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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • section 33(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act),
  • notifications.6. Section 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957,
  • schedule of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Item 1
  • rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944,
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
  • Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953.
  • Central Excise Rules, 1944,
  • Importance) Act, 1957,
  • Excise Act, 1957,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 33(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act),
  • notifications.6. Section 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957,
  • schedule of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Item 1
  • rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944,
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
  • Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953.
  • Central Excise Rules, 1944,
  • Importance) Act, 1957,
  • Excise Act, 1957,
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, under section 33(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, stated a case referring a question of law to this court. The assessee is a dealer who manufactured hosiery goods (banyans) from hosiery cloth and also sold hosiery cloth. For the assessment period 1964–65 the assessing officer exempted sales of hosiery cloth (Rs. 11,672.92) under a notification but imposed sales tax on sales of manufactured hosiery goods (banyans). The assessee contended that banyans were exempt under Notification No. STGL-AR-107/59 dated 1 July 1959 (as amended). That contention was rejected successively by the appellate authority, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revision, and by the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, which upheld the imposition of tax on banyans. The Tribunal referred the legal question to this court.

The referral turns on the scope and effect of a series of notifications issued by the Governor of Bihar: the principal notification of 1 July 1959 (Schedule III, item 23), an amending notification of 5 August 1959 (retrospective to 1 July 1959) adding item 27 including “hosiery cloth sold in lengths,” and a later notification of 19 October 1966 (operative from 1 October 1966) adding item 32 excluding “Cotton, silk and cotton-silk mixed hosiery goods.” The period under assessment is 1964–65.

The opinion is delivered by Untwalia, C.J., with S.K. Jha, J. concurring. The reference was answered in the negative.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the hosiery banyans were exempt from the levy of sales tax under item 23 of Schedule III of Notification No. STGL-AR-107/59 dated 1 July 1959 (as amended) for the period in question (1964–65)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee contended that the expression “cotton fabrics,” as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957, included hosiery cloth and hosiery goods made from cotton yarn.
  • On that basis, the assessee submitted that hosiery banyans fell within the scope of item 23 of Schedule III of the 1 July 1959 notification and thus were exempt from sales tax effective from 1 July 1959 (by necessary implication), even though a later notification of 1966 expressly excluded hosiery goods.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The revenue contended that the expression “cotton fabrics” in item 23 of Schedule III of the 1 July 1959 notification was used in a narrow sense and did not include hosiery cloth or hosiery goods.
  • Consequently, hosiery cloth was separately excluded by the retrospective 5 August 1959 notification as “hosiery cloth sold in lengths,” and hosiery goods were excluded only later by the 1966 notification; thus, for 1964–65 banyans were taxable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ishwardas Kapoor and Sons v. Member, Board of Revenue, Bengal [1946] 1 S.T.C. 153 Whether handloom-woven cloth subjected to needle work after weaving remains within an item describing handloom-woven cloth. The court observed this decision was distinguishable and did not materially assist the present case.
Sharfaji Rao v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1953] 4 S.T.C. 6 That ready-made garments made of cloth are different in character from cotton cloth. Cited to support the proposition that manufactured garments may be distinct from raw cloth; the court found the point obvious and relevant.
Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur [1962] 13 S.T.C. 1031 Distinction between the terms “cloth” and “clothes” (i.e., cloth from factory vs articles made from cloth). Relied on to emphasise that banyans (manufactured garments) are different from hosiery cloth (the raw or semi-finished textile).
Pravin Bros. v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) Whether embroidered sarees and embroidered pieces intended for ladies' underwear fall under a statutory entry as cotton fabric. Used as support for the view that certain processed or altered textile articles are not simply “cotton fabric simpliciter,” favouring the revenue's position.
Vaiswaner Trading Co. v. State of Gujarat (15 S.T.C., same volume) Whether joined or worked pieces retain the same character as the raw product (example: rolled steel sections joined by riveting). Noted as illustrating that context matters and similar-sounding issues require case-by-case decision; used to caution against overgeneralisation.
State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal (Supreme Court) Whether processing that is merely for convenience of sale alters the essential character of the goods (iron/steel example). Held of no help to the assessee; the court distinguished that case from the instant facts where manufacture produced a different article.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mahajan Bros. Whether hosiery goods are to be equated with ready-made garments or with “garments” in general. Cited in support of the view that “hosiery” is distinct from “garment” and that hosiery goods are knitted, not made of cloth — supporting the revenue's narrow construction.
Government of Madras v. Madurai Braided Cord and Tape Producers Co-op. Industrial Society [1968] 22 S.T.C. 470 Whether braided cords are varieties of textile/fabric within a statutory entry. Referenced for the dictionary meaning of “fabric” and to show braided cords were treated as textile fabrics; however, the court concluded hosiery goods are not analogous.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Ashok Elastic Works [1971] 28 S.T.C. 743 Whether certain articles (dori and fita) manufactured from cotton yarn fall within “cotton fabrics of all varieties.” Cited to show some manufactured articles from cotton yarn were held to be cotton fabrics; the court distinguished those facts from hosiery goods and did not equate them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in sequential steps, grounded in the text of the notifications and statutory definitions appearing in the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957, and the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:

  1. The court first identified the content and temporal application of three relevant notifications:
    • The 1 July 1959 notification (Schedule III, item 23) exempted specified goods including “Cotton fabrics…” from general and special sales tax.
    • The 5 August 1959 notification (retrospective to 1 July 1959) added item 27 to Schedule III and expressly listed sub-items including “hosiery cloth sold in lengths.”
    • The 19 October 1966 notification (operative from 1 October 1966) added item 32 excluding “Cotton, silk and cotton-silk mixed hosiery goods.”
    From these dates, the court noted that the period under assessment (1964–65) fell after the 1959 notifications but before the 1966 notification; therefore hosiery goods were not expressly excluded from tax in 1964–65 by the 1966 amendment.
  2. The court examined the statutory definition of “cotton fabrics” in item 19 of Schedule I of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (referred to by section 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957). That definition described “cotton fabrics” as all varieties of fabrics manufactured wholly or partly from cotton, and then expressly listed certain examples (dhoties, sarees, chadars, etc.), while also listing exclusions based on fibre content.
  3. The court considered the ordinary meaning of “fabric” (relying on the Concise Oxford Dictionary cited in the opinion) as “woven material” or “texture,” and concluded that “cotton fabrics” prima facie referred to cotton cloth which is generally woven. The court expressed uncertainty whether knitted cotton cloth would fall under this term, but emphasized context.
  4. The court placed strong reliance on the contemporaneous state notifications of 1959. It treated the 1 July 1959 notification and the retrospective 5 August 1959 notification as part of a single scheme because both were made to have effect from 1 July 1959. The fact that the latter notification expressly listed “hosiery cloth sold in lengths” as a separate excluded item demonstrated that the State Government did not consider hosiery to be subsumed within the general expression “cotton fabrics” used in item 23.
  5. The court applied a rule of interpretation: where a statutory provision uses a general term and immediately employs special or specific words, the special words are not to be presumed included within the general term. On that principle, hosiery cloth (and by extension hosiery goods) were not to be read into the general expression “cotton fabrics” as used by the State notification.
  6. The court further reasoned that even if hosiery cloth could be argued to fall within “cotton fabrics” in some contexts, banyans (manufactured hosiery garments) are different in character from the cloth from which they are made. The opinion relied on cited authorities distinguishing cloth and garments, and on the practical and linguistic difference between woven cloth and knitted hosiery.
  7. The court noted that although a 1955 Central Government notification (issued under Central Excise Rules, 1944) described “hosiery” under a cotton fabrics exemption for central excise purposes, that central notification concerned a different statute and a different purpose. The court declined to import that inclusion into the meaning of “cotton fabrics” for the State’s 1959 sales tax notification.
  8. After weighing the definitions, dictionary meaning, the contemporaneous State notifications, and the cited case law (used mainly to illustrate distinctions between cloth and manufactured articles or to show that context matters), the court concluded that hosiery banyans did not fall within item 23’s exemption as “cotton fabrics” for the period 1964–65.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the reference in the negative and held that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the hosiery banyans were not exempt from the levy of sales tax under item 23 of Schedule III of the notification dated 1 July 1959 for the period in question (1964–65).

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The decision upholds the departmental view and the assessments imposing sales tax on the sale of hosiery banyans for the period 1964–65.
  • The assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the reference; the hearing fee was assessed at Rs. 100.

The opinion does not assert that it establishes a novel or broad precedent beyond the interpretation applied to the specific notifications and facts of this case; it confines its reasoning to the text of the notifications, definitions and the contextual rule of interpretation relied upon.

Disposition

Reference answered in the negative. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference; hearing fee assessed at Rs. 100. (Opinion by Untwalia, C.J.; S.K. Jha, J. agreed.)

    Sri Ram Hosiery Works v. The State Of Bihar

    Untwalia, C.J:— On being asked to state a case, the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, has done it under section 33(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act), and referred the following question of law for determination by this court:

    “Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the hosiery banyans were exempt from the levy of sales tax under item 23 of Schedule III of Notification No. STGL-AR-107/59—9134-F.T. dated 1st July, 1959, as amended from time to time by the Government of Bihar, under section 4 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959?”

    2. The assessee is a dealer, which manufactures hosiery goods (ganji) from hosiery cloth and sells hosiery goods. It also deals in hosiery cloth. The assessing officer exempted the sale of hosiery cloth to the tune of Rs. 11,672.92 from the imposition of sales tax, as sale of hosiery cloth was exempted from sales tax under a certain notification to be referred to hereinafter in this judgment. He, however, imposed sales tax on the sale of hosiery goods, namely, banyans. The contention on behalf of the assessee was that under the notification dated 1st July, 1959, sale of hosiery banyans was also exempt from sales tax. This contention was repelled by the appellate authority as also by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revision. The assessee filed a second revision before the Commercial Taxes Tribunal. Agreeing with the departmental authorities, the Tribunal has upheld the imposition of sales tax on the sale of hosiery banyans. Hence this reference. Notification No. STGL-AR-107/59—9134-F.T. dated 1st July, 1959, was issued by the Governor of Bihar in exercise of his powers under section 4(3)(a) of the Act. He was pleased to exempt the goods specified in the second column of Schedule III annexed to the notification from the levy of both “general sales tax” and “special sales tax”. Item No. 23 of Schedule III reads as follows:

    “Cotton fabrics, rayon or artificial silk fabrics, woollen fabrics, sugar and tobacco, as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, and handloom cloth excluding pure mill cloth.”

    3. Another notification dated 5th August, 1959, was issued by the Governor of Bihar adding certain items to Schedule III of the old notification. This notification was given a retrospective effect and it came into force from 1st July, 1959, the day on which the first notification came into force. Item 27 added to Schedule III enumerates various items, such as handkerchiefs, towels, napkins, etc. The tenth sub-item of item 27 is “hosiery cloth sold in lengths”. The notification dated 19th October, 1966, which was made to come into operation with effect from 1st October, 1966, was issued adding to the Third Schedule item 32, which reads:

    “Cotton, silk and cotton-silk mixed hosiery goods.”

    4. On the face of the three notifications, therefore, it would be noticed that in express language “hosiery cloth sold in lengths” was excluded from the levy of sales tax with effect from lst July, 1959, by including such article in item 27 of Schedule III, and cotton hosiery goods were also excluded with effect from 1st October, 1966. The period of assessment in question is 1964–65. On the face of these three notifications, therefore, it would be noticed that hosiery goods, namely, banyans, were not excluded from the levy of sales tax in the year 1964–65.

    5. But the argument put forward on behalf of the assessee is that the expression “cotton fabrics”, as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957, includes hosiery cloth as also hosiery goods made out of cotton yarn. It was, therefore, submitted that though the express exclusion of hosiery goods was by a different notification which came into force from 1st October, 1966, by necessary implication the sale of such goods was exempt from the levy of sales tax from 1st July, 1959. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the revenue that the expression “cotton fabrics” was used in a narrow sense in item 23 of Schedule III of the notification dated 1st July, 1959; it did not embrace within its ambit hosiery cloth or hosiery goods and, therefore, they were expressly excluded by subsequent notifications.

    6. Section 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise Act, 1957, defines the expression “cotton fabrics” to have the meaning assigned to it in item 19 of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. We have therefore to go to item 19 of Schedule I of the 1944 Act. In the said entry it is mentioned:

    “‘Cotton fabrics’ mean all varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly from cotton, and include dhoties, sarees, chadars, bed-sheets, bed spreads, counterpanes and table-cloths, but do not Include any such fabric:

    (a) if it contains 40 per cent or more by weight of wool;

    (b) if it contains 40 per cent or more by weight of silk; or

    (c) if it contains 60 per cent or more by weight of rayon or artificial silk………”

    7. The 1957 Act was meant to impose additional excise duty on certain goods. Under the Central Excise Rules, 1944, power has been given to the authorities concerned to exempt certain goods from the levy of certain duties. In exercise of that power a notification was issued in the year 1955 by the Central Government exempting cotton fabrics described in that notification from the whole of duty leviable thereon under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Item 1 of this notification is “hosiery”. It would thus be seen that although the expression “cotton fabrics” in item 19 of Schedule I of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, in its inclusive definition did not include hosiery but included dhoties, sarees, chadars, bed-sheets, etc., in the notification issued in the year 1955, hosiery was treated as one of the items of cotton fabrics. But the State Government, while issuing the notification dated 1st July, 1959, did not treat the expression “cotton fabrics” to include “hosiery”. And that is clear from the fact that by a subsequent notification issued about a month later, which was made retrospective from 1st July, 1959, hosiery cloth sold in length was an express item of exclusion from the levy of sales tax. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the notifications issued in the year 1959, both of which were made to come into force from 1st July, 1959, can be treated as part and parcel of the same notification. Treating them so, one has to accept that the sub-items enumerated in item 27 of Schedule III were not included in the general expression “cotton fabrics”. If in a statutory rule or statutory notification there are two expressions used, one in general terms and the other in special words, by a rule of interpretation, it has got to be held that the special words were not meant to be included in the general expression. If hosiery cloth sold in length could not be taken to have been included in the expression “cotton fabrics”, it is plain that hosiery goods would surely not be so. They were for the first time by an express language excluded from the levy of sales tax in the year 1966.

    8. I now proceed to consider the meaning of the expression “cotton fabrics”, apart from the meaning given to it by the State Government when they issued the other two notifications, one in the year 1959 and the other in the year 1966. “Cotton fabrics”, as defined in item 19 of Schedule I of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, mean all varieties of fabrics manufactured from cotton. The word “fabric”, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, means “woven materials”, “texture”, “often textile fabric”. It would thus be noticed that “cotton fabrics” would mean cotton cloth which is generally woven. I am not sure whether a knitted piece of cotton cloth will be covered by the expression “cotton fabrics” or not. The words occurring in item 19 after the word “include”, namely, dhoties, sarees, chadars, etc., go to indicate as to what is meant by cotton fabrics. It means cotton cloth, and although dhoties, sarees, chadars, etc., could be included in the expression “cotton cloth” because of borders being there or some stitching being there, one could say that they have ceased to be a piece of cotton cloth and, therefore, the word “include” makes them go within the ambit of the expression “cotton fabrics”. If the legislature thought to include dhoties, sarees, chadars, etc., by an express language in the expression “cotton fabrics” and if they meant to include hosiery cloth or hosiery goods in it, they would have surely described them as being inclusive in the definition. Dhoties, sarees, chadars, etc., in common parlance and description are nearer to the expression “cotton cloth” than knitted hosiery cloth meant for manufacture of hosiery goods. If the nearer goods were sought to be included expressly, then the remote ones could not be left out from enumeration after the word “include” if the legislature thought them to include in the expression “cotton fabrics”. To my mind, therefore, the expression “cotton fabrics” by itself as mentioned in item 19 of Schedule I of the Central Excises and Salt Act will not include hosiery goods. Even without stretching the imagination one could say that even knitted cotton cloth, like hosiery cloth, is included in the expression “cotton fabrics”. But in the context of what is mentioned in item 19 itself, after the word “include” and in the context of what has been done by the State Government by issuance of another notification in the year 1959, I am constrained to hold that even hosiery cloth was not meant to be included in the expression “cotton fabrics”. Of course, the notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power under rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, included hosiery in the description of “cotton fabrics”. But such inclusion under a different notification issued for a different purpose cannot be pressed into service for understanding the meaning of the expression “cotton fabrics” mentioned in item 23 of the notification dated 1st July, 1959. Handkerchiefs, towels, napkins, dusters, etc., in a broader sense could be cotton fabrics, but because some more processing has to be done in order to present a piece of cotton textile in the shape of handkerchiefs, towels, etc., they were expressly mentioned in item 27 added to Schedule III of the notification dated 1st July, 1959. As I have said above that shows that the expression “cotton fabrics” was used in a narrow sense in the original notification.

    9. There is no case directly on the point. Some cases were cited at the Bar in order to help us to determine the matter in issue in this case and some are noticed in the order of the Commercial Taxes Tribunal. I shall briefly refer to them. In Ishwardas Kapoor and Sons v. Member, Board of Revenue, Bengal [1946] 1 S.T.C 153., the Calcutta High Court held that handloom-woven cloth subjected to needle Work performed by hand or machine, after it came out of the loom, could not be regarded as handloom-woven cloth within the meaning of item No. 16 of the schedule of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. This decision, although referred to by the Tribunal, is distinguishable and does not help us much. In Sharfaji Rao v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1953] 4 S.T.C 6., the Hyderabad High Court held that ready-made garments made of cloth were different from cotton cloth. Obviously, it would be so. In Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Sector II, Kanpur [1962] 13 S.T.C 1031., the Allahabad High Court pointed out the difference between the terms “cloth” and “clothes”. The former is what comes straight from the weaving or textile factory and the latter are articles after “cloth” has been converted by cutting and stitching and something has been done to “cloth” either by human or machine agency to make that “cloth” into a garment or wearing apparel. From “hosiery cloth” are manufactured banyans. Therefore, banyans will be surely different from hosiery cloth, and that is one of the reasons why I have said above that even if hosiery cloth would be included in the expression “cotton fabrics”, banyans which are made from hosiery cloth cannot be so. A Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Pravin Bros. v. State of Gujarat held that embroidered sarees and embroidered pieces intended for ladies' underwear made from malmal and voil cloth would not fall under entry 15 of Schedule A or entry 4 of Schedule D of the Statute in question, as it could not be treated as cotton fabric. It was something other than cotton fabric simpliciter. This decision lends some support to the view expressed by me above and can be pressed into service in favour of the revenue. The learned counsel for the assessee relied upon another decision of the same Bench of the Gujarat High Court at page 586 of the same volume, that is, 15 Sales Tax Cases (Vaiswaner Trading Co. v. State of Gujarat). In this case, it was held that where pieces of rolled steel sections are joined together by rivetting, they still retain the same form in which rolled steel sections are directly produced by the rolling mills within the meaning of entry 4 in Schedule AA of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. Sometimes it is difficult to decide such questions and each case has got to be decided with reference to the use of a particular term in the context of the statute, the rule, or the notification. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal is of no help to the assessee, as it was held that the processing was done for convenience of sale only. The raw materials were only re-rolled to give them attractive forms. A mere change of form did not rob them of the character of iron and steel for the purposes of levy of tax. It should be noticed in the instant case that the dealer used to sell hosiery cloth as also banyans after manufacturing them from the hosiery cloth. The two were different articles. As I have said, firstly, it is doubtful whether hosiery cloth itself could come within the expression “cotton fabrics”. Even if it be so, hosiery banyans could not be equated with hosiery cloth.

    10. Learned counsel for the assessee placed reliance on three more decisions, namely, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Mahajan Bros., Government of Madras v. Madurai Braided Cord and Tape Producers Co-operative Industrial Society [1968] 22 S.T.C 470. and Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P v. Ashok Elastic Works [1971] 28 S.T.C 743.. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mahajan Bros. the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that hosiery goods were not ready-made garments. It was pointed out that there was a clear distinction in the English language between “garment” and “hosiery”. It was emphasised at page 811: “Again, a garment is made of cloth, whereas hosiery goods are made not of cloth but are knitted out of woollen or silken or cotton or linen threads.” If, in the narrow sense, the expression “cotton fabrics” was used in item 23 to mean cotton cloth, then the words extracted above would show that hosiery goods could not be cotton fabrics. In the case of Government of Madras v. Madurai Braided Cord and Tape Producers Co-operative Industrial Society, the Madras High Court held that braided cords are not laces but a variety of textile within the meaning of entry 4 of the Third Schedule to the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The same dictionary meaning of the word “fabric” from the Concise Oxford Dictionary was relied upon to show that braided cords are cotton fabrics. But, in my opinion, hosiery goods are not so. The Allahabad High Court has taken the view in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P v. Ashok Elastic Works that dori and fita are cotton fabrics. “Cotton fabrics of all varieties” were meant to be included in the expression. The two articles, it was not disputed, were manufactured out of cotton yarn. Mere addition of elastic materials, the nature of which was not specified in the statement of the case, could not alter its nature. In my opinion, hosiery goods cannot be equated with the articles, dori and fita, which were under consideration in the Allahabad case”. For the reasons stated avove, the question of law under reference has got to be answered in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. I accordingly hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the hosiery banyans were not exempt from the levy of sales tax under item 23 of Schedule III of the notification dated 1st July, 1959, for the period in question. The assessee must pay tne costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 only.

    S.K Jha, J.:— I agree.

    11. Reference answered in the negative.

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    Comments

    Sri Ram Hosiery Works v. The State Of Bihar
    (Jul 17, 1974)