Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • S.B Sinha, J.
Acts
  • Clause (b) of Rule 3.21 of the Bihar Forest Manual.86.
  • Clause (b) of Rule 3.21 aforementioned.87.
  • Clause 9.9.3, of Rule 35,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • S.B Sinha, J.
Acts
  • Clause (b) of Rule 3.21 of the Bihar Forest Manual.86.
  • Clause (b) of Rule 3.21 aforementioned.87.
  • Clause 9.9.3, of Rule 35,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.B. Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of an order dated 18.6.1990 (Annexure-2) which rejected his prayer to be ranked in the seniority list of Foresters. The basic facts admitted in the record are:

  • The petitioner and respondents nos. 11 to 13 were appointed as Forest Guard on various dates in 1973–1974.
  • The petitioner claims Forester and Forest Guard posts belong to the same subordinate forest service cadre (Clause 3.19 of the Bihar Forest Manual) and that Forester appointments are governed by Clause 3.21.
  • The petitioner asserts respondents 11–13 were sent for Forest Guards' training earlier (1978, 1980, 1981) and obtained honours, while he was sent for the same training only in 1984–85 and was posted as Forester on or about 2.4.1985.
  • Respondent nos. 11 and 12 were later given seniority with retrospective effect (1989) from the dates they passed the examination (5.10.1978 and 6.10.1980 respectively); respondent no. 13 was given retrospective seniority from 6.7.1981.
  • The petitioner made several departmental representations (8.6.1980, 7.1.1981 and 19.11.1981) claiming he should have been sent for training prior to the said respondents, which remained unaddressed leading to the writ petition.

Counter affidavits were filed by the State and by respondent no. 13 (the latter did not dispute the facts). No counter affidavits were filed by respondents 11 and 12.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the posts of Forester and Forest Guard constitute a single cadre such that seniority for Forester should relate back from the date of joining the subordinate forest service (as argued under Clause 3.19 and Clause 3.21 of the Bihar Forest Manual)?
  2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to have his seniority in the post of Forester fixed retrospectively from the dates on which juniors (respondents nos. 11–13) passed their Forest Guards' training examinations (on the basis of honours/notional promotion or otherwise)?
  3. Whether the writ petition should be entertained despite significant delay and laches, given the petitioner's departmental representations and the State's subsequent retrospective seniority orders in 1989?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. R.N. Das)

  • The posts of Forester and Forest Guard belong to the same cadre (subordinate forest service) and therefore seniority should relate back from the date of joining the cadre.
  • He should have been given an opportunity to undergo Forest Guard training before respondents 11–13 because he was senior to them in appointment.
  • He made timely departmental representations (8.6.1980; 7.1.1981; 19.11.1981) but received no orders.
  • He relied on Bindeshwari Ram v. State of Bihar [(1989) 4 SCC 465] to support his seniority claim.
  • He argued that because of a policy decision dated 6.12.1989 (Annexure-3) he should be held senior to respondents 11–13 on the basis of joining dates as Forest Guards.
  • He contended that he should not be penalized for laches on the part of respondents and that the impugned order impinges his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16.
  • He relied upon several authorities to argue that delay should not necessarily bar relief where representations were pursued or where cause of action arose recently (citing multiple precedents listed in the record).
  • He also argued lack of knowledge of respondents' earlier training postings because he was posted in different Divisions.

State and Respondents' Arguments

  • The State submitted respondents 11–13 attended the Forest Guards' Training School in 1978, 1980 and 1981 respectively, while the petitioner completed his training only in 1984–85; therefore promotions were granted with retrospective effect from dates of successful completion of examination.
  • The State relied on a policy letter dated 20.8.1987 (Annexure-B to the counter affidavit) indicating that Forest Guards who rank first and pass with honours may be given notional promotion from date of passing but monetary benefits only from the date they joined office; this policy has been followed.
  • The State drew attention to a circular dated 11.1.1991 (Annexure-F to the counter affidavit) stating those who stand first in the Forest Guard examination shall be appointed directly to Forester, with 16.7.1990 as a cut-off date, and that seniority of directly appointed persons would be reckoned from the year in which they were appointed.
  • The State argued that Clause 3.21 of the Bihar Forest Manual contemplates promotion to Forester from Forest Guards and other branches, indicating separate cadres rather than a single cadre for seniority purposes.
  • Respondent no. 13 in his counter affidavit stated legal positions and did not dispute the facts asserted by the petitioner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as described in the opinion) Application by the Court (how this opinion used or treated the precedent)
Bindeshwari Ram v. The State of Bihar [(1989) 4 SCC 465] Principle that inter se seniority held in a lower grade (Rangers) may determine inter se seniority in a higher appointment when promotions occur simultaneously (Clause 9.9.3 of Rule 35 was relevant in that case). The court held this decision inapplicable on the facts here because the factual matrix and relevant clauses differ; Bindeshwari Ram concerned reckoning seniority of Assistant Conservators on basis of seniority as Rangers, which is not the position in this case.
State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyatkarandikar (1989 Supp (1) SCC 393 : AIR 1989 SC 1133) Cited by petitioner in connection with alleged violation of Articles 14 and 16. The opinion lists this authority among those relied upon by petitioner but does not develop a specific application; the court later indicates the set of decisions relied upon by petitioner have limited relevance here.
Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. The State of Maharashtra ((1974) 1 SCC 317 : AIR 1974 SC 259) Principle that courts may refuse belated claims as a rule of practice; in Deodhar promotions challenged were provisional so no substantive right had crystallized, and delay may be excused where promotions are provisional. The court distinguished Deodhar because, unlike Deodhar where promotions were provisional, respondents nos. 12 and 13 had been promoted much earlier on a substantive basis and thereby acquired rights; thus Deodhar did not entitle the petitioner to relief here.
U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. The Labour Court, U.P (1989 (59) F.L.R 660 (Allahabad)) Considered issues of supersession where employees in different Divisions belonged to same cadre. The court observed this authority is not relevant here because the petitioner's case does not involve supersession on that ground.
G.P. Goyal v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P ((1984) 4 SCC 329) Authority dealing with challenge to provisional seniority list after a long interval and consideration of repeated representations. Cited among decisions relied upon by petitioner; court indicates such authorities do not have much relevance in the facts before it.
Mahadev (Mahader) Kalekar v. State Bank of Hyderabad ((1990) 4 SCC 174) Holds that where petitioners pursued remedy through representations and association intervention, delay may be explained and relief not necessarily barred by laches. The court stated this decision is not applicable to the present facts.
Vimla Sharma v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (1990 Supp SCC 770) Relief granted where denial would be discriminatory and no substantive right had crystallized; person recommended for regular appointment but not formally appointed. The court noted this case involved no accrued right and thus is distinguishable from the present case where respondents had substantive promotions.
K. Prasad v. Union of India (1988 Supp SCC 269) Supreme Court withheld dismissal for laches where complicated/all-India repercussions were involved and significant compliance issues existed. The court noted the decision concerned complex, wide-reaching issues and thus is not analogous to this case.
Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India ((1986) 3 SCC 325 : AIR 1986 SC 1636) Addresses condonation of break in service in adverse circumstances. The court found this authority not relevant to the facts before it.
R.M. Ramual v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((1989) 1 SCC 285 : AIR 1989 SC 357) Holds that an Article 226 petition should not be dismissed for delay where no prejudice is caused by earlier seniority lists and where cause of action was recent. The court cited this decision as an instance where delay was excused because prejudice to others was absent; the court considered the circumstances but ultimately found petitioner here had delayed unreasonably and respondents had acquired rights.
H.R. Club v. The State of Bihar (1986 PLJR 116) Authority for the proposition that the High Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction may refuse relief if the petitioner approached court after unreasonable delay and conduct is relevant. The court relied on this principle in support of declining relief where there was long and unexplained delay by the petitioner.
B.M. Bharti v. L.M. Sud (1991 (62) FLR 227) Referenced as a recent Supreme Court decision on delay—context not elaborated in the opinion. Listed among authorities addressing delay; the court did not base a distinct application on it beyond citing in support of principles about delay.
Sarju Sharan v. The State Of Bihar & Ors. (1988 BLJ 494 : 1988 PLJR 469) Court's prior authority: petitioner failed to explain delay and was found guilty of laches where only one belated representation existed. The court referenced its earlier view that unexplained delay and scant efforts to pursue remedy justify refusal of relief; used as persuasive precedent on laches.
K.V. Rajlakshmi Setty v. State of Mysore (1967 SC 993) Writ petition dismissed on ground of laches where delay was unreasonable and petitioners did not act within reasonable time. Cited to support the proposition that laches can bar relief; the court referenced it among authorities upholding dismissal for delay.
State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal Holds that Article 226 jurisdiction is discretionary and High Court may decline to assist the tardy or acquiescent where inordinate delay is not satisfactorily explained. The court relied on this principle as a key authority for denying relief in cases of unexplained inordinate delay and applied it to the facts here.
Dr. (Mrs.) Rohtagi v. The State of Bihar (1986 PLJR 1160) Adopts view that writ petition should be dismissed if petitioner approaches High Court after long and unexplained delay (collects authorities). The court cited this decision as echoing the established rule about refusal of relief for long unexplained delays.
Dr. Amar Nath Singh v. The State of Bihar (1991 (2) PLJR 609) Division Bench refused relief where long delay in assailing advertisement/admissions would cause hardship to others who participated and changed position. The court relied on the reasoning about prejudice to others and hardship that can arise if belated challenges are permitted; this principle was applied to deny petitioner broader relief.
Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Sukla (1986 Supp SCC 285 : AIR 1986 SC 1043) Referenced in context of dismissal of belated challenges to examinations/advertisements where many candidates have relied on them. Cited in support of the principle that delay will not be allowed where parties have changed position and large numbers are affected; used to emphasize prejudice to others from belated challenges.
S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((1989) 4 SCC 582 : AIR 1990 SC 10) Holds limitation cannot be saved by non-statutory representations or futile representations. The court invoked this principle to underscore that representations do not necessarily excuse delay for limitation purposes where they are not statutory or are futile.
Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil ((1991) 3 SCC 368 : AIR 1991 SC 1607) Refused relief where appellants challenged selection after having taken posts and training; courts must consider conduct and equity of those selected. The court cited this case as authority for modulating relief where successful candidates have joined service and changed position; applied to justify denying disruptive relief.
R.N. Bose v. Union of India ((1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470) Principle that it would be unjust to deprive persons of rights which have accrued to them over time. Quoted and applied to emphasize that long-delayed challenges should not unsettle rights already accrued to others; used to support refusal of relief due to prejudice to respondents.
Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax (1969) 1 SCC 110 : AIR 1970 SC 898 Quoted in Deodhar concerning the need for those claiming fundamental rights to move court before other rights come into existence; courts should avoid harming innocent parties if rights emerge by delay. Used in the opinion as part of the legal background emphasising that a petitioner must move the court before other rights crystallize; court applied the principle to deny relief where others' rights had crystallized.
G.P. Doyal and v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P (as cited in the opinion) Case involved challenge to provisional seniority list after 12 years; Supreme Court noticed repeated representations and did not reject Article 32 on delay alone. Mentioned among authorities relied on by petitioner; the court treats it as part of the broader jurisprudence on delay but finds it not decisive for these facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in discrete steps, each grounded in the record and statutory provisions cited in the opinion:

  1. Cadre question: The court rejected the petitioner's central contention that Forester and Forest Guard form a single cadre for seniority. It relied on Clause 3.19 (which lists the components of the subordinate forest service) and Clause 3.21 (which contemplates appointments to Forester by promotion from Forest Guards and other branches). The court concluded that these provisions indicate two distinct cadres rather than a single cadre, and therefore the petitioner's contention about automatic relation-back of seniority was incorrect (paras 33–38).
  2. Applicability of Bindeshwari Ram: The court examined the Bindeshwari Ram decision relied upon by the petitioner and explained that Bindeshwari Ram applied where inter se seniority in a lower grade determined seniority in a higher grade for officers appointed at the same time. The court found that factual and rule-based distinctions rendered Bindeshwari Ram inapplicable to the present case (paras 35–41).
  3. Knowledge, representations and laches: The court observed that the petitioner had, on his own account, made three representations (Annexure-11 series) in 1980–1981 claiming he should have been sent for training earlier. The record also showed as many as 31 other persons were sent for training before the petitioner. The petitioner had challenged promotions of only respondents 11–13 and not of others. For these reasons, the court held the petitioner's assertion that he lacked knowledge of the earlier training of respondents 11–13 was not supported by the record (paras 38–46).
  4. Delay and acquired rights of respondents: The court applied established principles (citing a string of Supreme Court and High Court authorities) that a writ court may refuse relief if the petitioner approaches after an unreasonable delay, especially where third parties have acquired substantive rights in the interim. The court found respondents 12 and 13 had been promoted substantively prior to the petitioner and therefore had derived rights which could not be lightly disturbed. The court distinguished authorities relied on by the petitioner (for example, Deodhar) where promotions were provisional or where rights had not crystallized (paras 47–63).
  5. Inconsistencies and statutory compliance: Despite denying relief on laches grounds for much of the petition, the court observed inconsistencies in the respondents' positions and in the State's supporting annexures: (a) respondent no. 11 did not have five years' service in 1978 so was not eligible for promotion then; (b) the State's Annexures B and F appear inconsistent — Annexure-F treats those standing first as directly appointed (with seniority reckoned from appointment year and a cut-off date of 16.7.1990), while Annexure-3 (policy letter) speaks of notional seniority from date of passing the examination. The court found the State could not invoke both inconsistent instructions and that Annexure-B (an executive instruction) could not override statutory requirements under Rule 3.21 (paras 80–86, 100–104).
  6. Remedy and direction: Balancing the laches analysis with observed procedural and eligibility anomalies, the court directed respondents to reconsider the seniority granted to respondents 11–13 insofar as it was based on the date of passing the examination — particularly in the cases of respondents 11 and 12, who were given retrospective seniority in 1989 over the petitioner. The reconsideration must be in accordance with statutory rules (Clause (b) of Rule 3.21) and the law (paras 81–88, 103–105).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ application was allowed to the following limited extent: the respondents are directed to reconsider the cases of respondent nos. 11 to 13 with respect to the seniority granted to them from the date of passing the examination, and in particular to reconsider the seniority of respondents nos. 11 and 12 (who were granted such seniority only in 1989 over the petitioner), keeping in view the provisions of the statutory rules (Clause (b) of Rule 3.21) and in accordance with law (para 88–105).

The court declined to grant broader relief that the petitioner sought — chiefly because the petitioner had approached the court after what the court considered an unreasonable and unexplained delay and because respondents 12 and 13 had substantive promotions and had acquired rights which it would be unjust to disturb without proper cause (paras 45–53, 74–76, 92–96).

Consequences and implications:

  • The immediate practical effect is a direction for administrative reconsideration of seniority for respondents 11–13 in line with statutory rules; the court did not automatically reorder seniority in the petitioner's favour from 1978 or other earlier dates.
  • No costs were awarded (the court ordered no order as to costs) (para 89).
  • The court emphasized that it was not setting a broad new precedent to upset long-acquired substantive rights of employees where a petitioner has delayed in seeking relief; much of the reasoning reaffirms established principles on laches, acquired rights and the discretionary nature of Article 226 jurisdiction.
  • Where administrative policy circulars or executive instructions (Annexure-B / Annexure-F) conflict with statutory rules, the court required reconsideration in accordance with the statutory provisions (para 102–104).

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information outside the text of the opinion has been added or inferred.

Show full summary ...

    Ram Naresh Singh v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.

    S.B Sinha, J.:— The petitioner by way of this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India prays for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing an order dated 18.6.1990, as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application whereby his prayer to rank him in the seniority list of the Forester has been finally rejected.

    2. The basic facts of the case are admitted. The petitioner and the respondent nos. 11 to 13 were appointed on the post of Forest Guard on 5.5.1973, 24.4.1974, 24.1.1974 and 5.9.1974 respectively.

    3. According to the petitioner, the posts of Forester and Forest Guard belong to one cadre being that of the subordinate forest service and are governed by Clause-3.19 of the Bihar Forest Manual, which read as follows:—

    “The Subordinate Forest Service comprises of:—

    (i) Forest Rangers

    (ii) Foresters

    (iii) Forest Guards

    (iv) Other sub-ordinates, namely, Surveyor, Amin, Marking Officer, Felling Observer, Depot Officer, Coupe Overseer, Mines Muharrir, Naka Guard etc.”

    4. It is further the case of the petitioner that appointment to the post of Forester is governed by Clause 3.21 thereof.

    5. The petitioner contended that the authorities of the State of Bihar in violation of all norms and in an arbitrary manner sent respondent no. 11 for obtaining training in the Departmental Guards' Training School on 27.4.1978 (Annexure-8) and relieved him for that purpose on 27.4.1978 (Annexare-8.A); relieved respondent no. 12 in the year 1980 and respondent no. 13 in the year 1981 whereas, he was relieved for undergoing the said training in 1984 and was posted as a Forester on 2.4.1985

    6. Admittedly, the respondent no. 11 obtained Honours in Forest Guards' training on 5.10.1978; the respondent no. 12 stood first with Honours in Forest Guards' training on 6.10.1980 and the respondent no. 13 stood First with Honours in Forest Guard Training on 26.7.1981

    7. According to the petitioner, he being senior to Respondent nos. 11-13 ought to have been given an opportunity to undergo the forest guards' training prior to the said respondents.

    8. The petitioner has further contended that he had made representations before the authorities concerned on 8.6.1980 (Annexure-11); 7.1.1981 (Annexure-11.A) and 19.11.1981 (Annexure-11.B), to the effect that he should have been sent for undergoing training in Forest Guard's training prior to the said respondents but no order was passed therein.

    9. On 14.5.1982, the petitioner was relieved for undergoing Foresters' training, but on 18.5.1982, as would appear from Annexure-9, he was sent back on the ground that he had not been promoted to the post of Forester. The petitioner ultimately was relieved for training in the Departmental Guards' Training School in the year 1984-1985 and stood first with honours in the examination held in the said training school.

    10. The respondent no. 11 joined as a Forester in the year 1988 but on a representation made by him, by an order dated 16.3.1989 he was given seniority with retrospective effect from 5.10.1978

    11. The respondent no. 12 joined as a Forester on 13.7.1982 and in the year 1989 he was given seniority with retrospective effect from 6.10.1980 Similarly, the respondent no. 13 joined as a Forester on 21.5.1982 and he was given seniority with retrospective effect from 6.7.1981

    12. The petitioner, as noticed hereinbefore, was posted as Forester on or about 2.4.1985

    13. Mr. R.N Das, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised various contentions in support of this application.

    14. According to the learned counsel, as the posts of Forester and Forest Guard belong to the same cadre, the seniority of employees in the said cadre should relate back from the date of his joining the said cadre.

    15. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Ram v. The State of Bihar [(1989) 4 SCC 465 : 1990 (1) PLJR 20 (SC)].

    16. It was next contended by the learned counsel that as the petitioner was posted in different Divisions, he was not aware that respondent nos. 11 to 13 had been sent for training prior to 1980 and thus he could not make representations earlier.

    17. According to the learned counsel, in view of the policy decision dated 6th December, 1989, as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application, the petitioner should have been held to be senior to respondent nos. 11 to 13 on the basis of the joining of their respective post as Forest Guards.

    18. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for laches on the part of the respondents and by reason of the impugned order (Annexure-2) his fundamental rights, as contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India has been affected.

    19. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon in State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyatkarandikar, (1989 Supp (1) SCC 393 : A.I.R 1989 S.C 1133).

    20. The learned counsel also submitted that it is not a case where the petitioner's application should be dismissed on the ground of delay or laches alone, as he had been pursuing his departmental remedy before the authorities concerned.

    21. The learned counsel, in this connection has placed strong reliance upon in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. The State of Maharashtra ((1974) 1 SCC 317 : AIR 1974 SC 259); U.P State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. The Labour Court, U.P (1989 (59) F.L.R 660 (Allahabad); G.P Goyal v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P ((1984) 4 SCC 329); Mahader Kalekar v. State Bank of Hyderabad ((1990) 4 SCC 174); Vimla Sharma v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (1990 Supp SCC 770); K. Prasad v. Union of India (1988 Supp SCC 269 at 273); Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India ((1986) 3 SCC 325 : AIR 1986 SC 1636) and in R.M Ramual v. State of Himanchal Pradesh ((1989) 1 SCC 285 : AIR 1989 SC 357).

    22. It was further submitted that in any event as the petitioner's representations had been finally rejected in 1990 (Annexure-2) and as two of his juniors namely respondent nos. 11 and 12 had been given seniority with retrospective effect from the date of passing of their examination in the year 1989, it must be held that cause of action for filing the writ petition has arisen recently.

    23. In this case, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State and another counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 13.

    24. Respondent no. 13, in his counter affidavit has merely stated the legal position and has not disputed the statement of facts made in the writ application.

    25. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 11 and 12.

    26. Mrs. M.M Pal, the learned Standing Counsel No. 2 has, drawn my attention to paras-11, 12 and 14 of the counter affidavit and submitted that respondent nos. 11 to 13 attended the Forest Guards' Training School in the years 1978, 1980 and 1981 respectively and in view of the fact that the petitioner completed his training only in the year 1984-1985, all persons have been granted promotion with retrospective effect from the date of successful completion of their examination.

    27. It was further contended that in this case the policy decision of the State as contained in the letter dated 20.8.1987 (Annexure-B to the counter affidavit), wherein it has been stated that all Forest Guards, who rank first and pass their examinations with Honours may be given a notional promotion from the date of their passing of the examination but they should be given monetary benefit only from the date they joined their office has been followed.

    28. My attention has further been drawn to the Circular letter dated 11.1.1991, as contained in Annexure-F to the counter affidavit wherein it has been stated that the persons who stand first in the examination in Forest Guard shall be appointed directly to the post of Forester.

    29. In that Circular letter, it has further been stated that 16.7.1990 would be considered to be the cut off date for the purpose of appointment in the posts of Forest Guard obtaining honours in the examination.

    30. It was further stated therein that if any person prior to that date has been promoted in the cadre of Forester and/or Forest Officer upon having stood first in the examination or having obtained honours therein, he will be deemed to have been directly appointed.

    31. It was further stated that the seniority of those persons so directly appointed would be reckoned from the year in which they had been appointed.

    32. However, it was mentioned that by reason of such appointments; quota of filling up the posts of Foresters by way of promotion shall not be affected.

    33. Mr. Das is not correct in his submission that the posts of Forester and Forest Guard constitute one Cadre. In terms of Clause 3.19 of the Bihar Forest Manual only it has been stated as to what would constitute the subordinate forest service.

    34. The very fact that in view of Clause 3.21 of the said Manual, permanent and temporary appointments to the class of Foresters can be made only by promotion from Forest Guards and other branches is pointer to the fact that the cadres of Forest Guards and Foresters are two different cadres and not the same cadre.

    35. The decision of the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Ram's case (supra) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch as, in that case, in terms of Clause 9.9.3, of Rule 35, the inter se seniority of the Rangers having been appointed substantively to the service if order of promotion is passed at the same time, their respective seniority shall be reckoned on the basis of their inter se seniority of Rangers.

    36. The Supreme Court in that decision held that in order to determine the inter se seniority of the Assistant Conservators of Forest, who were appointed at the same time, the respective seniority held as Rangers shall be the determining factor.

    37. Such is not the position here.

    38. In this case, the petitioner himself has in his rejoinder to the counter affidavit quoted a letter dated 11.7.1989 issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, Ranchi whereby the petitioner's case for giving him seniority in the post of Forester was recommended.

    39. It appears from a perusal of the said letter that as many as 31 persons had been sent for training prior to the petitioner although they joined in the post of Forest Guards later than him.

    40. In this writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the promotion of the respondent nos. 11 to 13 only and not of any other person who were also sent for obtaining training prior to the petitioner.

    41. The submission of Mr. Das, to the effect that the petitioner had no knowledge about the fact that the respondent nos. 11 to 13 had been sent for obtaining training prior to the petitioner is also not borne out from the records of the case, inasmuch as, the petitioner himself has stated that he made three representations to that regard which are contained in Annexure-11 series namely, on 8.6.1980, 7.1.1981 and 19.11.1981

    42. The petitioner also cannot be heard to say that he was not aware of the orders of promotion granted to the respondent nos. 12 and 13 much earlier to his promotion as a Forester.

    43. As noted hereinbefore, the respondent no. 13 joined the post of Forester on 21.5.1982 whereas the respondent no. 12 joined the post of Forester on 13.7.1982

    44. It is, however true that so far as respondent no. 11 is concerned, he joined the post of Forester in the year 1987 i.e after the petitioner.

    45. In my opinion, therefore, the petitioner at this juncture cannot be permitted to question the promotion of the concerned respondents after such a long time.

    46. The petitioner underwent the training in the year 1984-1985 in Forest Guards' Training School without any demur whatsoever. He is, therefore, in my opinion, estopped and precluded from contending that the respondent nos. 11 to 13 should not have been sent for training earlier to him as he has approached this Court more than after a decade from the said date.

    47. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar's case (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the case where the promotions were given to the respondents on provisional basis and as such no employee had derived any substantive right to hold the said post.

    48. In the instant case, the respondent nos. 12 and 13 had been promoted much prior to the petitioner on a substantive basis. They have, therefore, derived right to hold the said posts.

    49. In Deodhar's case (supra) the Supreme Court held:

    “In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts.”

    50. The Supreme Court in Deodhar's Case further referred to its earlier decision in Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay ((1969) 1 SCC 110 : AIR 1970 S.C 898), wherein it has been held as follows;—

    “The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent paties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court.”

    51. It further relied upon the decision of R.N Bose v. Union of India ((1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 S.C 470), wherein, it has been held as follows:—

    “It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.”

    52. In Deodhar's case (supra), the Supreme Court distinguished its aforementioned two decisions holding:

    “Here, as admitted by the State Government in paragraph-55 of the affidavit in reply, all promotions that have been made by the State Government are provisional and the position has not been crystallised to the prejudice of the petitioners.”

    53. It is, therefore, clear that in that decision, the Supreme Court has taken into consideration that in a case where the action would harm other parties and would affect the promotion of others a writ petition filed after a long time should not be entertained.

    54. In U.P State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. The Labour Court, U.P (1987 (59) F.L.R 660 (Allahabad)), the Allahabad High Court was considering, a case where an employee was superseded by another employee in another Division although they belonged to the same cadre. In this case, question of petitioner's supersession on that ground is not in question.

    55. Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India ((1986) 3 SCC 325 : AIR 1986 SC 1636) is not relevant for the purpose of this case, inasmuch as, the Supreme Court, therein was considering a case where an employee in adverse circumstances had to accept the offers of re-appointment with a stipulation in his contract of service that he would not be entitled to continue in service and in the facts and circumstances of the case thereof, it was held that the appellant was entitled to condonation of the break in his service despite the terms to the contrary in his fresh appointment.

    56. The case of G.P Doyal and v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P ((1984) 4 SCC 329) was a case where again only a provisional seniority list was challenged after 12 years. The Supreme Court further noticed that as the petitioner's repeated representations had not been elicited any relief, the application under Article 32 should not be rejected on the ground of delay alone.

    57. In K. Prasad v. Union of India (1988 Supp SCC 269), the Supreme Court did not dismiss the writ petition on the ground of laches because of complicated questions involved therein which had an all India repercussions.

    58. In that case, it was held that there had been no proper compliance of Rule and it was directed that all the 82 eligible officers as of October, 1966 should be considered afresh for promotion to the higher post.

    59. In R.M Ramual v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((1989) 1 SCC 285 : AIR 1989 SC 357), the Supreme Court held that an application under Articles 226 should not be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches where no prejudice was caused to the appellant by the seniority list which was prepared in the year 1971 and he was prejudiced only when the order impugned therein was passed on 28th April, 1982.

    60. Further, in that case, the Government had been accepting the recommendations and had been directing that inter se seniority of the appellant and all the concerned respondents be determined on the basis of their substantive rank on November 1, 1966 and in that situation, it was held that there has been no unreasonable delay on the part of the appellant to challenge the order dated 28th April, 1982.

    61. In Mahadav Kalekar v. State Bank of Hyderabad ((1990) 4 SCC 174), the writ petition was not dismissed on the ground of delay holding:

    “The petitioners were pursuing their remedy and having not received any relief, the matter was taken up by the Association. The petitioners have annexed Annexure-P-9 record of discussions held with the representative of Associate Bank Officers' Association Unit (SBH) at Hyderabad on December 1, 1988 in which the issue regarding notional seniority to Group ‘A’ promotions of 1984 batch was one of the issues to be considered in the aforementioned meeting. Thus it cannot be said that the petitioners have not explained the period from 1984-89 till the writ petition was filed in the High Court. It may be farther noted that the petitioners were not at all at fault and it was only on account of a general stay granted by the High Court in the writ petition filed by the SC/ST candidates that promotions in entire Group ‘A’ were stayed.”

    (Underlining is mine for emphasis)

    62. This decision is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    63. The aforementioned decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner have thus not much relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    64. It is now well known that this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction may refuse to grant a relief, if the petitioner approached the Court after an unreasonable delay. The conduct of the petitioner is also relevant.

    (See:— H.R Club v. The State of Bihar) (1986 PLJR, 116)

    65. Reference, in this connection may also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in B.M Bharti v. L.M Sud (1991 (62) FLR 227).

    66. In Vimla Sharma v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (1990 Supp SCC 770), the Supreme Court granted relief to the appellant on the ground that although she was recommended for regular appointment on 10th November, 1975 but work has been extracted from her although the Management did not make any order in her favour and she had been made to continue in Junior High School all through.

    67. In the facts and circumstances of that case, it was held that it would be discriminatory and unjust to deny her the post and regular appointment.

    68. Thus, in that case also, the question of any person acquiring any right to hold a post did not arise.

    69. In Sarju Sharan… v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.… (1988 BLJ 494 : 1988 PLJR 469), I have held as follows:—

    “From the aforementioned facts it would be evident that the petitioner has not seriously tried to explain the delay. The very fact only one such representation has been annexed which was also made on 1.10.1980, it is a clear proof of laches on the part of the petitioner. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner is guilty of serious delay and laches and on that ground he is not entitled to any relief.

    70. In K.V Rajlakshmi Setty v. State of Mysore, reported in 1967 SC 993 a writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay alone. In the aforementioned decision the Supreme Court held as follows:—

    “There is also a good deal of force behind the contention that the appellants are guilty of laches. After the passing of the order of May 17, 1950, they should have made an application within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean that they could rest upon their oars if they were really being discriminated against.”

    71. Recently the Supreme Court again in State of M.P v. Nandlal Jaiswal held as follows:—

    “Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.”

    Recently, this Court also in Dr. (Mrs.) Rohtagi v. The State of Bihar reported in 1986 PLJR page 1160 after taking into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court in 1970 S.C 470; 1970 SC 1343 and 1973 SC 1168 held that a writ petitioner should be dismissed if the petitioner approaches the High Court after long and unexplained delay. The same view has also been adopted by the Division Bench decision of this Court in 1985 Pat. 70 and 1985 PLJR 1148.”

    72. In Dr. Amar Nath Singh v. The State of Bihar (1991 (2) PLJR 609), a Division Bench of this Court while considering the matter of appointment of the Additional District Judges by this Court refused to grant relief to those petitioners as they appeared in the written examination but did not qualify, on the ground that the same would cause hardship to the candidates called for interview stating:

    “Further, there is a long delay in assailing the advertisements i.e in October 1990, whereas the advertisements are dated 8.2.1985 and 20.9.1989 In CWJC No. 6582 of 1990 the petitioners are candidates, who have not been called for interview, though participated in the written test. They allowed the examination to be held without protest pursuant to the advertisements. It is therefore, too late for them to turn round and assail the advertisements (See: 1986 Supp SCC 285 : AIR 1986 SC 1043) Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Sukla. It is true that in CWJC No. 6700 of 1990 the petitioner did not participate in the examination, but even in a public interest litigation delay will not be allowed when parties have changed their respective position and more than two thousand candidates have participated in the examination. This would cause hardship to the candidates called for interview.”

    73. In S.S Rathore v. State Of Madhya Pradesh. ((1989) 4 SCC 582 : AIR 1990 S.C 10), the Supreme Court while considering the question of limitation for filing a suit held that limitation cannot be saved on the ground that representations had been filed which are not statutory in nature nor would the same save limitation if futile representation are made by the petitioners.

    74. In Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil ((1991) 3 SCC 368 : AIR 1991 S.C 1607), the Supreme Court refused to grant any relief to the petitioners thereof, who challenged the marks allotted for group discussion and interview after unsuccessfully trying their luck by appearing before the Interview Board; holding:

    “The next question which arises for consideration is as to what direction would be just and proper in the circumstances of this case. We do not agree with the High Court to quash the entire selection made by the Board for the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil). It may be noted that Rajeev Govil, Vivek Aggrawal and Gyandra Srivastava who remain unsuccessful had filed writ petitions after taking chance and fully knowing the percentage of marks kept for interview and Group discussions. It is no doubt correct that they cannot be estopped from challenging the rule which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, but in modulating the relief, their conduct and the equity of those who have been selected are the relevant consideration. The appellants have joined the posts on 28th December, 1989 and after compelering the training are discharing their duties at different places. It has been submitted on their behalf that some of them had left their earlier job and have also become overage. Thus we do not consider it proper in the interest of justice to set aside the selection of the appellants.”

    75. As indicated hereinbefore, thus, the petitioner having approached to this Court after undue and unreasonable delay, cannot get any relief from this Court; particularly, in view of the fact that on his own showing at least 31 persons had been sent for training prior to him, although, he was the seniormost.

    76. The petitioner did not file any writ application immediately after he came to learn that the respondent nos. 11 to 13 had been sent for training before him as far back as in the year 1980. Further, he joined the training School without any demur whatsoever.

    77. Further, a promotion is to be granted to those Forest Guards who stood first with honours at Forest Guard Training School and have been put in at least five years of satisfactory service.

    78. The petitioner cannot contend that had he been sent for training in 1978, 1980, 1981 alongwith respondent nos. 11 to 13, he would have stood first with honours at the examinations.

    79. The petitioner, therefore, cannot automatically be granted seniority with effect from 1978, in view of the fact that the respondent nos. 12 and 13 were promoted on 21.5.1982 and 13.7.1982 respectively.

    80. However, one aspect of the matter cannot be overlooked.

    81. The respondent nos. 11 and 12 had been granted promotion with retrospective effect only in the year 1989. Respondent no. 11 joined the post of Forester in the year 1987 i.e after the petitioner.

    82. In the year 1978, the respondent nos. 11 even did not complete five years' of service so as to entitle him to be promoted to the post of Forester on that date.

    83. The respondents in their counter affidavit have also not stated as to why the respondent no. 11 was promoted to the post of Forester in the year 1987 although, he had completed his training in the year 1978. It has also not been disputed that the Respondent no. 11 got only honours but did not stand first in the training.

    84. The stands of the respondents are also inconsistent and contradictory to each other insofar as whereas in terms of Annexure-F, they contend that the persons having successfully completed their examination with honours would be deemed to have been directly appointed from the date on which they are promoted but from Annexure-3, it appears that a circular letter had been issued to the effect that a notional seniority can be given to a candidate from the date he passed the said examination.

    85. The respondent-State thus cannot rely upon both the Annexures. Further, Annexure-B is merely an executive instruction and cannot supersede the statutory rules as contained in Clause (b) of Rule 3.21 of the Bihar Forest Manual.

    86. In order to promote an eligible candidate with retrospective effect, the respondents were bound to consider the conditions precedents thereof as laid down under Clause (b) of Rule 3.21 aforementioned.

    87. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, the respondent no. 11 was not even eligible for being promoted in the year 1978.

    88. In this view of the matter, the respondents are directed to reconsider the case of respondent nos. 11 to 13 so far as seniority granted to them from the date of passing of the examination and in particular, the case of the respondent nos. 11 and 12 as they were given such seniority only in 1989 over the head of the petitioner, keeping in view the provisions of the statutory rules and in accordance with law. This writ application is thus allowed to the aforementioned extent only.

    89. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Ram Naresh Singh v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.
    (Dec 12, 1991)