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Judicial Opinion Summary — Navaniti Prasad Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Three writ applications, raising substantially the same questions arising from a common set of historical facts, were heard together with the consent of the parties. The litigation concerns the legal and financial status of teachers in 429 Private Government Aided Sanskrit Schools in the State following the lapse of the "Bihar non-Government Sanskrit Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Ordinance, 1992" (which lapsed with effect from 01.05.1992).

The opinion identifies three relevant time phases: (1) pre-16.12.1989 (pre-Ordinance), (2) 16.12.1989 to 01.05.1992 (Ordinance period, starting with Ordinance No. 32 of 1989 and ending with Ordinance No. 26 of 1992), and (3) the post-Ordinance lapse period. Prior to the Ordinance, the Government had designated 429 schools as Government Aided Sanskrit Schools with a staffing pattern typically of "7 + 2" or "8 + 2" (teaching plus office staff) and had fixed remuneration rates remitted via the Sanskrit Shiksha Board. During the Ordinance period, management and control were taken over; teachers/staff were treated as Government servants and paid at higher rates. The post-Ordinance period raised disputes about which staffing and pay arrangements should prevail after lapse.

The matter also involved related litigation before higher fora: counsel agreed that aspects of the Ordinance had been placed before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra v. State of Bihar (reported 1994 (2) PLJR 359), and the opinion places emphasis on a Supreme Court order dated 28.04.1997 (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No 5375 of 1997) and an order of the Patna High Court dated 13.02.1996 quoted therein.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the status of teachers in Private Government Aided Sanskrit Schools of different standards in the State after the lapse of the Ordinance of 1992?
  2. At what rate must payments (salaries) be made to such teachers after the lapse of the Ordinance?
  3. Who are the persons who are to be paid after the lapse of the Ordinance?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • With the lapse of the Ordinance, the pre-Ordinance status quo as of 16.12.1989 should be restored in full.
  • The effect of the Ordinance was only that those within the "Manak Mandal" were paid at Government rates during the Ordinance period; after lapse, everyone should receive grant-in-aid irrespective of Manak Mandal membership.

State and Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board's Arguments

  • On lapse of the Ordinance, only those teaching and non-teaching staff recognized by the Ordinance would continue to be aided, but payments should be at pre-Ordinance rates.
  • The Board contended (as to some posts sanctioned during the Ordinance with retrospective effect) that such retrospective sanctions were invalid and of no effect.
  • The State issued administrative memoranda (e.g., Memo No. 966 dated 14.12.1995 and Memo No. 1056 dated 21.12.1995) suggesting cancellation or exclusion of certain posts (including Science Teachers and certain Primary Teacher posts); the State urged these to be given effect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subhash Chandra v. State of Bihar, 1994 (2) PLJR 359 Existence of related proceedings before the Constitution Bench on the effect of the Ordinance and its provisions (not detailed by the Court because counsel agreed matter was before the Apex Court). Court declined to enter into detailed analysis of Ordinance provisions because the matter was pending before the Supreme Court; treated the case as contextually relevant.
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No 5375 of 1997 — Supreme Court order dated 28.04.1997 (Annexure-C) Held that post-Ordinance salaries have to be paid on the basis of the Patna High Court order dated 13.02.1996; the Apex Court partly allowed appeals and reiterated prior orders. The Court treated this Apex Court order as dispositive: it read the Supreme Court's direction as restoring the pre-Ordinance status for payment purposes and relied on its quoted text.
Order of the Patna High Court dated 13.02.1996 (quoted in the Supreme Court order) Holds that teachers appointed against sanctioned posts by following normal procedure (and non-teaching staff appointed before the Ordinance) are entitled to salary and allowances at the old scale as if the Ordinance was never passed; members within the Manak Mandal were to be paid as Government servants during the Ordinance period. The Court directly applied the Patna High Court formulation (as quoted by the Supreme Court) to conclude that the pre-Ordinance position is to be treated as revived on lapse of the Ordinance.
All India Groundnut Syndicate Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, AIR 1954 Bombay 232 Principle that a department/government cannot rely on its own default to defeat rights of a party; one cannot benefit from one's own default. The Court invoked this principle to reject the Board's contention that retrospective sanctions granted by the State during the Ordinance period could be treated as invalid; the Court held retrospective sanctions must be respected and cannot be defeated by the State's prior inaction.
Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board v. State of Bihar (LPA No. 656 of 2010) — Division Bench judgment dated 08.04.2010 Addresses effect of Memo No. 966 dated 14.12.1995 and holds that letter to be ineffectual/a "dead letter" (as noted by the Single Judge and described by the Division Bench in paragraph-8). The Court relied on the Division Bench's finding that the 14.12.1995 letter was a dead letter to hold that administrative attempts to cancel sanctioned posts (or deprive teachers) could not be given effect; similar 1995 memorandum (Memo No. 1056) was also treated as ineffectual.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the dispute by first identifying and explaining three temporal phases relevant to the legal questions: (i) pre-Ordinance (pre-16.12.1989), (ii) the Ordinance period (16.12.1989 to 01.05.1992), and (iii) the post-Ordinance lapse period. This chronological framework was used to match factual staffing and pay arrangements to legal consequences.

On the pre-Ordinance phase, the Court recorded that the Government had designated 429 schools as Government Aided Sanskrit Schools, fixed sanctioned staffing patterns (commonly 7+2 or 8+2), and fixed rates of remuneration disbursed via the Sanskrit Shiksha Board.

For the Ordinance period, the Court noted that the Ordinance took over management and control of the schools and, by its schedule, set a "Manak Mandal" staffing pattern for each taken-over school; employees included in the Manak Mandal were treated and paid as Government servants at higher rates during the Ordinance. The Court declined to go into further detail of Ordinance provisions because the matter was before the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra.

Turning to the post-Ordinance lapse period (the core dispute), the Court considered the rival contentions: petitioners sought full restoration of the pre-Ordinance position; the State and Board argued that only staff recognized by the Ordinance should be aided (but at pre-Ordinance rates). The Court found the position conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court's order dated 28.04.1997, which referred to and quoted a Patna High Court order dated 13.02.1996. The quoted Patna High Court principle — that teachers appointed against sanctioned posts by following normal procedure and non-teaching staff appointed before the Ordinance are entitled to payment of salary and allowances at the old scale as if the Ordinance was never passed — was read as restoring the pre-Ordinance status.

Applying that authority, the Court concluded there was no ambiguity: on lapse of the Ordinance the pre-Ordinance sanctioned strength and approved services revive irrespective of the Manak Mandal. While during the Ordinance members within the Manak Mandal were paid as Government servants, once the Ordinance lapsed everyone entitled to payment would receive grant-in-aid at pre-Ordinance rates (subject to increments where due).

The Court addressed two subsidiary issues:

  • Sanctions granted during the Ordinance period (including those with retrospective effect to a date prior to the Ordinance): the Board argued such sanctions were invalid. The Court rejected that contention and held that the State and the Board could not be allowed to repudiate the State's own sanctioning acts. Invoking the principle from All India Groundnut Syndicate, the Court held that the State cannot benefit from its own default; therefore posts sanctioned by the State — including with retrospective effect or during the Ordinance period — continue as sanctioned posts for payment and other consequences after lapse.
  • Administrative memoranda of the State (Memo No. 966 dated 14.12.1995 and Memo No. 1056 dated 21.12.1995) which purported to cancel or exclude certain posts: the Court found these memoranda tried to attribute to the Ordinance an effect (cancellation of sanctioned posts beyond the Manak Mandal) which in fact the Ordinance did not effect. The Court further relied on a Division Bench decision in LPA No. 656 of 2010 (08.04.2010) holding Memo No. 966 to be a dead letter. In consequence, both memoranda were treated as ineffectual ("dead letters"), and could not be used to deprive teachers (including Science Teachers) entitled to grant-in-aid.

On the basis of the above analysis, the Court concluded that all Science Teachers and all teachers whose services were approved while occupying sanctioned posts prior to the Ordinance, or whose posts were sanctioned and services approved during the Ordinance period (including retrospective sanctions), would be deemed entitled to Government grant-in-aid at the rates paid prior to the Ordinance, subject to applicable increments.

Holding and Implications

Writ applications are allowed in the terms indicated in the opinion.

Direct consequences for the parties stated in the opinion:

  • All teachers appointed against sanctioned posts through normal procedure and non-teaching staff appointed before the Ordinance are entitled to salary and allowances at the old (pre-Ordinance) scale as if the Ordinance was never passed, and those who were within the Manak Mandal were entitled to Government rates during the Ordinance period.
  • On lapse of the Ordinance, the pre-Ordinance sanctioned strength and approved services revive irrespective of the Manak Mandal; payments after lapse are to be in the form of Government grant-in-aid at pre-Ordinance rates (subject to increments, as applicable).
  • Sanctions granted by the State during the Ordinance period — including retrospective sanctions to dates prior to the Ordinance — remain valid and cannot be rendered ineffective by the State or the Board.
  • Administrative memoranda of the State dated 14.12.1995 (Memo No. 966) and 21.12.1995 (Memo No. 1056) that purported to cancel or exclude certain sanctioned posts were held to be ineffectual (dead letters) and cannot deprive teachers of their entitlement.
  • The petitioners (whose petitions had been pending long) are directed to be paid their dues at the earliest but not later than three months from the date of the order.

The opinion grounds its ruling primarily on prior judicial orders quoted and relied upon (the Supreme Court order of 28.04.1997 and the Patna High Court order dated 13.02.1996) and on the applied principle that the State cannot benefit from its own default (as cited from All India Groundnut Syndicate). The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond its application of those authorities to the factual matrix before the Court.

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    Deo Shankar Jha v. State Of Bihar

    Navaniti Prasad Singh, J In all these three writ applications, the question involved is basically the same, based on the same set of historical facts and, as such, have been heard together with consent of parties.

    Having heard the parties, in my view, three issues are involved which call for a decision by this Court. Firstly, what is the status of Teachers in Private Government Aided Sanskrit Schools of different standards in the State after the lapse of the Bihar non-Government Sanskrit Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Ordinance, 1992 which ordinance lapsed without being converted into an Act with effect from 01.05.1992 The second question involved is what is the rate at which payments have to be made to such Teachers after the lapse of the Ordinance and lastly, who are the persons who are to be paid after the lapse of Ordinance.

    In order to appreciate these issues, it would first be necessary to point out three time phases which are relevant. The first phase is the period, pre-16.12.1989 when for the first time, the said Ordinance in the shape of Ordinance No 32 of 1989 was promulgated. The second period is the period between 16.12.1989 starting with Ordinance No 32 of 1989 to 01.05.1992 which ended with Ordinance No 26 of 1992 and the third period is post-Ordinance lapsing period.

    So far as the first time phase is concerned, that is pre-Ordinance stage, there were 429 Schools which had been picked up by the Government as Government Aided Sanskrit Schools. In these Schools, Government had set down a staffing pattern which was 7 + 2 or 8 + 2. This means that in some Schools, there were sanctioned seven posts of Teachers and two for office staff. In some Schools, where Science teaching was permitted/recognised by the Government, there was one additional Teacher. Thus, there were eight Teachers + two office staff. However, this number could increase depending on School to School by virtue of larger number of students considering which Government used to sanction additional teaching strength. To the extent of these sanctioned posts, Government had fixed the rate of remuneration and based on these calculations, used to remit the money to the Sanskrit Shiksha Board for disbursal to the Schools concerned.

    Now we come to the Ordinance period. By the said Ordinance, as referred to above, it was the management and the control of the Schools that were taken over. It is not advisable for this Court to deal in detail about the provisions and the effect of Ordinance as learned counsel agree that the matter is before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court from the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra v. State of Bihar since reported in 1994 (2) PLJR 359.

    In the Ordinance period, by virtue of Ordinance, there was a schedule thereto which recognized for each individual School take over. The sanctioned strength which, in some cases, deferred from what was the sanctioned strength prior to Ordinance but as noted above, it is not necessary for this Court to resolve this dispute as the matter is before the Apex Court and secondly, it is not relevant for the present case. Under the Ordinance, the Teachers and the staff of the take over Schools were treated as Government servants and were paid accordingly which was much more than what they were getting in the pre-Ordinance stage.

    Now we come to the post-Ordinance period where Ordinances were allowed to lapse and this is the period with which we are concerned. Petitioners' stand is that with the lapse of Ordinance, the status quo ante, as existing on the day of first Ordinance, is to be restored that is status as obtaining on 16.12.1989 Learned counsel for the State and Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board submit that on lapse of Ordinance, only those staff, teaching and non-teaching as were recognized by the Ordinance, would continue to be aided but at the rate which would be pre-Ordinance. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the position pre-Ordinance would revive in full. It is further elaborated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the only difference that took place in the Ordinance period was that people who fell within the staffing pattern (Manak Mandal) of the Ordinance were entitled to payment at a higher scale at the Government employee rate whereas the others who were on sanctioned post but beyond the Manak Mandal in fact continued to be paid at the pre-Ordinance rates on basis of grant-in-aid. Post-Ordinance would now be paid as grant-in-aid irrespective of Manak Mandal which lapsed with the Ordinance itself. It is upon consideration of these rival contentions would the three issues, as noted in the beginning, would stand resolved. In my view, the position is not open to debate and stands fully resolved by judgment/order dated 28.04.1997 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No 5375 of 1997. This order is Annexure-C to the counter affidavit of the State of Bihar in CWJC No 216 of 1998. By this order, while partly allowing the appeals, Supreme Court has noted various orders that were passed by it and by the High Court. At the cost of repetition, this order was passed on 28th April, 1997. the Supreme Court, in the aforesaid order, held thus :

    “… … … As regards the post Ordinance period there is no dispute and the salary has to be paid on the basis of the order dated February 13, 1996. … … …”

    We do not have to search for order dated 13 February, 1996 because in the same order, the Apex Court has quoted the said order, which is the order of the Patna High Court in the contempt proceedings, which is quoted hereunder :

    “… … … In our view, all the teachers, who have been appointed against sanctioned posts in the schools after following the normal procedure as also the non-teaching staff who were so appointed before the Ordinance of 1989 will be entitled to the payment of salary and allowances at the old scale to which they were entitled, as if the Ordinance was never passed. Even after the lapse of the Ordinance they will be entitled to payment of salary and allowances. During the period the Ordinance was in force the members of the teaching and non-teaching staff who came within the Manak will be entitled to the salary and allowances as Government servant. … … …”

    If we read the two orders, the position is crystal clear and leaves no ambiguity. The High Court has clearly held that on lapse of Ordinance, the pre-Ordinance status would revive that is the sanctioned strength and the approved services irrespective of the Manak Mandal as in the Ordinance. Thus both, with regard to Teacher and Science Teacher, the position would stand restored. The position that would emerge is we have to shut our eyes to the Ordinance and deem it that the position, as obtaining before Ordinance, continues. That is the order of the Apex Court.

    In my view, learned counsel for the petitioners are correct that during Ordinance period, there were two types of employees, one Manak Mandal and would be entitled to payment at Government rates as Government servant and the other would be persons beyond the Manak Mandal but within the sanctioned strength in respect of pre-Ordinance period who would be paid at the rate of Government grant-in-aid. Once Ordinance lapses then status quo ante is to be restored and everybody would get the payment as per Government grant-in-aid who may be Teachers and Science Teachers.

    Two small sub issues arise, one in respect of some posts at the time when the Ordinance came into being they were not sanctioned. They were sanctioned by the State Government subsequently but with retrospective period that is prior to the Ordinance period. Learned counsel for the Board submits that these are invalid sanctions by the Government and are of no effect. I wonder how Board, which is a statutory instrumentality of the State, can take such a stand against the action of the State. Neither the State nor the Board could be permitted to challenge this action at all. State was conscious that it was granting sanction during the Ordinance period and was so granting it from a period prior to the Ordinance. The purpose was simple. The requirement of teaching post being there, Teachers having been appointed pending sanction, sanction takes time. Therefore, once post was sanctioned but had to be sanctioned retrospectively from the time it was applied for taking the view as advanced by the learned counsel for the Board would be like saying that Government was bound to sanction the post but it slept. Ordinance intervened. Now the right of the Teacher, who was on the post for which sanction was to be granted, losses his right. In other words, Government would be saying that I ought to have sanctioned but for my failure to sanction, you have lost your right. All I can say in this regard but only refer to what was said by Chief Justice Chagla in the case of All India Groundnut Syndicate Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, AIR 1954 Bombay 232 :

    “But the most surprising contention is put forward by the Department that because their own officer failed to discharge his statutory duty, the assessee is deprived of his right which the law has given to him under sub-section (2) of S 24. In other words, the Department wants to benefit from and wants to take advantage of its own default. It is an elementary principle of law that no person - we take it that the Income-tax Department is included in that definition - can put forward his own default in defence to a right asserted by the other party. A person cannot say that the party claiming the right is deprived of that right because “I have committed a default and the right is lost because of that default.”

    Thus, all those posts, which were sanctioned by the State Government in the period of Ordinance, over and above posts that were already sanctioned prior to Ordinance including those posts which were sanctioned with retrospective effect, would continue to be sanctioned posts for payment and other consequences even after lapse of Ordinance.

    The other issue is with regard to the letter of the State Government, as contained in Memo No 966 dated 14.12.1995 (Annexure-1) to CWJC No 216 of 1998. This letter tries to create a piquant situation. It states that the Ordinance having recognized in its Manak Mandal, lesser sanctioned post, then what was sanctioned earlier for this 429 Schools, the difference between the two would be deemed to be cancelled post. I may first observe that as I have held above, the Ordinance does not say so as I have held above Ordinance creates two classes of Teachers, one who would continue to get grant-in-aid notwithstanding beyond the sanction (Manak Mandal) of the Ordinance and the other who fell within the Manak Mandal (staffing pattern) of the Ordinance who would get Government rates. There was no question of cancellation of the sanctions. Learned counsel for the State submitted that at least this letter can be taken to be effective prospectively cancelling the post after 14 December, 1995. He states that upto this date, all Teachers whether Science or not, have been paid. Effectively, Science Teachers are to be excluded by operation of this letter. In my view, this letter assumes that the effect of Ordinance was cancellation of sanctioned post beyond the Manak Mandal which in fact is not the intention of the Ordinance. However, I may not be required to deal on this aspect any more as this issue has recently been set at rest by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of The Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board v. The State of Bihar (LPA No 656 of 2010) being judgment dated 08.04.2010 In that case, identical issue was involved. A learned Single Judge of this Court had granted similar prayer of that writ petitioner for payment of his salary as a Science Teacher after 1995. State and the Board resisted on basis of this very letter being Memo No 966 dated 14.12.1995 Learned Single Judge held the said letter to be ineffectual and in words of the Division Bench a dead letter as noted in paragraph-8 thereof. If it is a dead letter then nothing more is required to be done but to perform the last rites thereof and forget about it as if that letter never existed. If the letter did not exist then the position would be in view of the judgment of the Division Bench and what I have held earlier that all Science Teachers and all Teachers, whose services were approved being on sanctioned post prior to the Ordinance or whose posts was sanctioned and services approved during the Ordinance period, would be deemed to be Teachers entitled to Government grant-in-aid at the rate that were being paid prior to the Ordinance subject to such increments which may be due.

    On similar reasoning, a similar letter of the State Government being issued under Memo No 1056 dated 21.12.1995 which deals with purported cancellation of Primary Teacher posts which were sanctioned by letter No 957 dated 18.11.1989 cannot also stand because the import of this letter is identical to that of the letter dated 14 December, 1995 which the Division Bench has already held to be a dead letter. This letter of 1995 is also a dead letter.

    The writ applications are, thus, allowed in the terms indicated above with the issues accordingly decided.

    As the writ petitions have been pending before this Court for over a decade, it is expected that the petitioners would be paid their dues at the earliest but not late three months from today.

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    Deo Shankar Jha v. State Of Bihar
    (Sep 16, 2010)