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  • clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190
  • absent.4. Section 13(1) of the Code
  • Section 559(1) of the Code runs:(1)
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  • clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190
  • absent.4. Section 13(1) of the Code
  • Section 559(1) of the Code runs:(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused moved this Court against an order of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh. The opposite party (the complainant) had filed a complaint before Mr. Muhammad Jamil Hasan, the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate (SDM) in charge of Sadar Sub-division, Hazaribagh, on 8 September 1960. The SDM examined the complainant on oath and ordered an inquiry to be made by the Mukhiya. The complainant subsequently filed protest petitions (12 and 30 October 1960) seeking withdrawal of the inquiry from the Mukhiya. The Mukhiya submitted a report dated 4 November 1960; that report and the protest petitions were placed before Mr. R.R. Prasad, the Second Officer, on 9 November 1960.

On 9 November 1960 Mr. R.R. Prasad dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The complainant applied to the Court of Session for further inquiry; this application was considered by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, who concluded that Mr. Prasad lacked jurisdiction to pass the order under S.203 because the complaint had been filed before, and cognizance taken by, the permanent SDM. On that basis the Sessions Judge set aside Mr. Prasad's order and directed further inquiry. The accused petitioner appealed to this Court. The case was placed before a Bench pursuant to a Division Bench reference, which formulated two specific points for decision concerning the jurisdiction of a Second Officer and the proper authority to pass orders under Sections 203 and 204 CrPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, Second Officer Sri R.R. Prasad could pass an order under Section 203 of the CrPC as he did on 9-11-1960 during the absence of the Sub-divisional Magistrate.
  2. Whether an order under Sections 203 or 204 can be passed only by that Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence on a complaint under Section 200.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopi Ram Jhunjhunwala v. Rameshwar Prasad (Criminal Revision No. 672 of 1957, disposed 22-12-1959) (unreported) Consideration whether a Second Officer who heard a matter in the absence of the permanent SDM had jurisdiction to act under Section 204, when the complaint had been filed before the permanent SDM who had examined the complainant on solemn affirmation. The Court observed that, while the earlier Bench rejected an argument that the permanent SDM had not taken cognizance when he examined the complainant and ordered inquiry, this Court holds that the earlier Bench was incorrect to conclude Mr. Choubey (the Second Officer in that case) had no jurisdiction unless it was demonstrated there was no order under Section 17(1) appointing him in charge. To that extent the earlier decision is overruled.
Ram Krishna Sinha v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 195 Support for the proposition that an officer in charge of Sub-divisional Magistrate's work may validly exercise certain powers; also contains observations about defective transfers and possible curative provisions. The Court stated that the views given in that decision provide considerable support to the opinion expressed in the present case. The Court noted, however, that some observations in that case (about curing a defective transfer under S.529(f)) were not applicable to the facts of the present matter.
Mt. Sanjha v. Mt. Jaya, AIR 1958 Pat 74 Held that a Magistrate acting in the absence of the SDM issued process under S.204 and transferred the case; later the SDM recalled the order and directed further inquiry—addressing when a magistrate who takes cognizance may rescind or be restrained by another magistrate's actions. The Court observed that the facts of Mt. Sanjha v. Mt. Jaya are clearly distinguishable from the instant case and that the particular point in the instant case did not arise for decision in that case; therefore the decision was not applied to overturn Mr. Prasad's action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the two referred questions together and analysed statutory provisions and administrative appointments that determine the competence of officers to exercise magistrate powers.

  1. Statutory context:
    • Section 203 CrPC: states that "the Magistrate before whom a complaint is made, or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint."
    • Section 204 CrPC: provides that a Magistrate who has taken cognizance of an offence may issue process if he is satisfied there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
    • Section 13(1) and (3) CrPC: empower the State Government to place any Magistrate in charge of a Sub-division and to delegate that power to the District Magistrate.
    • Section 190(2) and Section 192(2) are referenced as authorities under which the District Magistrate empowered Mr. R.R. Prasad to take cognizance and to transfer cases in the absence of the SDM.
    • Section 17(1) is the provision under which the Deputy Commissioner appears to have acted when preparing a distribution list placing Mr. R.R. Prasad in charge of SDM work (including sawalkhani) during the SDM's absence.
    • Section 559(1) CrPC: "Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor-in-office."
  2. Application of the statutory framework to facts:
    • The District Magistrate had, by a memo dated 14 September 1960, empowered Mr. R.R. Prasad to take cognizance under clauses of Section 190(1) and to transfer cases under Section 192(2) in the SDM's absence.
    • On 21 September 1960 a distribution list of Sub-divisional work—apparently under S.17(1)—placed Mr. R.R. Prasad in charge of the SDM's duties (including sawalkhani) during the SDM's absence; thus, for that period, Mr. Prasad functioned as successor-in-office to the permanent SDM for the general file.
    • Given Section 559(1), a successor-in-office is for operational purposes the Magistrate whom he succeeds; therefore the temporary successor can exercise powers under Sections 203 and 204 in respect of complaints before the SDM or cognizance taken by the SDM.
    • By parity, if a Second Officer in charge had taken cognizance during the SDM's absence, the returning permanent SDM would also be able to act thereafter in respect of that case because he occupies the same office the Second Officer had occupied when taking cognizance.
  3. Consideration of precedents:
    • The Court examined an unreported Bench decision (Gopi Ram Jhunjhunwala) and concluded that the earlier Bench was incorrect to hold that the Second Officer had no jurisdiction unless there was specific appointment under S.17(1); the present Court overruled that aspect to the extent indicated.
    • Ram Krishna Sinha was treated as supportive of the Court’s view that an officer in charge may validly exercise the requisite jurisdiction; however, some dicta from that case about curing defective transfers under S.529(f) were deemed inapplicable to the present facts.
    • Mt. Sanjha v. Mt. Jaya was found distinguishable on its facts and therefore did not affect the conclusion reached here.
  4. Conclusion of analysis:
    • On the specific facts—where Mr. R.R. Prasad had been empowered by the District Magistrate and placed in charge of the SDM's work under the distribution list—the Court concluded Mr. Prasad was the successor-in-office and thus had jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 on 9 November 1960.
    • Answering the broader question, the Court held that the Magistrate who takes cognizance of a complaint (or receives it when filed) can pass orders under Sections 203 or 204, and that his successor-in-office (temporary or permanent) can also pass such orders; additionally, a Magistrate to whom the case is transferred may pass an order under Section 203.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The order of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge setting aside Mr. R.R. Prasad's order dated 9-11-1960 is set aside. The Court held that Mr. R.R. Prasad, acting as the Sub-divisional Magistrate in the permanent SDM's absence, could validly pass the order under Section 203 CrPC on 9 November 1960.

Immediate consequences and directions:

  • The application for further inquiry is remanded to the Court of Session for disposal on merits in accordance with law.
  • Because of the delay, the parties are ordered to appear before the Court of Session within two weeks from the date of this judgment; the Judge is to fix a hearing date within three weeks thereafter and, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, dispose of the matter.

Broader implications:

  • The Court clarified the scope of who may exercise powers under Sections 203 and 204 CrPC: the magistrate taking cognizance or receiving the complaint, his successor-in-office (temporary or permanent), and a magistrate to whom the case is transferred may all, in appropriate circumstances, pass orders under these sections.
  • The Court expressly overruled to the extent indicated an aspect of the earlier unreported decision in Gopi Ram Jhunjhunwala; beyond that, the opinion confines its conclusions to the statutory and factual matrix before it rather than announcing a general new doctrine beyond the reasoning applied.

Judgment authored by Sahai, J.; Ramratna Singh, J. and S.P. Singh, J. agreed. Order accordingly.

    Krishnadeo Prasad, Accused v. Mt. Budhni, Complainant Opposite Party.

    Sahai, J.:— This application by the accused is directed against an order of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge of Hazaribagh.

    2. The relevant facts may be shortly stated. The opposite party filed a petition of complaint before Mr. Muhammad Jamil Hasan, the Sub-divisional Magistrate in charge of Sadar Sub-division of Hazaribagh on the 8th September, 1980. The Magistrate Examined the complainant on oath, and ordered an enquiry to be made by the Mukhiya. On the 12th and 30th October 1960, the complainant filed protest petitions before the Magistrate for withdrawal of the inquiry from the Mukhiya. No null was passed. The Mukhiya submitted a rcpon dated the 4th November, 1960, which was placed for hearing before Mr. R.R Prasad, the Second Officer, on the 9th November, 1960, along with the protest petitions. By an order of that date, he dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Cr PC. The complainant opposite party filed an application for further inquiry in the Court of Session, and that application was put up for disposal before the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge of Hazaribagh. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that Mr. R.R Prasad had no jurisdiction to pass an order under S. 203 of the Code in respect of the complaint because it was filed before the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate who had also taken cognizance of it. On this ground alone, he set aside Mr. Prasad's order, dated the 9th November, 1960, and directed further inquiry. The accused petitioner has come up to this Court against that order. The case has been placed before this Beneh on a reference made by a Division Bench. In the order of reference the learned Judges have formulated the points for decision as follows:

    “1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances it this case, Second Officer Sri R.R Prasad could pass an order under Section 203 of the Cr PC as he did on 9-11-1960 during the absence of the Sub-divisional Magistrate?

    2. Whether an order under Ss. 203 of 204 can be passed by only that Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence on a complaint under S. 200?”

    3. I think that both the points can be considered together. Section 203 lays down that “the Magistrate before whom a complaint is made, of whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint” Section 204 provides that a Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence, may issue process if he is satisfied ??? there is sufficient ground for proceeding. It is clear, therefore, that a Magistrate to whom a complaint has been made, or a Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, and it is only the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of a complaint who can issue process no other Magistrate can pass an order under S. 203 or 204 unless he can be held to be either permanently or temporarily a successor-in-office of the Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed or who took cognizance of an offence on the complaint. It is, therefore, necessary to consider in this case whether Mr. R.R Prasad was the successor-in-office of the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate on the 9th November, 1960, a date on which the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate was admittedly absent.

    4. Section 13(1) of the Code empowers the State Government to place any Magistrate in charge of a Sub-division, and to relieve him of his charge. Sub-section (3) provides that the State Government may delegate its powers under the section to the District Magistrate. By Bihar and Orissa appointment notification No. 638-A, dated the 17th January, 1930, the State Government has delegated its power under S. 13 to all District Magistrates in the Province of Bihar and Orissa.

    5. In exercise of the power conferred upon the District Magistrate under S. 190(2) of the Code, the District Magistrate of Hazaribagh, by an order communicated under Memo. No. 3079-80 L.S, dated Hazaribagh the 14th September, 1960, to the Officers concerned, empowered Mr. R.R Prasad to take cognizance under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 in the absence of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. By the same order, he empowered Mr. R. R Prasad under section 192(2) to transfer a case for inquiry or trial to any other specified and competent Magistrate.

    6. On the 21st September, 1960, the Deputy Commissioner (who is the District Magistrate) of Hazaribagh drew up a distribution list of work of gazetted officers of the Sub-divisional level at Hazaribagh. In this distribution list, he has not mentioned the section under which he has acted; but ??? seems manifest that he has acted under S. 17(1) of the Code. Against the name of Mr. Muhammad Jamil Hassan, Sub-divisional Magistrate, the first item is that he could be in charge of the Sadar Sub-division. Against the name of Mr. R.R Prasad, the first item reads: “Second Officer, S.D.O's work including sawalkhani during his absence.”

    7. Had there been no order under S. 17(1) of the Code, the position might have been different. In view of this order, however, there is no escape from the conclusion that Mr. R.R Prasad was put in charge of the work of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, including sawalkhani, in the absence of the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate, and thus, for the time being, he was the successor-in-office of the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate in respect of the general file, including sawalkhani. Section 559(1) of the Code runs:

    “(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor-in-office.”

    8. It follows from this sub-section that the successor-in-office is, for all intents and purposes, the Magistrate whom he has succeeded. That being so, the successor-in-office, for the time being, of the Sub-divisional Magistrate before whom a complaint is filed, or who has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of a complaint, should be deemed to be the same Magistrate. He occupies the same office or Court. He can, therefore, pass an order under section 203 or 204 in respect of such a case.

    9. Conversely, suppose a Second Officer, being temporarily in charge of the work of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in his absence, hears a; complaint, or takes cognizance of an offence on the basis of a complaint, the question may arise whether the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate, on his return, can pass an order under S. 203 or 204) of the Code in respect of that case. It seems to me that he can certainly do so because he occupies the office which the Second Officer, when entertaining the complaint or taking cognizance of the offence, occupied.

    10. Our attention has been drawn to an unreported decision of a Bench of this Court in Gopi Ram Jhunjhunwala v. Rameshwar Prasad (Criminal Revision No. 672 of 1957, disposed of on the 22nd December, 1959). In that case, the complaint was filed before the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate who examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and sent the case for inquiry to an Anchal Adhikari. This Anchal Adhikari's report came up to be heard by Mr. A.S Choubey, the Second Officer on the 13th July, 1956, in the absence of the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate, Mr. Choubey ordered, under section 204 of the Code, that summons should issue against the accused. The argument raised on behalf of the petitioners was that Mr. Choubey could not take action Under S. 204 of the Code in respect of a complaint, the offence alleged in which had been taken cognizance of by the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate, The only argument which was advanced before the Bench in reply on behalf of the opposite party was that the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence when he Entertained the complaint, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation, and directed an inquiry to be made. With great respect, their Lordships rightly rejected this argument. There cannot be slightest doubt that, when a Magistrate examines a complainant on oath and directs an inquiry to be made under S. 202 of the Code, he takes cognizance with a view to following the procedure laid own, in Chapter XVI. It seems to me, however, with the greatest respect, that the learned Judges were not correct in holding that, in the case before them, Mr. Choubey had no jurisdiction to pass an prefer under S. 204. Unless it was found that there was no order under S. 17(1) of the Code, appointing Mr. Choubey to be in charge of the work of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in his absence, it could (not be said that Mr. Choubey had no jurisdiction to pass the order which he did. To that extent, therefore, the decision is overruled.)

    11. The learned Standing Counsel has also drawn our attention to Ram Krishna Sinha v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 195. The views which I have expressed above receive considerable support from that decision. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad, who has appeared on behalf of the opposite party, has, however, drawn our attention to some observations of Biswas, J. who has delivered the judgment of the Bench to the effect that the order of the Magistrate in charge of the Sub-divisional Magistrate's work in that case, whereby he transfer the case to himself, was defective but the ??? could be cured under S. 529(f) of the Code. I ??? not think that those observations have any application in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    12. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad has referred to Mt. Sanjha v. Mt. Jaya, AIR 1958 Pat 74. In that case, the Magistrate, acting in the absence of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, issued process under S. 204, and transferred the case for disposal to a certain Magistrate; thereafter the Sub-divisional Magistrate recalled the order summoning the accused persons, and directed that the complaint be further inquired into. Their Lordships held that the Sub-divisional Magistrate's order was wrong because, though a Magistrate taking cognizance, may rescind the order in certain circumstances before the case has passed the stage of rescission of the order, e.g, after summonses have been issued, another Magistrate cannot do so. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. The point which arises for decision in the instant case did not arise for consideration in that case.

    13. It seems to me that Mr. R.R Prasad could certainly pass the order under S. 203 of the Code which he did on the 9th November, 1960, in view of the fact that he was acting as the Sub-divisional Magistrate in his absence on that date. The first question formulated by the referring Bench is thus answered.

    14. So far as the second question is concerned, the answer must be that it is the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or receiving the complaint when it is filed, who can pass an order under Ss. 203 or 204 in respect of that case; but his successor-in-office, either temporary or permanent, can also pass an order under those sections. A Magistrate to whom the case is transferred may also pass an order under S. 203 of the Code. In view of the opinion recorded above, the learned Additional Sessions Judge's order is clearly erroneous. It is, accordingly, set aside, and the application for further inquiry is remanded to the Court of Session for disposal on merits in accordance with law. In view of the great delay in disposal of this case, the parries must appear before the Court of Session within two weeks from today, and, after fixing a date within three weeks thereafter and giving an opportunity to the parries to be heard, the Judge, hearing the case, should dispose of it.

    Ramratna Singh, J.:— I agree.

    S.P Singh, J.:— I agree.

    IH/V.S.B/D.V.C

    15. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Krishnadeo Prasad, Accused v. Mt. Budhni, Complainant Opposite Party.
    (Jul 20, 1964)