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Judgment Summary — Second Appeal concerning Suit for Possession (Plot No. 420, Village Ramgarh)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (appellants) filed a suit for possession and a declaration of title in respect of a small strip of land described in Schedule A of the plaint, said to measure 1½ decimals and appertaining to Plot No. 420, Khata No. 130, Village Ramgarh.

The plaintiffs alleged they purchased the suit land from Lakhan Sao under two registered sale deeds dated 18 July 1960 (Exts. 1 and 1-a) pursuant to an agreement dated 11 November 1959, and that they had come into possession. Each sale deed, while sharing the same boundaries, described the area as ¾ decimal. A pleader commissioner's report and other materials led the courts below to find that the area within the four stated boundaries was approximately 6 decimals, so that the precise east–west identification of the disputed strip within those boundaries remained uncertain.

The plaintiffs say a proceeding under Section 144 CrPC between the parties was decided in their favour, but the defendant later took forcible possession and demolished a hut on part of the land. The defendant contested the plaintiffs' claim, asserting that (i) the owners had agreed on 2 April 1960 (Ext. E) to sell 4½ decimals to him, (ii) he purchased three decimals by two registered sale deeds from Malo Sao and Pemlal Sao (23-4-1960 and 14-6-1960), and (iii) an attempted sale deed by Lakhan Sao on 23-4-1960 (Ext. F/3) could not be registered because Lakhan Sao did not admit execution; subsequently Lakhan Sao purportedly sold to the plaintiffs, which the defendant contended was illegal and did not convey title to the plaintiffs.

Both courts below dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. They found (a) the description of the suit land in the plaint and sale deeds was vague and uncertain, and (b) the defendant, being a transferee from the plaintiffs' vendor and having taken possession in part performance of a contract, was entitled to protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The lower appellate court further found that the plaintiffs' earlier agreement dated 11-11-1959 (Ext. 3), which the plaintiffs relied on, was forged and fabricated, and that the plaintiffs were never put in possession under it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the description of the suit land in the plaint and the sale deeds was sufficiently definite under Order 7, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enable an executable decree.
  2. Whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act bars the plaintiffs' suit because the defendant, as transferee under a contract for sale, had taken possession in part performance and satisfied conditions for protection under Section 53-A.
  3. Whether, for the defence of part performance under Section 53-A, the price/consideration must have been paid in praesenti (i.e., immediately), or whether deferred or partially paid consideration suffices.
  4. Whether possession relied upon for Section 53-A must have been delivered by the vendor at the vendor's instance, or whether possession taken by the transferee in part performance also qualifies.
  5. Whether the plaintiffs' earlier agreement for sale (11-11-1959) was genuine or, as found by the lower court, forged such that the plaintiffs never acquired possession under it.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. R. S. Chatterji

  • If the defendant could not resist the plaintiffs' claim (i.e., if Section 53-A did not apply), the question of the exact area or demarcation could be left to the plaintiffs and their vendor to resolve; the court should not deny the plaintiffs relief on that account.
  • In relation to Section 53-A: (i) the contract relied upon by the defendant was not enforceable because consideration had not been paid in praesenti; and (ii) possession was not delivered to the defendant by his vendor but was taken forcible, so the defendant was not entitled to protection under Section 53-A.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant relied on an agreement dated 2 April 1960 (Ext. E) to purchase 4½ decimals and on two registered sale deeds from other owners to show he had bought three decimals and acquired rights. He argued that his vendor Lakhan Sao had contracted to sell to him and that the defendant had taken possession in part performance.
  • The defendant alleged the plaintiffs' sale deeds from Lakhan Sao were irregular or illegal because a deed by Lakhan Sao presented for registration earlier failed due to Lakhan Sao not admitting execution; subsequently Lakhan Sao purportedly sold the same land to the plaintiffs, from which plaintiffs could not derive title.
  • The defendant pointed to uncertainty in the plaintiffs' description and argued the plaintiffs' claimed earlier instrument (11-11-1959) was not genuine and that the plaintiffs were not in possession pursuant to it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raju Roy v. Kashinath Roy, AIR 1956 Pat 308 Bench decision cited for the proposition that a contract under Section 53-A must be capable of specific performance (i.e., a lawful and enforceable contract). The court relied on the principle to reject the contention that consideration must pass in praesenti; it held that all that is necessary is that the contract be lawful and capable of specific performance.
Nathulal v. Phoolchand, (1969) 3 SCC 120 : AIR 1970 SC 546 Sets out the four conditions necessary to make out the defence of part performance in an action in ejectment: (1) written contract signed by transferor with ascertainable terms; (2) transferee has taken possession or continues in possession in part performance; (3) transferee has done some act in furtherance; (4) transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. The court applied these four conditions to the facts and concluded the defendant's contract satisfied them: contract and signed document existed, some consideration was paid (Rs. 1,000 of Rs. 2,000), the defendant had taken possession, and the contract was enforceable; therefore Section 53-A defence stood.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis: (A) sufficiency of description under Order 7, Rule 3 CPC; and (B) applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act (doctrine of part performance).

A. On the description of the property (Order 7, Rule 3 CPC): The court noted that when immovable property is the subject-matter, the plaintiff must describe it with sufficient particulars (boundaries or particulars in settlement/survey records) so a decree, if passed, can be executed under Order 21 CPC. The lower courts had found the description inadequate because, although the northern and southern boundaries were fixed, the east–west line of the disputed strip could not be definitely fixed within the approximately 6-decimal area identified by the pleader commissioner's report. The appellants' counsel acknowledged the difficulty and argued the problem could be left for the plaintiffs and their vendor to resolve; the court rejected that approach, observing it is the court's duty to pass only decrees that can be executed precisely, and that where particulars are insufficient the proper course is to call for more particulars or allow amendment rather than simply dismiss outright on that ground.

B. On Section 53-A (part performance): The court analyzed two contentions raised for appellants.

(1) Requirement of payment of consideration in praesenti — the court rejected the contention that Section 53-A requires the consideration to have been paid immediately. Relying on the statutory definition of "sale" and "contract for sale" in Section 54 of the Act and on Raju Roy, the court held that the contract must be lawful and specifically enforceable, but parties are free to fix terms for payment of price (which may be immediate, at deed execution, at registration, by exchange, in further installments, or at future time). The expression "contracts to transfer for consideration" in Section 53-A must be read consistently with Section 54 and the settled law: the essential requirement is a contract capable of specific performance and not absolute pre-payment of the price. The court noted that, on the findings, the contract relied on by defendant specified Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000 had been received by Lakhan Sao, supporting the validity of the contract.

(2) Mode of taking possession — the court rejected the appellants' contention that possession under Section 53-A must be delivered by the vendor at the vendor's instance. The text of Section 53-A speaks of the transferee having "in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof" or, if already in possession, continuing in possession. The court observed the legislature used the language deliberately so that the act of giving possession was not left solely to the transferor's option; a transferee taking possession may be protected where a vendor turns dishonest and seeks to deny the purchaser's equity. The court referred again to the Nathulal case for the second condition and concluded that possession taken by the transferee in part performance is sufficient for Section 53-A purposes.

C. Application of the Nathulal conditions: The court found the factual findings of the courts below satisfied the four statutory/their judicial conditions: there was a signed contract with ascertainable terms; the defendant had taken possession in part performance; some acts in furtherance were shown; and the defendant had performed (partly) or was willing to perform his part. Accordingly, Section 53-A applied to bar the plaintiffs' action.

D. On the question of forgery and mens rea: the appellate court had found (and this court accepted the finding) that the plaintiffs' earlier agreement dated 11-11-1959 (Ext. 3) was forged and that the plaintiffs were never put into possession pursuant to it—factors that undercut the plaintiffs' claimed entitlement to relief.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. The courts below correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

Direct consequences:

  • The dismissal of the appeal affirms the lower courts' findings that (a) the description of the suit property was insufficiently definite for the purposes of an executable decree and (b) the defendant was entitled to protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act on the facts found (valid contract for consideration, part-performance, and possession taken by the transferee).
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs in favour of the respondent as recorded by the court.

Broader implications: The judgment applies and reiterates established principles regarding Section 53-A and the necessity of a describable subject-matter for an executable decree, but the opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond applying existing statutory provisions and the precedents cited.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs.

    Nagar Khan And Others v. Gopi Ram Agarwala .

    1. The plaintiffs appellants is in this second appeal had instituted a suit for possession after declaration of their title with respect to a small strip of land measuring 1½ decimals only appertaining to Plot No. 420, Khata No. 130 of village Ramgarh, described in Schedule A of the plaint.

    2. The plaintiffs' case is that they purchased the suit land for a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- under two registered sale deeds dated the 18th July, 1960 (Exts. 1 and 1-a) from one Lakhan Sao in pursuance of an agreement dated the 11th November, 1959 and claim to have come in possession over the same. In each of the two sale deeds, although the boundary is the same, the area mentioned is ¾ decimal. According to the finding recorded by the Courts below, on the basis of the materials on the record, particularly a pleader commissioner's report, the area of the land within the boundaries, as mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint as well as in the sale deeds, is approximately 6 decimals. The land has been shown to be bounded on the north by Gola Road, on the south by the land of the plaintiffs, on the east by the house of the defendant, Gopi Ram Agarwala, and on the west by a lane and thereafter the land of the plaintiffs. In this way, although the northern and the southern boundaries are fixed, the disputed land has yet to be fixed east to west at any place within the boundaries of the area of 6 decimals mentioned above. I have mentioned these facts in some detail as the plaintiffs' suit has been dismissed on the ground of vagueness in the description of the land in suit also. A proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr PC was started between the plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the defendant, on the other, which, according to the plaintiffs' case, was although decided in their favour, the defendant later on took forcible possession of the suit land and demolished the hut which was standing on a part of the land. The claim of the plaintiffs is being resisted by the defendant on the around that the owners of the plot in question had entered into a written agreement with him on the 2nd April, 1960 (Ext. E) to sell 4½ decimals of land, out of the aforesaid plot, and in pursuance of the agreement, he purchased three decimals of land under two sale deeds executed by two of the owners, namely, Malo Sao and Pemlal Sao, on 23-4-1960 and 14-6-1960 respectively which were duly registered. Another sale deed, which was executed by Lakhan Sao on 23-4-1960 (Ext. F/3), which was also presented for registration, could not be registered as Lakhan Sao did not turn up to admit execution and subsequently he purported to sell the land to the plaintiffs in the name of plaintiff No. 2 which was wholly illegal and the plaintiffs did not derive any title there under. According to the further case of the defendant, the area covered by the two sale deeds (Exts. 1-and 1.a) in favour of the plaintiffs is only ¾ decimal. In the written statement itself, uncertainty and vagueness in the description of the suit land was pleaded by the defendant.

    3. Both the Courts below have dismissed the suit on the finding that the defendant being a transferee from the vendor of the plaintiffs, having already taken possession of the disputed land in part performance of the contract, the plaintiffs claiming through the defendant's transferor, namely, Lakhan Sao were debarred from enforcing any right in respect of the property in pursuance of the provision contained in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and that the description of the suit land given in the plaint as well as in the sale deeds was quite vague and uncertain. The Court of appeal below has also recorded a clear finding that the agreement for sale deed 11-11-1959 (Ext. 3) set up by the plaintiffs to meet the sale deed of the defendant, being earlier in point of time to their sale deeds, was a forged and fabricated document and that the plaintiffs were never put in possession in pursuance of the same.

    4. According to the provision of Order 7, Rule 3 of the CPC, where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaintiff has to describe the same with sufficient particulars to identify it with boundaries or particulars in the record of settlement or survey, so that the decree, if passed, will be capable of execution. Both the courts below have devoted considerable attention on this question and have recorded a clear finding, as already pointed out above, that the description of the property was insufficient and it was difficult to fix up the same with definiteness within the four boundaries mentioned above. Mr. R.S Chatterji, who appeared for the appellants in this Court, when confronted with this situation could not satisfactorily meet the point. He, however, simply contended that if it could be held that the defendant was not entitled to resist the claim of the plaintiffs, it would be a matter between the plaintiffs, on the one hand, and their vendor, on the other, to fix up the area. There is hardly any substance in this contention as it is the duty of the Court to pass only such decree which can be executed under the machinery provided by Order 21 of the CPC with all precision and without any confusion or embarrassment either to the executing Court or to any other person. However, on this ground a suit cannot be dismissed, nor a plaint rejected, and in such cases the Court may call upon the plaintiffs to furnish more particulars, even to the extent of allowing the amendment of the plaint.

    5. The difficulty of the plaintiffs, however, is on the second question, namely, Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Chatterji in order to meet this point raised the following contentions: (i) the contract for sale relied upon by the defendant was not enforceable as the consideration was not paid in praesenti and, (ii) possession was not delivered to the defendant by his vendor, but he took forcible possession of the land and therefore the defendant was not entitled to the protection of this provision.

    6. Let me consider the contentions in seriatim. The first contention of Mr. Chatterji that under the contract to transfer under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the consideration mentioned for the transfer of the property must pass in praesenti as, according to him, it was a special provision; does not appear to have any substance. All that is necessary is that the contract must be a lawful and enforceable contract. In other words, it must be capable of being specifically performed as has been held by a Bench decision of this Court in Raju Roy v. Kashinath Roy, AIR 1956 Pat 308. Section 54 of the Act defines ‘sale’ as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. A ‘contract for sale’ has also been defined in the said section as follows:

    “A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties.”

    7. According to these definitions, therefore, it is manifest that it is open to the parties to settle the terms with respect to the payment of the consideration which can be agreed by parties to be paid either at the time of (i) the agreement itself, (ii) execution of the sale deed, (iii) registration of the sale deed, (iv) exchange of equivalent or by several other modes or at any future time subsequent to the execution and the registration of the document itself. If the title has been intended to pass on the execution of the sale deed, the only remedy in case of non-payment of the consideration available to a vendor is to bring a suit for recovery of the consideration. It is, therefore, not possible to read the expression “contracts to transfer for consideration” occurring in Section 53-A of the Act in violation of the provision contained in Section 54 just referred to. There is also enough indication in Section 53-A of the Act itself in the express provision a little later that “the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.”

    8. Mr. Chatterji failed to cite any authority in support of his proposition. The Supreme Court in the case of Nathulal v. Phoolchand, (1969) 3 SCC 120 : AIR 1970 SC 546 while laying down the conditions necessary for making out the defence of part performance to an action in ejectment by the owner, has indicated the following four conditions; (1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; (2) that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract; (3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and, (4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. All that is required, therefore, with respect to the validity of a contract contemplated under Section 53-A of the Act, to be used as a shield to the action against him by a defendant, is to prove the contract. It is not disputed that the contract in question was for a mentioned consideration of Rs. 2,000/- and according to the finding, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- had already been received by Lakhan Sao from the defendant. It is also evident that the defendant took possession of the land in question, and when the document was presented for registration, the defendant's vendor, namely, the aforesaid Lakhan Sao did not turn up. It is evident, therefore, that the contract relied upon by the defendant was quite valid and satisfies all the conditions of Section 53-A. The first contention raised by Mr. Chatterji has, therefore, no substance and is overruled.

    9. Coming to the second contention of Mr. Chatterji that the delivery of possession contemplated under Sec. 53-A must be at the instance of the vendor in part performance of the contract in furtherance of his intention to complete the contract, is also of no force. Section 53-A was brought on the statute book in the year 1929 in order to protect the purchaser from any fraudulent intention of the vendor after a contract was completed and to give him relief on the principle that if a man has made bargain with another and allowed that man to act on it, he will have created an equity himself which he cannot resist by setting up want of any infirmity (sic) and to meet situations like that as one in the present case, that a vendor having already contracted with the defendant to sell the property for Rs. 2,000/- later on turns round when he finds in the plaintiffs a purchaser for double the amount. Advisedly, the legislature has used the expression with regard to possession in Section 53-A of the Act as “and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof.” The act of giving possession has not been left at the mercy and option of the transferor, but of taking possession by the transferee himself, as in a given case, the dishonest intention may set in on the part of the transferor even before the stage for delivery of possession arrives. The second contention is not supported from the provision of the section itself, rather it is in contrast with the specific provision as already indicated above. Reference may again be made in this context to the case of Nathulal, (1969) 3 SCC 120 : AIR 1970 SC 546 (supra) of the Supreme Court with respect to the second condition mentioned thereunder, namely;

    “that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract.”

    10. The facts found by the Courts below, which cannot be disputed, satisfy all the conditions for application of the doctrine of part performance of the contract as provided in Section 53-A of the Act, which forms part of a substantive law.

    11. In other words, there was a contract for sale of the land to the defendant by its admitted owner Lakhan Sao, who also come in possession in part performance of the said agreement, which is for consideration and enforceable in law, and the defendant has also established that he has not (sic) always willing to perform his part of the contract. The Courts below have, therefore, taken a correct view of the case and have rightly dismissed the suit.

    12. This appeal, therefore, has got no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.

    13. Appeal dismissed.

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    Nagar Khan And Others v. Gopi Ram Agarwala .
    (Apr 25, 1975)