli. Smt. Man Bai denied that Smt. Makhman had contracted a karewa and contended that the revenue entries in her favour had been correctly made.

The trial court framed seven issues, held that Smt. Man Bai was Kallu Singh's sister, applied Hindu law, rejected plaintiffs' customary-law plea for lack of specific pleading and proof, found the revenue authorities empowered to review the 1930 mutation, rejected plaintiffs' contentions of reversion to Pana Ghatoli and adverse possession by the proprietary body, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed; the appeal centers principally on the plea of adverse possession.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Smt. Man Bai, defendant No. 1, is a sister of Kallu?
  2. If issue No. 1 is proved, is defendant No. 1 an heir of Kallu?
  3. Whether the revenue authorities were not empowered to review the mutation order after such a long period and what is its effect?
  4. Whether the land in dispute was obtained by Kallu without compensation from Pana Ghatoli, and whether it reverts to Pana Ghatoli for that reason?
  5. Whether the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 8 to 12 are proprietors of Pana Ghatoli?
  6. Whether the proprietors of Pana Ghatoli have acquired ownership of the land in suit by adverse possession for more than twelve years?
  7. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the land in dispute?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Karori Mal and Sewa Ram) Arguments

  • Their principal contention on appeal was adverse possession: possession by a stranger should be presumed adverse unless the true owner shows it was permissive.
  • They argued that the knowledge of the true owner about the adverse nature of the possession is not necessary for limitation to run.
  • The appellants relied on several authorities (listed in the opinion) to support the propositions that possession, if exclusive and claimed as one's own, is evidence of title and that overt, open possession can make limitation run even without the owner's actual knowledge.
  • They further contended that the change in the mutation (removal of the absentee's name from revenue records) is itself an overt act amounting to ouster and therefore commences adverse possession.

Respondent's (Smt. Man Bai / defendant No. 1) Arguments

  • Smt. Man Bai denied that Smt. Makhman had contracted a karewa marriage and maintained that the entries in the revenue papers had been correctly made in her favour.
  • Implicitly, and as found by the trial court and the revenue authorities, she asserted her position as Kallu Singh's sister and heir and disputed any claim that the proprietary body had acquired adverse title.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Allah Dad v. Fazal Dad, 46 I.C. 964 The criterion of adverse possession: possession claiming the land as one's own. The court observed this case is of limited assistance because it did not deal with the question of the true owner's knowledge; it did not address the precise issue on the present facts.
Ghulam Murtaza v. Nagina, I.L.R. 11 Lah. 410 Possession not lawful or permissive at inception supports title by adverse possession where possession continued long enough. The court treated this authority as dealing with different facts (long, hostile initial possession) and not helpful to appellants on the present record.
Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev, I.L.R. 11 Bom. 216 Possession is general evidence of title; exclusive possession is significant and it is for the opponent to show permissive origin. The court noted this decision turned on its specific facts (exclusive long possession) and is not controlling for the present case.
Secretary of State for India v. Bommadevara Venkatanarasimha, 58 I.C. 689 Where the true owner had opportunity to know and was not misled, he cannot plead ignorance of the law to arrest limitation; relates to riparian owners. The court said this proposition, insofar as it requires opportunity to know, goes against appellants because here the court found Smt. Man Bai had no such opportunity.
Raghubarprasad Ramgulam Gurao v. Ballo Sheocharan, A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 311 Possession to be adverse need not be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the person against whom it is claimed; overt and unconcealed possession is sufficient so that the person, with due vigilance, ought to be aware. The court acknowledged this authority but applied the Privy Council principle (see Debendralal Khan) and found the facts here did not show sufficiently open and hostile possession that the absentee ought to have known.
Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan, A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 23 Privy Council ruling: the nature of requisite possession varies with the subject; classical requirement nec vi nec clam nec precario must be established. The court relied on this authoritative ratio to require that adverse possession must be overt, not by stealth, and observed that the requisite nature of possession depends on context; applied it to find no adverse possession here.
Chanar Singh Jai Ram v. Chanar Singh Jeet Singh, A.I.R. 1935 All. 265 Single Bench decision applying the Privy Council ratio in Debendralal Khan's case. The court noted this as an application of the Privy Council ratio but did not treat it as determinative beyond that alignment.
Sukhadeb Ram v. Kulamani Sen, A.I.R. 1944 Pat. 74 Single Bench decision applying the Privy Council ratio in Debendralal Khan's case. Referred to as another Single Bench application of the Privy Council decision; not treated as decisive on these facts.
Prem Singh v. Tej Singh, A.I.R. 1980 E.P. 252 Ouster implies denial of the right of the claimant to his or her knowledge (actual or presumed). The court invoked this principle to explain that exclusive possession by co-sharers does not by itself constitute wrongful ouster unless it is an open and hostile act to the knowledge of the ousted co-owner.
Sardar Amar Singh v. Sardarni Shiv Datt Kaur, A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 89 Observed that removal of an absentee co-sharer's name from revenue records by co-sharers in possession is an overt act amounting to ouster. The court declined to accept this observation as generally applicable on the facts before it, noting that it would not subscribe to that holding in the present circumstances where the mutation was kept secret.
Beli Ram v. Munshi, A.I.R. 1834 Lah. 456 Held that it is for the co-sharer in possession to prove an overt act constituting adverse possession of which the absentee had knowledge. The court referenced this decision as representing a contrary view to Sardar Amar Singh and used the contrast to support its conclusion that mere removal from revenue records, when secret, did not constitute overt ouster here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis turns substantially on principles governing adverse possession and the requirement that possession amounting to ouster must be sufficiently open and hostile so as to be brought to the notice of the excluded co-owner (or that the excluded co-owner ought to have known by due vigilance).

First, the court reviewed authorities relied upon by the appellants and observed that many of those cases either involved materially different facts (long, exclusive possession from inception) or did not address the specific question of whether the true owner's knowledge is required. The Privy Council decision in Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan was treated as authoritative: the nature of requisite possession varies with the subject matter and the classical maxim nec vi nec clam nec precario (not by force, not by stealth, not by permission) must be considered.

Applying these legal principles to the record, the court accepted the trial court's factual findings that:

  • Smt. Man Bai was living in another village and believed Smt. Makhman to be alive and in possession;
  • The mutation proceedings of 1930 were kept secret from Smt. Man Bai and the entry was secured without her knowledge;
  • There was an absence of independent evidence as to whether or when Mst. Makhman remarried or whether such remarriage forfeited her estate;
  • Exclusive possession by co-sharers over a larger share does not automatically amount to wrongful ouster of a co-sharer; ouster requires open, hostile, overt acts of which the ousted co-owner knew or ought to have known.

The court evaluated the appellants' submission that removal of the absentee's name from revenue records constitutes an overt act commencing adverse possession. It considered the conflicting Single Bench authorities (Sardar Amar Singh and Beli Ram) and declined to adopt the broad proposition from Sardar Amar Singh, because on these facts the mutation had been effected secretly and the conduct of the appellants was not sufficiently open and hostile.

The court further noted that statutes of limitation must be strictly construed and should not be applied to deprive a rightful owner of property unless the statutory provisions clearly and precisely apply. On the present evidence and findings, the appellants had not shown that the conclusion of the trial court on adverse possession was erroneous or unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit is affirmed. The opinion concludes with the succinct order: "Appeal dismissed."

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the trial court's findings stand: Smt. Man Bai is recognised as the sister and heir of Kallu Singh for the purposes decided in the suit, and the plaintiffs' claim based on adverse possession and other grounds was rejected.
  • The court, while applying established authorities (including the Privy Council's decision in Debendralal Khan), found no reason to set aside the factual and legal conclusions reached below. The opinion does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond applying existing principles to the facts of this case.
Appeal dismissed.

    Kishori Lal And Another v. Mst. Man Bai And Others

    Bishan Narain and Dua, JJ.:— Kallu Singh, son of Mehar Singh, Chauhan Rajput, of village Bat Tahera in Tehsil Jhajjar, District Rohtak, was the last male holder of the land now in dispute. He died sometime in 1920 and on his death Smt. Makhman, his widow, succeeded to his estate. On 1st August 1930 Shiv Nath Lambardar made a report to the Patwari that Smt. Makhman, widow of Kallu Singh, had died without leaving any issue and that Jiwan Singh, son of Shiv Singh, was in possession of the estate left by her. It was, in the circumstances, suggested that Jiwan Singh's name be entered in place of the lady. After making a reference to the pedigree-table it was reported that no heirs of the deceased were traceable. The proceedings of 2nd September 1930 before the Revenue Officer show that Smt. Makhman had by means of interrogatories admitted Jiwan Singh to be her heir and raised no objection to her name being removed from the revenue papers. The pedigree-table of the settlement of 1879 was then referred to and then mutation was ordered to be entered in favour of Shamilat Pana Ghatoli in proportion to Khewat money on account of her karewa marriage. I may here note that the original report by Shiv Nath Lambardar that Smt. Makhman had died was obviously incorrect and what was perhaps intended to be stated was that she had remarried.

    2. On 28th April 1944 Jiwan Singh attempted to have the mutation entered exclusively in his own name, but he did not succeed and on 14 September 1944 mutation in his personal favour of the entire estate was rejected. Smt. Man Bai, defendant No. 1—respondent in the present litigation, applied in 1945 for a review of the mutation entry of 1930 on the ground that being the sister of Kallu Singh she was the real heir and that the proprietary body were not entitled to succeed to Kallu Singh's estate. Her application for review was allowed by the Collector on 12th October 1945 and after protracted proceedings before the revenue authorities the mutation in her favour was sanctioned on 13th June 1947. During the mutation proceedings Shivnath Singh raised the objection that his ancestors had given the land in question to Smt. Man Bai's grand father and, therefore, this property should revert to him. This plea was, however, not sustained by the authorities. It was also explained in these proceedings that till then Smt. Man Bai had not come to know about the mutation entry in favour of the proprietors of Pana Ghatoli, and since her brother's wife, Smt. Makhman, was alive, she never came to this village and did not know as to what was happening with respect to the revenue entries. It may also be stated here that in the course of the mutation proceedings the proprietors took up the plea that this lady was not Mohar Singh's daughter and, therefore, was not entitled to succeed as Kallu Singh's sister on remarriage of Smt. Makhman. After investigating into the matter the Naib Tehsildar upheld Smt. Man Bai's claim on 2nd November 1949. It is worth noting that in these proceedings Jiwan Singh expressly admitted that Smt. Man Bai was Mohar Singh's daughter and Kallu Singh's sister.

    3. The present suit was instituted on 31st August 1951 by Karori Mal and Sewa Ram for a declaration that Smt. Man Bai had no right of succession or ownership in respect of the land left by Smt. Makhman deceased and that the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 8 to 12 along with Jiwan Singh defendant No. 2 are the owners and possesses therefor in proportion to the shares of the Khewat money regarding Pana Ghatoli and that Smt. Man Bai had no right to interfere with their said right.

    4. The suit was resisted by Smt. Man Bai defendant No. 1 who denied that Smt. Makhman had contracted a karewa and pleaded that the entries in the revenue papers had been correctly made in her favour.

    5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:—

    1. Whether Smt. Man Bai, defendant No. 1, is a sister of Kallu?

    2. If issue No. 1 is proved, is defendant No. 1, an heir of Kallu?

    3. Whether the revenue authorities were not empowered to review the mutation order after such a long period and what is its effect?

    4. Whether the land in dispute was obtained by Kallu without compensation from Pana Ghatoli, and it reverts to the said Pana for that reason?

    5. Whether the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 8 to 12 are proprietors of Pana Ghatoli?

    6. Whether the proprietors of Pana Ghatoli have acquired ownership of the land in suit by adverse possession for more than twelve years?

    7. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the land in dispute?

    6. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding Smt. Man Bai defendant No. 1 to be the sister of Kallu Singh and the parties to be governed by Hindu Law. The contention on behalf of the plaintiffs, that according to the custom of District Rohtak a sister had no right of succession, was repelled by the Court below on the ground that custom had not been specifically pleaded and proved on the present record with the result that the rights of the parties had to be determined according to their personal law. Under issue No. 3 the Court below held that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the revenue authorities were not empowered to review the impugned mutation of 1930 merely because along period had elapsed. Issue No. 4 was also decided against the plaintiffs; under issue No. 5, however, the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 8 to 12 were held to be the proprietors of Pana Ghatoli. Under issue No. 6 the trial Court repelled the contention that the proprietors of Panna Ghatoli had acquired ownership of the land in suit by adverse possession for more than twelve years. It has been expressly observed that defendant No. 1 being a female and resident of another village, could not have come to know of the change in the revenue entries and of the possession of the proprietary body. Defendant No. 1 being ignorant of the plaintiffs' possession of the land and denial of her rights of ownership, the necessary ingredients of adverse possession were held not to be established on the present record. Issue No. 7 was, however, decided in favour of the plaintiffs. With these findings, as already noticed, the plaintiffs' suit has been dismissed with no order as to costs.

    7. On appeal by Karori Mal and Sewa Ram, Mr. Shamair Chand has laid great stress on the plea of adverse possession. He had contended that when a stranger happens to be in possession, it must be assumed to be adverse unless the true owner shows that it was permissive. He has next contended that knowledge of the true owner about the adverse nature of the possession of a stranger is not necessary. In support of his contention he has cited the following authorities:—

    8. Allah Dad v. Fazal Dad . 46 I.C 964. is a judgment by Division Bench of the Punjab Chief Court the head-note of which lays down that “the criterion of adverse possession is, whether a person possesses land, claiming it as his own; if he does, he must be held to be in adverse possession”. This case is hardly of any assistance because it did not deal with the question of knowledge of the true owner as such a question did not arise for consideration on the facts.

    9. In Ghulam Murtaza v. Nagina . I.L.R 11 Lah. 410, the plaintiffs, who were malikan qabza in their village and as such not entitled to any share in the shamilat, somehow managed to take possession of portions of the shamilat before 1880 and continued to hold it for over forty years; on these facts it was held established that their possession was neither lawful nor permissive at its inception and, therefore, their title by adverse possession was fully proved. This authority again deals with entirely different facts and is of no avail to the appellants.

    10. Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev . I.L.R 11 Bom. 216. is relied upon for the proposition that possession is general evidence of title and is primarily exclusive, and it is for him, who impugns this exclusive title, to show that the possession arose in some way which had preserved his own right. In this case the defendant had taken sole possession of a part of a house at the time of general partition about thirty five years before the suit and was in exclusive enjoyment thereof. On these facts the adverse possession was held established.

    11. Secretary of State for India v. Bommadevara Venkatanarasimha . 58 I.C 689. deals with the case of riparian owners and is an authority for the proposition that where the true owner of land, having the opportunity to acquaint himself with all the facts and the law, and not being led into any error by the fraud of a party, sees that party openly enjoying the land and claiming it as owner, the true owner cannot, in order to arrest limitation, plead ignorance of the law which made him unaware of his right to possession. This proposition, if anything, goes against the appellants, because here the finding of the Court below is that this lady had no opportunity to acquaint herself with all the facts.

    12. Raghubarprasad Ramgulam Gurao v. Ballo Sheocharan . A.I.R 1941 Nag. 311. is an authority for the proposition that possession to be adverse need not be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the person against whom it is claimed, and it is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time is running ought if he exercises due vigilance to be aware of what is happening. Reliance for this dicta is placed on a decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan . A.I.R 1934 P.C 23..

    13. I need hardly refer to Chanar Singh Jai Ram v. Chanar Singh Jeet Singh . A.I.R 1935 All. 265. and Sukhadeb Ram v. Kulamani Sen . A.I.R 1944 Pat. 74. on which also reliance was placed by the learned counsel. These are Single Bench decisions and they merely apply the ratio of the Privy Council decision in Debendra Lal Khan's case.

    14. The Judicial Committee has in Debendralal Khan's case authoritatively laid down that the nature of the requisite possession must necessarily vary with the nature of the subject possessed, and that the classical requirement namely nec vi nec clam nec precario must be established. The counsel submits that according to the authorities cited above Smt. Man Bai could with reasonable and due diligence have come to know of the change in the revenue entries and of the possession of the proprietors. In my view the counsel is not right in his submission. On the facts of this case it is obvious that a lady in the position of Smt. Man Bai, living in a different village and believing Mst. Makhman to be alive and in possession of property, could not have with due diligence come to know either of the change in the revenue entries or of the alleged exclusive and hostile possession of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 8 to 12. It is clear that the mutation proceedings of 1930 were kept secret from Smt. Man Bai and the entry in question was secured behind her back and without her knowledge. The trial Court has dealt with this matter at considerable length under issue No. 6 and I am also inclined to agree with its reasoning and conclusions. The counsel for the appellants has not been able successfully to assail them. Smt. Man Bai is a cosharer, being also one of the proprietors and, therefore, exclusive possession of a larger share by the other co-sharers cannot by itself be regarded as wrongful or adverse unless it amounts to an open and hostile overt act to the knowledge of the ousted co-owner. See Prem Singh v. Tej Singh . A.I.R 1980 E.P 252.. Ouster obviously implies denial of the right of the claimant to his or her knowledge, actual or presumed.

    15. The counsel then contended that the change in the mutation is by itself an overt act and for this submission he has relied on Sardar Amar Singh v. Sardarni Shiv Datt Kaur . A.I.R 1937 Lah. 89. in which a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court has observed that removal of the name of the absentee co-sharer from the revenue records at the instance of other co-sharers in possession of the land is an overt act amounting to ouster, and commences adverse possession of the co-sharers in possession even if no notice of removal is sent to the absentee co-sharer. The learned Judge did not follow the decision of another Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Beli Ram v. Munshi . A.I.R 1834 Lah. 456. in which on similar facts the possession of one co-sharer was not held to amount to an overt act. In the latter case it was observed that it was for the co-sharer in possession, in order to defeat the title of the absentee co-sharer, to prove that by some overt act he constituted his possession into an adverse possession to the other co-sharers, an overt act of which such co-sharer had knowledge. Although both these cases do not completely cover the one in hand, yet I am not as at present advised, prepared to subscribe to the observations contained in Sardar Amar Singh's case. The manner in which the mutation proceedings in the instant case were kept secret from Smt. Man Bai clearly shows that the conduct and the possession of the appellants was not sufficiently open and hostile so as to amount to adverse possession. On the circumstances of the present case, therefore, the mere removal of name of Mst. Makhman from the revenue papers can by no means be construed to amount to an overt act. In this connection the fact that Smt. Makhman is still alive and the absence of independent evidence on this record as to when—if at all she had remarried and absence of a finding whether her marriage had the effect of forfeiture of her estate are also not without significance.

    16. It is indisputable that statutes of limitation are to be strictly construed and unless their provisions clearly and precisely apply to a particular case, no rightful owner can be deprived of his property at the instance of a wrong doer. The appellants have not succeeded in showing that the conclusion of the Court below on the plea of adverse possession is in any way erroneous, unsustainable or unjust.

    17. For the reasons given above this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Kishori Lal And Another v. Mst. Man Bai And Others
    (Feb 9, 1960)