Ashwini Kumar Sinha, J.:— These three writ cases involve common question of law and hence they have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.
2. The authority concerned, i.e Respondent no. 2, has held that the petitioners were liable to pay salestax on wheat bran (Chokar). Whether wheat bran (Chokar) is a cattle feed or not and whether the petitioners are liable to pay sales-tax on the sale of wheat bran are the intricate and significant questions involved in these writ cases.
3. Admittedly the period in question is the period before 29.6.1985 (the date on which the Notification No. S.O 611 dated 29th June, 1986 came into force).
4. The petitioners claim that no sales-tax was payable on the sales of wheat bran as, according to the petitioners, it was exempted under item no. 35 of the Notification No. Bikrikar/SAN/1026/77-14547 dated 26th December, 1977 (Annexure 1 to C.W.J.C No. 2725/84) as a cattle feed; whereas, in short, the submission advanced on behalf of the State is that the effect of exemption Notification dated 26.12.1977 is taken away because a retroactive Notification (with effect from 26.12.77) was issued on 9th March, 1978 (Notification No. 3320) which made “Bran” exigible to tax.
(It will be most pertinent to note that in Annexure-1 to C.W.J.C No. 2725/84; in Item No. 35, Explanation (i) to (iii) has been wrongly typed as this Explanation was inserted by Notification No. 3322 dated 9.3.78, retrospectively from 26.12.77).
5. In other words, the submission on behalf of the State is that the retroactive Notification of 9th March, 1978 (No. 3320) inferentially and by implication taxes Bran by superseding the exemption Notification. The submission on behalf of the State also was that an evidence of intention to tax Bran should be read or inferred by implication by allowing the Notification of rate of tax or eligibility in order to override the exemption.
6. The petitioners claim (in C.W.J.C No. 2725/84), by a petition dated 29.3.84, that no sales-ax was leviable on the sale of wheat bran which, according to the petitioners, was a cattle feed, was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Barh Circle Barh (Respondent no. 2), by his order dated 4.5.84 (Annexure-5 to C.W.J.C No. 2725/84) (wrongly mentioned as order dated 29.3.84 in paragraph-1 of the writ petition and also in the prayer portion). The petitioners also challenge Anuexure 5(i).
7. Similar orders as in Aanexures-5 and 5-A were passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Singhbhum Circle, Jamshedpur (Respondent no. 3) in C.W.J.C No. 5637/85 and by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bokaro Circle, Bokaro Steel City (Respondent no. 2) in C.W.J.C No. 1918/84 as in annexure-4.
8. Thus, the impugned annexures are Annexures-5 and 5-A in C.W.J.C No. 5637/85 and Annexures-4 in C.W.J.C No. 1918/84. The orders passed in these two writ cases are of different dates, as would appear from the impugned annexures.
9. The answer to the significant questions, rests upon the interpretations of the two Notifications referred to above, and also the Notification dated 29th June, 1985 (S.O 611). These Notifications will be referred to hereafter.
10. The petitioner in C.W.J.C No. 2725/84 is a registered partnership firm and runs a Flour Mill which is engaged, inter alia, in producing various products, namely; Bran out of wheat crushing, Atta, Maida and Sujji.
11. Similarly, the petitioner in C.W.J.C No. 5637/85 is a Private Limited Company and is engaged; inter alia, in the very same products.
12. Similarly, the petitioner in C.W.J.C No. 1918/84 is a Limited Company and is engaged, inter alia, in producing the very same products.
(We are not concerned in the present writ cases with regard to the products, namely, Atta, Maida and Sujji, as the present writs have been confined only to the question of the product namely, “Wheat-bran”).
13. Before I deal with the question involved in these writ cases, it is most pertinent to quote the three Notifications, referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs.
14. In the Notification dated 26th December, 1977, it would not be pertinent to quote any other item except item no. 35. (This Notification has been marked Annexure-1 to C.W.J.C No. 2725 of 1984).
(A) Notification dated 26th December, 1977 has been made Annexure-1 to the writ case No. C.W.J.C 2725/84 which is quoted as below:
“No. Bikrikar/San-1026/77-14547, the 26th December, 1977. — In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Fifth Ordinance, 1977 (Bihar Ordinance No. 257 of 1977), the Governor of Bihar in supersession of all previous Notifications in this regard is pleased to exempt the sale of goods specified in the second column of the Schedule annexed hereto from the levy of ‘Sales-Tax’ subject to the conditions and restrictions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof.
Schedule
Sl. No.
Description of goods.
Conditions and restrictions subject to which exemption has been allowed.
1.
2.
3.
***
***
***
35
Cattle Feed and Poultry Feed.
***
***
***
2. This Notification shall come into with effect from 26th of December, force 1977.
(B) Notifications dated 9th March, 1978, on which the submission on behalf of Respondent (State) is based, as follows:
Before I quote the Notifications, it is pertinent to mention that in the Bihar Gazette (Extra Ordinary) dated 13th March, 1978, there were two Notifications dated 9th March, 1978 and they are as follows:
(i) The 9th March, 1978.
No. Bikrikar/BB/12215/77-3320. — In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Bihar Sales Tax Fifth Ordinance, 1977 (Bihar Ordinance no. 257 of 1977), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to make the following amendments in the Schedule appended to the Government of Bihar, Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department Notification No. Bikrikar/San./1026/77-14545, dated the 26th December, 1977 as amended from time to time, namely—
AMENDMENTS.
1. In the said Schedule, for serial no. 11 and its corresponding entries in columns 2 & 3, the following serial number and its corresponding entries shall, respectively, be substituted, namely:—
1.
2.
3.
11.
Atta, Maida, Sujji and Bran
“3 percent”
2. In the said Schedule, the words “excluding Atta, Maida, Sujji and Paddy”, appearing within bracket in column 2 against serial no. 12, shall be substituted by the words “excluding Atta, Maida, Sujji, bran and paddy”
3. This Notification shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 26th December, 1977.
By order of the Governor of Bihar
A. HAKIM
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and ex-officio Special Secretary to Government,
(This Notification has been marked Annexure-B in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C No. 5637/85).
The 9th March, 1978.
No. Bikkrikar/BB/12215/77-3322 — In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Ordinance, 1977 (Bihar Ordinance No. 257 of 1977), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to make the following amendments in the Schedules appended to Government of Bihar, Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department Notification No. Bikkrikar/San./1026/77-14547, dated the 26th December, 1977 as amended from time to time, namely—
AMENDMENTS.
1. In the said Schedule, for the entries in column 2 against serial no. 35 the following entries shall be substituted, namely—
“Cattle Feed and Poultry Feed”.
Explanation:—
1. Pellets and mash concentrates for cattle.
2. Pig mash and pellet.
3. Poultry mash and pellets for layers, growers, chicks and broilers.
4. Poultry feed concentrate.
2. This Notification shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 26th December, 1977.
By order of the Govt. of Bihar.
A. Hakim
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and ex-officio Special Secretary to Government.
(This Notification has been marked Annexure-A in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C No. 3637/85).
15. I have purposely quoted this Notification which was published in both the languages, i.e, in Hindi and in English, as the learned Counsel for the respondents has in support of his submission, argued that if the Notification is published in both the languages (Hindi and English) and in the english translation of the Hindi Notification if an omission to translate a word has occurred then it would be the Hindi version of the Notification which will prevail.
(iii) Then remains the Notification dated 29.6.85 (S.O No. 611) which needs to be quoted.
I would omit other items from this Notification which are not necessary for the purpose of the present case.
“S.O 611—the 29th June, 1985.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 7 of part I of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (Bihar Act No. 5 of 1981) the Governor of Bihar is pleased to make the following amendments in Schedule appended to the Government of Bihar, Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department Notification No. Bikrikar/San/1026/77-14547, dated the 26th December, 1977 as amended from time to time, namely:—
AMENDMENT
1. In the said schedule, serial Nos. 43 and 63 and their corresponding entries in columns 2 and 3 shall be omitted.
2. In the said schedule for serial nos. 2, 91 and 35 and their corresponding entries in columns 2 and 3 the following entries shall be substituted:—
1.
2.
3.
***
***
***
35.
(1) Pellets and mash concentrates for cattle.
(2) Pig mash and pellets;
(3) Poultry mash and pellets for layers, growers, chicks and broilers;
(4) Poultry feed concentrate.
3. This Notification shall come into force with effect from 1st July, 1985.
(I must mention here that neither of the parties made this Notification of 29th June, 1984 (S.O 611) an annexure either to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, but this Notification was produced before the Court at the argument.)
16. Thus, a look at the Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977 shows that, amongst others, “Cattle Feed” and “Poultry feed” were exempted from levy of sales-tax without any condition or restriction being imposed as per Column 3 of the Schedule to the Notification and the said Notification came into force with effect from 26th December, 1977.
17. Thereafter on 9th of March, 1978 came two of the Notifications—one being No. 3320 and the other being 3322. These Notifications were also published in English version simultaneously. By Notification No. 3320 dated 9th March, 1978 rate of tax (3 per cent) was introduced on “Bran” and by Notification No. 3322 dated 9th March 1978 an Explanation to the words “Pashu Chara Tatha Kukut Chara” was added and in the Explanation it was said as below:
18. Whereas; in the English (Notification No. 3322) translation of this Hindi Notification the words were omitted to be translated.
19. The stand taken on behalf of the respondents was that the extent and scope of the words “Cattle feed” was fully explained by Notification No. 3322 dated 9.3.78 and no item other than the four items mentioned therein classified for the exemption under entry no. 35 of Notification No. 14547 dated 26.12.77 (as amended by Notification No. 3322 dated 9.3.78). Further stand taken on behalf of the respondents was that “Bran” was included in the Notification No. 3320 for fixing rate of tax (3 per cent) and hence it was submitted that as the rate of tax was fixed by the Notification No. 3320 issued on the same date (i.e 9.3.78), Bran (Chokar) was exigible to tax under the specific entry made in this regard in that Notification. On behalf of respondents it was further submitted that if the intention of the legislature was to exempt it (Bran) from taxation, it would have been included to the category of Cattle feed in the amended entry 35 of the Notification No. 3322 of the same date, i.e 9.3.78
20. Though, from the period 26th December, 1977 the petitioner (in C.W.J.C No. 2725/84) effected sale of wheat bran obtained by it in the manufacturing process, the petitioner paid sales-tax including additional taxes thereon under a mistaken impression that it was liable to tax; however, on realising the mistake the petitioner (of C.W.J.C No. 2725/84) filed a petition (Annexure-2 of Writ Case No. 2725/84) before respondent no. 2 (the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Barb Circle, Barh) claiming refund of the same which was refused by the impugned annexures (Annexures 5 and 5(1) of C.W.J.C No. 2725/84).
21. As already stated above, Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977 does exempt “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” from the levy of sales-tax.
22. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that wheat bran was essentially a Cattle feed and as such came under item 35 of the list of exemptions-vide Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977 and hence was not exigible to any sales-tax.
23. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Explanation put by the State Government by Notification No. 3322 dated 9th March, 1978, only explained the word “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” and it neither restricted nor extended the meaning of the word “Cattle feed and Poultry feed”. In short, the submission was that the purpose of adding the Explanation was only to explain the word “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” and hence no tax was leviable on the sale of the aforesaid goods.
24. Earlier to the Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977, “Cattle feed” was liable to be taxed under the sales-tax but the Notification dated 26th December, 1977 exempted it from the leviability of any sales-tax. What is apparent is that by the subsequent Notification No. 3322 dated 9th March, 1978 only an Explanation in serial no. 35 of the original Notification (dated 26th December, 1977) was inserted and there was no amendment in Col. 3 of the original Notification (dated 26th December, 1977) which had exempted “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” from the purview of sales-tax.
25. Thus, the significant question to be decided is whether Chokar (wheat bran) was a Cattle feed?
26. I will take up this question first as this is the main question.
27. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that Chokar (wheat bran) was essentially a Cattle feed not only in commercial parlance but also in technical, common and legislative parlance. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the materials on the record including unambiguous admissions by the authorities of the State to the effect that Chokar was essentially a Cattle feed and has referred to various Annexures appended to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners (of C.W.J.C No. 2725/84). Learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the averment made by the petitioners to the effect that Chokar (Bran) was essentially a Cattle feed. As a fact this averment has not been traversed/repudiated by the respondents in their counter affidavit and thus Chokar (Bran) being essentially a Cattle feed stands admitted by the respondents.
28. In order to strengthen the submission further, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to a letter dated 14th October, 1985 (Annexure-7 to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 2725/84). This letter is from the Joint Secretary to the Government, Food, Supply and Commerce Department, Patna, addressed to the Bihar Roller Flour Millers Association, Patna and is in reply to the letter dated 10.10.85 sent by the President by the aforesaid Association. This letter (Annexure-7) from the Government of Bihar clarifies as to what a wheat bran is. It is pertinent to quote this letter:
The President,
Bihar Roller Flour Millers Association, Kaveri Apartment, Bandar Bagicha, Patna.
Sub: Certification of Wheat Bran as Cattle feed.
I am directed to refer to your letter No. 5/85-43, dated 10.10.85 on the subject and to say that wheat bran is essentially a cattle feed.
Yours faithfully,
14/10.
Joint Secretary to Government.”
29. My attention was also drawn to another letter of the Government of Bihar dated 15.10.85 (Annexure-8 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners). The petitioner itself bad, by its letter dated 14.10.85, asked for a clarification on the subject and the Government of Bihar through its Joint Director, Cattle feed, Animal Husbandary Department, clarified that to the following effect by his letter dated 15.10.85
30. It is again pertinent to quote the reply by the Government of Bihar itself by way of clarification sought for.
31. My attention was further drawn to another letter (Annexure-9 of the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners) from the Director, U.S WHEAT ASSOCIATES dated 17.2.86 addressed to the Executive Director of Shree Madhav Roller Flour Mills (p) Ltd. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, while drawing my attention to this letter submitted that the U.S Wheat Associates, New Delhi, was an incorporate body of Wheat Growers of U.S.A and was highly technical body from whom a clarification about wheat-bran and their use in India was called for and the reply from them (Annexure-9) was as follows:—
“U.S WHEAT ASSOCIATES, REPRESENTING WHEAT GROWER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.
New Delhi
February 17, 1986.
The Executive Director;
Shree Madhav Roller Flour Mills (P) Ltd., P.O Shree Madhav Mills
Patna 800008.
Dear Sir:
With reference to your letter No. 195 of February 05, 1986; we wish to inform you that wheat bran is the course outer covering of the wheat kernel as separated from clean and scoured wheat in the usual process of commercial milling. Bran constitutes about 14½% of the wheat kernel included in whole wheat Hour but more often removed and used in animal or poultry feed. Of the nutrients in whole wheat, the bran, in addition to indigestible cellulose material contains about: 86% of the niacin, 73% of the pyridoxcins, 50% of the pantothenic acid, 42% of the riboflavin, 33% of the thiamine, 10% of the protein. The above nutrients are also available in animal and poultry feed and to a lesser extent in whole Wheat products. In human diet, indigestible cellulose mate rial or the bran, also known as “dietry fibre” tends to add bulk to intestinal contents mainly through its absorption of water and other liquids present in the digestive tract.
In most countries wheat bran which is separated in commercial milling process i used as animal and poultry feed and not for human consumption. In our knowledge wheat bran in India is also used for animal feed and not for human consumption.
In case we can be of any further assistance, please feel free to write to us. Thanking you for your interest in us.
Very truly yours,
for U.S WHEAT ASSOCIATES
Sd/- L.R KANDHARI
(L.R KANDHARI)
Director.”
32. Again my attention was drawn to a Certificate dated 1-3-86 (Annexure-10 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners) granted by the Director-incharge, Flour Mill and Food Processing Engineers, Consultant and Services, New Delhi. This Certificate dated 1.3.86 certified as follows:—
“1.2.86
To Whomsoever It May Concern:
This is to certify that Brown Bread is manufactured from whole wheat Flour only. Bread cannot be made out of wheat Bran only. Wheat Bran is only used as a Cattle Feed.
Sd/- K.K Gupta
(Dr. Ing. K.K Gupta)”
33. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also referred to a letter dated 3.2.86 written by Shri Saryug Singh, Private Secretary to the Minister of Revenue and Land Relief Rehabilitation Department, Government of Bihar. This letter is dated 3.2.86 and has been marked as Annexure-11 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners.
34. It is again pertinent to quote this letter.
35. In support of the submissions that in common commercial parlance also wheat bran was understood and was known as “Cattle feed”, my attention was drawn to an affidavit (Annexure-12 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the Accountant of one Shrikrishna Goshala, Patna City). This affidavit is dated 21.1.86 and it is again pertinent, to quote the relevant extract of this affidavit:—
*********
36. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also drew my attention to an affidavit sworn by the Proprietor of the firm Padma Trading, at North Market Road, Ranchi, which deals mainly in Cattle Feed. This affidavit has been marked as Annexure-13 and is dated 22.2.86 It is again pertinent to quote this affidavit (Annexure-13 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners).
“In the Court of Notary Magistrate,
Ranchi
AFFIDAVIT
I, Prabhat Kumar Modi, son of Sri Sheo Shankar Modi, resident of North Market Road, P.O, P.S and District Ranchi, do hereby solemnly declare as under:—
1. That I am proprietor of the firm Padma Trading, located at North Market Road, Ranchi.
2. That my firm is mainly dealing in cattle feed only.
3. That I on behalf of my firm use to purchase wheat Bran (Chokar) from various flour Mills and sell the same to the customers who purchase it for the purpose of feeding their cattle.
4. That in the market also chokar is understood as cattle feed.
5. That to my knowledge the use of Chokar (Wheat Bran) is to feed the cattle like Cows & Buffalos etc.
6. That the statements made above has been read by me and I have understood the same and they are true to my knowledge.
Sworn & signed this affidavit this the 22nd day of February, 1986, at Ranchi.
Deponent
Sd/- Prabhat Kumar Modi.
Sd/- Illeg.
Identified by me
22.2.86
37. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also referred to two other affidavits, i.e, Annexures 14 and 15 of the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioners, which are to the same effect as that of Annexure-13. It would be pertinent to quote those two affidavits also:
(a) AFFIDAVIT.
I, Bishwanath Agrawal, aged about 36 years, resident of Bodam Bazar, P.O, P.S and District Hazaribagh, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as follows:—
1. That I am the Partner of the Firm Chiranji Lal Bishwanath, Hazaribagh.
2. That my Firm is mainly dealing in Cattle Feed and Food Grain Items.
3. That I on behalf of my firm use to purchase Wheat Bran (Chokar) from various Flour Mills and sell the same to the customers who purchase it for the purpose of feeding their cattle.
4. That in the market also Chokar is understood as Cattle feed.
5. That to my knowledge the use of Chokar (Wheat Bran) is to feed the cattle like Cows & Buffalos etc.
Sd/- Bishwanath Agrawal.
VERIFICATION.
I, Bishwanath Agrawal do hereby declare that the statements made above are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, signed and verified on this the 22nd day of Feb., 1986, at Hazaribagh.
(b) Before Notary Public, Giridih.
AFFIDAVIT
I, Prakash Chand Jain s/o Late M.L Sarawgi resident of Giridih P.S Giridih Dist. Giridih, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as follows:—
1. That, I am the Proprietor of the firm Shree Mahabir Khadya Bhandar, Giridih.
2. That my firm is mainly dealing in Cattle Feed.
3. That I on behalf of my firm use to purchase wheat bran (Chokar) from various Flour Mills and sell the same to the customers who purchase it for the purpose of feeding their cattle.
4. That in the market also Chokar is understood as Cattle Feed.
5. That to my knowledge the use of Chokar (Wheat Bran) is to feed the cattle like Cows & Buffalos etc.
Sd/- Prakash Chand Jain.
VERIFICATION.
I, Prakash Chand Jain do hereby declare that the statements made above have been read by me and I have understood the same and they are true to my knowledge, information and belief. Verified at Giridih dated 18th day of Feb., 1986.”
38. It would be relevant to mention here that the respondents, in their counter affidavit, have not traversed or contradicted these materials on the record and thus the fact that Bran (Chokar) is commercially used as “Cattle feed” and is commonly sold for that purpose, has not been denied by the respondents in their counter affidavit.
39. In the case of Glaxo Laboratory India) Ltd. v. State of Gujrat, reported in 43 Sales-tax cases 386, a Bench of the Gujrat High Court at Ahmedabad, interpreting the words “Cattle feed and poultry feed”, held as follows:—
“On a true and correct interpretation of the words “Cattle-feed” and “Poultry-feed”, those terms must include not only that food which is supplied to domestic animals or birds as an essential ration for the maintenance of life but also that feed which is supplied over and above the maintenance requirements for growth or fattening and for production purposes, such as for reproduction, for production of milk, eggs, meat, wool or feathers and in the case of animals, also for efficient output of work.
In modern times, “cattle-feed” and “poultry-feed” include a large variety of concentrates, in addition to roughages, that have a high value because they are rich in easily digested nutrients and feed supplement. Amongst the feeds which are considered essential for the proper nutrition of animals and birds, which are to be kept in a state of efficient production, are included vitamins and, more particularly, vitamins A and D, which have been found to have a profound effect upon live-stock farming by increasing the efficiency of animal production and preventing serious nutritional diseases. Vitamin A, which is required for growth, reproduction, production and even for maintenance and vitamin D, which is needed to enable the animal to assimilate and use other important elements of its feed, are most apt to be lacking in natural livestock feeds and that they are included as additives in mixed feeds so as to make good the deficiency.
Whichever way one looks at the matter, therefore, whether one looks at it from the angle of the etymological meaning of the word in the context in which it is used here along with fodder and concentrates, or whether one looks at it from an angle of a person conversant with the industry or trade of live-stock farming or poultry raising, the words “cattle-feed” and “poultry-feed” cannot any longer be considered as meaning only that conventional food which is necessary for the bare maintenance of cattle or birds, as the case may be. Such feed must consist of both the elements, namely, ration for maintenance and ration for production purpose.”
40. As to what a wheat-bran is has been explained in a letter dated 17.2.86 (Annexure-9 of the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners) from the Director, U.S WHEAT ASSOCIATES, representing Wheat Growers Organization of the United States at New Delhi, which may be referred to in paragraph 17 of the judgment.
41. Again in the case of Commissioner of Sales-tax, U.P v. Narain Das Bareylal, reported in 42 S.T.C at page 470, a Bench of Allahabad High Court (even though it was a case of rice bran) held that as rice bran is used primarily for feeding cattle and, as in common parlance, it would be classified as a Cattle Fodder, it would not go out side the purview of “Cattle Fodder” in Notification No. S.T-3471.X dated 16th July, 1956, issued under the U.P Sales-tax Act, 1948, only on account of the special use of extracting oil to which it is put by some consumers. It further held that commodities had to be classified in accordance with their normal use, and the words in a Notification have to be interpreted as understood in common parlance.
42. Learned Counsel for the respondents has not cited any decision to show that Bran (Chokar) was not a Cattle feed. In fact, at the cost of repetition, the respondents, in their counter affidavit, have not repudiated the claim of the petitioners that Wheat Bran (Chokar) was essentially a Cattle feed and that in the common commercial parlance also the Wheat Bran was understood and was known as Cattle feed.
43. Thus, in view of the fact that the claim of the petitioners that Wheat Bran (Chokar) was essentially a Cattle feed and was not used for any purpose other than feeding the cattle having not been repudiated by the respondents in their counter affidavit I hold that Wheat Bran (Chokar) is a Cattle feed and is as such not only in common parlance but also in technical and commercial parlance. The respondents have not placed any material in rebuttal of the materials filed by the petitioners (i.e, Annexures 7 to 15 of the supplementary affidavit) in C.W.J.C No. 2725 of 1984. These unimpeachable documents placed on the record by the petitioners are sufficient to hold that Wheat Bran is used primarily for feeding the cattle and, in common parlance, it would be classified as a cattle fodder and hence it is not possible to take a view that it would go out-side the purview of cattle fodder only on account of some special use to which it may be put to by some consumers.
44. I further agree to the views taken in the cares of Glaxo Laboratory (India) Ltd. v. State of Gujrat (Supra) and Commissioner of Sales-tax, U.P v. Narain Das Bareylal (Supra) and for the reasons as given in those decisions also I hold that Wheat Bran (Chokar) is a Cattle feed.
45. Then remains the only other question to be considered, i.e, whether the petitioners are liable to pay sales-tax on the sale of Wheat Bran?
46. An already stated above, in the earlier part of the judgment, the stand of the respondents was that the effect of the exemption Notification No. 14547 dated 26.12.77 is taken away because a retroactive Notification (with effect from 26.12.77) was issued on 9th March, 1978 (Notification No. 3320) which made “Bran” exigible to tax. Notification No. 3320 dated 9.3.78 (already quoted earlier) was issued under Bihar Sales-tax 5th Ordinance, 1977 and 3 percent tax was levied on Bran (along with Atta, Maida and Sujji) and this Notification was made retrospective with effect from 26th December, 1977. In that view of the matter the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents was that because of the retroactive Notification dated 9th March, 1978 (No. 3320) the effect of exemption Notification No. 14547 dated 26th, December, 1977 was taken away and hence the “Bran” was exigible to tax. The learned Counsel for the respondents also submitted that an evidence of intention to tax bran should be read/inferred by implication by allowing a Notification of rate of tax in order to override the exemption. In my opinion there is no force in this submission. The ex-emotion Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977 with regard to “Cattle-feed” and “Poultry-feed” could be withdrawn but that was not done until 29 June, 1985 by Notification No. S.O 611 (quoted in para 9 above). This notification no. S.O 611 of 29th June, 1985 came into force with effect from 1st July, 1985 and as this was not brought on the record by either of the parties, a copy of the Notification was produced in Court at the time of argument and by this Notification in item no. 35 of the exemption Notification no. 14547 of 16th December, 1977 the words “Cattle feed” and “Poultry food” were withdrawn and only four specified items were mentioned. In fact, earlier Item no. 35 of exemption Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977 was for the first time substituted by Item No. 35 of this Notification (S.O 611) dated 29th June, 1985. Thus in my opinion, the exemption was taken away only with effect from 1st July, 1985 by Notification No. S.O 611 of 29th June, 1985. The position would still be clear that “Cattle feed” and “Poultry feed” were exempted from levy of additional tax by S.O No. 1613 dated 28th October, 1981 and by this Notification Items 1 to 35 were exempted from levy of additional tax and Item no. 52 was “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” (reference of this Notification be made at page 254 and for Item no. 52 at page 257 of the Bihar Sales-tax Law by S. Srinivasan (1984 Edition).
47. It is well settled that the taxing Notification prescribing a rate of tax by itself will not have the overriding effect on the exemption Notification. The pith and the substance of the sub-mission of the learned Counsel for the respondents was that as a rate of tax on Bran was put by Notification No. 3320 of 9th March, 1978, it made Bran exigible to tax. There is no substance in this submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents. In Column 3 of the exemption Notification No. 14547 of 26th December, 1977, no condition or exception was specified and Cattle feed and Poultry feed were exempted from payment of sales-tax without any condition or exception. In the case of Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dayal Singh Kulfiwala—reported in 49 S.T.C 295 a similar question was under consideration. The question was whether ‘Kulfi’ and ‘Lassi’ were ‘milk products' and exempted by Notification under section 4, U.P Act and whether subsequent fixing of rate of tax on ‘Kulfi’ and ‘Lassi’ by Notification under section 3A of that Act had the overriding effect on the exemption Notification. The learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in the case of Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dayal Singh Kulfiwala (supra) held as follows:—
“The operating fields of the two sections, namely, Section 3A and 4 are distinct and separate. Section 3A by itself cannot override the power under section 4. On the other hand, if certain goods have been classified for purposes of Section 3A and the point of tax has also been declared by the State Government, if such goods had been exempted from sale, the Department cannot contend that the exemption should not be construed in favour of the assessee”.
48. Similarly, in the case of Commissioner of Sales-Tax, U.P, Lucknow v. Rita Ice Cream, reported in 49 S.T.C 297, similar question was under consideration. This was a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court and it was a case under U.P Sales-Tax Act. Under similar situation, as in the present case, it was held that “even though ice Cream and Lassi have been made taxable under section 3A, on account of the Notifications issued under section 4, the turn-over of these Items could not be included in the not taxable turn-over. Thus, the view taken by the revising authority that the sale of Ice-cream was not taxable in the view of the exemption granted under the Notification issued under section 4 in respect of milk products appears to be correct”. It was further held that “transactions sales which enjoy exemptions have to be included in the gross turn-over but they are exempted when the not turn-over is calculated”
49. Similar view, under similar situation, was taken in the case of Deepcband Goyal v. Sales-tax Officer—reported in 52 S.T.C 110.
50. Yet a Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court (at Jodhpur) in the case of Mahabir Industries v. Board of Revenue—reported in 61 S.T.C 88, under similar situation, took the same view and held on the facts (similar to the present case) that “Notification No. F. 5(24)FD/C.T/72-14 dated 19th May, 1972 issued under section 5 of the Act (Rajasthan Sales-tax Act) prescribing the rate of tax on Gowar will not have overriding effect on entry 9 of the schedule appended to the Act which deals with exemption”. It further held that “the Notification will not nullify entry 9 of the schedule so far as the exclusion of Gowar from Cattle feed is concerned”.
Yet in the case of Ram Nath Saryug Prasad v. State of Bihar—reported in 1981 Bihar Revenue and Labour Journal 156, a similar view, under similar situation, was taken. This was a Bench decision of the Patna High Court and it dealt with a case under the Bihar Sales-tax Act itself and it held that “where under section 4 a particular commodity is exempted from liability of the payment of sales-tax, any Notification relating to the rate of tax payable on any commodity must be subjected to the governing provision of section 4. It further held that section 6 postulates before the rate is made applicable, i.e, liable to sales-tax”. It was further held that “if, however, under section 4, there is also an exemption, the question of applying any rate of tax obviously does not arise and where in the Notification issued under this section any commodity is included which runs counter to express exemption under section 4, section 4 shall prevail over the incidental inclusion of such a commodity under section 6 which must be taken to be without the necessary sanction”.
51. A similar view, in almost a similar situation was taken by the High Court of Karnataka in the case of K. Janardhana Acharya v. State of Karnataka—reported in 46 S.T.C 575.
52. In the case of A.V Fernandez v. State of Kerala—reported in 8 S.T.C 561, the Supreme Court observed as follows at page 574:
“There is a broad distinction between the provisions contained in the statute in regard to the exemption of tax or refund or rebate of tax on the one hand and in regard to the non-liability to tax or non-imposition of tax on the other. In the former case, but for the provisions as regards the exemptions or refund or rebate of tax, the sales or purchases would have to be included in the gross turnover of the dealer because they are prima facie liable to tax and the only thing which the dealer is entitled to in respect thereof is the deduction from the gross turnover in order to arrive at the not turnover on which the tax can be imposed. In the latter case, the sales or purchases are exempted from taxation altogether. The Legislature cannot enact a law imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax thereupon and they are not liable to any such imposition of tax. If they are thus not liable to tax, no tax can be levied or imposed on them and they do not come within the purview of the Act at all. The very fact of their non-liability to tax is sufficient to exclude them from the calculation of the gross turnover as well as the not turnover on which sales-tax can be levied or imposed”.
53. Thus, on a review of the aforesaid decisions, I hold that the taxing Notification fixing a particular rate of tax on a particular item has no overriding effect on the exemption Notification which expressly exempted the particular item from levy of tax. I further hold that Notification No. 3320 issued on 9th March, 1978 making Bran exigible to tax retrospectively with effect from 26th December; 1977, on which much reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents, does not nullify Entry no. 35 of the exemption Notification (No. 14547) dated 16.12.1977 so far as exclusion of Cattle-feed and Poultry-feed from sales-tax is concerned—for the simple reason that fields of operation of the two Notifications, referred to above, under the different sections of the Act are altogether different.
54. Reference to the case of Deepchand Goyal v. Sales-tax Officer (supra) has already been referred to above and in that Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court it was also held that “if once an exemption is granted under section 4 of the Act in respect of any class of goods or class of persons, then unless such exemption is withdrawn, it shall remain in force”.
55. I fully agree with the aforesaid view taken by the Allahabad High Court and I hold that if once the exemption is granted in respect of any class of goods then unless such exemption is withdrawn, it shall remain in force.
56. Having held as such I hold that there is no force in the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents that because of the retroactive Notification dated 9th March, 1978 (No. 3320) the effect of exemption Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977 was taken away and thus this submission of the respondents also fails.
57. For the aforesaid reasons I further hold that an evidence of intention to tax Bran cannot be read in the retroactive Notification (No. 3320) dated 9th March, 1978, or inferred by implication in order to override the exemption Notification No. 14547 dated 26th December, 1977. It is well settled that there can be no tax by implication and thus the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that the retroactive Notification (No. 3320) dated 9th March, 1978, inferentially and by implication taxed Bran by superseding the exemption Notification also fails.
58. I further hold that as exemption from tax on “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” (Item no. 35 of the exemption Notification no. 14547 of 26th December, 1977) was withdrawn only on 29th June, 1985 by Notification No. S.O 611 (which came into force with effect from the 1st July, 1985), the exemption Notification with regard to “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” (No. 14547 dated 26th December, ???) remained in force till 30th June, 1985.
59. Then remains other important limb of the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents to be considered, i.e, the stand taken by the learned Counsel for the respondents was that the Notification No. 3322 issued on 9th March, 1978 restricted the meaning of Cattle feed and Poultry feed by adding an Explanation to the effect that:
“ASPASTIKARAN:—PASHAUCHARA TATHA KUKUTCHARA SE ABHIPRET HAI”
60. Hence it was exhaustive and therefore it excluded any other item except the four mentioned in the Explanation. It will be pertinent to mention here that this Notification (No. 3322) dated 9th March, 1978 was also published in English language which was to be taken as one under clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India and in the Notification in English language the aforesaid words, i.e, “PASHUCHARA TATHA KUKUTCHARA SE ABHIPRET HAI” was omitted to be translated.
61. Thus, though it would bear repetition, on 9th March, 1978 simultaneously two Notifications were published and both were made retrospective from 26th December, 1977 — one was no. 3320 by which rate of tax on Bran was fixed (reference of which has already been made in earlier paragraph) and the other being No. 3322 published in both languages, i.e, Hindi and English.
62. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the Explanation to Notification No. 3322 dated 9th March, 1978, published in Hindi, was exhaustive and it explains as to what Cattle feed and Poultry feed were and hence it excluded Bran, as Bran was not included in the four items of the Explanation; in short, the sub-mission was that the Explanation limited the categories enumerated therein and as Bran was not mentioned therein, it cannot be taken to be still under exemption. On the other band, Notification No. 3320 (already referred to above) made Bran exigible to tax.
63. On the other hand, the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners was that the Explanation does not restrict the meaning of the expression sought to be explained. The exemption Notification of 26th December, 1977 used the expression “Cattle feed” and “Poultry feed” and the Explanation inserted by Notification No. 3322 dated 9th March, 1978 (published both in English and Hindi languages) very much retained the expression “Cattle feed” and “Poultry feed”.
64. Thus the submission was that; firstly, the Explanation, in law, does not restrict the meaning of the expression sought to be explained nor could it restrict the expression while explaining nor did it even purport to do so. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that there may be some cases in which an explanation can widen the meaning of the expression but, in no case, it can restrict in the eye of law.
65. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be most pertinent to mention just here that the Notification No. S.O 611 published on 29th June, 1985, the expressions “Cattle feed” and “Poultry feed” (of item no. 35 in the exemption Notification No. 14547 dated 26.12.77) were dropped and only those four items, as mentioned in the explanation to the expression “PASHU CHARA TATHA KUKUTCHARA” in the Notification No. 3322 dated 9th March, 1978 were retained. Even the word Explanation and the words thereafter, i.e, “PASHUCHARA TATHA KUKUTCHARA SE ABHIPRET HAI” were dropped.
66. Can it then be said, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents? At the out set the answer to the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents is in negative.
67. It is well settled that the proper function of an Explanation is to make plain or elucidate what is enacted and not to add to or subtract from it. An Explanation does not either restrict or extend the enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down the scope of the provision that it is supposed to explain. (Reference be made to the full Bench case of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of In R.E.H v. Jagdesh—reported in 1966 A.P 35).
68. It is true that in some cases an Explanation can widen the scope of the expression sought to be explained but in such cases effect must be given to the legislative intent and the courts have to find out the true intention of the Legislature. It is also well settled that even if the Explanation is not very happily worded but if the intention of the Legislature is clear and unambiguous, in that case effect must he given to the legislative intent. (Reference be made to the case of Hiralal Ratanlal v. S.T.O Sec. III, Kanpur) (reported in (1973) 1 SCC 216 : AIR 1973 S.C 1034). In view of the aforesaid well settled principles in interpreting an Explanation-as the generic words “Cattle feed and Poultry feed” (used in the exemption Notification No. 14547 of 26th December, 1977) were factually retained till before the Notification No. S.O 611 dated 29th June, 1985, I hold that the true intention was to retain the Cattle feed and Poultry feed excluded from sales-tax and the true intention by the Notification no. 3322 of 9th March, 1978 was not to restrict the Cattle feed and Poultry feed only to the four items contained in the Explanation. As already stated above, it is well settled that an Explanation does not restrict the enacting part nor narrows down the scope of the provision that it is supposed to explain. The intention of restricting the Cattle feed and Poultry feed only to the four items mentioned in the Explanation to Notification No. 3322 of 9th March, 1978 cannot be read by any stretch of imagination; firstly because the generic terms “Cattle feed” and “Poultry feed” were retained and, secondly, even in latter Notification of 28th October, 1981 (S.O 1613) “Cattle feed” and “Poultry feed” were exempted from levy of additional fax in item no. 52 of the Notification. (Reference of this Notification has already been made in paragraph 24 above).
69. Thus, the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents, in my opinion, is clearly untenable, as it proceeds on a misconception of the scope of an Explanation and hence it is without any substance and fails. (Reference of the case of A.V Fernandez v. State of Kerala-reported in 8 S.T.C 561 has already been made in paragraph 26 above) The same case is also reported in A.I.R 1957 S.C 657 and by the Supreme Court it has further been held in that case as follows:—
“It is no doubt true that in construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law. If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxes. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the tour corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter. We must of necessity, therefore, have regard to the actual provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder before we can come to the conclusion that the appellant was liable to assessment as contended by the Sales Tax Authorities.”
70. It is also Well settled that if in construing taxing statutes if two interpretations are possible effect must be given to one that favours the citizen and not to one that imposes a burden on him. (Reference be made to the case of The Central India Spinning & Weaving and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. The Municipality, Wardha (A.I.R 1958 S.C 341).
71. Then remains the only other part of the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents to be considered.
72. As, already stated above, in the early part of the judgment, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that if the Notification is published in both the languages (Hindi and English) and in the English translation of the Hindi Notification if an omission to translate a word has occurred resulting in inconsistency then it would be the Hindi version of the Notification which will prevail.
73. On the other band the learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that under Article 348(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution of India, the Notification which is in English language must prevail.
74. It is pertinent to quote Article 348(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution of India:
“348. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this part, until Parliament by law otherwise provides—
(b) the authoritative texts—
(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State shall be in the English language.
75. It is well settled that if the inconsistency/contradiction between the Notification issued in English and the Notification issued in Hindi does not affect the substance of the matter, it is the Notification published in English language which must prevail in view of the provision of Constitution of India (just referred to above) over the Notification published in Hindi. (Reference be made to a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sagir Ahmad v. Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh-reported in 1954 All. 257).
76. For the reasons already detailed in the earlier paragraphs of my judgment, I hold that, in fact, there is no contradiction/inconsistency between the Notification issued in Hindi and the Notification issued in English (Both the Notifications being of 9th March, 1978). Hence I hold that in view of the provision of the Constitution, referred to above, the Notification appearing in English must prevail over the Notification appearing in Hindi.
77. Even if there was divergence between the two versions, i.e, Hindi version of the Notification and the English version of the Notification, by virtue of Article 348 of the Constitution of India (referred to above), it is the English version that will prevail. (Reference be made to a Full Bench case Of Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Ramrati v. Gramsamaj Jehwa reported in 1974 All. 106) (Reference be also made to a Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Shri Alok Kumar Agrawal v. State of Bihar reported in A.I.R 1976 Patna 392).
78. It is also true that a State which has prescribed Hindi as the language for the official use in the State, both the Hindi version as also the English translation of the Notification (Bill, Act etc.), published in the Official Gazette are valid and authorised and both of them can be looked into and put to official use. There is no competition between the two. It is only in case of conflict or divergence between the two versions that the English version may reign supreme and supersede the Hindi one. (Reference be made to a Full Bench case of Jaswant Sugar Mill Ltd. Meerut v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (iii) U.P, Allahabad reported in 1962 Allahabad 240.
79. I have already held above that in the present case there is no conflict/inconsistency/divergence between the two Notifications (one published in Hindi and the other in English) of 9th March, 1978. There being no ambiguity in the English version of the Notification dated 9th March, 1978, resort cannot be had to a Hindi version of the Notification and under Article 348(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution of India the version in English language must prevail.
80. It is also pertinent to quote clause (3) of Article 248 of the Constitution of India, which is as follows:—
“(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of clause (1), where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor (xx) of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor (xx) of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article”.
81. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents, in view of the Bihar Official Language Act, 1950, read with Article 348(3) of the Constitution, submitted that the original Notification being in Hindi the proper course was to look at the publication in Hindi principally for the purpose of properly interpreting the provision of the enactment and not the English version of the Notification which is merely given the status of an authoritative text.
82. The learned Counsel for the respondents, in support of the submission has relied upon the case of Ramdhyan Singh v. State of Bihar-reported in 1979 (3) Services Law Reporter 369. In that case a Hindi version of the Notification was published on 18th June, 1975; whereas, the English version was published on 2nd July, 1975 and by inadvertence clause regarding suspension was omitted in the English version of the Notification. On the facts of that case a great conflict/inconsistency/contradiction existed between the two versions of the Notification and on the facts and in the circumstances of that case it was held that. “It is just and proper that Hindi version should prevail”.
83. In the present case, I have already held above that there is no conflict/inconsistency between the two versions of the Notification of 9th March, 1978. The case of Ramdhyan Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents, is quite distinguishable.
84. Learned Counsel for the respondents, in support of his submission, also placed reliance upon the case of Binod Bihari Mahto v. State of Bihar reported in (1975) 3 SCC 328 : A.I.R 1974 S.C 2125. This case also is quite distinguishable. This was a case under Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971) and the order of detention was under challenge. The order of detention was in Hindi (the official language of the State) but there was also an English version of the order of detention. At the time of arrest, the Hindi as well as English versions of the order of detention were served on detenu together with the grounds of detention which were also in Hindi and English versions. The English version of the grounds of detention recited that the District Magistrate was satisfied that if the detenu was allowed to remain at large he would indulge in activities prejudicial, to the maintenance of public order or security of the State. The words “or security of the State” were absent in the Hindi version. However, there was no material difference between Hindi and English versions of the order of detention. The satisfaction which was recited in the order of detention and on which the order of detention was manifestly and avowedly based, was that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. There was no reference to the security of the State in the recital of the satisfaction contained in the order of detention either in Hindi version or English version. In such circumstances, it was held that the addition of words “security of the State” in the recital of the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in the English version was the result of inadvertence and the order of detention could not be invalidated on the basis of such an obvious error, ignoring the order of detention in both its Hindi and English versions, Hindi version of grounds of detention and the totality of the context so far as English version was concerned. On the facts of that case it was further held that Hindi being the official language of the State, it was Hindi version of the grounds of detention which was to be regarded as authentic and the validity of detention, on the facts of that case, was to be judged with reference to the Hindi version of the grounds of detention. Article 348(1)(b)(iii) and clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution were not under consideration in the case of Binod Bihari Mahto (supra) and thus reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents on this case, in support of his submission, was under a misconception. Secondly, on facts, too, the case is distinguishable.
85. Learned Counsel for the respondents also relied upon the case of Rajendra Prasad v. The Chancellor (Patna)-reported in 1984 (1) S.L.R 315 : 1984 PLJR 316.
86. The facts of this case also are clearly distinguishable. There was apparent inconsistency between the amending statute (admittedly in Hindi) and the English version of that amendment (i.e, Section 57A(3)(a) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, as amended in 1980) and hence the ratio decided in this case was on the particular facts and circumstances of that case. This case, too, does not support the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents.
87. Thus, in view of the weighty pronouncement as referred to in paragraphs above, I hold that in view of the provisions as contained in Article 348(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution of India, the Notification dated 9th March, 1978 appearing in English must prevail over the Notification of the same date appearing in Hindi.
88. I further hold that though it is true that Hindi has been adopted as the official language of the State of Bihar under the Bihar Official Language Act, 1950 there was no conflict/inconsistency/contradiction in the Hindi and English versions of the Notification dated 9th March, 1978 and hence it was the English version of the Notification dated 9th March, 1978 which must prevail over the Hindi Notification of the same date. I further hold that even if there was some inconsistency/conflict (which there is none), in the two Notifications, they did not affect the substance of the matter in the present case and, in that view of the matter also, it was the Notification in English which must prevail under Article 348(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution of India.
89. Before concluding this point, to me it appears that it is of importance that in the matter of issuing and publishing Notifications which are now issued in Hindi, and it may be noted that it is only that Hindi version of the Gazette which is available to the general public, great care should be taken and the people concerned with making these Notifications should have taken greater care in having them published in Hindi.
90. Thus, all the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents fail as being without any substance.
91. In the result, all the three writ cases are allowed and the impugned Annexures-Annexure-5 and 5(1) of C.W.J.C No. 2725/84, Annexures-5 and 5-A of C.W.J.C No. 5637/85 and Annexure-4 of C.W.J.C No. 1918/84 are quashed only in so far as they relate to Wheat-bran (Chokar). However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
(Lines have been underlined by me for emphasis).
S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— I agree.