Uday Sinha, J.:— This is an application under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order of the Income-tax Officer, Ward ‘A’, Ranchi Circle, Ranchi, dated October 19, 1974 (annexure 2), the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Ranchi Range, Ranchi, dated April 1, 1975 (annexure 3), and of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bibar-I, Patna, dated January 30, 1976 (annexure ‘5 ‘), imposing penalty of Rs. 300 upon the petitioner for not filing the estimate in regard to advance tax payable by him. The penalty proceeding was initiated in terms of section 273(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

2. The petitioner is a registered partnership firm dealing in clothes in the town of Ranchi. The accounting year of the petitioner ends with the 31st March every year. On June 21, 1971, a notice was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to pay Rs. 3,050 as advance tax for the assessment year 1972-73. The petitioner paid the advance tax demanded by annexure 1. Having failed to submit to the Income-tax Officer an estimate of the current income and the advance tax payable by him on the current income calculated in the manner laid down in section 209 of the Act the petitioner filed the returns under section 14A of the Act and paid along with it all that he was liable to pay upon his total income during the assessment year 1972-73. The petitioner showed in his return a total iucome of Rs. 80,317. The amount of tax computed on the current income of the petitioner having exceeded the amount of advance tax demanded from him by more than 33⅓% and the petitioner not having filed the estimate as required by section 212(3A), the Income-tax Officer, Ranchi, initiated a proceeding under section 273(c). A notice with enclosure was served upon the petitioner. After hearing the petitioner the assessing officer passed the impugned order contained in annexure 2. The submission on behalf of the petitioner having failed before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Ranchi Circle, Ranchi, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Ranchi Range, Ranchi, but without any success. The petitioner then moved the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar-I, Patna, under section 264(1) of the Act, but the petitioner's contention failed to find favour with him as well. The petitioner, therefore, has by the present application prayed for quashing of annexures “2”, “3” and “5”. The application was opposed by learned standing counsel for the income-tax department. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following points in support of his application:

(i) The impugned orders were invalid for the reason that there was reasonable cause for the assessee to have failed in furnishing the estimate of advance tax in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 212 of the Act.

(ii) The penalty imposed upon the petitioner was illegal and invalid, as the notice under section 210 of the Act served upon the petitioner was invalid. The said notice was invalid, as it contained only up to part of paragraph 4, the subsequent portions of the notice in accordance with Form 28 were wanting. The notice was also invalid according to the petitioner because it was not signed by the Income-tax Officer.

(iii) The order of the Income-tax Officer dated October 19, 1974 (annexure ‘2’), was illegal, as it was passed in complete disregard of the principles of natural justice.

3. I shall hereafter proceed to consider the merits of the contentions.

4. The first submission on behalf of the petitioner as stated earlier was that the income-tax department had failed to show that there was no reasonable cause for the petitioner for not having filed the estimate of advance tax. According to learned counsel, the petitioner had failed to furnish the required estimate, but mere failure to do so was not sufficient to visit the petitioner with a penalty. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the onus of showing want of reasonable cause in the conduct of the assessee (petitioner) was upon the department and not upon the petitioner. The income-tax department in the instant case, according to the learned counsel, has failed to show that there was no reasonable cause for the petitioner in not filing the required estimate by the 15th of March, 1972, when the last instalment of the advance tax would have been due. Before the assessing officer the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner appears to be that there was no mens rea on the part of the petitioner in not having filed the return of estimated income by the 15th of March, 1972, as the entire tax on the basis of the return was paid by the assessee on the 31st of July, 1972. The Income-tax Officer rejected the submission holding that in terms of the Income-tax Act the existence of mens rea was not a necessary element for imposing the penalty under section 273(c) of the Act. The appellate authority, while rejecting the contention of the petitioner, observed that the cause shown by the petitioner for the default was not a reasonable cause as the income of the assessee, according to his books and as assessed, was Rs. 68,022 which was not just below the margin of limit, not to speak of the assessed income. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the default or the cause for the default was within the personal knowledge of the appellant (petitioner) and unless he discharged the initial burden of proving his case satisfactorily, the assessee was bound to be visited with a penalty. With those observations the appeal was dismissed. The Income-tax Commissioner in revision went into greater detail. It was contended before him that the failure to file the estimate in terms of section 212(3A) of the Act was not actuated with any mala fide motive but it was due to his inability to determine that there was sudden rise in income which was the cause for failure to file the estimate. After hearing, the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that it was unbelievable that the petitioner could not get an inkling before the 15th of March about the rise in income. The Commissioner also found that there was nothing to show that there was a precipitate rise in the sales of the petitioner's firm. He, therefore, held that there was no cause which prevented the assessee from not filing an estimate under section 212(3A) and paying the tax thereon. The learned Commissioner took note of the fact urged on behalf of the petitioner that the assessee had paid advance tax as soon as he filed the return, but taking all the facts into consideration, he came to the conclusion that the petitioner had no reasonable cause for not filing the estimate by the 15th of March, 1972.

5. Section 212 of the Act provides for estimate of income and tax to be paid by an assessee liable to pay advance tax. Prior to 1969, an assessee was required to file an estimate only if the estimated income of the assessee was liable to fall below, the estimate of the department in respect of which a demand had been made in terms of section 210 of the Act. The Act was, however, amended in 1969 by the Finance Act, 1969 (14 of 1969). Sub-section (3A) was added. Sub-section (3A) read as follows:

“(3A) In the case of any assessee who is required to pay advance tax by an order under section 210, if, by reason of the current income being likely to be greater than the income on which the advance tax payable by him under section 210 has been computed or for any other reason, the amount of advance tax computed in the manner laid down in section 209 on the current income (which shall be estimated by the assessee) exceeds the amount of advance tax demanded from him under section 210 by more than 33⅓ per cent, of the latter amount, he shall, at any time before the date on which the last instalment of advance tax is due from him, send to the Income-tax Officer an estimate of—

(i) the current income, and

(ii) the advance tax payable by him on the current income calculated in the manner laid down in section 209,

6. And shall pay such amount of advance tax as accords with his estimate on such of the dates applicable in his case under section 211 as have not expired, by instalments which may be revised according to subsection (2):

Provided that in a case where the Commissioner is satisfied that, having regard to the nature of the business carried on by the assessee and the date of expiry of the previous year in respect of such business, it will be difficult for the assessee to furnish the estimate required to be furnished by him in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section before the date on which the last instalment of advance tax is due in his case, he may, if the assessee pays the advance tax demanded from him under section 210 before such date, extend the date for furnishing such estimate up to a period of thirty days immediately, following the last date of the previous year in respect of that business, and where the date is so extended, the assessee shall pay, on or before the date as so extended, the amount by which the amount of advance tax already paid by him falls short of the advance tax payable in accordance with his estimate.”

7. It will be seen that an assessee who is required to pay advance tax is liable to furnish an estimate of current income and advance tax on the said current income if the current income is likely to be greater than the income on which the advance tax has been computed by the department in terms of section 210 of the Act. If, for any other reason, the amount of advance tax computed in terms of section 209 exceeds the amount of advance tax demanded from him by more than 33⅓ per cent, then again the assessee is obliged to file an estimate of (i) the current income and (ii) the advance tax payable by him on the current income calculated in the manner laid down in section 209. Sub-section (3A) enjoins the assessee to pay such amount of advance tax which may accord with his estimate. A proviso was added to this section by the Finance Act, 1970 (19 of 1970), which came into force with effect from April, 1970. The proviso provided that the Commissioner may in suitable cases extend the date for furnishing estimates of income and tax by thirty days if he was satisfied that it will be difficult for the assessee to furnish the required estimate before the date on which the last instalment of advance tax may be due. This satisfaction of the Commissioner would be based on the nature of the business carried on by the assessee and the date of expiry of the previous year in respect of such business. That being the law with effect from April 1, 1969 (and the power to extend the date of filing of the estimate since April 1, 1970), good or bad, had to be complied with by the petitioner-assessee. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that since the assessment year of the petitioner ended with the 31st of March, 1972, it was not possible for him to have anticipated the precipitate rise in income and, therefore, there was good cause for the petitioner in not filing the estimate by the 15th of March, 1972, which was the last date for filing the estimate of advance tax. If this contention were to be accepted, the petitioner's case would be an appropriate one for the petitioner applying to and satisfying the Commissioner of Income-tax that regard being had to the date of expiry of the previous year in respect of his business, it would be difficult for the petitioner to furnish the estimate required to be furnished by him. The petitioner having failed to take advantage of the proviso to sub-section (3A) of section 212 of the Act, can it be said by any stretch of imagination that there had been no wilful default on the part of the petitioner in not submitting the estimate of income and the tax. In my view, such a view would be contrary to the purpose of enacting sub-section (3A) and the proviso thereto. The law in relation to filing of estimate of advance tax may be harsh, but that is hardly of any consequence. The law provided it and it had to be complied with. The law clothed the Commissioner with authority to minimise the rigour of the law wherever it was justified, but the petitioner chose not to comply with the requirement of sub-section (3A) as well as the opportunity to get the date extended. In my view, therefore, there was wilful default on the part of the petitioner in not filing the estimate of income and advance-tax.

8. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner could not file estimate within the requisite time, but there was no mens rea on its part. Section 273(c) not having ruled out mens rea as a pre-condition for levy of penalty, the orders in question were illegal. Penal proceedings being in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings and there being no deliberate defiance of law, the penalty in question could not have been levied upon the petitioner. It was also submitted that the petitioner was not guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest nor did it act in conscious disregard of its obligation. Reliance was placed on Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State Of Orissa†., [1972] 83 ITR 26, 29 (SC); (1969) 2 SCC 627 : AIR 1970 SC 253. That was a case relating to the Orissa Sales Tax Act and their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the law in paragraph 7 which is as follows:

“Under the Act penalty may be imposed for failure to register as a dealer Section 9(1) read with section 25(1)(a) of the Act. But the liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof of default in registering as a dealer. An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged, either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Those in charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out.” The nature of a penalty proceeding under the Income-tax Act came up for consideration in Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali , [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated in paragraph 4 that the proceeding in regard to levy of penalty was a quasi-criminal proceeding. The view that such proceedings are penal in nature was also proved in that case. It was also laid down in Anwar Ali's case, [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC) that in a proceeding under section 28 of the 1922 Act (which is equivalent to section 271(1)(a) of the 1961 Act) being of a penal nature the burden was on the department to prove that a particular amount was a revenue receipt. It would be perfectly legitimate to say, to quote the words of the Supreme Court, that the mere fact that explanation of the assessee is false does not necessarily give rise to the inference that the disputed amount represents his income. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narayanadas Ramkishan, [1975] 100 ITR 18 (AP), Shakuntala Mehra v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, [1976] 102 ITR 301 (Delhi) and V.L Dutt v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1976] 103 ITR 634 (Mad) for the proposition that mere failure to file return of income was not sufficient for imposing penalty on the assessee. On the other hand, learned standing counsel for the income-tax department placed reliance upon Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala v. Gujarat Travancore Agency., [1976] 103 ITR 149 (Ker) [FB] which laid down that proof of mens rea was not necessary for imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. All the cases relied upon by counsel for the parties relate to cases under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The provision under section 273(c) is in pari materia with that of section 271(1)(a), whereas section 271(1)(a) relates to non-filing of return of total income required to be furnished under sub-section (1) of section 139. Section 273(c) relates to penalty for not furnishing estimate of advance tax payable under subsection (3A) of section 212 of the Act. Both the provisions open with the words “has without reasonable cause failed to furnish”. The reasoning in regard to interpretation of section 271(1)(a) must, therefore, apply a fortiori with those of section 273(c). The provisions under the Orissa Sales Tax Act considered in Hindustan Steel Ltd.'s case, [1972] 83 ITR 26 SC) were also similar to those of section 273(c). The gist of the authorities citad at the Bar appears to be that mere non-filing of return is not sufficients visit the assessee with a penalty. The department must furnish something more than mere non-filing of the estimate within the requisite time not necessary to enter into a dissertation as to the nature of penal provisions, since the law of the land has been clearly spelt out by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel's case, [1972] 83 ITR 26 (SC) and Anwar Ali's case, [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC). In regard to the burden of proof the Orissa High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K.C Behera, [1976] 103 ITR 479 struck a different note and held that the decision in Anwar Ali's case, [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC) had no application to initiation of penalty proceedings subsequent to April 1, 1964, when the Explanation was added to section 271(1). According to their Lordships the Explanation placed on the assessee the burden of proving that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or wilful neglect of the assessee, where the total income returned was less than 80 per cent, of the total income assessed. The Orissa decision, however, is of no assistance for there is no Explanation added to section 273, as was added to section 271(1)(a). In that view of the matter, the position must be accepted that the initial burden of want of reasonable cause must lie upon the department. The mere failure to furnish the estimate within the requisite time cannot visit the assessee with penalty. Once the department has shown prima facie that there was no reasonable cause for not furnishing the estimate within the time allowed by the statute, the onus must shift to the assessee.

9. Applying the test laid down above, I am of the view that in the instant case, the department had shown prima facie want of reasonable cause in the petitioner in not having filed the estimate of advance tax required to be done by sub-section (3A) of section 212 of the Act. The order of the Income-tax Officer as usual is sketchy, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that there was no reasonable cause from the fact that the income of the assessee was Rs. 68,022 which was not just below the margin limit. The Commissioner of Income-tax while considering the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner found that the inability of the petitioner to determine the tax was untenable. The petitioner having followed the mercantile system of accounting, it was incredible, according to the Commissioner of Income-tax, that the assessee could not get an inkling before the 15th of March about the rise in income. After considering the materials before him, the Commissioner came to the conclusion that there was complete want of evidence that there was any rise in the turnover or that there was any rise in the general trend of business. He also found that there was no precipitate rise in the sales till the 15th of March. From the fact that there was no precipitate rise in the income of the assessee the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that there was no reasonable cause. In my view, there were sufficient grounds for the Commissioner of Income-tax to come to the conclusion that there was no reasonable cause for the petitioner not to have furnished the estimate by the 15th of March. What is reasonable cause must always be a question of fact. In the instant case, the Commissioner had good materials to come to the conclusion that there was no reasonable cause for the assessee not to have filed the estimate. This court, not being a court of appeal, cannot hold whether the conclusion was justified or not. That could be done only when there was no material before the Commissioner of Income-tax. The fact, however, is that there was no precipitate rise in income prior to 15th March, 1972, which cannot be said to be no material in coming to the conclusion to which the Commissioner arrived. In that view of the matter, I find no merit in the first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and it is accordingly rejected.

10. The second point urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the notice under section 210 was illegal, inasmuch as it did not contain the signature of the Income-tax Officer. The notice was in Form 28 with an enclosure. The position is not in controversy that the Income-tax Officer did not sign the notice served on the petitioner but signed the enclosure thereto. The enclosure mentions the net amount of tax payable by the assessee. The Income-tax Officer having signed the demand for advance tax, the notice and the enclosure thereto must be read together. Upon a harmonious construction of the two, it must be held that the failure to sign the notice cannot vitiate the penalty levied upon the assessee. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon N.N Subramania Iyer v. Union of India, [1974] 97 ITR 228 (Ker) in support of his proposition that signing the requisite notice is a pre-condition for levying penalty. He also placed reliance on B.K Gooyee v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 62 ITR 109 (Cal) for that proposition. In my view, none of these cases is of any assistance to the petitioner as I shall presently show. In N.N Subramania Iyer's case, [1974] 97 ITR 228 (Ker) penalty had been imposed upon the petitioner under the Wealth-tax Act for not having included certain agricultural assets in the return. The penalty notice in that case was held to be illegal, as several grounds for imposing penalty under section 18(1) of the Wealth-tax Act had been printed. None of those several grounds had been struck off and thus there was no indication in the notice in regard to the contravention for which the petitioner had been called upon to show cause why penalty should not be imposed. The situation in the present case is entirely different. The notice and the enclosure clearly indicated that the petitioner was being called upon to deposit advance tax on certain basis in terms of section 210 of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be held that the petitioner was kept in the dark or that he was misled in complying with the provisions of the statute or the directions in the notice. In that view of the matter, N.N Subramania Iyer's case, [1974] 97 ITR 228 (Ker) is of no avail to the petitioner.

11. In B.K Gooyee's case, [1966] 62 ITR 109 (Cal), notice under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, had been issued against the petitioner. On the basis of that notice the assessee filed the return and thereafter an assessment was made. One of the points raised in that case was that the notice under section 34 was bad in law, inasmuch as it did not bear the signature of the Income-tax Officer. The language of section 34 of the 1922 Act suggests that no Income-tax Officer can proceed to reassess on the grounds mentioned in section 34 without issuing notice to the assessee in terms of the provisions of section 34. Cases in regard to issue of notices under section 34 stand on a footing entirely different from cases of penalty for failure to furnish estimate or return. The very basis of assumption of power under section 34 is the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer that income liable to tax has escaped assessment. If the assessing officer fails to sign the notice issued under section 34, it will be impossible to say that the assessing officer was of the opinion that particular income had escaped assessment. In that view of the matter, the Calcutta decision also is of no avail to the petitioner.

12. Allied to the point under consideration, another submission was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the notice under section 210 of the Income-tax Act purporting to be in Form 28 did not contain all the recitals prescribed in that form. Annexure “1”, the notice under section 210, shows that only part of paragraph 4 was cyclostyled. Portions of paragraph 4 and the other subsequent paragraphs were wanting. It was, therefore, contended that no notice had been served upon the petitioner calling upon him to pay advance tax and, therefore, the failure to furnish estimate of income could not be penalised. The point urged in this behalf had been raised for the first time before this court. It does not appear to have been raised before the Income-tax Officer. The appellate authority has mentioned in its order as follows:

“Admittedly there is service of the notice under section 210 and the appellant had also paid the first instalment of advance tax. It is too late in the day to contest the irregularity of service of the demand notice of advance tax nor did the representative make out a case as to how the service is irregular.”

13. The infirmity pointed out there does not appear to have been raised before the income-tax authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner showed to us the original notice served upon the petitioner. Apart from the enclosure, the notice shown to us was only in one page. It is difficult to say whether there was only one cyclostyled page or whether there were two cyclostyled pages. If the petitioner had urged this point before the appellate or revisional anthority, the grievance of the petitioner could have been considered. I am, therefore, not inclined to permit the petitioner to urge this question of fact for the first time before this court. If the notice in Form 28 contained two pages, it is difficult to say whether the second page contained the signature of the Income-tax Officer or not. In that view of the matter, the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner in regard to the invalidity of the notice must be rejected. The effect of the failure to serve on the petitioner the notice containing paragraphs 4 and 8 does not need to be considered, since the necessary factual basis is wanting in the instant case. Even if the infirmity pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner were to be taken as factually correct, the petitioner has not shown anything which would indicate that he was prejudiced by the defective notice having been served upon him. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax has mentioned in his order that the service of notice was admitted. The manner in which the point has been urged before this court does not seem to have been raised before him. Even before the Commissioner of Income-tax the submission was in bald terms as mentioned’ in ground No. 2 (annexure “4”). The order of the Commissioner does not give any inkling that such a submission was raised.

14. The last submission urged on behalf of the petitioner was that he was denied reasonable opportunity of making his submission before the Income-tax Officer. The factual position in this regard, and not in controversy, is that the case was fixed for hearing on October 21, 1974, but his order levying the penalty is dated October 19, 1974. It is also not in dispute that on the 19th of October, 1974, the petitioner had appeared before/the Income-tax Officer and made submissions in regard to the imposition of penalty. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the case having been heard and disposed of before the date fixed in the case, the order was vitiated as the petitioner had no opportunity of making his submission as to why penalty should not be levied. The submission has only got to be stated to be rejected. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Income-tax Officer of Ward-A, Ranchi. It has been stated in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit that on the 19th the representative of the assessee had filed a written explanation and he submitted his explanation regarding assessment year 1971-72, The representation was also heard by the Income-tax Officer. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he had made some submission on October 19, 1974, but he wanted further time to explain the matters. There is nothing to show that the petitioner's submission had been heard only in part. We have been shown the order sheet of the assessing officer and it completely negatives the factual position as stated by learned counsel for the petitioner. In that view of the matter, the fact that the case was heard on October 19, 1974, and not on the 21st does not vitiate the impugned order in any manner.

15. The order in question is not vulnerable to attack on the ground urged by learned counsel for the petitioner for another reason. Even if the petitioner was not fully heard by the Income-tax Officer or had not been heard at all, the petitioner had filed an appeal. He had no grievance about opportunity of hearing being provided to him by the appellate or revisional authority. The order of the Income-tax Officer having merged in the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner of Income-tax, the grievance of not having been provided the opportunity to make his submissions is absolutely without any substance. Reference may be made to the case of Sheopujan Choudhury v. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 212. A similar contention was raised in that case. The petitioner had made a grievance that he had not been given an opportunity of hearing by the Deputy Commissioner although he had been heard by the appellate authority in an appeal filed against the order of the Deputy Commissioner. Ramaswami J., as he then was, on difference of opinion between Rai and Sinha JJ. observed as follows (pages 219, 220):

“It is true that there was no oral hearing given to the petitioner before the licence was cancelled. But it is not a correct proposition to say that the principle of audi alteram partem, includes necessarily the right to oral hearing in every case. The principle only means that the party affected should be given sufficient opportunity to meet the case against him and not that he is necessarily entitled to an oral hearing. That was the view expressed by the House of Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] AC 120 (HL)…….

It is conceded by Mr. Baldeva Sahai appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was given an oral hearing both before the Commissioner of Excise and before the Board of Revenue. But the point taken by learned counsel was that the order of Deputy Commissioner of Santa] Parganas was a nullity because the petitioner was not given an oral hearing at that stage. But as a matter of law it is not correct to state that the party adversely affected should be heard at each and every stage of the administrative process.

There is no such general requirement in the principle of audi alteram partem. On the contrary, the principle is satisfied if the party adversely affected is given sufficient opportunity to know the case he has to meet and to answer that case at some stage and not at all the stages of the administrative proceeding.

As I have said, the question as to whether a fair opportunity has been given to the party adversely affected depends very much on the particular facts of each case. I think that the concept of ‘natural justice’ cannot be imprisoned within the strait jacket of any fixed formula. It is not a mechanical instrument applicable to all situations. As observed by Frankfurter J. in Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. Howard McGrath, [1951] 341 US 123, 164:

‘Whether the ex parte procedure to which the petitioners were subjected only observed “the rudiments of fair play”,- Chicago, M. & St. P. Rly. Co. v. F. Polt, [1914] 232 US 165,—cannot, therefore, be tested by mere generalities or sentiments abstractly appealing. The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished, these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment’.”

16. Sheopujan Choudhury's case, AIR 1956 Pat 212, fully applies to the facts of the present case. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner in regard to denial of reasonable opportunity of being heard must, therefore, be rejected as totally untenable. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Fertiliser Corporation of India v. State of Bihar, [1975] Bihar Bar Council Journal 775. In my view, that case was decided upon its own special facts which have no relevance to the case before us. Having given my anxious consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, I do not find any merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.

M.P Singh, J.:— I agree.