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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Shiva Kirti Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Eight Letters Patent Appeals were heard together because they raised common questions of law and fact concerning whether certain appellants (engineers appointed in BISCOMAUN in 1982-83) had been sent to State Government departments on simple deputation (and therefore liable to be repatriated) or whether their services had been transferred in the name of deputation pursuant to a State policy decision for the purpose of absorption/rehabilitation.

Two appeals (L.P.As. 787 and 788 of 2006) arose from a different judgment dated 13-7-2006; the remaining appeals arose from a common judgment dated 26-7-2006. The writ court had dismissed four writ petitions (C.W.J.C Nos. 1139 and 1899 of 2001 and C.W.J.C Nos. 7462 and 13598 of 2000), accepting the State's position that no decision to absorb the petitioners had been taken and that the petitioners were temporary deputationists whose deputation could be terminated. The Single Judge also accepted a Public Interest Litigation order (dated 8-2-2000 in Arun Mukherjee's case) as ground for repatriation of deputationists in P.R.D.A.

The appellants challenged that judgment mainly on the ground that, although the State had not issued a formal resolution, a policy decision (recommended by a High Level Committee) had been acted upon to close BISCOMAUN's engineering wing and to transfer/rehabilitate qualified engineers to Government departments against vacant posts. The appellants relied on documentary material (minutes of 12-2-1993, a departmental memo dated 16-12-1993, deputation orders from 1993/1994/1997 and related correspondence) and earlier judicial decisions treating similar transfers as transfer-for-absorption rather than simple deputation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants were merely on simple deputation (subject to repatriation) or whether their services had in substance been transferred for the purpose of absorption/rehabilitation under an acted-upon State policy.
  2. Whether non-publication of a formal government resolution defeats the appellants' claim to absorption when the State acted on a policy decision communicated and implemented in practice.
  3. Whether the general rule that a deputationist has no right to continue on deputation can be invoked against employees whose parent organization was closed or financially incapacitated and who were transferred pursuant to a rehabilitation policy.
  4. Whether orders for repatriation based on observations in Arun Mukherjee's PIL apply to these appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The transfer of services was made pursuant to a State policy decision (recommended by a High Level Committee) to close BISCOMAUN's engineering wing and absorb eligible engineers in Government departments; the fact that no formal resolution was published does not negate the policy's legal effect since it was acted upon for years and communicated to concerned authorities.
  • Employees in similar positions had been absorbed following the same policy; denying the appellants absorption violated equality of treatment (Article 14) and legitimate expectation.
  • The term "deputation" was used as a device for transfer and rehabilitation; prior judicial decisions had treated such transfers as transfers for absorption rather than ordinary deputation.
  • Repatriation orders based on the Arun Mukherjee case were inapplicable because those orders addressed unsatisfactory employees and the appellants' services were not found unsatisfactory; appellants were not parties to that PIL and were unaware of the order.
  • Doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation apply where the State's conduct and consistent past practice led employees to accept transfer and forgo rights in their parent organization.
  • Specific appellants had been selected for deputation after interview and with explicit communications indicating deputation "with provision for absorption."

Respondents' / State's Arguments

  • The general and well-settled principle of law is that an order of deputation does not confer any legal right to continue on deputation; deputation can be terminated and repatriation ordered.
  • No mandamus could be issued unless appellants established a legal right to the posts they held on deputation (reliance on State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash).
  • Where a decision of the Government is to be treated as a decision of State, the opinion must be communicated to concerned persons in accordance with rules (reliance on Bachhitra Singh v. State of Bihar); formalities of Rules of Business are relevant.
  • The writ court's reliance on a Division Bench decision (State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad) was appropriate in cases where deputation occurred after the cut-off date of 16-11-1999 when policy barred general deputation of non-government employees.
  • The order in Arun Mukherjee's PIL justified repatriation in respect of unsatisfactory staff of P.R.D.A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad, 2003 (4) PLJR 495 Held that deputations of employees (other than government servants) made after 16-11-1999 were illegal due to a subsequent government policy; establishes a cut-off date concept. The Court held that this Division Bench decision could not be used against appellants whose deputations were prior to 16-11-1999; found it inapplicable to most appeals except L.P.A No. 1110/2004.
Md. Amanullah … v. The State Of Bihar & Ors., reported 2004 (1) 145 Explained the concept of the cut-off date and clarified that earlier deputations were not adversely affected by the cut-off decision. The Court referred to this decision to support the position that deputations made prior to 16-11-1999 are not affected by Gopal Prasad.
Jamil Ahmad v. Industrial Development Commissioner, (2004) 13 SCC 736 Supreme Court authority relied upon by a Division Bench affirming reliefs in related matters (used in a reasoned order dismissing L.P.As 419 and 373 of 2007). The Court noted that a Division Bench relied on this Supreme Court judgment in affirming earlier single-judge reliefs in similar cases; the present Court considered the same line of reasoning persuasive in rejecting reliance on Arun Mukherjee for these appellants.
Lalan Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar (C.W.J.C No. 3381 of 2006) and Abhinash Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C No. 3565 of 2006) Single-judge decisions (later affirmed by Division Bench) quashing repatriation where absorption had been effected after long service and observing incorrect interpretations of Arun Mukherjee orders. The Court referred to these judgments as examples where repatriation orders were quashed and those petitioners were treated as absorbed; used to support appellants' claims of inconsistent treatment and legitimate expectation.
M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 621 Explains promissory estoppel: when a clear promise intended to create legal relations is acted upon, the promisor cannot go back if inequitable. The Court applied the principle to hold that appellants, who relied on State policy and acted on promises of rehabilitation, should not be left without relief; equity favors completion of the State's promise.
State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash, AIR 1963 SC 507 Authority for the proposition that mandamus cannot issue unless a legal right to the post is established. The State relied on this authority; the Court responded by emphasizing the modern administrative law requirement of fairness and legitimate expectation under Article 14, thus finding the appellants' equitable claims meritorious despite absence of a statutory right.
Bachhitra Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 395 Stands for the principle that an opinion of the concerned authority amounts to a government decision only when communicated to persons concerned; formalities under Rules of Business are relevant. The Court accepted that a decision must be communicated to be effective but found that in the present cases the policy decision, although not formalized as a Resolution, had been communicated and acted upon and therefore could not be treated as mere file notings.
Md. Shamim Ansari … v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2002 (2) PLJR 579 Single-judge holding that where deputation is a mechanism of rehabilitation because the parent organization has become defunct/financially crippled, the normal rules of deputation (e.g., continuation of lien) may not apply. The Court treated this judgment as clearly covering the main issue and supportive of holding that these transfers were for rehabilitation/absorption and not ordinary deputation.
Raghunath Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2003 (2) PLJR 396 Similar view to Md. Shamim Ansari but involved deputation after 16-11-1999 (thus running into the cut-off issue). The Court noted the case but observed that where deputation occurred after 16-11-1999 the Division Bench rule in Gopal Prasad applies.
Amarnath Singh — judgments including C.W.J.C No. 3513 of 1994 (order dated 12-9-1997) and a later judgment dated 12-2-2004 (C.W.J.C No. 2471 of 1998) Earlier orders quashing repatriation on facts where repatriation would amount to termination; later judgments directed regularization/absorption steps and were affirmed on appeal to higher forums. The Court relied on the Amarnath Singh line of authority as precedent where repatriation was quashed and similar employees were absorbed; used to show inconsistent treatment if appellants were denied similar relief.
Vijay Choudhary … v. The State Of Bihar & Others, 1995 (2) PLJR 201 Division Bench decision quoting Halsbury on legitimate expectation: expectation may arise from representation, promise or consistent past practice and should not be defeated without overriding public policy. The Court found this authority supports the appellants' case on legitimate expectation arising from consistent past practice and State conduct.
Arun Kumar Mukherjee (Public Interest Litigation) — orders including 8-2-2000 and 14-10-2004 (as referenced) Orders in that PIL contained observations allowing repatriation of certain P.R.D.A staff whose services were unsatisfactory; used by respondents to justify repatriations. The Court held that the Arun Mukherjee orders were for a different purpose, addressed primarily unsatisfactory staff, and could not be applied to the appellants; therefore the orders did not support repatriation of these appellants.
Shri Jagarnath Prasad v. The State of Bihar (L.P.A No. 342/96) — counter-affidavit referred State in that counter-affidavit admitted an extant policy to absorb eligible employees of BISCOMAUN and similar institutions whose finances were bad. The Court treated this admission (as part of the record) as confirming that such a policy was in operation and was relevant to the appellants' claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the factual matrix, documentary material (minutes of 12-2-1993, departmental memo dated 16-12-1993, deputation orders and correspondence) and the line of judicial authorities relied upon by both sides. The Court's reasoning can be summarized in the following steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Formal notification not required where a policy decision has been taken at a competent level, communicated to concerned authorities and acted upon. The Court accepted appellants' submission that decision communicated to concerned parties becomes effective and cannot be treated as mere notings in files (relying on principles of equality, reasonableness and established administrative law).
  2. The general rule that a deputationist has no right to continue on deputation cannot be mechanically applied where deputation was a device for rehabilitation/absorption because the parent organization had closed or become financially incapacitated. Prior decisions had treated similar transfers as transfers for absorption where the parent unit had ceased to be viable.
  3. The Court examined the applicability of the Division Bench decision in State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad (cut-off 16-11-1999). It concluded that Gopal Prasad could not be used against appellants whose deputations were prior to 16-11-1999 (except L.P.A No. 1110/2004 whose deputation was in 2001).
  4. The Court rejected reliance on Arun Mukherjee's PIL orders as a basis for repatriation of these appellants because those orders were directed at staff found unsatisfactory; the appellants' services were not found unsatisfactory, and they were not parties to that PIL. The Court noted single-judge and Division Bench decisions that had quashed repatriations where Arun Mukherjee had been wrongly interpreted to serve narrow interests.
  5. The Court applied equitable doctrines — promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation — holding that employees who relied on an acted-upon policy and gave up their earlier service rights were entitled to completion of the State's promise of rehabilitation/absorption, especially given their long service and proximity to superannuation.
  6. Having found the writ court's four reasons for dismissal to be unsustainable in law on the facts, and in view of the consistent past practice and judicial precedents treating similar deputations as transfers for absorption, the Court concluded that the appellants (except in L.P.A No. 1110/2004) were to be treated as having been transferred for absorption and not as mere deputationists subject to repatriation.

The Court limited its conclusions to the facts before it and grounded relief on documentary evidence, past practice, administrative law principles (equality, reasonableness), promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation as discussed in the opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

All the appeals except L.P.A No. 1110 of 2004 were allowed.

The Court set aside the impugned judgment(s) and orders under challenge in the allowed appeals. It quashed the orders or actions whereby appellants had been ordered to be repatriated or threatened with repatriation. The Court directed respondent-authorities to treat the deputation of appellants as not a simple deputation but one under a valid policy for rehabilitation/absorption effected through transfer of service, and to take follow-up action, if required, within three months.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • Respondents must treat the appellants as employees of the concerned departments for all practical purposes and keep in mind earlier judgments where similarly situated employees were absorbed.
  • Till follow-up action is taken, appellants shall continue on the posts they held on deputation and be treated as employees of those departments.
  • If any appellant allowed by this judgment had been repatriated or dismissed pursuant to the orders under appeal, such consequential orders of repatriation or dismissal shall stand quashed and the affected persons shall be reinstated with consequential benefits.
  • There shall be no order as to costs in the allowed appeals.

L.P.A No. 1110 of 2004:

  • DISMISSED — for two stated reasons: (1) no one appeared to press the appeal; and (2) the appellants in that appeal were sent on deputation in 2001 (i.e., after the cut-off date of 16-11-1999) and therefore their initial deputation was illegal under the Division Bench ruling in State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad.

The Court did not purport to lay down any new broad precedent beyond application of existing principles (administrative fairness, promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and the existing case law concerning deputation and cut-off date). The decision's immediate effect is to grant relief and directions for the appellants in the allowed appeals; the opinion emphasizes equality of treatment and the need to implement the State's acted-upon rehabilitation policy.

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    Avinash Vatsyayan v. State Of Bihar

    Shiva Kirti Singh, J

    All these eight Letters Patent Appeals have been treated analogous to each other and have been heard together because of a common issue of law as well as facts as to whether the appellants were sent to their present employers on simple deputation and therefore liable to be repatriated or whether their services had, in fact, been transferred in the name of deputation for the purpose of absorption in accordance with a policy decision. While two of the Letters Patent Appeals bearing nos. 787 and 788 of 2006 arise out from a different judgment dated 13-7-2006, the remaining appeals arise out of a common judgment dated 26-7-2006.

    2. Mr. Shashi Anugarah Narain, learned senior counsel for both the appellants of L.P.A No. 795 of 2006 led the arguments in all the cases, mainly on the basis of facts available in the records of that appeal. For the sake of convenience, the facts will be referred to from the records of that appeal only unless it is deemed necessary to refer specifically to the facts from some other appeals.

    3. As noticed earlier L.P.A No. 795 of 2006 and five other L.P.As seek to challenge a common judgment dated 26-7-2006 whereby the writ court dismissed four writ petitions bearing C.W.J.C Nos. 1139 and 1899 of 2001 and C.W.J.C Nos. 7462 and 13598 of 2000, after rejecting the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that petitioners had been sent on deputation from BISCOMAUN because Biscomaun at that time was under an Administrator and like several other public undertakings of Bihar was suffering from poor financial condition and inviability and as per recommendation of a High Level Committee constituted by the State of Bihar the deputation was for the purpose of being absorbed in different wings/departments of the State of Bihar and equality of treatment also requires that petitioners be treated as permanently absorbed like similar deputationists from BISCOMAUN and several other public undertakings who have been permanently absorbed. The writ court accepted the stand of the State and the Patna Regional Development Authority (P.R.D.A) that petitioners should be treated like ordinary deputationists whose deputation can be terminated at any time. The stand of the State Government was that it had never taken a decision to absorb the petitioners and similarly situated persons in different wings/departments of the State and only as a temporary measure the petitioners had been sent on deputation. The learned single Judge also accepted the stand of the State that engineers who were continuing on deputation in P.R.D.A had to be repatriated because of an order dated 8-2-2000 passed in a Public Interest Litigation bearing C.W.J.C No. 2290 of 1990.

    4. On behalf of appellants the judgment under appeal have been challenged mainly on the ground that the learned single Judge has failed to distinguish several other judgments rendered in identical situations including a judgment by the same Judge taking a different view that such transfer of service, in view of policy decision at highest level of the State Government could not be treated as a case of simple deputation, rather it was a case of transfer of service for the purpose of absorption because the concerned Public undertakings, Corporations etc. had become financially unviable and it had become difficult for them either to take work from many categories of employees or to pay them their salary and emoluments. According to learned counsel for the appellants the writ court has taken an over simplistic and technical view in these cases by disregarding the fact that even according to State the petitioners were sent on deputations some time in 1990 as per the policy decision of the State Government, as recommended by High Level Committee constituted by the State of Bihar and that in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Biscomaun it was clearly stated that Biscomaun is not in a position to pay salary to its employees.

    5. Before coming to the detailed arguments advanced by Mr. Shashi Anugrah Narain, learned Sr. Advocate, it will be useful to take note of certain basic relevant facts. The appellants in L.P.A No. 795 of 2006 are degree holder engineers who were appointed in Biscomaun in 1982-83. Annexure-1 to the memorandum of appeal contains minutes of decisions taken on 12-2-1993 in presence of High Officials like Development Commissioner, Bihar, Administrator, Co-operative Bank, Patna, Administrator, Bisomaun, Patna and representative of Finance/Personnel Department. As per that decision, working of various units and department of Biscomaun were reviewed and relevant decisions were taken which included a decision to close the Engineering Department and to take steps for absorption of such engineers who have necessary qualifications for being absorbed in Government Department against vacant posts. Annexure-2 is a proposal contained in memo no. 3359 dated 16-12-1993 issued by the Co-operative Department which is the controlling department of BISCOMAUN containing proposal for consideration by a Committee of the Cabinet for approval of Economic policy and economic co-ordination. That proposal included a proposal to close the engineering department of BISCOMAUN and for absorption of qualified engineers in Government department against vacant posts. The proposal shows that it had the approval of State Minister for Co-operatives. Although no formal policy decision was issued by the State of Bihar but in pursuance of decision noticed above, it is not in dispute that the engineering department of Bisomaun was closed and services of several graduate engineers as well as some diploma engineers of Bisomaun were transferred on deputation basis to different departments of the State Government like Science and Technology, Transport, Urban Development, Labour and Employment etc. Annexures 3 and 4 series to the connected writ petition (C.W.J.C No. 1139 of 2001) show that services of appellant no. 1, Kameshwar Prasad Singh were handed over to Urban Development Department for being posted under P.R.D.A in January/February, 1993. Some other engineers of Biscomaun had also been sent on deputation to Science and Technology Department, Transport Department, Co-operative Department. Copies of deputation orders of 1994 and of 1997 have also been annexed. Services of appellant no. 2, Santosh Kumar Singh were handed over to Urban Development Department on deputation pursuant to their request through letter dated 14-2-1995 contained in annexure-6 series. That letter simply asked for his services without mentioning that it was required on deputation.

    6. In the connected writ petition specific pleadings were made that several other similarly situated engineers of Bisomaun were absorbed elsewhere and also in P.R.D.A but the matter of absorption of the appellants remained pending. Since the writ petitioners had apprehension that on account of delay in passing formal orders of their absorption, the respondents may create a situation for their services being returned to Biscomaun where the engineering department was closed and they would not get service or salary for moved this court through writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition was (1) To absorb the services of the petitioners under the Urban Development Department and (2) to restrain the respondents concerned from returning their services to their parent organization. Judgment in the case of one Amarnath Singh who was sent on deputation to Transport Department was mentioned to show that order for his repatriation was quashed by judgment dated 12-9-1997 in C.W.J.C No. 3513 of 1994 on the finding that repatriation, in the facts of the case would amount to termination of his service. That judgment (annexure-13) was challenged by the respondents State of Bihar but the L.P.A before the Division Bench of this Court as well as S.L.P (Civil) No. 312 of 1999 were dismissed. A similar judgment dated 9-12-99 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Ramashray Singh and the concerned department of Industry and Technology, directed the Government of Bihar to take a decision in the matter of absorption of Ramashray Singh and others within two months keeping in view the Government decision dated 24-27th May, 1984 following which those petitioners were sent on deputation and also keeping in mind the judgment in the case of Amarnath Singh (Annexure-13).

    7. On the basis of aforesaid facts learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Mr. Shashi Anugrah Narain made a pointed challenge to the four reasons indicated by learned single Judge for dismissing the writ petition. The first reason that the Government policy to send the eligible engineers of Biscomaun on deputation for absorption was not formally notified, was assailed on the ground that for a number of years such policy held the field, and was acted upon. The surplus employees of various Boards, Corporations under Government control were sent on deputation and absorbed. Simply because the policy communicated to all concerned has not been formally notified, should not make any adverse impact upon the right of the appellants to receive similar benefits of absorption and retention of their services in the transferred departments as has been done in case of large number of other employees who were similarly situated. It was pointed out that Government cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own lapses in not notifying the policy although it was implemented over a long period under orders of the State Government itself. It was further submitted that employees are entitled to legitimate expectation that they would also get the same benefits as given to other similarly situated employees even if the policy has not been formally notified as a resolution of the State Government. Once a decision was actually taken by the Competent Authority and communicated to all Boards, Corporations under the State Government as well as to concerned department, according to learned senior counsel for the appellants, it would not matter at all that such policy was not formally notified.

    8. We have no hesitation in accepting the aforesaid submission, both on the basis of requirements of equality, reasonableness and equity as well as on the well established principle of administrative law that decision by a public authority when communicated to the concerned parties, becomes effective and cannot be treated as mere notings in the files.

    9. The next reason adopted by the learned writ court is that the deputationists, in law, can have no right to oppose an order of repatriation as is being assailed on behalf of some of the appellants. To meet this reason, it has been submitted that once it is held that even in absence of a formal notification, the Government policy to transfer the services of persons like the petitioners for absorption is valid, then use of the term “deputation” while transferring the services of the appellants to Government departments cannot deprive them of the benefit of the government policy noticed above whose benefits had been given to many similarly situated persons. Secondly, it has been shown from judgments in the case of similarly situated deputationists that in the past this Court had treated the transfer of services of similar employees under government policy decision to be really not a deputation but a transfer for the purpose of absorption. In some of the judgments it was held that generally a deputationist has no right to continue in the loanee department and he can be sent back to his present department but if the earlier department or organization is closed or has become so crippled financially as not to be in a position to continue the service and pay salary, there cannot exist any lien for the concerned employees over the earlier service/post. In fact, prior to the two judgments under appeal, as the discussions would reveal, this Court had always taken the view that the transaction in question was not a simple deputation as is ordinarily understood in service jurisprudence rather, as a fact the term deputation was used only as a good and acceptable mechanism to transfer services of suitable employees to organizations and departments where vacant posts were available and where their services could be utilized and absorbed in the light of policy decision noticed and discussed earlier.

    10 In our considered view the aforesaid submissions in respect of second reason adopted by the writ court also have merits and in the peculiar facts of the case the principle that deputationists have no right to continue on deputation could not have been invoked against the appellants.

    11. Thirdly, it was submitted that the learned writ court has wrongly placed reliance upon a Division Bench Judgment in the case of State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad, 2003 (4) PLJR 495. It was pointed out that in that case the deputation orders were found to be illegal because they had been issued after 16-11-1999 which was accepted as the cut off date and as per subsequent policy decision of the government, general deputation of employees other than government servants could not be made in government departments. It was pointed out that the concept of cut-off date and that earlier deputations had not been adversely affected by such judgment stands explained by another Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Md. Amanullah… v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.…, reported in 2004 (1) 145. Undisputedly the deputation of the appellants in these appeals is prior to 16-11-99 except of the appellants of L.P.A No. 1110 of 2004. It may be mentioned here that nobody has appeared on behalf of the appellants in the aforesaid L.P.A No. 1110/04 but so far as appellants in other appeals are concerned their deputations being prior to 16-11-99, it has rightly been submitted that the Division Bench judgment in the case of State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad (supra) could not have been used against such appellants.

    12. The fourth and the last reasoning of the learned writ court that repatriation was required to be made in view of order dated 8-2-2000 passed in Arun Mukherjee's case (a Public Interest Litigation) has also been assailed by pointing out that the said absorption was only in respect of such staff of P.R.D.A working on deputation whose services were not satisfactory and on account of poor performance of those employees a general observation was made that they could be repatriated. It was further submitted that services of the appellants were never found unsatisfactory and the said order in Arun Mukherjee's case could not be used against the appellants in view of special facts and policy decision discussed above and also because the appellants were not a party to that case and were not even aware of that order. It was also pointed out that recently a learned single judge of this Court has allowed the writ petitions of similarly situated employees vide judgment and order dated 28-2-2007 passed in C.W.J.C No. 3381 of 2006 (Lalan Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar) and C.W.J.C No. 3565 of 2006 (Abhinash Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar)

    13. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments show that petitioners in those two cases were Assistant Engineers in BISCOMAUN and like the appellants of these cases they were also sent on so called deputation to P.R.D.A where their services were absorbed after obtaining opinion of the Advocate General but the Secretary of Urban Development Department, Government of Bihar directed for return of their service to BISCOMAUN on the ground that their absorption was without adequate authority and without the approval of the State Government. In that case also a stand was taken that the repatriation was required on account of order dated 14-10-2004 passed in Arun Kumar Mukherjee's case. The learned single Judge gave a finding that observations made in various orders in the case of Arun Kumar Mukherjee had been wrongly interpreted to serve narrow interests and not the wider directions of the Court to which were issued in different back-grounds. Ultimately the repatriation orders were quashed after observing that after long years of service those petitioners had been left in a blind alley. The aforesaid judgment was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 21-4-2008 whereby L.P.As 419 and 373 of 2007 were dismissed by a reasoned order in which reliance was placed upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jamil Ahmad v. Industrial Development Commissioner, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 736. We are also of the view that order passed in Arun Mukherjee case was for a different purpose and has no application to the appellants.

    14. Although the reasons and grounds given out in the order under appeal have been noticed above and found to be not sustainable in law, in deference to the learned counsel appearing in this appeal it is deemed necessary to take note of some judgments cited on behalf of the appellants and also some submissions by different counsels appearing in different appeals. In the case of Md. Shamim Ansari… v. State Of Bihar & Ors.…, 2002 (2) PLJR 579 a learned single Judge in somewhat similar circumstances considered the submissions on behalf of the State that as a deputionist the petitioner of that case had no right to the post of deputation. In that case the petitioner who was a driver in the Sugar Development Corporation had been transferred to a Government department on deputation because the Corporation like many other Corporations and BISCOMAUN was not in good financial position and deputation was for the purpose of rehabilitation of eligible employees. The learned single Judge, in somewhat similar circumstances as in these cases, held that the normal rule governing a deputationist has no application to a case where deputation is not in the ordinary sense of the term and is more a case of rehabilitation. Since the parent department of that petitioner has ceased to exist for all intent and purposes, it was further held that it would be futile and unrealistic to suggest that the deputationist continued to have lien in his parent department. That judgment clearly covers the main issue in theses cases also.

    15. The aforesaid view was followed by another learned single Judge in the case of Raghunath Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2003 (2) PLJR 396. However, in this case the deputation was made after 16-11-1999 and as per subsequent Division Bench judgment in the case of State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad (supra) it has been held that deputations of employees other than Government Servants made in a Government department after 16-11-99 would be illegal and in violation of a clear policy decision of the State Government.

    16. On behalf of appellants of L.P.A No. 720 of 2006 Shri Krishnandan Singh, learned Senior Advocate, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Shashi Anugrah Narayan, learned Senior Counsel noticed earlier, highlighted the facts that the appellant in his case was still working on deputation in Science and Technology Department, Government of Bihar on the basis of deputation made on 13-12-1994 which was actually for the purpose of absorption as per government policy decision; the prayer of this appellant is that he should not be repatriated because the Engineering wing of BISCOMAUN where he was earlier employed has been closed under policy decision and the appellant cannot be taken back in service. Materials including annexures 3 to 5 and 19 to the connected writ petition were highlighted to show that even for deputation there was a selection process and after interview only suitable and eligible persons were taken on deputation. It was shown that in the communication contained in annexure-19 dated 13-12-1994 it was mentioned that selection was made for deputation with provisions for absorption. It was also contended on the basis of facts noticed earlier that several similarly situated employees of BISCOMAUN working on similar nature of deputation have been absorbed and hence denial of absorption in the case of appellants would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on a judgment dated 12-2-2004 passed in C.W.J.C No. 2471 of 1998 (Amarnath Singh v. State of Bihar) which is appended as annexure-4 to reply to the counter-affidavit available in records of this appeal. That judgment has been passed by the same learned single Judge whose orders are on appeal. He considered the prayer of Amarnath Singh for issuance of a direction either to regularize him on the post of Motor Vehicle Inspector or to appoint him on regular basis against vacant post. That petitioner was earlier working in Bihar State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd and he was also deputed like the appellants to a department of the Government of Bihar which happened to be department of Transport. In 1993 an order for his repatriation was issued but was quashed by order dated 12 September, 1997 passed in C.W.J.C No. 3513 of 1994. That order was confirmed up to the Apex Court and thereafter he moved this Court again for being regularized or appointed in the concerned department. An order to that effect was passed by the learned single Judge fixing a time limit of six months to complete the exercise for his absorption/appointment. On a careful consideration of the aforesaid submission, we have no option but to agree that the State Government has been taking discriminatory and conflicting stand. Since the deputation of the appellants is of the same nature as in the case of Amarnath Singh (supra), the learned writ court should have adhere to its own earlier views which would be also in consonance with the principle of equality in treatment of its employees by the State.

    17. Mr. Chitranjan Sinha, learned senior Advocate has appeared for the appellant of L.P.A No. 608 of 2006 who was, in a similar manner deputed from Biscomaun to Science and Technology Department on 13-12-1994 and posted in Govt. Polytechnic at Ranchi. He has referred to a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of State in L.P.A No. 342/96 (Shri Jagarnath Prasad v. The State of Bihar) which has been appended as part of annexures-5 series to C.W.J.C No. 1139 of 2001 (Satyendra Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar). In paragraph-20 of that counter affidavit the State took a stand and admitted the extant policy of the State Government to absorb the services of the eligible and suitable employees/officers of the Biscomaun or other semi Govt. Institutions whose financial position was not good, in departments/, Boards/Corporations/Authority. There is no reply to this contention and hence it must be accepted that such a policy of the State Government was admittedly in operation at the relevant time. Even in the order under appeal the learned single Judge has observed in paragraph-2 at page-2 of the judgment that the writ petitioners were sent on deputation in different departments of the Government of Bihar some time in the year 1990, as per policy decision of the State, as recommended by High Level Committee constituted by the State of Bihar.

    18. It was further submitted on behalf of appellant of L.P.A 608 of 2006 that on account of dismissal of the writ petition by order under appeal, the appellant has been dismissed by the order of Jharkhand Government dated 13-10-2008 which is merely a consequential order which has been brought on record through I.A No. 7174 of 2008 and either the same should be set aside by a specific order or a general clarification be issued that all consequential orders of dismissal or repatriation pursuant to orders under appeal shall stand set aside.

    19. On behalf of State learned A.A.G 3, Mr. Lalit Kishore placed reliance upon a catena of decisions by the Supreme Court and by this Court on the well accepted general principle of law that ordinarily an order of deputation does not create any legal right to continue on deputation. With due respect to the learned AAG-3 those judgments need not be enumerated and considered because the Principle relating to deputation as understood in ordinary terms is well settled and has not been disputed by the appellants. As noticed earlier, by placing reliance upon several judgments of this Court the appellants have taken a clear and categorical stand that in the case of appellants the deputation was not an ordinary deputation as understood generally in service-jurisprudence, rather it was a device for rehabilitation of eligible employees of the defunct or loss making Boards and Corporations etc. under a policy decision which was acted upon and benefited large number of employees, except the appellants.

    20. Learned AAG-3 further submitted that no mandamus can be issued in favour of the appellants unless they can establish a legal right to the posts which they are/were holding under deputation. For this reliance was placed upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash reported in AIR 1963 SC 507. In reply it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that right of employees to receive fair treatment and corresponding duty of the State as employer to act fairly has been well recognized by catena of recent judgments and hence the appellants cannot be denied relief on the technicality that their claims are not based upon any Statute or Rules. We find merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that now requirements of acting reasonably and fairly is an essential constituent of Article 14 of our Constitution.

    21. Learned senior counsel for the State has placed reliance upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bachhitra Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 395 for advancing and supporting the contention that the opinion of the concerned authority will amount to a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to the persons concerned. It was also submitted that as per Rules of Business that action must be taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Governor as per well established principle of law. The appellants have not expressed any reservation against aforesaid proposition of law as already noticed earlier. In the instant case, although the decision taken at the highest level was not expressed formally as a resolution of the State Government but the same was communicated to the concerned authorities who acted upon the same. Many departments of BISCOMAUN were closed and its eligible employees were transferred to different departments for the purpose of rehabilitation and not on simple deputation. The issue, in such a situation would be, whether for non-publication of a formal “Resolution”, the employees like the appellants can be made to suffer and left in lurch after many years of service under so called deputation which they accepted as a measure for their rehabilitation. On the promise made by the authorities who were competent to take such a policy decision the appellants gave up their old service and its legal benefits and opted for a rehabilitation scheme which was to work under the technicality of absorption after deputation. In such circumstances, non-issuance of the requisite “Resolution” in the name of head of the State cannot be allowed to adversely affect the employees like the appellants. It has rightly been submitted on behalf of the appellants that in such circumstances the principle of Promissory Estoppel will come to their aid and they will have legitimate expectation of being rehabilitated against vacant posts on which they have worked for long period on being found eligible in all respects. There is no complaint that the services of the appellants were unsatisfactory.

    22. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M.P Sugar Mills v. State of U.P, AIR 1979 SC 621 explains the meaning of promissory estoppel as a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice so that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear promise intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that such promise would be acted upon by the other party, the maker would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would lead to inequitable consequences having regard to dealings between the parties. The appellants did not fight for their rights against the erstwhile employer and on the promise of rehabilitation apparent from the policy which was acted upon in the past, they agreed for and accepted the transfer of their services to different departments in the garb of deputation. Equity warrants in such a situation that the State Government should complete its promise or assurance so that the appellants may be treated as employees of the concerned departments and not as mere deputationists. It is not in dispute that the appellants are in the late evening of their service life and some of them have only 2-3 years to superanuate.

    23. In support of the submissions based on the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, learned senior counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Vijay Choudhary… v. The State Of Bihar & Others…, 1995 (2) PLJR 201. In paragraph-14 of that judgment a statement of law from the Halsbury laws of England (4 Edition) Volume 1 (1) 151 has been extracted and the same reads as follows:-

    “A person may have legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority, even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority including an implied representation or from consistent past practice. In common parlance it means that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectations without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so.”

    In the facts of the case, the counsels for the appellants have rightly advanced submissions in support of case of the appellants on the basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation.

    24. In the light of what has been discussed and held above, it follows as a logical corollary that all the appeals must succeed except L.P.A No. 1110 of 2004. Accordingly, the judgment and orders under challenge in other appeals are set aside. Further, the impugned orders or actions under challenge whereby the appellants have either been ordered to be repatriated or are threatened with repatriation are quashed. The respondent-authorities are directed to treat the deputation of appellants not as simple deputation but one under a valid policy for the purpose of rehabilitation or absorption through the device of transfer of service and to take follow up action, if required, within three months. The respondents will also keep in mind and act as per earlier judgments which were accepted by them and similarly situated employees were absorbed because the State and its officials, ie., the respondents are duty bound to ensure equality of treatment to the appellants. Till such decision or follow up actions are taken the appellants shall be allowed to continue on the posts which they held on deputation and for all practical purposes they shall be treated to be the employees of the concerned departments where they are/were working on deputation. The writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent. It is made clear that if, on account of the judgment and orders under appeals any of the appellants whose appeals have been allowed have been repatriated from their posts under the State or dismissed from service, such impugned or consequential orders of repatriation or dismissal shall stand quashed and they shall be reinstated and allowed to work with all consequential benefits. In the facts of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

    25. L.P.A No. 1110 of 2004 has to be dismissed for two reasons. Firstly, because nobody has appeared to press this appeal and secondly because the appellants of this appeal were admittedly sent on deputation in the year 2001 which was after the cut off date of 16-11-1999 and hence their initial deputation itself was illegal and contrary to the revised policy of the State Government as per law declared by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Gopal Prasad, 2003 (4) PLJR 495. Hence, while other appeals stand allowed as indicated above, this appeal is dismissed but without costs.

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