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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference made under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act by the District Judge of Muzaffarpur concerning the conduct of Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad, a pleader enrolled since 1950. The allegation against him is that he intentionally took back certain documents in collusion with his clients to assist them, which was deemed professional misconduct. The alleged misconduct occurred in the court of the then presiding officer of the 2nd Court of Munsif at Muzaffarpur, but the proceeding was initiated and drawn by the District Judge. The enquiry was conducted by the Registrar of the Civil Court at Gaya, whose report formed the basis of the District Judge's conclusions. Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad challenged the maintainability of the reference on procedural grounds, raising questions about jurisdiction and the proper authority to conduct the enquiry.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge had jurisdiction to initiate and conduct the enquiry under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act when the alleged misconduct occurred in another subordinate court.
  2. Whether the enquiry under Section 14 can be delegated or transferred to an officer other than the presiding officer of the court where the misconduct allegedly took place.
  3. The appropriate standard of proof required to establish professional misconduct under the Legal Practitioners Act.
  4. Whether the pleader's conduct in filing an application for the return of documents, allegedly forged and subject to a criminal proceeding, constituted professional misconduct.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The term "presiding officer" in Section 14 refers exclusively to the presiding officer of the court where the alleged misconduct occurred, not any other court officer.
  • The reference initiated by the District Judge is not maintainable because the enquiry was conducted by the Registrar, which is contrary to the statutory requirement that the presiding officer must personally receive and adjudicate the charge.
  • The pleader lacked actual knowledge that the documents sought to be withdrawn were the subject of a criminal proceeding, arguing difficulty in verifying exhibit numbers and claiming the signature on the application does not prove knowledge.
  • The standard of proof for professional misconduct should be the same as in criminal trials, requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, and mere suspicion or error of judgment is insufficient.
  • Contended that the reference was incompetent on technical grounds but conceded that the High Court may take cognizance of the misconduct on its own initiative.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In the matter of Mt. Tanak Kishore, 1 Pat LJ 576 (AIR 1916 Pat 115) Whether proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act are transferable under Section 24 of the CPC; obiter observation that enquiry may not be delegated to another officer. Held that the observation on delegation was obiter and not binding; the case was decided on non-transferability under CPC.
Emperor v. Satyendra Nath Roy, 1 Pat LT 379 (AIR 1920 Pat 274) (FB) Enquiry should be conducted by the presiding officer of the court where misconduct occurred. Initially relied upon to support exclusive jurisdiction of the presiding officer but later distinguished due to ex parte hearing and lack of contested facts.
Mukhtar Manzur-ul-Haq v. Emperor, 4 Pat LT 97 (AIR 1923 Pat 185 (1)) (SB) Reiterated that enquiry must be by the presiding officer of the court where misconduct was committed. Found to be influenced by Emperor v. Satyendra Nath Roy; not accepted as good law in light of broader statutory scheme.
In re Banmali Das, 4 Pat LT 235 (AIR 1922 Pat 608 (2)) Similar principle that enquiry is to be held by the presiding officer of the court of alleged misconduct. Also based on earlier case; court rejected its binding effect, favoring a broader jurisdictional interpretation.
Thein Nyun v. District Superintendent of Police, Maubin, ILR 13 Rang 737 (AIR 1936 Rang 158) Followed the Patna decisions on exclusive jurisdiction of the presiding officer. Not accepted as good law; court preferred a wider construction consistent with the statute.
In re Rabindrachandra Chatterjee, ILR 49 Cal 850 (AIR 1922 Cal 484) Held that any presiding officer of a subordinate court where the pleader is practicing has jurisdiction to take action for misconduct. Followed by this court as the correct interpretation of Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act.
In re Akhouri Banwari Prasad Mukhtar, ILR 17 Pat 96 (AIR 1938 Pat 17 (SB)) Adopted the Calcutta High Court's broader interpretation of jurisdiction under Section 14. Court preferred this view over earlier Patna decisions, affirming jurisdiction of any presiding officer in the subordinate court system.
Emperor v. Suriya Narayan Singh, 1 Pat LT 372 (AIR 1920 Pat 84) Standard of proof for guilt under the Legal Practitioners Act is the same as in criminal cases: beyond reasonable doubt. Applied to require strict proof of professional misconduct, rejecting lower standards based on suspicion.
A Pleader v. Judges of High Court of Madras, AIR 1930 P.C 144 Charges of professional misconduct must be clearly proved and not inferred from suspicion or error of judgment. Reiterated the necessity of clear proof for misconduct under the Legal Practitioners Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by analyzing the jurisdictional scope of Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, focusing on the meaning of "presiding officer." It acknowledged earlier Patna and Rangoon High Court decisions that limited enquiry jurisdiction exclusively to the presiding officer of the court where the misconduct occurred. However, the court found these decisions unpersuasive due to their reliance on an ex parte hearing and obiter observations.

The court favored a broader interpretation consistent with the statutory scheme and definitions in Section 3 of the Act, which defines "subordinate court" inclusively. It held that any presiding officer within the subordinate court system where the pleader practices may initiate and conduct proceedings for professional misconduct. This approach aligns with the Calcutta High Court's decision in In re Rabindrachandra Chatterjee and was affirmed by this court in In re Akhouri Banwari Prasad Mukhtar.

Regarding delegation of the enquiry, the court found that Section 14 clearly requires the presiding officer to personally receive and record evidence and adjudicate the charge. The District Judge's delegation of the enquiry to the Registrar was held to be a procedural violation, rendering the reference technically incompetent.

Substantively, the court examined the conduct of Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad in filing an application for the return of documents that were forged and subject to a criminal proceeding under Section 476 of the CrPC. The court found a clear inference that the pleader was aware of the nature and significance of the documents and colluded with his client to withdraw them, thereby obstructing justice and committing professional misconduct.

The court applied the standard of proof consistent with criminal trials, requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt. It rejected the pleader's claim of ignorance, emphasizing the responsibilities inherent in the legal profession and the expectation of above-board conduct. The court also criticized the conduct of the presiding officer of the 2nd Court of Munsif for negligence and lack of integrity in safeguarding the documents.

Despite the misconduct, the court noted the pleader's short tenure of five years and apparent repentance, opting for leniency by issuing a reprimand with a warning for future conduct.

Holding and Implications

The reference under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act is held to be technically incompetent due to improper delegation of the enquiry; however, the District Judge had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against the pleader for professional misconduct.

The court reprimanded Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad for his professional misconduct in colluding to withdraw forged documents relevant to a criminal proceeding. The pleader was warned to maintain the dignity and responsibility of the legal profession in future. The court also expressed serious disapproval of the conduct of the presiding officer of the 2nd Court of Munsif for negligence.

No new precedent was set, but the decision clarifies the proper scope of jurisdiction under Section 14, emphasizing that any presiding officer within the subordinate court system where the pleader practices may take cognizance of misconduct. It also underscores the requirement that the presiding officer must personally conduct the enquiry without delegation.

    The State Of Bihar v. Chandreshwar Prasad, Pleader, Muzaffarpur Opposite Party.

    Ahmad, J.:— This is a reference made under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act by the District Judge of Muzaffarpur. It relates to the conduct of one Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad, who is enrolled as a Pleader in that District Court since the 21st of March, 1950, and has been practising there as such since then. The main allegation against him as found in the order under reference which is dated 26-9-1957, is:

    “that Sri Chandreshwar Prasad, pleader, intentionally took back these documents in collusion with his clients in order to help them. I would, therefore, recommend that the matter may be placed before the Hon'ble High Court for taking suitable action against Sri Chandreshwar Prasad, pleader, under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act.”

    2. Now, the admitted position is as will appear from the facts on the record that the alleged misconduct was committed, if at all, in the Court of Mr. Kamleshwar Prasad Verma, the then presiding officer of the 2nd court of Munsif at Muzaffarpur, and not in the Court of the District Judge; but the officer who on the basis of that alleged misconduct had finally drawn the proceeding giving rise to the present reference was the District Judge, Further, it is not denied that though it was the District Judge who had drawn the proceeding, but the actual enquiry therein, as ordered by the District Judge himself was made by the Registrar of Civil Court Gaya, with the result that at the end of the enquiry what constituted the basis for the conclusions drawn by the District Judge in his; order under reference was the materials, collected and the report submitted by the Registrar, and not any evidence deposed to directly before the District Judge.

    3. Accordingly, on the basis of these two admitted fact's, Mr. Baldeva Sahay appearing for the Pleader, in answer to the show-cause notice issued by this Court on 19-11-1957, has, to begin with, challenged the very maintainability of the reference as made here apart from any question of merit in it. This necessarily takes us at once first to the wording of Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act itself and then to the authorities on the subject. The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:

    “If any such Pleader or Mokhtar practising in any subordinate court or in any Revenue-office is charged in such Court or office with taking instructions except as aforesaid, or with any such misconduct as aforesaid the presiding officer shall send him a copy of the charge and also a notice that, on a day to be therein appointed, such charge will be taken into consideration. Such copy and notice shall be served upon the Pleader or Mokhtar at least fifteen days before the day so appointed.

    4. On such day, or on any subsequent day to which the enquiry may be adjourned, the presiding officer shall receive and record all evidence properly produced in support of the charge, or by the Pleader or Mokhtar and shall proceed to adjudicate on the charge.

    5. If such officer finds the charge is established and considers that the Pleader or Mokhtar should be suspended or dismissed in consequence, he shall record his finding and the grounds thereof and shall report the same to the High Court: and the High Court may acquit, suspend or dismiss the Pleader or Mokhtar.” In the reading of Mr. Sahay the term “the presiding Officer” as used therein refers to the presiding officer of the Court in which the alleged misconduct is committed, and not the presiding officer of any Court other than that, though the latter may fall within the same subordinate Court in which the Pleader or Mokhtar is practicing. In support of this reading of the section Mr. Sahay has laid reliance on the four decisions of this Court, in (1) In the matter of Mt. Tanak Kishore, 1 Pat LJ 576 : (AIR 1916 Pat 115), (2) Emperor v. Satyendra Nath Roy, 1 Pat LT 379 : (AIR 1920 Pat 274) (FB) : (3) Mukhtar Manzur-ul-Haq v. Emperor, 4 Pat LT 97 : (AIR 1923 Pat 185 (1) (SB); and (4) In re Banmali Das. 4 Pat LT 235 : (AIR 1922 Pat 608 (2)) as also on a decision of the Rangoon High Court in Thein Nyun v. District Superintendent of Police, Maubin, ILR 13 Rang 737 : (AIR 1936 Rang 158), wherein these Patna decisions have been followed.

    6. Now, so fat as the decision in 1 Pat LJ 576 : (AIR 1916 Pat 115) is concerned, that, in my opinion, is not of any assistance on the point raised here. Therein the main point and the only point which arose for consideration was whether a proceeding under the Legal Practitioners Act is transferable under Section 24 of the CPC, or, to put it differently, whether the provisions of Section 24 of the CPC are applicable to a proceeding under the Legal Practitioners Act. To that both the learned Judges, Mullick and Atkinson, JJ., who heard and decided that case, gave the answer in the negative. And that, in my opinion, if I may say so with all respect, was sufficient to dispose of that case. It, however, appears that in the course of discussion on that point they went further and also observed that

    “the section leaves no room for the contention that the enquiry may be delegated or transferred to another officer who is not the presiding officer of Court in which the mal-practices complained of were committed.”

    This observation as I read the case and as is evident also from the facts stated therein was neither necessary nor called for on the point raised there. Therefore in law it is obiter.

    7. Then come the other three decisions of this Court. Each of them is a Bench decision of three Judges. Two of them, namely, Dawson-Miller, C.J and Mullick, J. were common in all the three decisions, while the third Judge in two of them, namely, in 1 Pat LT 379 : (AIR 1920 Pat 274) and in 4 Pat LT 235 : (AIR 1922 Pat 608 (2)) was Jwala Prasad, J. and in 4 Pat LT 97 : (AIR 1923 Pat 185 (1)) Kulwant Sahay, J. Obviously, therefore, come as they do from four very eminent Judges of this Court they deserve all respect and inasmuch as all of them uniformly lay down in substance that “the enquiry should be made by the presiding officer of the Court, that is to say, the Court in which the offence or mis-conduct was committed, and that he along was the proper person to hold such an enquiry” they wight heavily in favour of the contention raised on this point by Mr. Sahay.

    8. But a close reading of these decisions clearly shows that the latter two, namely, the decisions in 4 Pat LT 97 : (AIR 1923 Pat 185 (1)) and 4 Pat LT 235 : (AIR 1922 Pat 608 (2), are mainly based on wholly influenced by the decision in the first case, namely, in 1 Pat LT 379 : (AIR 1920 Pat 274). In that view of the matter the learned Standing Counsel acting for the State has submitted that unless the decision in the first case, namely, 1 Pat LT 379 : (AIR 1920 Pat 274) is found to have been given in consonance with the law as laid down in Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act none of them can be said to have any binding effect in law. On principle I think there can be no two opinions on this point and on facts it cannot be denied that the hearing in the case in 1 Pat LT 379 : (AIR 1920 Pat 274) was unfortunately ex parte.

    9. Naturally, therefore, their Lordships who gave) the decision in that case could not ??? all the assistance which they would have had the case been a contested one. Then, the language also as used in section 14 is not after all altogether free from certain amount of equivocation. Therefore, unless very closely examined, it is quite possible that the first impression that a bare reading of the section may leave on the mind may not be exactly what it really means. In law, however, the true construction of any section in a statute is that which is more consistent with the scheme of the Act as a whole and not less with the essential principle underlying it.

    10. Looked at from this point of view, I think it is difficult to hold that the enquiry as is contemplated in the section is to be held exclusively, if at all, by the presiding officer of the Court in which the misconduct or offence is alleged to have taken place, and not in any Court other than that, though the latter may be one of these subordinate Courts where the Pleader or Mokhtar is actually practising. On the contrary, the more wholesome construction seems to be that the word “presiding” an used therein refers to the entire class of officers who preside in the subordinate Court where the Pleader or the Mokhtar is practising, and not only the officer in whose Court the alleged misconduct is committed. That means the scheme underlying Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act is that once any Pleader or Mokhtar practising in any subordinate Court or Revenue office is charged in that subordinate Court or office with any misconduct as contemplated in the Act the presiding officer of any Court that lies in the ambit of that subordinate Court or Revenue office shall have power to proceed against him for that misconduct.

    11. This, in my opinion, necessarily follows from what is provided in the definition of the phrase “subordinate Court” as is given in S. 3 of the Act. Therein “subordinate Court” is defined to mean “all Courts subordinate to the High Court including Courts of Small Causes.” Therefore, if a Pleader or Mokhtar is practising in a District Court, it means that he is practising in all the Courts including Courts of Small Causes which fall within the ambit of that District Court. As such any presiding officer of any of the Courts where the Pleader or Mokhtar is practising has got the power under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act to take cognizance of the misconduct that is committed by him in that subordinate Court and to initiate proceeding for the same as laid down therein.

    12. In the opinion of the Calcutta High Court an elaborately discussed in In re: Rabindrachandra Chatterjee, ILR 49 Cal 850 : (AIR 1922 Cal 484) this is the true construction of the section. Subsequently this Court also in In re: Akhouri Banwari Prasad Mukhtar. ILR 17 Pat 96 : (AIR 1938 Pat 17 (SB)) has preferred to follow the Calcutta decision in spite of what had been laid down earlier to the contrary in the aforesaid three decisions. The learned Judge, while referring to the judgment of the Rangoon High Court in ILR 13 Rang 737 : (AIR 1936 Rang 158) which is on line with the earlier three decisions of this Court, have observed

    “In our opinion it was not at all necessary for the learned Chief Justice to have considered the effect of that Calcutta case and therefore his remarks must be treated as obiter. In any case we are of the opinion that the decision of the Calcutta High Court is perfectly correct and that it is in accord with the plain meaning of Sections 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act.”

    And finally their Lordships concluded with the observation that

    “it is within the jurisdiction of any Court before whom the Pleader is practising, if brought to is notice that the Pleader has committed any professional misconduct, to take action against him and those proceedings will be entirely with jurisdiction.”

    For these reasons I think the view taken on this point in the said three decisions of this Court in 1 Pat LT 576 : (AIR 1916 Pat 115) : 4 Pat LT 97 : (AIR 1923 Pat 185 (1)) and 4 Pat LT 235 : (AIR 1922 Pat 608 (2)), as also in 1 Pat LJ 576 : (AIR 1916 Pat 115) and in ILR 13 Rang 737 : (AIR 1936 Rang 158) cannot be accepted as good law. Accordingly, the contention raised by Mr. Sahay as to the implication underlying “the phrase the presiding officer” has to fail.

    13. The next contention that has been advanced on behalf of the pleader in support of the in ??? of this reference is that even if the District Judge had jurisdiction which, in my opinion, as held above, he had, he could not however in law, ??? once initiated the proceeding, transfer the ??? to the Registrar for receiving and recording the ??? as done here. On this point I think the ??? as it stands gives full support to Mr. Sahay. It ??? lays down that “the presiding officer ??? receive and record all evidence properly ??? in support of the charge, or by the pleader and Mokhtar and shall proceed to adjudicate on the charge”.

    14. In this case unfortunately what the District ??? did was that he having framed the charge ??? in Section 14 of the Legal ??? Act and having the show-cause submitted ??? the Pleader, finally on the 1st July, 1957, ??? the proceeding to the Registrar to conduct the same and submit his report by 31-7-1957. This, in my opinion, was directly in contravention of the ??? of the section and as such cannot be sustained as law. To this extent, therefore, the reference made here has to be held as technically ???

    15. In substance, however, I think this entire ??? on the question, whether the reference is competent or not has at best, in view of what is ??? provided in Section 13 of the Legal ??? Act, only an academic value; for though the reference may, on the technical ground, fail, ??? the facts as stated above are now before the High Court. Therefore, the High Court in the exercise of the absolute power that is given to it under Sec. 13 may, if it so chooses, take cognizance of the alleged misconduct and start proceedings on its own initiative as it thinks fit and proper as laid down in Banamali's case, 4 Pat L.T 235 : (AIR 1922 Pat 608 (2)). In the present case, Mr. Sahay has conceded that all the materials necessary for the disposal of the case are already on the record, and there is nothing further which his client may set up in support of his defence. That being so, ??? the reference has to be held incompetent for the reasons as stated above, there is no reason why the High Court having been already apprised of the fact's, should fail to take notice of them and proceed against the pleader for the misconduct disclosed by them.

    16. Accordingly, Mr. Sahay has next taken us ??? the entire materials on the record & has on their basis contended that even on merits the pleader cannot be held to have committed any misconduct; as contemplated in law. The facts as disclosed in ??? records show that there was a Title Suit, bear ??? no. 15 of 1955 in the 2nd Court of the Munsif at Mnzaffarpur. Therein Sri Tripuresbwari Prasad the client of the pleader, was one of the defendants. That case on hearing was disposed of by Mr. Kamla Prasad Sinha on 31-1-1955. By his judgment Mr. Sinha decreed the claim of the plaintiff, but farther held that the rent receipts Exhibits E to E-4 and the money order coupon Exhibit F filed by the defendants in that Court were forged documents.

    17. Accordingly on the basis of that finding the ??? of that case on 18-8-1955, filed on ??? under Section 476 of the Cr PC for making a complaint of that offence as provided therein. This application in the usual course was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1955. Therein the appearance on behalf of Sri Tripureshwari Prasad and others who were named in that application as the party responsible for the) filing of those forged documents was filed for the first time on 3-12-1955, and it is not denied that it was done through Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad alone in whose favour on the same day a vakalatnama had also been executed by his clients and filed in the Court.

    18. So far, however, I think there was nothing wrong. But the trouble begins from now hereafter. It is said, which is not disputed that only two days after that, namely, on 5-12-1955, Sri Chandreshwar Prasad filed another vakalatnama executed in his favour by Sri Tripureshwari Prasad in the previous Title Suit No. 15 of 1953. That Title Suit, as already stated, had already been disposed of on 31-1-1955. But this vakalatnama had been filed in the suit for the withdrawal of the documents that had been filed in that case on behalf of Sri Tripureshwari Prasad and others including those which were numbered therein as Exhibits E to E-4 and F, and were already the subject matter of the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC.

    19. The allegation made against Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad is that this had been done by him in collusion with his client Sri Tripureshwari Prasad with the deliberate intention of destroying the very evidence on which the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC rested. As such it was a case of misconduct on his part. It is true that originally Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad had not worked for any of the parties in the Title Suit. But the fact remains that at least on 3-12-1955, when he filed vakalatnama for the first time in the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC for Sri Tripureshwari Prasad and others, he must have received all necessary instructions as he what was the subject-matter of that proceeding.

    20. Therefore, the probabilities are more in favour of the conclusion that he was in the know of the entire scheme underlying that application for the withdrawal of the documents. But even if it be conceded that perhaps till then he had not been careful enough to take all necessary instructions, as he should have done, before filing the vakalatnama in that case, his subsequent conduct any way confirms that at least by 20-1-1956, when these documents were actually returned to him he must have come to know about the entire facts leading to the application under Section 476 of the Cr PC.

    21. This I say for the reason that though initially the application for the return of documents had been returned and rejected twice, once on 6-12-1955 and then on 18-1-1956, but even then he did no desist from the same. On the contrary, on 19-1-1956, he again filed a fresh application for the return of those documents, which is Exhibit 5 on the record, though in the meantime on 17-12-1955, he had already filed a detailed show-cause on behalf of his clients in the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC. That show-cause is in four sheets and each of them bears the signature of the pleader Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad.

    22. Therefore, it is too difficult to accept as pleaded on his behalf that he was not in the know of the facts which were seated in the show-cause. And if he knew the facts as stated therein, then it is difficult to accept that on 19-1-1956, when the fresh application for the return of the documents was filed, he could not realise that it was being done with the deliberate intention of destroying the very documents which were the subject of enquiry under Section 476 of the Cr PC. In my opinion, any person having average common sense, and much less a pleader, even though of a short standing, could have appreciated at least this much that in those set of circumstances any attempt on the part of his client to withdraw those documents from the record was nothing but a contrivance to destroy the very basis of the allegation that was the subject-matter of enquiry in the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC.

    23. Mr. Chandreshwar Prasad in doing this may have thought that he would easily escape the consequences if detected by taking up the plea of ignorance and negligence in filing that application; but he should have realised that even negligence or ignorance, and much less a deliberate intention, in acting like this is not in the least consistent with the responsibility and dignity of the noble profession which he has chosen to join for his life. The responsibility of any individual acting as a pleader is very heavy, and the least that is expected of the person acting as a pleader is that his actings and doings in the course of his profession should bet always above-board and far even from suspicion. And if he is not in a position to maintain this standard, it is better of him to retire from it than to be a cause of reflection on the very profession itself.

    24. Mr. Sahay, however, has very strenuously argued that even accepting that the pleader was in the know of all the facts relating to the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC by the time his last application for the return of documents was filed on 19-1-1956, it was difficult for him to verify from the facts stated in the application that it was about the return of those very documents which were the subject-matter of the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC, and in support of this contention he has placed before us the whole of that application which is Exhibit 5 on the record.

    25. Therein in the column of “Particulars of the documents” those to be returned have been described by Exhibit numbers alone, and, therefore, it has been argued that unless the Pleader at the time when he signed that application had remembered that such and such was the Exhibit number of the papers which were the subject-matter of the proceeding under Section 476 of the Cr PC, or unless he had verified the Exhibit numbers referred to therein with the actual documents which were the subject-matter of that proceeding, he could not have realised as to what it would lead to.

    26. But in the ordinary course of business, especially when a pleader or a lawyer is busy in doing so many multifarious acts in the course of his profession while in Court, it is difficult for him either to remember the Exhibit numbers of so many documents with which he may be connected on behalf of his clients in the discharge of his duties as a lawyer, or to verify those numbers each time when any step is to be taken about any of them in the Court as to which documents the particular Exhibit Numbers refer to. Therefore, Mr. Sahay submitted that the mere signature on such an application on behalf of the lawyer cannot be a proof of the fact that actually he had knowledge that such and such specific documents are being sought to be returned thereunder.

    27. And in support of this contention reliance has been placed by Mr. Sahay on the principle of onus as laid down in Emperor v. Suriya Narayan Singh 1 Pat L.T 372 : (AIR 1920 Pat 84) and A. pleader v. Judges of High Court of Madras, AIR 1930 P.C 144. In the former case a Bench of this Court has held:

    “This Court is entirely unable to understand why a different standard of proof of guilt ??? be required in a case like the present from that which is necessary in any other legal proceedings. The proof which is required in order to convict on a criminal charge is that which leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court that the offence has been committed. To adopt a different standard of proof in cases arising under the Legal ??? Act would, in our opinion, be an ??? novel departure and unjustifiable on any known principle of law.”

    In the latter their Lordships of the Privy council laid down:

    “Charges of professional misconduct must be clearly proved and should not be inferred fawn mere ground for suspicion, however reasonable or what may be mere error of judgment or indiscretion. An appropriate guide may be found in Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, No. 18 of 1879, under which a pleader or muktar may be suspended or dismissed, who is guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty.”

    28. On principle, I think there can be no doubt, as contended by Mr. Sahay, that the standard of proof in a case under the Legal Practitioners Act has to be the same as in the case of any ether accused on trial in a criminal case. As such in ordinary circumstances the mere act of signing in petition for the withdrawal of documents judged ??? this standard could have left some scope for what Mr. Sahay has contended. But here, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, as also to the ordinary responsibilities which are attached to the office of a Pleader in accepting vakalatnama and in acting in any cause on behalf of his ??? the chain of circumstances as stated above seems to be such as to lead to the irresistible conclusion that the pleader at the time when he signed the petition for the withdrawal of documents had knowledge the fact that it included therein even those documents which were the subject of enquiry under Section 476 of the Cr PC.

    29. This conclusion becomes all the more apparent when this act on the part of the pleader is judged not only in the light of the anxiety which his ??? must have had to get these documents somehow returned, but also in relation to what in this connection had happened in the office of the 2nd Munsif. Originally perhaps that office was ??? to return those documents and that I think for good reasons but thereafter on 20-1-1956, it maidenly developed a different mood and then returned all the documents as prayed for without any further objection. This I am sure could not have happened without some deliberation and consultation on the part of the client and the pleader both.

    30. Therefore all these facts and circumstances taken together leave no doubt at least on my mind that the return of the documents in this case was; the result of a clear understanding on one side between the pleader and the client, and on the other between the client and the office of the 2nd Munsif, Muzaffarpur. That being so, it cannot be said that the signing of the application for the return of the documents was a mere mechanical act, or an ordinary incident or a conduct of an unintentional character.

    31. In view, however, of the fact that his pleader has recently joined the profession five years back, and it may be that for that reason he has not yet succeeded in adjusting himself to all the responsibilities which the profession demands from him as also in view of the fact that now he seems to be repentant for what he has done, I think the Court should this time take a lenient view of the matter and let him of in only with a warning that in future he would never again give any occasion for any complaint like this.

    32. Before, however, I leave the case it is necessary to mention here that in this connection the conduct displayed by the office of Mr. Kameshwar Prasad Varma, who was then in charge of that Count does not also leave any good impression upon the mind of this Court. It is true that he was no. 8 the Munsif who had tried Title Suit No. 15 of 195. But all the same, it cannot be denied that it was in his Court that the application under Section 476 of the Cr PC was then pending for disposal. Therefore, he should have been as a rule extra careful in maintaining proper custody of the documents involved in that proceeding.

    33. Further, it is very surprising to find that though finally on 9-3-1956, he passed an order in favour of filing a complaint in connection with the forgery of those documents, he neither on that day nor on any other clay in the course of the hearing of that matter took any trouble to see as to whether the documents were actually on the record or not, or at least to find out as to whether even prima facia they look like forged documents. This conduct on his part seems to be more consistent with the conclusion that being aware of the fact that those documents had already been returned long ago on 20-1-1956, he left the matter knowingly unnoticed so that the enquiry, if any, for the recovery of these documents may be delayed as far as possible and in the meantime in the absence of those document the criminal trial may ultimately fail which in this case actually happened.

    34. Such a conduct is not only reprehensible, but betrays utter lack both of responsibility and integrity on the part of this officer.

    35. Misra, J.:— I agree.

    36. Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— I agree entirely.

    JC/K.S.B

    37. Pleader reprimanded.

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    Comments

    The State Of Bihar v. Chandreshwar Prasad, Pleader, Muzaffarpur Opposite Party.
    (Aug 12, 1959)