1. This is an application in revision against an order dismissing the petitioner's application for being added as an intervener defendant under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Circumstances giving rise to the present application are as follows One quarter No. 15.M.I.G situated within Lohianagar Housing Colony in the town of Patna and belonging to the State of Bihar was allotted by the Housing Department to one Manoranjan Prasad Singh as a monthly tenant. On account of default in payment of rent and on the ground that the tenant had vacated the house and kept it vacant though locked the Housing Department sent a notice to the tenant aforesaid to show cause against the cancellation of the allotment in his favour. The notice aforesaid was returned unserved, the report being that the person concerned had left and was not traced. Thereafter the State Government cancelled the allotment in favour of Manoranjan Prasad Singh aforesaid and on 9th of December, 1970 allotted the aforesaid house to the petitioner on a monthly rental of Rs. 110/-. There were certain other conditions attached to the allotment in his favour, namely, that the petitioner would deposit three months rent in advance, that he would pay rent on the 5th of every month that the allotment in his favour was a temporary one and in case it was allotted to come body else on a permanent basis he would vacate the house in question, that he would keep the house in proper repairs and that he would pay the holding tax and other taxes in addition to the monthly rent. It was directed that the petitioner would execute written deed of agreement whereafter he was to be given vacant possession of the house. The aforesaid order is Annexure 1 to the present application.

2. It appears next that the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 300/- being three months' rent in advance by receipt dated 21st of December, 1970/23rd January, 1971. It is said, however, that on account of the house being under the unauthorised occupation of opposite party No. 1 the petitioner could not get actual possession of the house. It appears that on the 10th January, 1971, the Executive Engineer on behalf of the Housing Board filed an application under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Bihar Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1956 (Act XX of 1956) for eviction of opposite party No. I from the aforesaid house alleged to be under his unauthorised occupation. It may be mentioned at this stage that opposite party No. I claims to be staying in the house aforesaid as a guest of the original tenant Manoranjan Prasad Singh. The competent authority under the Act aforesaid, namely, the Sub-Divisional Officer. Sadar, Patna ordered the eviction of opposite party No. 1 by an order dated the 5th May, 1972. A title suit was then filed by opposite party No. 1 (Title Suit No. 71 of 1972) in the court of Munsif 3rd, Patna for a declaration that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated the 5th of May, 1972 was without jurisdiction and illegal and also for grant of a permanent injunction against the State of Bihar and the House Controller, opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 restraining them from evicting the plaintiff, (opposite party No. 1). During the course of the suit, it is said, that a petition for ad-interim injunction was filed by the plaintiff-opposite party and was granted with the result that the order of eviction stands stayed. The State of Bihar has entered appearance in this suit. The petitioner filed an application on the 1st of July, 1972 for being impleaded as a defendant. This application has been dismissed by an order dated the 11th of August, 1972. Hence this application.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged firstly that the court below has exercised jurisdiction with material Irregularity inasmuch as it has not considered the question as to whether the petitioner is proper party and his presence is necessary for the complete and effectual adjudication of the matters involved in the suit. In this connection it is urged that the petitioner has a direct interest in the matter involved in the suit. Secondly he has urged that the order of the learned Munsif, if sustained, will result in multiplicity of suits, which it is the purpose of law to avoid, and thirdly that the State of Bihar is indifferent in the matter the main interest involved being that of the petitioner and is, therefore, not properly defending the suit which might result in great prejudice to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the State of Bihar has admitted the position that the house having been allotted to the petitioner he has a direct interest in the suit.

4. Learned counsel for the opposite party has however, urged that the petitioner cannot be deemed to have any interest in the suit except an incidental one inasmuch as the plaintiff purports to assail only the order of eviction passed against him and not the allotment made in favour of the petitioner. Secondly, it is said that the petitioner has no locus standi because the allotment in his favour is temporary and conditional on his executing a deed of agreement which has not been done so far.

5. The main question which thus arises in whether the petitioner is a necessary party or a proper party whose presence is required for a complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. The fact that there was an order of allotment in favour of the petitioner has not been disputed. The fact that he had deposited in advance rent for three months is also not in dispute. Even on behalf of the State of Bihar it has been stated in this Court that the execution of the deed of agreement is not a condition precedent to the allotment but only a condition subsequent. It has to be executed before the petitioner can be let into the house. Reading. Annexure 1 it is quite clear that the actual possession of the house is to be given to the petitioner on executing the deed of agreement to the effect that he would vacate it if the house be allotted to some other person on a permanent basis. There is no warrant for the proposition that the tenancy in favour of the petitioner will be created only after the execution of the deed of agreement and because of its non-execution the petitioner has no Interest whatsoever in the property in suit. The State of Bihar having cancelled the allotment in favour of the original tenant a fresh allotment was made in favour of the petitioner. Had the house been vacant it would have undoubtedly gone to the petitioner on his doing the needful. It is the actual fact that opposite party No. 1 is in possession of the house which stands in the way of the petitioner's getting actual possession thereof. In circumstances like these. I am unable to hold that the petitioner has no direct interest in the matter. It is obvious that if the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 succeeds in getting a decree in his favour there would be a permanent injunction not merely against the State of Bihar but even against the judicial Authority, the House Controller from evicting the opposite party No. 1 with the consequence that it would never be possible for the petitioner to get into the house even though this has been allotted to him as a monthly tenant. Therefore, the fate of the allotment in favour of the petitioner depends upon the result of the suit.’

6. It is immaterial that the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 has chosen to seek reliefs only against the State of Bihar and the House Controller. The effect of the relief as I have shown earlier would be to destroy the effect of the allotment in favour of the petitioner. The relief would thus operate not merely to the prejudice of opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 but even against the petitioner Inasmuch as the lessor the State of Bihar and the House Controller both would be paralysed and if the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 cannot be evicted from the house actual possession thereof can never be given to the petitioner. It is thus obvious to me that the petitioner is directly interested in the result of the suit and in the proper adjudication of the question involved therein. A plaintiff cannot be allowed to secure a relief in effect against a party not on record. It is one thing to say that the order passed in the suit in his absence would not bind the petitioner. The fact, however, remains that the petitioner will have to go to a court of law praying for the relief that the allotment in his favour is valid and the unauthorised occupation thereof by opposite party No. 1 illegal. It is obvious thus that there will have to be another litigation in respect of the same question which may conveniently decided in the present suit. It is well settled that the principle underlying the provisions of Order 1. Rule 10 of the Code is also to avoid multiplicity of suits and likelihood of conflicting decisions. It need not be stated that the present suit may be decided one way and yet when the petitioner would come up for a redress of his grievance and the grant of a relief the suit may he decided differently. It is therefore, necessary to avoid possibility of such conflicting decisions.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Section 9 of the Bihar Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1956 which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any order made under the Act and urged that this obvious point of lack of jurisdiction in the Munsif has not been taken up as a point against the maintainability of the suit in the written statement filed by the State of Bihar. Next it has been urged that the suit itself is not maintainable in view of the fact that the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 merely claims to be a guest of the original tenant and he could not be said to have any locus standi as a successor-in-interest of the original tenant and in absence of any title in him to continue in possession of the house he is an unauthorised person and could be legally evicted under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. It is said that this point ought to have been raised by the State of Bihar at the earliest in order to throw out the suit but it has not been done. It is not necessary for me to enter Into the merits of these two arguments. The fact, however, remains that the State of Bihar having done what they could do by cancelling the allotment in favour of the original tenant and re-allotting the house to the present petitioner would undoubtedly have no such interest in the subject-matter of the suit as the present petitioner who has in these days of house scarcity in the town of Patna, been able to be an allotment and who has further do posited rent of three months advance which is lying in deposit since January 1971 now for nearly about two years. The questions raised here may legitimately be raised in the court below and I have no doubt that the court would consider the question whether the suit is at all maintainable.

8. Learned counsel for the parties have been at variance on the question as to whether this Court should interfere in a matter such as the present one. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum (AIR 1958 SC 886), Chakori Mahton v. Mahadeo Singh (AIR 1952 Pat 433). Umesh Chandra v. Kapildeo Narain Singh (1969 BLJR 264), Krishnamachari v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal (AIR 1968 Mad 142) and Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh ((1970) 2 SCC 386 : AIR 1971 SC 761). On the other hand, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the opposite party on the cases of Gouri Shankar v. State of Bihar (1970 Pat LJR 531), Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. v. District Committee Dhanbad (AIR 1962 Pat 357), Banarsi Das Durga Prasad v. Parma Lal Ram Richhpal Oswal (AIR 1969 Punj 57).

9. In the case of AIR 1958 SC 886 (supra) their Lordships held that in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. It is well know (sic) that there is a conflict of judicial authority on the question as to whether the “question involved in the suit” should be interpreted in the narrower sense as embracing questions between the parties to the suit or should receive a wider interpretation as embracing questions between the parties to the suit and even third parties in proper cases. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have noted the opposite trends of decision both in this country and in England. They, however, referred to with approval the view taken in decision of English courts, that in order that a party may be added as a defendant in the suit, he should have a legal interest in the subject-matter of the litigation legal interest not as distinguished from an equitable interest, but an interest which the law recognises and that person who would be only indirectly or commercially affected by the result of the litigation cannot be impleaded os a party as a person having a direct interest in the subject-matter ??? dispute. In that case the plaintiff ??? filed a suit claiming that she was ??? legally wedded wife of the defendant and that she was entitled to receive certain amount of money from him. The defendant admitted the claim put a third party filed an application for herself and her son being added is parties on the ground that she was the legally wedded wife of the defendant and consequently interested in denying the marriage of the defendant with the plaintiff. The majority decision approved of the party being impleaded in the suit.

10. In the case reported in AIR 1952 Pat 433 (supra) the petition of the intervenor had been defeated on the ground that the plaintiff did not want I the applicant to be added as a party land that the applicant would not I be affected by the decision of the suit I for not being a party thereto. The order was set aside on the ground that the court below had not considered whether it was necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the question involved in the suit. In the case (reported in 1969 BLJR 264 (supra) reliance was placed on the decision reported in AIR 1952 Pat 433 (supra) and AIR 1958 SC 886 (supra). In this case a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr PC was pending between the person seeking to intervene and the plaintiff and he contended that the plaintiff had no title or possession in respect of the suit land and that he was in possession through his Bataidars. It was held that his presence was necessary in order to adjudicate effectually and completely upon the question involved in the suit. In the case reported in AIR 1968 Mad 142 (supra) the learned Judge has considered the), question and the case laws on the point, with great respect, in an elaborate manner. His Lordship found it difficult to accept the narrower interpretation of the question as given in the case of Prayag Doss v. Board of Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (ILR 50 Mad 34) : (AIR 1926 Mad 836) by V.V Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. and referred to the views expressed in different Bench decisions of the Madras High Court in favour of the wider interpretation which are to be found in the cases reported in Seethai Achi v. Mayyappa Chettiar, (AIR 1934 Mad 337), Anjaneya Sastri v. Kothandapani, (AIR 1936 Mad 449) etc.

11. I find myself in respectful agreement with the views expressed by his Lordship and I find that it would be unnecessarily limiting the discretion of the Court by the narrower Interpretation of the wordings of Order 1. Rule 10(2) of the Code. To say that “all the questions involved in the suit” must be read as “questions involved between the parties to the suit” is to read into the provision of law something which is not there and as if it read “all the questions involved in the suit between parties thereto”. Learned Judges of the Supreme Court do not seem to have accepted the narrower interpretation inasmuch as they have held that even a proper party who is directly interested in the property involved can be added as a party. In this connection may be mentioned the case reported in (1970) 2 SCC 386 : AIR 1971 SC 761 (supra). That was a suit for declaration that transferees from mortgagor's son were not owners of the suit land but the suit was only against the transferees and it was held that the mortgagor's son was a proper party and the suit as framed only against the transferees was not properly framed.

12. Turning now to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party, in the case of 1970 Pat LJR 531 (supra) the suit was for a declaration that entries made in the recent survey settlement records with respect to certain plots of land were wrong. The applicants prayed to be added as intervener claiming to be the tenants of the State of Bihar, the defendant and in actual possession of the suit lands. The order adding them as parties was challenged in this Court. U.N Sinha, J. (as he then was) held that the result of the suit would not affect the interveners and that their addition would change the nature of the suit. Attention of the learned Judge does not appear to have been drawn to the case of the Supreme Court referred to above. On facts the case is entirely different from the instant case. In the case reported in AIR 1969 Punj 57 (Supra) a learned single Judge held that a person ought not to be added as defendant, merely because he would be incidentally affected by the judgment. There is lot of difference between a person being “incidentally interested” and a person “directly interested”.

13. In this case also the case of the Supreme Court referred to above does not appear to have been considered. In the case reported in AIR 1962 Pat 357 (Supra) the learned Judge has adopted the narrower interpretation of the expression “all the questions involved in the suit” as meaning the question involved between the parties to the litigation. In this case also the view expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court was not considered and reliance was placed on the decision in the case reported in ILR 50 Mad 34 : (AIR 1926 Mad 836) (Supra). The facts of this case were different from the instant case. It was not suggested in that case that the intervener was a person who ought to have been added as a party or that his presence was necessary for complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. This decision has therefore, no application. The last case relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party is the decision reported in AIR 1968 Mad 142 (Supra). This decision, in my view, is of no avail to the opposite party. It was held in this case that only a necessary party or a proper party may be added, and the cardinal tests are whether the real controversy between the parties on record necessitate the presence of a third party and whether all controversies arising in the suit may be finally determined and set at rest by impleading the proposed party to avoid multiplicity of suits etc.

14. In the instant case the learned Munsif has advanced the following reasons for rejecting the prayer of the petitioner. It is said that “the plaintiff does not seek to establish his title or interest over the suit property…………” The learned Munsif seems to have ignored the fact that the plaintiff does seek to establish his right to continue in possession by challenging the order of eviction passed against him. His continue once in possession will result in defeating the allotment in favour of the petitioner. The second reason given is that the intervenor is not a party to the eviction proceeding. That in my view is immaterial. Any way it has been urged during the course of argument and supported by a certified copy of the order passed by the House Controller that an application was filed before him on the 22nd of December, 1971 by the petitioner praying that he may be heard and the counsel of the parties were heard. It said that in this view of the matter though the petitioner was not actually a party to the proceeding he had been heard and adverse inference cannot be drawn from the fact that he was not party. Lastly, the learned Munsif says that “the interest of the petitioner in regard to the validity of his allotment is not affected in this suit as intervenor as not a party……” I am unable to accept this ground. It is obvious that the allotment will become ineffectual if not invalid. I am therefore, satisfied that the learned Munsif, has misdirected himself and accordingly exercised his jurisdiction improperly and with material irregularity. I have already held that in the present case the petitioner is vitally and directly interested in the result of the suit and is a proper party in whose presence matters Involved in the suit can be effectually and completely adjudicated upon. The order of the learned Munsif is accordingly set aside and he is directed to implead the petitioner as a defendant to the suit. The application is accordingly, allowed but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order for costs.

15. Revision allowed.