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Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of Section 3 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 (Punjab Act No. VI of 1947).22. The Act of 1949
  • Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947,
  • provisions contained in Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act
  • SECTION 22 PUNJAB GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1898
  • Section 3 of the East Punjabi Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
  • SECTION 51 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14
  • provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order
  • provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
  • Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act,
  • Government Premises (Eviction) Act (27 of 1950)
  • Section 5(7A) of the Income-tax Act 1923
  • EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT
  • Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950,
  • Government Premises (Eviction) Act.
  • Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
  • O. 23 Rule 3 of the CPC.
  • Rent Restriction Act
  • Section 4(1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 3 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 (Punjab Act No. VI of 1947).22. The Act of 1949
  • Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947,
  • provisions contained in Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act
  • SECTION 22 PUNJAB GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1898
  • Section 3 of the East Punjabi Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
  • SECTION 51 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14
  • provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order
  • provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
  • Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act,
  • Government Premises (Eviction) Act (27 of 1950)
  • Section 5(7A) of the Income-tax Act 1923
  • EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT
  • Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950,
  • Government Premises (Eviction) Act.
  • Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
  • O. 23 Rule 3 of the CPC.
  • Rent Restriction Act
  • Section 4(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by a lessee arising from a suit for ejectment filed by the District Board, Gurdaspur, concerning a sarai at Pathankot (including a portion formerly occupied by the office of the E.A.R.O.). The premises were first leased on 9-8-1945 (Exhibit P.5) for one year, with the last lease dated 28-3-1947 (Exhibit P.1). The lease fixed rent at Rs. 965 per annum and stated that the premises were to be vacated on expiry of the year on 31-3-1948.

The District Board instituted the ejectment suit on 7-7-1952, alleging (1) liability to ejectment on account of expiry of the tenancy period and (2) unauthorized alterations and constructions by the tenant. The lessee (appellant) responded with several defences, including that the building was exempt as government premises from the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, that the exemption provision was unconstitutional, and that a permanent tenancy had been created; he also claimed reimbursement for improvements (claimed at about Rs. 40,000). Fifteen issues were framed at trial. The trial court decreed the suit on 19-11-1953.

The decree was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge on 31-8-1954. The lessee appealed to this Court on 11-12-1954. During pendency, on 23-12-1957 the appellant filed an O.23 R.3 CPC petition alleging a compromise based on a District Board resolution dated 6-10-1956 and related government letters and an enclosure proposing a 25-year lease (subject to Government sanction). Government later declined to grant the sanction. The Court heard submissions and disposed of the appeal with the decision summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there had been a binding compromise within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC that disposed of the litigation.
  2. Whether Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (power to exempt buildings or classes of buildings) is unconstitutional (including whether it offends Article 19(1)(f) or Article 14 of the Constitution).
  3. Whether the notification exempting all Crown property from the Rent Act was invalid (including whether it was a permissible classification and whether it operated retrospectively as to pre-existing tenancies).
  4. Whether the appellant had acquired a permanent tenancy or any agreement giving such tenancy (sufficient to prevent ejectment).
  5. Whether the appellant was entitled to compensation for improvements (invoking principles in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The appellant contended that the building was not properly exempt from the Rent Act because the exemption clause (Section 3) conferred unconstitutional, unfettered discretion on the Government and thereby offended Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
  • The appellant asserted that a permanent tenancy had been created (or agreed to be created) and that he could not be ejected.
  • The appellant claimed entitlement to reimbursement for improvements, contending that about Rs. 40,000 had been expended on the premises (breakdown claimed: Rs. 9,000 in 1946; Rs. 7,000 in 1947; Rs. 24,000 in 1951) and relied on the principles of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The appellant also argued that the notification exempting Crown property could not operate retrospectively to deprive existing tenants of rights.
  • By petition under O.23 R.3 CPC the appellant asserted that the parties had compromised the dispute by a Board resolution and related documents (including an enclosure proposing a 25-year lease), and that this compromise should dispose of the litigation.

Plaintiff / District Board and Government Positions (as recorded)

  • The suit alleged that the tenant was liable to ejectment because the tenancy period had expired and because the tenant had altered the building and made constructions without the landlord's consent.
  • The record shows the existence of official communications and resolutions in which the Board sought Government sanction for a proposed compromise/lease; the Government, however, ultimately refused sanction and issued orders (including from the Revenue Minister) directing that the lessee be evicted even if litigation were necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satish Chander v. Delhi Improvement Trust, 1957-59 P.L.R. 621 (AIR 1958 Punj 1) Held the Government Premises (Eviction) Act ultra vires on the ground that powers were wide and protections inadequate, amounting to interference with Article 19(1)(f). The appellant relied on this decision to argue Section 3 unconstitutional. The Court considered it but distinguished the present provision because Section 3 vests exemption power in the State Government (a different institutional actor) rather than in a single executive official.
Brigade Commander, Meerut v. Ganga Prasad, AIR 1956 All 507 Held the same Government Premises (Eviction) Act ultra vires as contravening Article 14 because of unequal treatment of persons in similar situations. The decision was cited for the proposition that unguided discretion of an authority could violate equality under Article 14; the Court distinguished the present statutory power as vested in the State Government rather than a minor official.
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., 1954 S.C.R. 803 (AIR 1954 SC 224) Struck down provisions as unreasonable where executive was given arbitrary and uncontrolled powers in regulating trade/business; cl.4(3) void. Cited as authority for the general principle that arbitrary powers conferred on executive officers may be unreasonable; Court distinguished present case on the basis that Section 3 relates to State Government action, not powers vested in minor officials.
Rampratap v. Dominion of India, AIR 1953 Bom 170 Authority relevant to validating exemptions of Government from general laws in appropriate cases (classification and rational connection tested under Article 14). Considered one of the authorities more in point; used to support the proposition that exemption of Government may be permissible and not irrational.
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 Observed that discretionary power vested in high executive authorities is not necessarily discriminatory and abuse should not be lightly assumed. Relied upon to support the view that discretion vested in government-level authorities does not automatically render a provision unconstitutional.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 Held that vesting discretion in an authority does not by itself invalidate the provision; possibility of discriminatory treatment does not necessarily void the law. Used to reinforce the Court's conclusion that mere vesting of discretion (here in the State Government under Section 3) does not make the provision unconstitutional.
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balasara, 53 Bom LR 982 (AIR 1951 SC 318) Discussed classification and when exemption of certain classes from law can be upheld under Article 14. Referred to in support of the proposition that exemption of Government property from a Rent Act could be permissible and not arbitrary.
Charanjitlal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 (AIR 1951 SC 41) Authority on classification and limits of state power under Article 14 (cited alongside State of Bombay case). Referenced in the discussion that the exemption of Government from application of a Rent Act need not be arbitrary in every case.
Maina Sahu v. Balak Das, AIR 1938 Pat 435 Discussed application of principles akin to Section 51 of Transfer of Property Act where transferees who expected permanent interest were later evicted and claimed compensation. The appellant relied on principles discussed in this case to claim compensation; the Court held the present facts did not bring the case within that rule (no proved agreement for permanent lease or estoppel).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing the principal contentions in sequence and applying the relevant legal principles and precedents as recorded in the opinion.

  1. Compromise under O.23 R.3 CPC: The Court examined the documentary material relating to the alleged compromise (District Board Resolution of 6-10-1956 and the enclosure proposing a 25-year lease). It emphasised that clause 12 of the proposed lease expressly stated the agreement would not be effective until Government sanction was obtained. Because Government refused to grant sanction, the Court concluded there was no completed compromise within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3, and the O.23 R.3 petition could not operate to dispose of the litigation.
  2. Constitutionality of Section 3 (East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949): The appellant argued Section 3 conferred unfettered discretion on the Government and violated Article 19(1)(f) and Article 14. The Court considered authorities where statutory powers vested in single officials were struck down for being wide and susceptible to abuse. However, it drew a distinction: Section 3 vests exemption power in the State Government (a collective, high-level organ), not in a single minor official or licensing officer. Relying on precedents (including Matajog Dobey and Pannalal Binjraj), the Court held that vesting discretion in high executive authorities is not necessarily discriminatory or constitutionally infirm; mere possibility of abuse does not render the provision invalid. On that basis and in light of supporting decisions (including Bombay authorities), the Court upheld the validity of Section 3.
  3. Validity and effect of the notification exempting Crown property: The appellant challenged the validity and retrospective operation of a notification dated 5-1-1949 exempting Crown property. The Court found the notification was issued under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 (a predecessor Act). The 1949 Act came into force on 25-3-1949 and repealed the 1947 Act; under Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, the earlier notification continued in force until superseded. The Court held that Crown property constituted a legitimate class and that the notification legitimately withdrew Rent Act protections in respect of Crown property. The Court further observed the Rent Act was remedial and did not create vested rights; thus, tenants on Crown property prior to the notification ceased to enjoy the Rent Act's protections after the notification took effect.
  4. Claim of permanent tenancy: The appellant relied on various government letters and documents suggesting a promise or hope of a long lease; however, the Court found that the appellant failed to prove the creation of a permanent tenancy or any binding agreement to that effect. The Court accepted the concurrent findings of the Courts below that no permanent tenancy had been proved, and found no error in those findings.
  5. Compensation for improvements under Section 51, Transfer of Property Act: The appellant claimed about Rs. 40,000 spent on improvements and relied primarily on Section 51. The Court noted (i) Section 51 in terms applies to transferees who believed themselves absolutely entitled and were later evicted by a person with a better title; (ii) prior authorities allowed compensation in cases where a permanent lease had been agreed or where estoppel could be raised. The Court found no evidence to bring the present case within those principles (no proved permanent lease, lack of accounting or substantiating proof, and trial findings that the appellant had not produced adequate evidence). The Court therefore declined to award compensation under Section 51 or by analogy thereto. The Court also noted government correspondence that changed positions over time, but held such communications insufficient in law to attract Section 51 relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Court affirmed the decree for ejectment (trial court and district judge findings were upheld).
  • The Court held (i) there was no binding compromise under O.23 R.3 CPC because Government sanction had not been obtained; (ii) Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act is constitutionally valid; (iii) the notification exempting Crown property was effective and Crown property constituted a permissible class for exemption; (iv) no permanent tenancy had been proved; and (v) the appellant was not entitled to compensation for improvements under Section 51 or by application of its principles to these facts.
  • There was no order as to costs in this Court.
  • The appellant was given three months from the date of the judgment to remove structures and restore the premises to the condition in which they were leased to the lessor.
  • The opinion does not announce a novel constitutional principle; rather it applies existing authorities to distinguish vesting of discretion in the State Government from delegation to subordinate officials and upholds the statute and the notification on those bases.

Source: summary prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what is explicitly contained in that text.

    Sadhu Singh v. District Board

    1. This is a lessee's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment filed by the District Board, Gurdaspur, with regard to a sarai situate at Pathankot including a portion which was occupied at one time by the office of the E.A.R.O The building was leased out on 9-8-1945, vide Exhibit P. 5, for one year. The lease was renewed, the last lease being of 28-3-1947, Exhibit P. 1. According to the terms of this lease, the rent was fixed at Rs. 965/- per annum and there was the usual term that the premises would be vacated on the expiry of year on 31-3-1948. The suit for ejectment was instituted on 7-7-1952 on the allegations that the tenant was liable to ejectment on account of the expiry of the period of tenancy and for having altered the building and made constructions without the consent of the landlord.

    2. It was claimed that the building in dispute was exempt from the operation of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, it being Government premises. According to the lessee no such exemption could be claimed as the provision under which such an exemption had been made was unconstitutional. It was further pleaded that the lease was meant to be a permanent one and there could be no ejectment. If was also claimed that the lessee had effected improvements in the building with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff to the extent of Rs. 40,000/- to which he was entitled to be reimbursed before eviction. As many as 15 issues were framed by the trial Court. The suit was ultimately decreed on 19-11-1953.

    3. This decree was confirmed in appeal by the learned District Judge on 31-8-1954. An appeal was filed in this Court by the lessee on 11-12-1954. On 23-12-1957 the appellant filed a petition under O. 23 R. 3 of the CPC, alleging that the dispute between the parties had been compromised, vide District Board's Resolution No. 341 D/- 6-10-56 on the terms & conditions mentioned in the Government letter dated 21-7-1949 (produced as Exhibit D. 32 in the case), and Punjab Government letter dated 2nd/4th May 1951 (produced as Exhibit D. 1 in the case). A copy was attached giving the terms of the compromise. Along with this petition a copy of an enclosure to the District Board's Resolution dated 6-10-1956 giving the detailed terms of a lease for 25 years was attached. According to cl. No. 12 of this enclosure, the new agreement or proposal was not to be effective till the sanction of Government was granted. The enclosure referred to before contained the Sub-committee's report which was approved by the Board on 6-10-1956, in the following terms:

    “Sub-Committee's report is approved. It may be compromised subject to the modification of condition No. 7 as separately recorded from the date of Government's approval.”

    4. The Chairman District Board addressed a communication to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, on 16-10-1956 which is also to be found among the documents attached to the petition relating to the compromise. In this letter it was stated that the Board had decided to compromise the case and the approval of the Government was sought. On 29-10-1956 the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Vice Chairman of the Board as follows:

    “In view of the fact that Government is itself anxious to effect a settlement in the matter, you are advised to compromise the cases lodged in the Courts of law if the hearing dates are fixed before the sanction of the settlement arrived at is received from Government.”

    5. This obviously had reference to certain other litigation pending between the Board and the appellant relating to rent etc. It further appears from an affidavit of the Secretary of the Board dated 6-1-1958 that the Government declined to give sanction. The orders of the Government were made by the Revenue Minister, Giani Kartar Singh, and may be set out as follows:

    “S.H.L.G should visit the site himself or request Commissioner to do so in order to ascertain if the site can be sold for a good sum. The lessee does not appear to be a deserving one for grant of further leases. Steps should be taken to get the Sarai vacated from him even if that involves litigation.”

    6. The question about the compromise was put up before Gosain J. who made an order on 23-12-1957 directing parties to file the necessary affidavits and the replies. Thereafter the appeal has been placed before me for disposal.

    7. It is not possible to accede to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that there has been a compromise between the parties and that the suit had been adjusted wholly or in part by any agreement or compromise within the meaning of O. 23 Rule 3 of the CPC. As pointed out before, the so-called new agreement or proposal was not to be effective until the sanction of Government had been obtained. The Government refused to grant sanction with the result that there was no completed compromise.

    8. Mr. F.C Mital has next raised the question) of the constitutionality of Section 3 of the East Punjabi Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The aforesaid section is in the following terms:

    “The State Government may direct that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any particular building or rented land or any class of buildings or rented lands.”

    9. It is contended that the Government has been given unfettered discretion to exempt any particular building or class of buildings from the operation of the Act, which was intended to benefit the tenants generally against arbitrary and illegal eviction. Actually a notification dated 5-1-1949 was issued by the State Government by which all Crown property had been exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act. It is urged that by means of the aforesaid notification the very object of the Act is being defeated.

    10. Such a provision, according to Mr. Mital, offends the provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. In support of this he has relied on Satish Chander v. Delhi Improvement Trust, 1957-59 P.L.R 621 : (AIR 1958 Punj 1) which is a Bench decision of this Court declaring the Government Premises (Eviction) Act (27 of 1950) ultra vires on the ground that it offended against the fundamental right of property conferred by Article 19(1)(f). Certain Allahabad and Calcutta decisions were relied upon for holding the aforesaid Act to be unconstitutional. At page 626 (of Pun LR): (at p. 4 of AIR), it was observed by Falshaw J. as: follows:

    “I consider, however, that there is more force in the view expressed in both the judgments that the powers given to the competent officer under the Act are so wide and capable of abuse and that the protections provided by the Act to the rights of any person effected by orders passed by the competent authority under sections to be enforced are so inadequate that the provisions of the Act as a whole amount to interference with the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(1)(f); to hold property which is not saved by the provisions of cl. (5) of the Article.”

    11. The learned Judge further considered that the Act in that case was capable of widest possible employment in matters of wholly different nature to the cases mentioned above. In Brigade Commander, Meerut v. Ganga Prasad, (S) AIR 1956 All 507, the same Act was declared ultra vires as contravening the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 was held to be applicable with full force to a situation where a person occupying Government premises was not afforded the same protection as was afforded to a person occupying private land and differential treatment had no reasonable connection with the objects sought to be achieved.

    12. Moreover, the unguided and unfettered discretion of a non-judicial authority to relegate persons Similarly situated to different remedies was found to be clearly violative of the principle of equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14. Falshaw J: in Satish Chander's case, 1957-59 Pun LR 621 : (AIR 1958 Punj 1) did not consider that Article 14 could be properly invoked with regard to the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950, as the Allahabad Court; sought to have done. My attention was also called to Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 S.C.R 803 : (AIR 1954 SC 224), where the validity of certain provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order was involved.

    13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court declared the provisions of cl. 4(3) of the Order void on the ground that the law or order which conferred arbitrary and uncontrolled powers upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities must be held to be unreasonable. It is noteworthy that the executive authorities on whom the so-called unfettered and arbitrary powers had been conferred in the cases cited before me consisted of the Competent Officer in one case, and the licensing authority, which meant the District Magistrate of the District, in the other case. Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act, however, confers powers to make an exemption on the State Government which is very different from conferring powers on an executive official.

    14. The State Government does not consist of one individual and whatever decisions are taken by the Government they cannot be regarded exercise of discretion in the same manner as it can be exercised by the District Magistrate or a competent Officer under the Government Premises (Eviction) Act. The authorities which are more in point for deciding the question raised are Rampratap v. Dominion of India, AIR 1953 Bom 170 Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , (S) AIR 1956 SC 44 and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397.

    15. In the Bombay case it was held that in exempting Government from the operation of the law, by virtue of Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947, the legislature had not created a class of which it could be said that it had no rational connection with the object the legislature wanted to achieve by the Act and that the classification was not unreasonable. At page 1173 it has been observed that Article 14 does not prevent the State in proper cases from exempting certain classes of persons from the application of a particular law, nor does it compel the State to extend the application of a particular law to all classes of subjects or to all territories coming within the jurisdiction of the State.

    16. An argument was raised that if the classification was such as was destructive of the very object then that classification was not a permissible classification. It was pointed out in that case by the counsel impugning the validity of Section 4(1) that the whole object of the Rent Restriction Act was to control rents and to control evictions, and if Government were to be exempted from that legislation then the result-would be that it would be open to the Government: to raise rents and also to evict their tenants. After considering the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. F.N Balasara, 53 Bom LR 982 : (AIR 1951 SC 318) and Charanjitlal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : (AIR 1951 SC 41), Chagla C.J came to the conclusion that the exemption of the Government from the operation of the Act could not be considered arbitrary and capricious.

    17. The learned Chief Justice considered that the underlying assumption of the exemption was that the Government would not increase rents and would not eject tenants unless it was absolutely necessary in the public interest and unless a particular building was required for a public purpose. While deciding the constitutionality of Section 197 of the Cr PC their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Matajog Dobey's case, (S) AIR 1956 SC 44 observed that a discretionary power was not necessarily a discriminatory power and abuse of power was not to be easily assumed where the discretion was vested in the Government and not in a minor official.

    18. In Pannalal Binjraj's case, AIR 1957 SC 397, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the power of transfer given to the Commissioner of Income-tax by Section 5(7A) of the Income-tax Act 1923 rendered that provision unconstitutional and no rules or directions had been laid in regard to the exercise of that power. Their Lordships laid down the law quite clearly that the mere fact that a discretion had been vested in the authority concerned was not sufficient to characterize the exercise of discretion as discriminatory. Even if there was a possibility of a discriminatory treatment of persons falling within the same group or category, such possibility could not necessarily invalidate the piece of legislation. If a mala fide order was passed that could be struck down, but the provision itself would not become unconstitutional. The following observations of Bhagwati J. at page 408 are significant:

    “It may also be remembered that this power is vested not in minor officials but he top-ranking authorities like the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Central Board of Revenue who act on the information supplied to them by the Income-tax Officers concerned. This power is discretionary and not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power cannot be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in such high officials.”

    19. In view of the discussion above, it must be held that, the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act are perfectly valid.

    20. Mr. F.C Mital has then attacked the validity of the notification itself. According to him the notification exempts all Crown property from the provisions of the Act and this cannot fall under S. 3, according to which, any property, building or class of buildings etc. could be exempted. The argument is that S. 3 contemplates a particular building or a class of buildings with reference to the same being residential or non-residential or capable of being-classified with reference to the locality or the material used therein. I fail to see any force in this contention.

    21. All properties or buildings which are Crown, property would certainly form a class by themselves as the word ‘class’ must be given its plain meaning: and cannot be given a restricted or a narrow meaning as Mr. Mital seeks to give. The next submission of Mr. Mital is that the notification in question could not have a retrospective effect and could not be made applicable to those leases which had created relationship of landlord and tenant prior to the enforcement of the Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. This argument is obviously based on fallacy. The notification in question was issued on 5-1-1949, under the provisions of Section 3 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 (Punjab Act No. VI of 1947).

    22. The Act of 1949 came into force on 25-3-1949. The notification was therefore not issued under the Act of 1949, but was issued under a similar provision existing in the previous Act of 1947. The Act of 1947 was repealed by S. 21 of the Act of 1949, By virtue of the provisions of Section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, the notification issued under the Act of 1947 was to continue in force until it had been superseded by any other notification issued under the new Act. As soon as the notification was made in January 1949, it exempted all Crown property from the provisions of the Act which meant that the protection which was given by the Rent Act to tenants was withdrawn with regard to Crown property. In other words, so far as Crown property was concerned, the ordinary law of the land was to apply in the matter of eviction of the tenants occupying such property.

    23. There was no question of taking away any vested rights as the Rent Restriction Act could not be regarded as having created any vested rights in the tenants to remain in occupation of the property. The Rent Act constituted a kind of remedial legislation which gave additional protection to the tenants but could not possibly be regarded as creating any vested rights in them. Therefore, even if a person was living in the Crown property as a tenant prior to the notification he ceased to enjoy the protection given by the Rent Act after the notification.

    24. The main defence of the appellant was that a permanent tenancy had been created or had been agreed to be effected. A good deal of emphasis was laid on various letters and documents of the Government which held out a hope that the property in dispute would be leased out to the appellant permanently and that he would not be ejected so long as the paid the rent. There will be an occasion to notice some of this correspondence when the question of compensation for improvements is considered, but suffice it to say with regard to the matter of permanent tenancy that the appellant has completely failed to prove any such tenancy or any agreement by virtue of which such a tenancy would have come into existence. The concurrent findings of the Courts below are also to this effect and Mr. Mital has not been able to show that there is any error involved in those findings.

    25. Mr. F.C Mital his strenuously contended that even if the appellant is to be ejected he should be given compensation for the improvements. It is claimed that a certain portion marked A, B, C, D and Q in the plan, Exhibit P. 43, was built by the appellant at a cost of Rs. 9,000/- in the year 1946 soon after the property in question had been taken on lease. In 1947 the water and electricity were laid at his cost and another portion D, B, R, S was constructed at a cost of Rs. 7,000/-. Reference is invited to the reports and resolutions of the officers of the District Board and the District Board itself. Exhibits D. 22 and D. 21, which showed that the buildings were in such a bad state of repairs that they were estimated to cost about Rs. 12,000/-.

    26. Another sum of Rs. 24,000/- is claimed to have been expended later on in 1951. It is, thus, claimed that about Rs. 40,000/- were expended on these improvements for which compensation must be granted before the appellant can be ordered to vacate the demised premises. The trial Court found that the appellant had not produced any evidence to show what the value or the cost of the improvements was nor had he produced any account-books to substantiate his claim to the tune of Rs. 40,000/-. Mr. Mital, however, urges that his client was not given proper opportunity by the trial Court to produce the evidence on the question of the value of improvements.

    27. He has referred me to the proceedings of the trial Court to show that the appellant's evidence had been closed arbitrarily and that he had not been allowed to examine Gurcharan Singh, an overseer, who had prepared an estimate of the improvements, and Ch. Dalip Singh and S. Sher Singh, member and Vice-President of the District Board respectively. The question whether proper opportunity had been given or not was considered by the learned District Judge and he was of the opinion that the objection was devoid of all force and that the appellant's conduct showed that his intention was simply to prolong the proceedings. Apart from this, it would be unnecessary to decide this matter if the appellant cannot succeed in showing that he is entitled to compensation for improvements and that the same can be granted to him in these proceedings.

    28. For the purpose of claiming compensation Mr. Mital has mainly relied on the provisions of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that when the transferee of immovable property makes an improvement on the property, believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto, and he is subsequently evicted therefrom by any person having a better title, the transferee has a right to require the person causing the eviction either to have the value of the improvement estimated and paid or secured to the transferee, or to sell his interest in the property to the transferee at the then market-value thereof, irrespective of the value of such improvement.

    29. Although this section does not in terms apply between a landlord and a tenant, compensation has been allowed on the principles contained therein to I persons who entered into possession on an agreement that they would be given a permanent lease. Some of the cases in which the aforesaid principle was applied are discussed in Maina Sahu v. Balak Das, AIR 1938 Pat 435, but in all those cases, either there was a verbal agreement to create a permanent lease or such facts existed as raised an estoppel against the landlord from contending that a permanent lease was not to come into existence.

    30. The learned District Judge has discussed certain authorities according to which even in case of a permanent lease expenses incurred in making improvements cannot be allowed under the provisions of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is altogether unnecessary to discuss this matter further as there is absolutely nothing on the record which can bring the present case within the rule laid down in AIR 1938 Pat 435, or attract the principle of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that the Government has been acting in a very strange and queer way as is apparent from certain documents on the record. The Secretary to the Punjab Government addressed a letter to the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, dated 4-5-1951, with regard to the ejectment of the appellant. In para 2 of the letter it is stated as follows:

    “On further consideration of the matter in its-important aspects Government have ordered that the District Board, Gurdaspur should be directed to give the Sarai in question to S. Sadhu Singh on a lease for 25 years on the present rent with the conditions that he shall not sublet the premises or use them for any other purpose and he will not be entitled to any compensation when handing back the-premises on the expiry of the aforesaid period of 25 years. If the Board fails to comply with these orders-immediately Government will resume control of the Sarai from the Board and lease it out themselves. These orders of the Government may kindly be communicated to the Board (vide Exhibit D. 1).”

    31. Previous to this also a letter had been addressed by the Secretary to Punjab Government to the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on 5-12-1950, calling the attention of the Board to instructions issued by the Punjab Government in an earlier letter dated 21-7-1949 whereby the old tenants and refugees were not to be ousted if they agreed to pay rents equal to three times the rents prevailing in 1939. The Government wanted to be apprised of the full facts of the case of the appellant and also whether he agreed to the aforesaid condition or not (vide Exhibit D. 2). In a subsequent letter, Exhibit D. 4, dated 22-4-1952, however, the Government again took a decision that the appellant should be ejected.

    32. Thereafter in 1956 during the pendency of the present appeal the Deputy Commissioner wrote a letter to the Vice-Chairman of the Board dated, 29-10-1956, which has already been referred to at an earlier stage, and then finally there are the orders of the Revenue Minister dated 3-5-1957 to the effect that the property in question should be got vacated from the appellant even if that involved litigation. It is unfortunate that the Government should have been changing its decision from time to time as it must have created a semblance of a hope in the mind of the appellant that he might be allowed to stay on indefinitely. But that by itself was not sufficient in law to attract the application of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    33. For all these reasons the judgment of the learned District Judge must be upheld and the appeal dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Ordered accordingly.

    34. The appellant will have three months from today to remove the structures etc. and restore the premises in dispute in the condition it was leased out to the lessor.

    IB/D.H.Z

    35. Appeal dismissed.

    Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

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    Sadhu Singh v. District Board
    (Apr 10, 1958)