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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit by the plaintiff-respondent (the lessee) for possession of 227 bighas 11 biswas of land and for a declaration that a Collector's order dated 1-4-1950 was invalid. The material facts as presented in the opinion are:

  • Original owners Ghayas-ud-Din and Siraj-ud-Din mortgaged the land with possession on 25-5-1945 to several mortgagees (defendants 1–5).
  • On 21-2-1946 the owners executed a perpetual lease in favour of the plaintiff for Rs.10,000 (registered deed): Rs.5,000 paid and Rs.6,000 deposited to be paid to the mortgagees; the lease deed included a right for the plaintiff to redeem the property from the mortgagees.
  • The plaintiff applied to the Collector on 22-4-1949 for redemption under the Redemption of Mortgages Act; meanwhile, the owners left India at Partition and the property vested in the Custodian as evacuee property.
  • An Ordinance (25-7-1949) and later Act 36 of 1949 declared that all leases effected by evacuees terminated from 25-7-1949. Despite this, the Collector (apparently uninformed of the legal position) passed an order allowing redemption on 5-10-1949.
  • The Custodian applied for review and the Collector, with superior's permission, reviewed and set aside his earlier redemption order on 1-4-1950, apparently relying on provincial tenancy review powers.
  • The mortgagees filed a suit under Section 13 of the Redemption of Mortgages Act which was dismissed on 2-6-1950; consequently, the Collector's original redemption order remained effective vis-à-vis the defendants until the Collector's own review.
  • The plaintiff filed suit on 23-11-1950 seeking a declaration that the Collector's review (1-4-1950) was invalid and for possession; this suit was decreed on 29-12-1951.
  • One defendant, Surja, died on 28-7-1951 while the suit was pending; the plaintiff did not initially bring his legal representatives on record. An appeal by the mortgagees (including Surja's representatives) was filed on 29-1-1952; the Custodian filed a separate appeal on 6-2-1952.
  • The District Judge framed two issues concerning Surja's death and the effect of non-impleading his representatives, and whether abatement (if any) could be set aside; the District Judge set aside abatement, allowed Surja's representatives to be brought on record, and decided the appeal on merits upholding the decree for the plaintiff.
  • The defendants appealed to this Court pressing two principal points: (1) that the decree was a nullity because it was passed against a dead person and the District Judge should not have set aside the abatement or should have remitted the case to the trial Court; and (2) that the Collector's review order was not invalid, so the plaintiff was not entitled to the decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of a defendant (Surja) during the proceedings caused the suit to abate such that the decree passed was a nullity, and whether the District Judge was entitled to set aside abatement and allow the deceased's legal representatives to be brought on record (including whether limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should have been extended).
  2. Whether the Collector had jurisdiction to review and set aside his earlier order of redemption (dated 5-10-1949) by his order of 1-4-1950, or whether that review order was without jurisdiction and therefore invalid; and relatedly whether the plaintiff's redemption and decree should stand.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' / Appellants' Arguments

  • The decree obtained by the plaintiff was a nullity because it had been passed against Surja, who had died before the decree; therefore the decree should be set aside for abatement.
  • The District Judge should not have set aside the abatement because there was insufficient ground to extend the period under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for bringing the legal representatives on record.
  • Even if abatement could be set aside, the District Judge should have remitted the case to the Senior Subordinate (trial) Judge to continue proceedings from the stage when Surja died.
  • On merits, it was contended that the Collector's later order reviewing his earlier order of redemption was valid; therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to the decree obtained in his favour.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments

  • The plaintiff swore that he did not know of Surja's death; this ignorance was accepted by the District Judge and constituted sufficient cause for not making the application to implead the legal representatives within the statutory period.
  • The plaintiff relied on the order of the Collector allowing redemption (ordered on 5-10-1949) and maintained that the Collector had no power to review that order under the Redemption of Mortgages Act; the only statutory route to avoid such an order was by a suit under section 12, which suit by the mortgagees had been dismissed on 2-6-1950.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tota Bam v. Kundan, AIR 1928 Lah 784 Holds that legal representatives of a deceased defendant may be brought on record after the expiry of the period of limitation where the plaintiff has waived the point and there is no prejudice; in such circumstances there may be no need to remit to the trial Court if the decision would not have been altered. The Court relied on this decision to support the District Judge's conclusion that Surja's representatives could be brought on record and that remittance to the trial Court was unnecessary because no prejudice resulted and the decision would not have been altered.
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156 Establishes that once representatives of a deceased party are brought on record for one purpose they are deemed to have been brought on record for all purposes, where no prejudice ensues. The Court applied this principle to hold that when Surja's legal representatives were brought on record at the appellate stage, they must be deemed to have been brought on record at the stage of the suit as well, provided no prejudice had been caused.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the procedural question of abatement and impleading legal representatives, and (B) the merits question of the Collector's power to review his redemption order.

A. Abatement, limitation and procedure when a defendant dies

  • The Court explained the statutory framework: abatement occurs 90 days after the death of the defendant and the opposite party has a period (150 days total from death) in which to apply to set aside abatement; if the party cannot move in time, recourse may be had to Section 5 of the Limitation Act to extend time.
  • The Court emphasized that abatement does not make a decree a nullity for all purposes; rather, a decree can be set aside and legal representatives afforded opportunity to be represented.
  • Applying these principles, the Court accepted the District Judge's factual finding — based on the plaintiff's sworn statement — that the plaintiff was ignorant of Surja's death and that Surja's counsel continued to appear; such ignorance constituted sufficient cause for delay and justified extending limitation under Section 5. The District Judge was therefore right to set aside abatement and allow the legal representatives to be brought on record.
  • On the appropriate procedure after abatement is set aside, the Court explained that the normal course is to remit proceedings to the trial Court to continue from the stage when the death occurred. However remittance is necessary only if the legal representatives have been prejudiced by proceedings after death. Here, after Surja's death (28-7-1951) no evidence was taken and only arguments were addressed; the District Judge found (and the Court accepted) that the decision would not have been altered if Surja's representatives had been on record earlier, so remittance was unnecessary.
  • The Court relied on Tota Bam v. Kundan and Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram to support these conclusions: the authorities permit bringing representatives on record after time where no prejudice exists and treat bringing representatives on record at appeal as sufficing for earlier stages when no prejudice results.

B. Merits — Collector's power to review redemption orders

  • The Court examined the Redemption of Mortgages Act and highlighted section 12 (quoted in the opinion) which provides that an order made under the summary provisions of the Act is conclusive, subject to the result of any suit instituted by an aggrieved party.
  • The Court noted that the mortgagees did institute a suit (under Section 13) to impugn the Collector's order, but that suit was dismissed on 2-6-1950. Consequently, the Collector's original order allowing redemption must be treated as final vis-à-vis the question of the right to redeem.
  • The Court analysed whether the Collector possessed power to review his own order in proceedings under the Redemption of Mortgages Act. Although some provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act (Sections 79, 85–92 and 101) had been applied to the Redemption Act, Section 32 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (which confers power to review) had not been imported into the Redemption of Mortgages Act. Revenue Courts do not have an inherent power to review judgments; review power exists for civil courts under the Civil Procedure Code, but the Redemption Act is a self-contained code for summary proceedings before the Collector.
  • Because Section 82/Section 32 style review provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act were not incorporated into the Redemption Act, the Collector had no power to review his redemption order in the summary proceedings under that Act. The Court therefore concluded that the Collector's order dated 1-4-1950 setting aside his earlier order was without jurisdiction and invalid.
  • Given these conclusions, the Courts below were correct in upholding the plaintiff's decree and in holding the Collector's review order invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court upheld the District Judge's decision to set aside abatement and to allow the legal representatives of the deceased defendant (Surja) to be brought on record, and the Court held that the Collector's order of 1-4-1950 purporting to review and set aside his earlier redemption order was without jurisdiction and invalid.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The decree in favour of the plaintiff (awarding declaration and possession based on the Collector's redemption order) stands; the Collector's review order is null for want of jurisdiction.
  • The District Judge's exercise of discretion in extending limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (on the facts accepted by him) and in declining to remit the matter to the trial Court was affirmed because no prejudice had been shown to have resulted to the deceased defendant's representatives.
  • The Court expressly declined to make any pronouncement on whether the Custodian's interests were finally adjudicated in the suit; that issue was not considered and remains open for future consideration.
  • The Court ordered that, in the circumstances, the parties bear their own costs before this Court.

No additional precedents or legal principles beyond those expressly cited in the opinion have been inferred or added in this summary.

    Birbal v. Harlal

    1. This second appeal arises out of a suit by Hartal plaintiff-respondent for the possession of 227 'Bighas' 11 'Biswas' of land. The plaintiff also sought a declaration to the effect that an order passed by the Collector on 1-4-1950 was invalid. The facts which have given rise to this appeal are briefly as follows.

    2. Ghayas-ud-Din and Siraj-ud-Din, two Muslims, were originally owners of the land in dispute. They mortgaged this land with possession to defendants 1 to 3 and the father of defendants 4 and 5 on 25-5-1945 for a sum of Rs. 6,000/-. Possession was made over to the mortgagees. A little later, on 21-2-1946, the owners executed a lease deed in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. The lease was a perpetual one and the deed was registered. Out of the total consideration Rs. 5,000/- were paid by the plaintiff in cash and the remaining Rs. 6,000/- were left in deposit for payment to the previous mortgagees, namely defendants 1 to 5. The lease deed gave the plaintiff the right to redeem the propsrty from the mortgagees. In order to give effect to this term the plaintiff made an application to the Collector on 22-4-1949 for the redemption of this land under the Redemption of Mortgages Act. The owners Ghayas-ud-Din and Siraj-ud-Din had, in the meantime, left India on the partition of the country and the property vested in the Custodian as evacuee property.

    While this application of the plaintiff was pending before the Collector an Ordinance was passed on 25-7-1949 and this Ordinance was later succeeded by act 36 of 1949 whereby all leases effected by evacuees were to be considered as having terminated with effect from 25-7-1949. Either in ignorance of this provision of the law or for some other reason the Collector passed an order of redemption in favour of the plaintiff on 5-10-1949. It is clear that the legal position was never placed before the Collector. The Custodian, however, made an application to the Collector for the review of his previous order and the Act whereby the losses made by evacuee were terminated was relied upon by the Custodian. The Collector with the permission of his superior reviewed his previous order and on 1-4-1950 set aside the order of redemption passed by him. The Collector apparently acted under the provisions of the Punjab Land Tenancy Act which gives power to the Collector to review his orders in certain conditions.

    The mortgagees had in the meantime filed a suit under Section 13 of the Redemption of Mortgages Act. This suit was dismissed on 2-6-1950. Therefore at this stage the net result was that the remedy which the aggrieved party was entitled to pursue under law had failed and so the order of redemption stood good as far as the defendants were concerned. The Collector had, however, reviewed his order at the instance of the Custodian and the plaintiff was held not entitled to redeem the land. The plaintiff then filed the present suit on 23-11-1950 for a declaration that the order of the Collector reviewing the previous order was invalid as it was not warranted by law and he also prayed for possession of the property which had been ordered to be redeemed by him. This suit was decreed on 29-12-1951 but a further complication had in the meantime arisen. While the suit was pending, Surja one of the defendants died on 28-7-1951 and no attempt was made by the plaintiff to bring his legal representatives on record.

    The decree followed on 29-12-1951 as I have already mentioned above and then an appeal was filed by the mortgagee-defendants including the legal representatives of Surja, namely, his sons and widow. This appeal was filed on 29-1-1952, and one of the grounds taken up was that the decree was a nullity inasmuch as it had been passed against a dead person. The Custodian filed a separate appeal. This appeal was filed on 6-2-1952. The plaintiff now made an application to bring the legal representatives of Surja, on record end also prayed that the abatement of the suit, if any, be set aside. This application was made on 7-4-1952 i.e., more than eight months after Surja's death. The District Judge made an enquiry into the questions whether Surja had died on the date alleged and whether the abatement should be set aside. He considered the pleas of the parties and also took their statements on oath and then he framed the following two issues :

    "1. Whether Surja one of the defendant-mortgagees died on 28-7-1951 and what is the effect of non-impleading his legal representatives within time on the present appeal?

    2. If it be held that the suit had abated in the trial Court because Surja's legal representatives were not impleaded within time then is that abatement liable to be set aside and can this Court set aside the abatement? The issues were framed on 2-3-1952." Parties apparently did not ask for opportunity to produce evidence and the District Judge adjourned the case to a future date for hearing arguments. Arguments were heard and the learned District Judge gave his decision whereby he set aside the abatement, allowed the legal representatives of Surja to be brought on record, and proceeded to decide the appeal on merits after coming to the conclusion that it was unnecessary to remit the case to the lower Court for further proceedings from the stage at which Surja's death had taken place. On merits the learned District Judge found that there was no force in the appeal and that the order of the Collector reviewing his previous order was illegal as it was not warranted by law and so the lower Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff was allowed to stand.

    Against this order the defendants have come up in appeal to this Court and on their behalf two points were urged before us one that the effect of Surja's death was that the suit abated and the decree against the dead person being a nullity was liable to be set aside, it was also contended that the District Judge should not have set aside the abatement because there was not sufficient ground for extending limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and in any event the learned District Judge should have remitted the case to the Senior Subordinate Judge with the direction that proceedings be continued from the stage at which Surja died. In the second place, it was urged that the order of the Collector reviewing his previous order was not invalid and that therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to the decree awarded in his favour.

    3. With regard to the question of abatement it is clear that abatement can be set aside even after the statutory period of CO days Ms expired. Abatement takes place 90 days after the death of the defendant or respondent. So the opposite party is allowed a period of 150 days in which to apply for setting aside the abatement, but if for some reason he cannot move the Court in this respect he is entitled to extrusion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The effect of abatement is not that a decree against, a dead person is a nullity for all purposes but that the decree can be set aside and the legal representatives given an opportunity of representing their case before the Court. In this case the first point to consider is whether there was sufficient ground for not making an application within the statutory period of 150 days. The plaintiff's contention was that he did not know of Surja's death. He has stated this on oath and this statement was accepted by the learned District Judge.

    Now ignorance of the death of a party is a very good ground for not moving the Court to bring his legal representatives on record, for a person cannot think of making an application in this behalf unless he knows that the party is dead. The defendants did not inform the Court and Surja's counsel continued to appear on his behalf. The plaintiff stated on oath that he did not know of Surja's death until much later. In the circumstances it seems to me that the plaintiff has shown sufficient cause for not making the application in time, and the learned District Judge was justified in extending limitation in this respect.

    4. The second point to consider is what is the procedure to be adopted in a case of this typo. Abatement having been set aside, parties are restored to their original position at the stage of the proceedings when Surja's death took place, and the normal course would be to remit the case to the trial Court with a direction that the proceedings be continued from that stage. But this course need be adopted only if the legal representatives of the deceased have been prejudiced in any way. In the present case, we find that Surja died on 28-7-1951. After this date no evidence was taken and the only proceedings which took place were the address of arguments by counsel, and the District Judge has found and rightly so that the decision of the case would not have altered in a.ny way had Surja's legal representatives been brought on the record before the decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff.

    The learned District Judge has referred to a decision of the Lahore High Court reported as -- 'Tota Bam v. Kundan', AIR 1928 Lah 784 (A), in which the facts were almost exactiy similar to the facts of the case before us. In that case Chuni, one of the defendants, died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. After Chuni's death some evidence on the question of waiver by the plaintiff was recorded and then a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants objected and among the defendants were the legal representatives of Chuni.

    The same contentions were raised as have been raised before us in tha present case, and a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that Chuni's legal representatives could have been brought on record after the expiry of the period of limitation, and since the plaintiff had given up tha question of waiver there was no need to remit the case to the trial Court as the decision of the trial Court would not have altered in any way even if Chuni's legal representatives had been given the opportunity of putting forward their defence, and the appeal dismissed. It was also held in a Privy Council csse reported as --

    'Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram', AIR 1917 PC 156 (B), that once the representatives of a de ceased party are brought on record for one purpose they must be deemed to have been brought on record for all purposes, and therefore in the present case when the legal representatives of Surja are brought on record at the stage of the appeal they must be deemed to have been brought on record at the stage of the suit also This will be so in all cases where no prejudice to a party has been caused.

    5. For these reasons I would hold that the learned District Judge was right in allowing the legal representatives of Surja to be brought on record.

    6. On the merits the appeal must fail. The" plaintiff made an application under the Redemption of Mortgages Act. He was entitled to do so. He claimed to have the rjght to redeem and this claim was to be enquired into and adjudicated upon in a summary manner laid down in the Redemption of Mortgages Act, The Collector did make an enquiry into it and ordered redemption. The only way of avoiding this order was by having recourse to the provisions of section 12 which says:

    "Any party aggrieved by an order made under Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or 11 of this Act may institute a suit to establish his rights in respect of the mortgage, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive....."

    Therefore the order of the Collector allowing redemption must be considered conclusive unless it is set aside by a suit brought by any party aggrieved by that order. Such a suit was brought by the defendants but the suit was dismissed on 2-6-1950 as stated above and the order of the Collector must therefore stand as a final order upon the question of the right to redeem the land in dispute. The Collector has not been given any power to review his order. It is not suggested that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to proceedings under the Redemption of Mortgages Act. This Act is complete in itself and lays down the procedure to be adopted by the Collector in dealing with the matters coming before him. The procedure is borrowed to some extent from the Punjab Tenancy Act, and Sections 79, 85, 86, 87, E9, 90, 91, 92 and 101 of that Act have been applied to the proceedings under this Act. Section 32 of the Punjab Tenancy Act confers upon the Collector the power to review his orders in certain circumstances. That section however, has not been imported into the Redemption of Mortgages Act.

    Revenue Courts do not possess inherent power of reviewing their judgments. Such a power has been conferred on the civil Courts by the Civil Procedure Code. No such power vests to Criminal Courts. Revenue Courts have power to review their judgments under Section 82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. That section not having been applied to proceedings under the Redemption of Mortgages Act, a Collector when he is hearing an application for the redemption of land in a summary manner provided by this Act has no power to review his orders, and the only way in which these orders can be avoided is by having recourse to the provisions of section 12. Therefore, it is clear that the order of the Collector dated 1-4-1950 whereby he reviewed his previous order is without jurisdiction and invalid. The Courts below were therefore right in awarding a decree to the plaintiff.

    7. The Custodian is a party to these proceedings and the question might arise at some future time whether his interests have also been affected and finally adjudicated upon in this suit. This is a matter upon which I do not choose to make any pronouncement at this stage. The dispute in the present proceedings is entirely between the plaintiff, who claims to have a right to redeem the mortgage, and the mortgagees. As to whether the lease in the plaintiff's favour can or cannot be avoided by the Custodian is a matter which was not considered in the present suit and therefore we need not express any opinion upon it.

    8. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case I would leave the parties to bear their own costs as far as this Court is concerned.

    Soni, J.

    9. I agree.

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    Comments

    Birbal v. Harlal
    (May 25, 1953)