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Citation Codes
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Case Number
Advocates
  • Anand Swaroop
  • S.M. Sikri
  • Advocate-General
  • and Bhagirath Dass
Judges
  • Bishan Narain, J.
Acts
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Anand Swaroop
  • S.M. Sikri
  • Advocate-General
  • and Bhagirath Dass
Judges
  • Bishan Narain, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Governor of Punjab issued notifications on 9-1-1956 and 11-1-1956 under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, amending earlier notifications so as to exclude disputes between (a) Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) Limited, Amritsar, and its workmen and (b) Amritsar Rayon and Silk Mills Limited, Amritsar, and its workmen from a reference previously made to an Industrial Tribunal concerning textile and allied industries of Amritsar.

The Textile Workers Union (Registered), Amritsar, filed two writ petitions (Nos. 197 and 196 of 1956) challenging the validity of those amendments on the ground that once a government refers a dispute under S.10(1)(c) to an Industrial Tribunal it cannot withdraw that dispute.

The procedural history set out in the opinion recounts several earlier notifications beginning on 6-6-1952 (initial reference of six disputes), subsequent broader references (21-6-1952 and 9-9-1952), an amendment (11-10-1952), a rescission on 4-12-1954 leaving only the 6-6-1952 notification operative, further amendments and separations of issues (18-3-1955), and exclusions of certain unregistered units (30-6-1955). The two challenged amendments (9-1-1956 and 11-1-1956) withdrew the two named industries' disputes from the Tribunal's reference. Subsequently (5-5-1956) most textile references were withdrawn except as to seven factories, said to be consequence of settlements.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after a government has referred an industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the government may subsequently amend, vary or rescind that reference so as to withdraw particular disputes from the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
  2. Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (which confers on an authority power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications/orders), is applicable to orders made under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, or whether the Industrial Disputes Act excludes Section 21 by necessary implication because Sections such as S.10, S.16, S.17, S.17A and S.18 are mandatory in character.
  3. Whether a dispute once referred must necessarily culminate in an award by the same Tribunal, or whether the government may withdraw or re-refer the dispute (and the consequences of any such power for settlements and conciliation processes).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioning Union's Arguments

  • Once a dispute is referred to an Industrial Tribunal under S.10(1)(c), the Government has no power to withdraw that dispute; the dispute must be adjudicated by the Tribunal.
  • If a dispute is settled before an award is made, the settlement may be incorporated in the Tribunal's award, but that does not permit the Government to withdraw the reference altogether.
  • The petitioners relied on the decision in D.N. Ganguly v. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 449 (A), which the opinion records as supporting the petitioners' contention.

Respondents' / State's Arguments

  • The Government may read Section 10(1)(c) together with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act so as to have power to amend, vary or rescind previous notifications under S.10; S.21 expressly confers power to amend or rescind notifications.
  • It was urged (by the respondents) that the Industrial Disputes Act does not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 21; to the extent exclusion is asserted, that exclusion would have to be by necessary implication, which the respondents disputed.
  • The respondents relied upon the principle (as set out in the opinion) that, in certain circumstances, the Government may withdraw a dispute from one Tribunal and refer it to another (citing Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Their Workers, AIR 1953 S.C. 505), indicating that withdrawal or re-reference is permissible in some situations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
D.N. Ganguly v. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 449 (A) Support for the contention that, once a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the Government has no power to withdraw it (as relied on by the petitioners). The opinion records that this decision "undoubtedly supports" the petitioners' contention; the court acknowledges the case but reaches a contrary overall conclusion after statutory construction and other authorities are considered.
Messrs. Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore v. Their Workers, AIR 1953 S.C. 505 Establishes that the Government may withdraw a dispute from one Tribunal and refer it to another; that a Tribunal may be created for a limited time and a dispute may be withdrawn if it cannot be adjudicated within that lifetime. The court treats this Supreme Court decision as supporting the proposition that orders/notifications under the Industrial Disputes Act can be rescinded or amended before an award is made, and uses it to bolster the conclusion that withdrawal/amendment is permissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by statutory construction and practical-policy reasoning, applying the following steps:

  1. Statutory Powers: The court noted that Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act authorises the appropriate Government to refer, by order in writing, any industrial dispute which in its opinion exists or is apprehended. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act confers a power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications or orders where power to make them is conferred.
  2. Harmonious Reading: The court read Section 10(1)(c) together with Section 21 and concluded that the Government therefore has power to amend previous notifications so as to exclude particular disputes from a reference where, in the Government's opinion, no dispute exists or none is apprehended.
  3. Counter-argument Considered: The court confronted the argument that the Industrial Disputes Act implicitly excludes Section 21 (on the ground that sections like S.10 and subsequent sections are mandatory and make it obligatory that a reference culminate in an award). The court found no express provision excluding Section 21 and rejected the necessary-implication argument: the mandatory language of S.10 and related sections did not preclude the application of S.21.
  4. Practical Consequences: The court reasoned that permitting amendment, variation or rescission serves the object of labour legislation — securing fair terms and preventing disputes — by allowing the Government to stop proceedings where disputes have ceased or changed, and by facilitating conciliation and settlement. Forcing proceedings to continue in the Tribunal when the real nature of disputes has changed or they have ceased would serve no purpose.
  5. Precedential Support: The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Minerva Mills to show that it is permissible to withdraw a dispute from a Tribunal (and to refer it elsewhere), and from that proposition inferred there is no obligation that a dispute once referred must be finally adjudicated by the same Tribunal; this supported the conclusion that references can be rescinded or amended before an award.
  6. Policy Observation: The court acknowledged that its conclusion might weaken collective bargaining power of trade unions or encourage individual settlements, but it explicitly stated that such policy considerations were not matters for judicial decision-making in these proceedings.
  7. Application to Facts: The court applied the legal conclusions to the facts: the reference relating to Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) Limited was withdrawn because the Government was satisfied there never was any dispute between management and workmen in that industry; the reference relating to Amritsar Rayon and Silk Mills was withdrawn because the Government was satisfied the parties had settled their disputes in the presence of the conciliation officer who had reported under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  8. Conclusion on Petitions: Given the statutory power to amend or rescind references and the factual findings about the absence or settlement of disputes, the court found no reason to hold the challenged notifications invalid and dismissed the petitions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed both writ petitions. The operative final line of the opinion is: "Petitions dismissed." The court left the parties to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The notifications of 9-1-1956 and 11-1-1956 excluding the disputes of Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) Limited and Amritsar Rayon and Silk Mills from the Industrial Tribunal's reference were upheld; the petitions challenging those amendments were dismissed. The petitioning union was not awarded costs; each party bears its own costs.
  • Legal consequence drawn by the court: A government has the power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, to amend, vary or rescind notifications/orders referring disputes to an Industrial Tribunal, even before an award is made, including the withdrawal of particular disputes or disputes relating to particular industries from an existing reference.
  • Broader policy note (as recorded by the court): While the conclusion may affect collective bargaining dynamics (potentially weakening unions' negotiating position or encouraging individual settlements), the court treated such policy effects as matters outside the scope of judicial intervention in the present proceedings.
  • No novel rule displacing cited authority: The court’s decision recognized and applied existing authorities (including Minerva Mills) and statutory construction rather than asserting a sweeping new departure from prior law; the opinion applies those principles to the facts of these petitions.
V.S.B

Disposition: Petitions dismissed.

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    The Textile Workers Union, Amritsar v. The State Of Punjab And Others

    1. The Governor of the Punjab issues a notification on 9-1-1956 and another one on 11-1-56 under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, whereby the previous notifications under S. 10 were amended so as to exclude the disputes between the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) Limited, Amritsar, and its workmen and between the Amritsar Rayon and Silk Mills limited, Amritsar, and its workmen from the purview of the Industrial Tribunal to which the disputes between all the textile and all other allied industries of Amritsar and their workmen had been previously referred for adjudication. The Textile Workers Union (Registered) Amritsar has filed these two separate writ petitions (Nos. 197 and 196 of 1956) to challenge the validity of these notifications on the ground that once the Government has referred a dispute for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act it is not open to it to withdraw that dispute. These petitions are contested by the Punjab State and also by the industries concerned. There is a fairly long history which has culminated in these notifications in dispute. By notification dated 6-6-1952, six disputes between the Textile Workers Union (Registered), Amritsar, and the Textile Manufacturers Association (Registered). Amritsar, were fererred under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. By notification dated 21-6-1952, the same six disputes between the same Union and the Textile Mills and Factories in Amritsar and Chheharta were referred for adjudication by the same Tribunal. By notification dated 9-9-1952, the same disputes between the same Union and the Textile Mills and Factories, represented by the Textile Manufacturers Association, Amritsar, and other allied textile Associations were referred for adjudication. The Governor then by notification dated 11-10-1952, amended the notification of 21-6-1952, by making the disputes to be between the industries and the workers Union as well as their respective workers. By notification dated 4-12-1954, the Governor rescinded the notification dated 21-6-1952, as amended by notifications dated 9-9-1952, and 11-10-1952.

    2. The result was that only the notification dated 6-6-1952, remained operative which had referred these very disputes between the Textile Workers Union and the Textile Manufacturers Association. By another notification of the same date (4-12-1954) the same disputes were referred for adjudication between the textile mills and factories, represented by the Textile Manufacturers Association and all other allied textile factories etc. of Amritsar and Chheharta and the Textile Workers Union. By a subsequent notification of 18-3-1955, the previous notification was amended and item No. 1 of the disputes which relates to reinstatement of retrenched workers was separated from the five items of dispute.

    3. I am informed that this was done to facilitate compromise and settlement between the parties concerned so far as it related to these five items and that in fact many such settlements were successfully made. There was then another notification by which the disputes relating to handloom industry, unregistered textile factories and other unregistered allied units were excluded from the purview of the Industrial Tribunal. This notification was issued on 30-6-1955. The original notification of 7-12-1954, was again amended on 9-1-1956 (by which the disputes between the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) Limited and its workmen were excluded from the reference.

    4. Similarly by notification dated 11-1-1956, the disputes between the Amritsar Rayon and Silk Mills and its workmen were excluded from the reference. The present petitions challenge the validity of the amendments dated 9-1-1956, and 11-1-1956, by which the disputes relating to these two industries and their workmen were withdrawn from adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal which was already seized of the same.

    5. Before discussing the case I may state that by notification dated 5-5-1956, a reference relating to all these textile industries etc. was withdrawn with the exception of the disputes relating to seven factories which are mentioned in that notification. I am informed that this was the consequence of the settlement and arrangements between the individual factories and their workmen.

    6. It is argued on behalf of the petitioning workmen Union that once a dispute is referred to the Tribunal the Government has no power to withdrawn it and the dispute must be adjudicated by the Tribunal. The learned counsel's argument is that if the dispute is settled before the award is made then the settlement may be incorporated in the Tribunal's award but the dispute cannot be withdrawn. The learned counsel has relied in support of his contention on D.N Ganguly v. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 449 (A), which undoubtedly supports him.

    7. Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, empowers an appropriate Government to refer by an order in writing any industrial disputes which in its opinion exists or is apprehended. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, lays down that when a power to make orders or issue notifications is conferred then that power includes a power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind any notification or order passed subject to the like conditions. One of the objects of the General Clauses Act is to shorten the language of statutory enactments and this is achieved by specifically mentioning the power to make orders only as the power of addition etc. therein is automatically and by necessary implication conferred on the authority by virtue; of this section.

    8. If Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, then there can be no doubt that the Government has the power to amend the previous notifications so as to exclude the disputes relating to the two respondent-industries. If in the opinion of the Government there is no existing dispute nor is one apprehended it is for this reason that the power to amend is not specifically mentioned in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

    9. It is, however, urged that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act exclude the applicability of S. 21 to S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. There is no such express provision in the Act and the argument is that the exclusion should be inferred by necessary implication. It is urged that S. 10 imposes a duty and obligation upon the State Government to refer an industrial dispute to the Tribunal if the prescribed conditions are satisfied and that Ss. 16, 17, 17A, and 18 are also mandatory in character. These sections make it obligatory on the Tribunal to make an award after following certain procedure and it has been laid down that such an award shall be binding on the parties. In view of the fact that these provisions are mandatory it is argued that when a reference has been made it must culminate into an award and the reference cannot be cancelled or withdrawn before an award is made.

    10. It is true that S. 10 is mandatory and that the other sections mentioned above also use similar language. This, however, does not, to my mind, make any difference to the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to the powers conferred under S. 10. If the Government after reference of the dispute and before the award is made comes to the conclusion that the nature of the dispute has changed or additional disputes have arisen then no violation of the provisions of the Act would be done if the order and notification is so amended or moulded as to bring it in consonance with the real dispute between the parties.

    11. Similarly if the Government comes to the conclusion that the industrial dispute has ceased to exist or is no longer apprehended then I see no reason why the Government should not have the right to rescind the notification. It has been repeatedly held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the object of all labour legislations is firstly to ensure fair terms to the workmen and secondly to prevent disputes between employers and employees so that production may not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the public may not suffer.

    12. In my opinion, this object can be better served by enabling the Government to vary, amend, or rescind the notifications under the Industrial Disputes Act rather than to allow those proceedings to continue even where such disputes had ceased to exist. It is well-known that conciliation between contending parties would be more easily achieved if there is a prospect of terminating arbitration proceedings before the Tribunal than where there is no such possibility. After all the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act indicate that compulsory adjudication by the Tribunal is to be resorted to when all efforts to bring about a settlements between the parties have failed.

    13. No purpose at all will be served by compelling the parties to continue proceedings before the Tribunal even after it is known that the nature of the disputes has changed or that additional disputes have arisen or that they or some of them have ceased to exist.

    14. The learned counsel for the respondents has brought to my notice the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Messrs. Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore v. Their Workers, AIR 1953 S.C 505 (B). It has been held in this decision that it is open to the Central Government to withdraw a dispute from one Tribunal and refer it to another Tribunal. It has further been held that a Tribunal may be created for a limited time and if the dispute cannot be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal within the lifetime then it can be withdrawn from that Tribunal and sent to another Tribunal. It, therefore, follows that it is not necessary that a dispute once referred to a Tribunal must necessarily be decided by the same Tribunal.

    15. It appears to me that if it is open to the Government to withdraw a dispute from a Tribunal for whatever reason, there is no corresponding obligation to refer the dispute to another Tribunal. In the circumstances of the casa the Government may or may not do so. At least there is no express or implied provision in the Act to lead to that conclusion. This decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court so far as it goes supports the view that the orders or notifications under the Industrial Disputes Act can be rescinded or amended before the Tribunal concerned has given its award.

    16. I am conscious of the fact that this conclusion may have the effect of weakening a trade union's power of negotiation and may encourage the individual firms to deal directly with its own workmen but it is a matter of policy with which I have nothing to do in these proceedings. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Government has full power to amend or vary or rescind an order passed and a notification issued under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even if it has the consequence of withdrawing particular disputes or disputes relating to particular industries from the reference already made to the Industrial Tribunal.

    17. At the end I may state that in the present cases the reference relating to the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) Limited, Amritsar, was withdrawn because the Government was satisfied that in this particular industry there never was any dispute between the management and its workmen and in the case of the Amritsar Rayon and Silk Mills the Government was satisfied that after reference of the dispute to the Tribunal the management and its workmen had settled disputes in presence of the conciliation officer who had reported the matter to the Government under. Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

    18. In these circumstances I see no compelling reason to come to the conclusion that it was incumbent upon the Government to allow the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal instead of amending the notifications which had already been issued. For all these reasons I see no force in these two petitions and I dismiss both of them. As the petitioning Union had filed the petitions on a question of principle, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    V.S.B

    19. Petitions dismissed.

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    The Textile Workers Union, Amritsar v. The State Of Punjab And Others
    (May 3, 1957)