S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:—The true import of the somewhat widely couched language of clause (c) of Section 4 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, is the significant question, which has necessitated this reference to the Full Bench.

2. The plaintiff-respondents had instituted the suit giving rise to the present proceeding on the 10th February, 1965, for setting aside the sale deed dated the 18th of February, 1959, executed by Choudhary Guptnath Singh, who was the Karta of the Hindu joint family, in favour of respondents Nos. 2 to 17. Barring a wholly fragmentary and conventional averment about the non-execution of the said deed, the primary claim for setting aside was sought to be rested on the basis of the absence of legal necessity, non-payment of any consideration, and lack of any bona fide inquiry. The further case set up was that defendants Nos. 2 and 17, by a fraudulent device and undue influence, had obtained the deed in question from Choudhary Guptnath Singh, but the same had not been acted upon at all.

3. Defendants Nos. 4 and 17 strenuously contested the suit by filing a joint written statement, controverting all material averments in the plaint. However, the other defendants filed a joint written statement, supporting the case of the plaintiffs.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, as many as 7 issues were framed, of which Issues Nos. 1 and 4 are relevant to the point and were in the following terms:

“1. Is the sale deed dated 18-3-59 alleged to have been executed by Choudhary Guptnath Singh in favour of defendants 2 and 17, fraudulent and collusive, as alleged by plaintiffs, or, the same is for legal necessity and for consideration, as alleged by defendants 2 and 17?”

“4. Whether the sale deed dated 18-3-59 was executed with consent of family members of Guputnath Singh and the same was for the benefit of the family of Guputnath Singh?”

5. In is manifest from the above, and, equally so from the very exhaustive judgment of the trial court, that the question of non-execution of the sale deed by Choudhary Guptnath Singh was not seriously raised or pressed and was indeed in terms abandoned by the plaintiffs. The matter before the trial court was pressed only with regard to the other grounds of challenge on the points of legal necessity, lack of consideration and absence of bona fide inquiry, etc.

6. It is common ground that during the pendency of the suit a notification under Section 3 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was issued on the 26th November, 1970, nor is it in dispute that the agricultural land pertaining to the area in question came within the ambit of the said notification. However, no issue of abatement under Section 4(c) of the Act was raised at all before the trial court. Consequently, more than a year later, on the 23rd December, 1971, the suit was decreed and the impugned sale deed was set aside, inter alia, on the following grounds:—

“On consideration of entire evidence and circumstances of the case, I hold that the sale deed in question is not a fraudulent and collusive sale deed, as alleged by plaintiffs, but the same is not for legal necessities. I also hold that the sale deed is for consideration. I also hold that the sale deed was not executed with consent of family members of Guputnath Singh, nor the same was for the benefit of the family of Guputnath Singh. I also hold that defendants have failed to prove that they had made honest and bona fide enquiry about the existence of legal necessities for the sale of suit land. ……….”

The present first appeal was preferred on 13th March, 1972. Curiously enough, even at that stage, no ground whatsoever regarding the suit having abated was taken on behalf of the defendant-appellants. However, later, on 2-7-1981, this question of abatement was pointedly raised by a petition filed under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to press the claim that the title suit as also the present appeal stand abated under S. 4(c) of the Act.

7. This petition under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure originally came up before a Division Bench comprised of my learned brothers B.P Jha and S. Ali Ahmad, JJ. Reliance on behalf of the appellants before them primarily was placed on Gorakhnath Dube v. Harinarain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451. Noticing the obvious significance of the question and the intricacy of interpreting clause (c) of S. 4 of the Act, couched as it is, in terms of wide amplitude, the matter was referred for an authoritative decision by the Full Bench.

8. The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act came into force in 1956. The statute has undergone a structural change by a number of subsequent amendments, to which detailed reference is not necessary. As the exhaustive provisions of the 40 sections of this Act would indicate, it was intended to be a self-contained Code for the purpose of consolidation of all agricultural lands within the State. The bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts under S. 37 of the Act would show that the Legislature clearly requires that with respect to any matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, the same alone provides the forum, and, further, all decisions or orders, given or passed under this Act, are immune from interference by the Civil Court.

9. Coming specifically now to S. 4, it deserves recalling that, as originally enacted, its contents and even the caption, were entirely different from the present ones, which were substituted by Act, 27 of 1975. The provision, as its caption indicates, deals with the necessary legal and consequential effects which follow upon a notification under S. 3(1) of the Act. It is unnecessary for our purpose to advert to all the provisions of the exhaustive S. 4. It suffices to mention that vide clause (c) thereof, it is plainly intended that with regard to all matters, a proceeding which can and ought to have been taken under this Act, and any proceeding pending before any court or authority at any stage, would abate, with the necessary consequence of being decided under the Act. Since the controversy herein is entirely focused under S. 4(c) of the Act, the same is quoted herein for facility of reference:

Effect of Notification under S. 3(1) of the Act: “Upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of S. 3 in the official gazette, the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operations, ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely—

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(c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority, whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated.”

10. It is indeed plain that the language of the provision aforesaid is couched in terms of widest amplitude. It is, therefore, capable on an equally wide ranging construction. However, it seems unnecessary to indulge in the exercise of its interpretation, because, it appears to me as covered by binding precedent. The controversy particularly before us is narrowed down by the authoritative observations of the final Court in Gorakhnath Dube's case (AIR 1973 SC 2451) (supra). To appreciate the true import and applicability of the said judgment, it may first be pointedly noticed that what had come for consideration before their Lordships was the provision of S. 5(2)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954, which was quoted in Paragraph 2 of the report. It is manifest therefrom that the provisions of Cl. (c) of S. 4 of the Bihar Act and Cl. (a) of sub-section (2) of S. 5 of the U.P Act are in pari materia. Consequently, the observations of the final Court in the context of the U.P Act would apply literally to the present case as well. Therein, whilst approving the ratio of Jagarnath Shukla v. Sita Ram Pande, 1969 All LJ 768, their Lordships pointedly observed as follows:—

“We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it.”

11. Now it seems to be plain that the meaningful distinction drawn by their Lordships and the observations in this context are attracted to and can fit in only to cases where the suit is rested wholly or primarily on the basis of a document or deed of transfer, etc. It is only where the issue turns on such a deed or document that the observations of the final Court come to play, and, consequently, in a converse case, where the proceeding or the declaration sought does not necessarily flow from a single document, the ratio of Gorakhnath Dubey's case (supra) would not be applicable. In such a case the matter has to be construed in the light of the language of clause (c) only.

12. Now applying the ratio of Gorakhnath Dubey's case (AIR 1973 SC 2451) to the case where the issue rests solely or primarily on the challenge to a particular document or deed, the resultant consequence is that if the said document is void ab initio then necessarily the proceeding will abate and the matter would come squarely within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities. However, if such a document is only voidable in nature and is sought to be voided by one of the parties on any ground, then the court has to adjudicate upon the same and set it aside, and, therefore, no abatement of such a proceeding would follow and the forum, including the Civil Court, will have continued jurisdiction to deal with the same.

13. Mr. Jagdish Pandey, learned Counsel for the appellants, somewhat tenuously and vainly had attempted to distinguish the observations in Gorakhnath Dubey's case. However, the argument was one of disperation and nothing meaningful could be pointed out which could possibly take the present case out of the sweep and ambit of those observations. Equally vainly, learned Counsel relied on a single Judge decision of this Court in Tarkeshwar Upadhayay v. Mahesh Thakur, 1982 BBCJ (HC) 114 : (AIR 1981 Patna 348). A close perusal of the same would indicate that after reference to Gorakhnath Dubey's case, the learned single Judge expressly held in paragraph 8 of the report that the document in the said case having been executed by a person of unsound mind was plainly void and inevitably the proceeding in the Civil Court would, therefore, abate and fall within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities. Reference was also made by learned Counsel to Bijali Thakur & Others… v. Rameshwar Thakur & Others…, 1977 BBCJ (HC) 701 and Banshi Bhagat v. Kisbun Bhagat, AIR 1981 Patna 304, which equally are of no relevance. As has been noticed above, the ratio in Gorkhnath Dubey's case (supra) is attracted only in a case founded entirely on a transfer document. It would appear that no such situation or issue arose in any one of the above cases, far from the same being considered or adjudicated upon.

14. To conclude, following the ratio in Gorakhnath Dubey's case (AIR 1973 SC 2451) (supra), it is held that under S. 4(c) of the Act, all cases where the lis is rested wholly on a document or transfer deed, the proceeding would abate, if such document is void, but no such abatement would result, if the same is voidable and has to be set aside by the court after adjudication.

15. We are mindful of the intricacy and the difficulty that the aforesaid enunciation may pose in actual practice. Yet the distinction betwixt a void and a voidable document is well known in law, though the line is not easy to draw in marginal cases, but, in view of the dictum of their Lordships the same has to be necessarily applied in this context.

16. In fairness to Mr. Keshari Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents, we must notice his argument, that where the challenge to the document is raised both on the grounds of the same being void and, in any case in the alternative as voidable, then the matter cannot be separated and the Court must proceed with the inquiry. Even in such a situation, the proceeding could, therefore, not abate, because the composite lis still under adjudication cannot be separated. In sum, the stand taken is that in cases of a composite challenge to the document on the ground of the same being void or voidable still the proceeding must continue and no abatement should follow. It is now unnecessary to pronounce on this somewhat refreshing alternative aspect, because of the firm conclusion I have arrived at herein, that the basic challenge to the sale deed in the present case was on the ground of the absence of legal necessity, consideration and lack of inquiry, etc., and, therefore, about its voidability and not that it was void simpliciter. On that finding, there is no occasion to consider any further alternative hypothetical submission.

17. Now, viewing the matter in the light of the aforesaid conclusions, it seems that the sale deeds was a sale primarily as a voidable document. At the very threshold stage of the suit not even an issue was claimed by the parties or framed by the Court with regard to any question of the document having been executed by Choudhary Guptnath Singh. As noticed earlier, the question of its non-execution seems to have not been raised at all, or, apparently given up, and, at the present stage, is a mere afterthought. The parties went to trial mainly on the question of the absence of the legal necessity or of consideration, etc., for the purpose of avoiding the document and led evidence therein. It was on the ground of the absence of legal necessity that the court found the sale deed to be voidable, and therefore, set it aside. It necessarily follows that herein the document in dispute was and has been held to be a voidable one. Plainly enough, the appellants' prayer herein cannot succeed. In View of the dictum in Gorakhnath Dubey's case (AIR 1973 SC 2451), it must be held that the original suit herein would not abate, nor the appeal arising therefrom. This petition under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is hereby dismissed. The first appeal would now go back to the Division Bench for decision on merits. There will be no order as to costs.

B.P Jha, J.:— I agree.

S. Ali Ahmad, J.:— I agree.

Petition dismissed.