1. By notification No. III/DI-8023/62L and E-5061 dated the 20th July, 1962, the State of Bihar referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Muzafiarpur, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947):
“Whether the termination of services/dismissal of Shri Bhagawati Saran Tiwari is proper? If not, whether he should be reinstated on his previous post in the factory and/or compensated?”
2. It was argued on behalf of the management before the Labour Court that the dispute in question was not an industrial dispute and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the reference.
3. This argument was overruled by the Labour Court by its order dated the 7th February, 1963 and it was held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the reference.
4. The petitioner has now obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of prohibition should not be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution restraining the Labour Court from proceeding with the hearing of the reference.
5. On behalf of the petitioner, learned counsel put forward the argument that Sri Bhagwati Saran Tiwari was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act which is to the following effect:
“‘workman’ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute……”
6. On behalf of the respondents it was contended before the Labour Court that Sri Bhagwati Saran Tiwari was a clerk in the Cane Department of the factory, but the contention was rejected by the Labour Court and it has been found on the evidence produced in the case that Sri Bhagwati Saran Tiwari was employed as a teacher in the Upper Primary School run by the factory. In view of this finding of the Labour Court, we are of opinion that Sri Bhagwati Saran Tiwari is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The view that we express is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, (1963-1964) 24 BLR 509 : (AIR 1963 SC 1873). It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that case that teachers employed by educational institutions, whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, collegiate or post-graduate education, are not workmen under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Reading the provisions of the Act and in view of the fact that education is more a mission and a vocation than a profession or trade or business, institutions like the University of Delhi and colleges run by them cannot be regarded as carrying on an industry for the purposes of the Act.
7. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that even if Sri Bhagwati Saran Tiwari was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, still the dispute in question will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Statute which reads as follows:
“‘industrial dispute’ means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.”
8. It was submitted that the dispute concerning a person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Statute, and the question relating to the dismissal of the teacher, Sri Bhagwati Saran Tiwari, would be a dispute falling within the language of Section 2(k) of the Statute. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. The interpretation of the phrase “any person” in Section 2(k) of the Act has been the subject-matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353. It has been held by the majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in that case that having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act and its other provisions, the expression “any person” in Section 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. It was held by the Supreme Court in that case that where the person was not a workman as he belonged to the medical or technical staff, a different category altogether from workmen, and the workmen of the establishment had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, it cannot be said, even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act.
9. In our opinion, the principle laid down in the Supreme Court case governs the present case also and applying the test laid down in that case, we are of opinion that the dispute referred by the State Government to the Labour Court, Muzaffarpur, under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. It follows, therefore, that the order of reference made by the State Government under Section 10(1) of the Act by notification No. III/DI-8023/62L and E-5061 dated the 20th July, 1962, is ultra vires and without jurisdiction and the Labour Court, North Bihar, Muzaffarpur, has also no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the said reference.
10. For these reasons, we hold that a writ in the nature of prohibition should be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution restraining the Labour Court, North Bihar, Muzaffarpur, from proceeding with the hearing of the reference (Reference Case No. 4 of 1962), which reference was made by the Government of Bihar by notification No. III/DI-8023/62L and E-5061 dated the 20th July, 1962. There will be no order as to costs.
KG/J/D.V.C
11. Order accordingly.