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  • Section 114 of the Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act
  • provisions of clause (2) of R. 46 of O.
  • O. 38, R. 5 and Section 151 of the CPC,
  • SECTION 114 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of R. 46
  • 46, sub-rule (3) of O. 21,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 114 of the Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act
  • provisions of clause (2) of R. 46 of O.
  • O. 38, R. 5 and Section 151 of the CPC,
  • SECTION 114 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of R. 46
  • 46, sub-rule (3) of O. 21,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a garnishee proceeding in which the appellant bank's objection was rejected. The decree-holder-respondent, widow of the deceased Nadir Ali, obtained a decree for her dower debt against the heirs of Nadir Ali. Execution of the decree sought realization of the decretal amount from assets of Nadir Ali held by his heirs. Nadir Ali had a Fixed Deposit Account of Rs. 6,090 with the Imperial Bank of India at Gaya. During the pendency of the suit, the decree-holder applied under Order 38, Rule 5, and Section 151 of the CPC for attachment before judgment, leading to a prohibitory order directed to the bank not to pay the amount to any party without court orders. The bank replied acknowledging the order and held the deposit in suspense. Subsequently, the court issued attachment before judgment and later passed a decree in favor of the decree-holder. Execution proceedings included notice under Order 21, Rule 63A of the CPC to the bank, which filed objections primarily contending that it should not pay without production of Letters of Administration or Succession Certificate. The trial court overruled these objections and ordered payment, leading to the present appeal by the bank under Order 21, Rule 63(11) of the CPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether garnishee proceedings under Order 21, Rule 63A of the CPC could be validly initiated without a prior attachment under Order 21, Rule 46 of the CPC?
  2. Whether the attachment under Rule 46, Clause (2) of Order 21 was duly complied with, specifically regarding the mandatory service and affixing of the prohibitory order?
  3. Whether the bank was justified in refusing to pay the decretal amount without production of a Succession Certificate under Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act?
  4. Whether the notice issued under Order 21, Rule 63A was valid and the garnishee proceedings had jurisdiction?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • No proceeding under Order 21, Rule 48 of the CPC was taken, thus garnishee proceedings could not be started.
  • The prohibitory order was issued under Order 38, Rule 5 and Section 151 of the CPC, which could not apply to a non-party like the appellant bank, rendering the attachment invalid.
  • Clause (2) of Rule 46 of Order 21 was not complied with, specifically the failure to affix a copy of the prohibitory order on a conspicuous part of the courthouse.
  • The bank was not bound to pay without production of Letters of Administration or Succession Certificate, citing Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Narendra v. Jankikuer, AIR 1947 Pat 385, to support objections regarding procedural non-compliance and jurisdiction.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narendra v. Jankikuer, AIR 1947 Pat 385 Non-compliance with mandatory procedural provisions under Order 21, Rule 46(2) of CPC invalidates attachment; non-curable under Section 99 CPC. Rejected appellant’s objection of invalid attachment due to non-affixing of order, noting appellant did not raise this issue earlier and presuming compliance under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
Kurseong Hydro-Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi Narayan Sukhani, ILR (1941) 1 Cal 389 (AIR 1941 Cal 364) Garnishee proceedings can only be initiated after actual attachment of the debt under Order 21, Rule 46 of CPC. Supported the view that garnishee proceedings without prior attachment are without jurisdiction.
Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Mian Musharaf Shah, AIR 1934 PC 217 (61 Ind App 371) Presumption of regularity in judicial acts and compliance with procedural formalities under Order 21, Rule 54 of CPC (applied analogously to Rule 46). Held that in absence of evidence to contrary, presumption that all procedural formalities were complied with, supporting presumption of valid attachment and service.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining whether the garnishee proceedings were validly initiated, emphasizing that such proceedings require a prior attachment under Order 21, Rule 46. The Court found that the prohibitory order issued on 17-11-1949, though not explicitly citing the provision, was validly made under Rule 46(1)(c)(iii) of Order 21, as the appellant bank was not a party to the suit and the order prohibited payment of the fixed deposit amount.

Regarding the mandatory requirement under Clause (2) of Rule 46 that a copy of the prohibitory order must be affixed on a conspicuous part of the courthouse and served on the person in possession, the Court noted that the appellant bank acknowledged receipt of the order, satisfying the service requirement. Although the appellant contended non-compliance with the affixing requirement, the Court held that this objection was not raised earlier and lacked evidence. Applying Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court presumed regularity and compliance with the affixing requirement.

The Court further rejected the appellant's argument that production of a Succession Certificate was necessary before payment, observing that the decree was against the heirs who were parties to the suit, and the deposit formed part of the deceased’s assets liable to be appropriated in satisfaction of the decree. The Court relied on settled Muhammadan law principles and the Indian Succession Act, holding that the bank’s liability ends upon payment in compliance with the court order, and the decree-holder’s undertaking indemnified the bank against future claims.

Consequently, the Court affirmed the issuance of the notice under Order 21, Rule 63A and upheld the garnishee proceedings as valid and within jurisdiction. The appellant's objections were found unsubstantial and rejected.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The Court held that the garnishee proceedings initiated against the bank were valid and lawful, grounded on a proper attachment under Order 21, Rule 46. The bank was correctly ordered to pay the decretal amount without requiring production of a Succession Certificate, as the decree-holder and all heirs were parties to the suit and the decree covered the assets in question. The bank’s payment pursuant to the court order constitutes a valid discharge from liability. This decision directly affects the parties by affirming the execution order and garnishee proceeding but does not establish any new precedent beyond the application of existing procedural and substantive law.

    Imperial Bank Of India Having Its Branch Office At Gaya, Objector v. Mt. Bibi Sayeedan Decree-Holder .

    1. This appeal by the garnished arises out of a garnishee proceeding in which the objection of the appellant has been rejected.

    2. In order to appreciate the points raised in the appeal it is necessary to set out briefly the relevant facts material for the decision of the present appeal:

    The decree-holder-respondent, who is the widow of one Nadir Ali, obtained a decree on account of her dower debt against the heirs of her deceased husband Nadir Ali in a money suit brought by her against them. This decree was put into execution, and, the decretal amount was sought to be realised from the assets of Nadir Ali in the hands of his heirs.

    3. Nadir Ali had a Fixed Deposit Account with the Imperial Bank of India at Gaya, to the tune of Rs. 6,090/- in his name. During the pendency of the money suit brought by the decree-holder, in which the decree under execution was passed, the plaintiff-decree-holder respondent on 17-11-1949, made an application under O. 38, R. 5 and Section 151 of the CPC, and prayed for issue of an attachment before judgment. On that application the trial Judge passed the following order:

    “Issue notice to defendants to show case why the attachment before judgment sought should not be allowed. This should be done after plaintiff files requisites by 24-11-1949. Meanwhile a copy of this order and petition may be forwarded to the Agent of the Imperial Bank of India, at Gaya requesting him not to make payment of this money to any party till further orders.”

    On receipt of this prohibitory order the Imperial Bank of India, the appellant, sent a reply on 25-11-1949, to the following effect:

    “With reference to your Attachment Order dated 17-11-1949, we beg to advise that we do not appear to maintain any current account in the name of the late Nadir Ali.

    4. The late Nadir Ali maintained a Fixed Deposit Account with us the proceeds of which amounting to Rs. 6,090/- are held by us in suspense and we have noted not to pay this amount to any one without the production of Succession Certificate and unless this Prohibitory Order has been withdrawn by the Court.”

    This reply of the appellant was acknowledged by the trial Judge and ordered to be kept on the record by his order No. 16, dated 30-11-1949. No cause having been shown by the defendant, attachment before judgment was Issued on 11-1-1950. The order passed by the trial Judge on the said date is in the following terms:

    “Notice to show cause why attachment before judgment be not issued served on all the defendants. Cause not shown. Plaintiff's pleader urges that attachment before judgment be issued in respect of Rs. 6,000/- which is lying in fixed deposit in the Imperial Bank of Gaya in the name of the husband of the plaintiff and Rs. 2,000/- as ijara money under a registered ijara deed executed by Mosst. Mahmooda in favour of the plaintiff's husband. Requisites for issue of attachment before judgment filed. Let attachment before judgment be now issued as prayed for returnable by 25-1-1950.”

    The attachment issued in pursuance of the above order of the Court was served and it was so recorded in the order sheet of the Court below under order No. 22 dated 20-2-1950.

    5. When ultimately a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff-decree-holder respondent and when it was put into execution a notice under O. 21, R. 63A was issued to the appellant. In response to the notice issued to the appellant under O. 21, R. 63A of the CPC, the Bank-appellant filed an objection before the executing Court on 29-8-1951. The principal objection of the appellant was, as mentioned in paragraph 2, clause (i) of the objection, that unless Letters of Administration or Succession Certificate are produced the Bank would not get an effective discharge in respect of “the debts” due by the Bank to Nadir Ali deceased. There was also an objection regarding attachment. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated 4-12-1952, overruled the objections of the Bank-appellant and asked the Bank to pay the amount in question to the decree-holder in satisfaction of the decree. From this order the present appeal has been preferred by the Bank under O. 21, R. 6311 of the CPC.

    6. Mr. S.N Bhattacharya who appeared for the appellant contended that no proceeding under O. 21, R. 48 of the CPC having been taken in the suit, or in the execution proceeding, no garnishee proceeding could be started. He further submitted that even if it be assumed that the prohibitory order issued by the trial Judge in the suit itself was an order under R. 46 of O. 21, even then as clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 of the Code had not been complied with as there was no evidence to prove the same, the whole proceeding was without jurisdiction and ineffective in law. In support of his contention he relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Narendra v. Jankikuer*. AIR 1947 Pat 385. There is no doubt that under O. 21, R. 63A of the CPC the foundation of a garnishee proceeding is an attachment made under R. 46 of O. 21 of the CPC. Rule 63A of O. 21 provides that where a debt other than the debts mentioned therein with which we are not concerned, has been attached under R. 46 and the debtor has been prohibited under clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of R. 46 and the garnishee does not repay the amount of the debt to the Court in accordance with R. 46, sub-rule (3) of O. 21, the Court, on the application of the decree-holder, may order a notice to issue calling upon the garnishee to appear before the Court and show cause why he should not pay the debt due from him to the judgment-debtor. Garnishee proceedings, therefore, in respect of a debt, can be started only after the debt has been attached under R. 46 of O. 21. This follows from the language of R. 63A of O. 21.

    7. The above view taken by me is supported by a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kurseong Hydro-Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi Narayan Sukhani, ILR (1941) 1 Cal 389 : (AIR 1941 Cal 364), in which it was held that garnishee proceedings in respect of a debt can be started only when the debt is both attachable under O. 21. R. 46 of the CPC and in fact has been so attached. The corresponding provision of O. 21, R. 63A of our Court in the Calcutta High Court is O. 21, R. 46A. The language of R. 46A of the Calcutta High Court and R. 63A of the Patna High Court of O. 21 is the same. On the language of R. 63A of Patna, like R. 46A of O. 21 of Calcutta, it is plain that if a debt attachable under O. 21, R. 40 had not in fact: been attached, garnishee proceedings cannot be taken.

    8. In the present case admittedly a notice under O. 21, R. 63A had been issued to the appellant is fling upon it to appear before the Court and show cause why it should not pay into Court the debt Sue from it. So far there is no dispute. But the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya is that as no attachment has been made in accordance with O. 21, R. 46, the issue of the notice under O. 21, R. 63A is without jurisdiction. On the above contention of Mr. Bhattacharya, therefore, two questions arise first, whether in fact there was an attachment under R. 46 of O. 21? and, secondly, whether clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 was complied with?

    9. The first question, therefore, is was the debt in question attached in fact under R. 46(1) of O. 21?

    10. For an answer to this question one has to look to the order-sheet of the trial Court in the Money Suit. On a reference to the Order of 17-11-1949, which has been reproduced in extensor earlier, it will be found that the provision of law under which the prohibitory order was issued to the appellant on 17-11-1949, is not mentioned in the order itself. Jit further appears that the above order was Issued ion the application of the plaintiff-decree-holder under O. 38, R. 5 and S. 151 of the Code praying for attachment before judgment. But an order for attachment before judgment can be issued only against the defendant of the suit as provided in O. 38, R. 5.

    11. The appellant admittedly was not a party to the suit, and, therefore, the prohibitory order in question could not have possibly been issued against the appellant under O. 38, R. 5 of the Code. Such a prohibitory order can be issued against a person, who is not a defendant to the suit, under R. 46 of O. 21. When there is a specific provision in the Code, no recourse can be had to the inherent powers of the Court under S. 151. Order 21, R. 46(1)(c)(iii) provides that in the case of other movable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, except property deposited in or in the custody of any Court, the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting the person in possession of the same from giving it over to the judgment-debtor. The order of 17-11-1948 complies with the requirements of R. 46(1)(c)(iii) of O. 21.

    12. On a reference to the order referred to above, therefore, notwithstanding that there is no mention of the provision of law under which the prohibitory order was issued on 17-11-1949, to the appellant, there is no doubt in my mind that the said prohibitory order was made under R. 46(1)(c)(iii) of O. 21. The mere absence of the provision of law under which a Court acts in a particular case cannot be a ground for urging that the Court acted not in accordance with law, but contrary to the provisions of law. Under Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. When, therefore, O. 38, R. 5 did not apply to the) case under consideration and O. 21, R. 46 did apply, it must be presumed that the Court issued the prohibitory order under R. 46, clause (1) of O. 21 of the Code.

    13. The first question, therefore, must be answered in the affirmative by holding that the debt in question was in fact attached under R. 46(1)(c)(iii) of O. 21 of the Code.

    14. The second question now is, was clause (2) of R. 46, O. 21, complied with?

    15. The principal objection of Mr. Bhattacharya is that clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 had not been complied with. Clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 provides that a copy of such prohibitory order shall be affixed on some conspicuous part of the Court house and another copy shall be sent to the person in possession of the same. In the present case the letter of the Bank sent to the Court on 25-11-1949, makes it clear that the attachment order of 17-11-1949 was received by the appellant. He has not disputed, nor can it be disputed, that the copy of the prohibitory order was sent to and received by the appellant. The second part of clause (2) of R. 401 of O. 21, therefore, is satisfied.

    16. Then remains the question, whether the first part of clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 was observed. There is no doubt as a matter of construction: that both the conditions envisaged by clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 must be complied with. There can, therefore, be no doubt, as rightly contended by Mr. Bhattacharya that the provisions of O. 21, R. 46(2) being mandatory, the failure to comply with any one of the requirements thereof nullifies the whole proceeding and the defect is not curable under S. 99 of the Code, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Narendra v. Jankikuer*, AIR 1947 Pat 385, wherein it was further held that to hold otherwise would be to use S. 99 to cure the proceeding itself, and not any mere error, defect or irregularity therein, and consequently, the failure to affix a copy of the prohibitory order on a I conspicuous pact of the Court-house will render the attachment invalid.

    17. The question, however, arises if this objection regarding non-observance of the first part of O. 21, R. 46, clause (2) on the facts of the present case can be sustained. In the show cause petition filed by the appellant on 29-8-1951, in pursuance of the notice under O. 21. R. 63A the appellant on this question made only the following specific objection which is to be found in paragraph 3, clause (iii), which runs thus:

    “(iii) That an attachment under O. 21, R. 46 could be made only if your petitioner's creditor Nadir Ali had been the judgment-debtor, which is not the case here. The attachment was therefore bad in law. Further there was no legal attachment as warranted under the provisions of O. 38, R. 5 of the CPC and as such your petitioner is not legally bound to pay the money.”

    From the above objection it is clear enough that the only ground on which it was said that the attachment under O. 21, R. 46 was bad in law was that it could be made only if Nadir Ali had been the judgment-debtor, which was not the case here. In the objection there is no whisper regarding non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21. On the other hand, the appellant itself took it that the attachment had been made under O. 21, R. 46. We, therefore, find from the objection of the appellant that the objection which is now being raised was not raised at all.

    18. The question whether the first part of clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 was also complied with or not is purely a question of fact which has to be agitated and specifically pleaded and proved. It was for the appellant to establish, if it thought it was a fact, that the prohibitory order made by the Court, which I have held to be under R. 46, clause (1) of O. 21 and a copy of which was sent to the appellant, was not served as required by the first part of clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21. In these circumstances, in the absence of evidence I cannot hold that clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 was not complied with. On the other hand, relying on Section 114 of the Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act, it must be held that the provisions of law were complied with.

    19. This view which I have taken is supported by a decision of the Privy Council in Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Mian Musharaf Shah, AIR 1934 PC 217 : 61 Ind App 371. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that if there was evidence that the land was attached, then in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it ought to be presumed that all necessary formalities were complied with. Their Lordships were considering R. 54 of O. 21 and relied on Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The above principles will apply also to R. 46 of O. 21.

    20. In the present case there is ample evidence to show, first, that an attachment, in respect of the debt in question, was made by the Court by a written order as contemplated by R. 46(1)(c)(iii) of O. 21, prohibiting the appellant from giving it over to the judgment-debtors; and secondly, that this prohibitory order was served upon the appellant, who acknowledged it by its letter dated 25-11-1949. Admittedly, there is no positive evidence that the first part of clause (2) of R. 46(2) of O. 21 was not complied with. On the other hand, the order of the Court dated 20-2-1950 shown that the attachment issued in pursuance of the order of the Court dated 11-1-1950, was served. The order of 11-1-1950 speaks also of the amount in deposit and an attachment in respect thereof could be only under R. 46 of O. 21 and not under O. 38 R. 5.

    21. In these circumstances, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it ought to be presumed that the first part of clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 was also complied with; in other words, it ought to be presumed, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, that the prohibitory order issued by the Court under R. 46(1) of O. 21, was affixed, as required by clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21, on some conspicuous part of the Court house also.

    22. The second question also, therefore, must be answered in the affirmative by holding that clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21 was complied with.

    23. I would, therefore, reject the aforesaid contention pointedly pressed on my attention and persistently argued by Mr. Bhattacharya as invalid.

    24. Lastly, it was contended that the appellant was not bound to pay the money lying in deposit with it in the name of Nadir Ali in spite of the order of the Court below, because as no Succession Certificate had been produced, the appellant will not get a valid discharge from its liability in respect of the deposit in question. In support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharya relied on Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act which provides for the production of a Succession Certificate. It is, however, admitted and not denied, that the plaintiff-decree-holder as well as the judgment-debtors who are parties to the suit brought by the decree-holder-respondent and who are parties to the decree under execution, are heirs of the deceased Nadir Ali.

    25. The objection, however, of Mr. Bhattacharya is that, if supposing, some other heir, who is not a party to the decree under execution, comes forward later on and claims the amount or a share in the amount lying in deposit with the appellant, then the appellant will be in a very precarious position and it may have to pay the amount twice over. It is well settled in Muhammadan Law, as will appear from S. 294 of Mulla's Muhammadan Law, Fourteenth Edition, that although the heirs of a deceased Muhammadan are not personally liable for the dower debt, each heir is liable for the debt to the extent only of a share of the debt proportionate to the share of the estate. After the death of her husband, therefore, if a widow brings a suit for recovery of her dower, it must be brought against all the heirs of her deceased husband. The present suit in which the decree under execution was passed was such a suit and in the presence of the heirs of the deceased Nadir Ali the decree in favour of the respondent was passed.

    26. Prima facie, therefore, there is no doubt that all the heirs of Nadir Ali, who were alive at the date of the suit, are parties to the decree under execution. The apprehension of the appellant, therefore, about any other heir coming in and making a claim in the future against the Bank-appellant is entirely misconceived. To make the position of the Bank more secure the decree-holder-respondent has filed an affidavit dated 18-9-1958, in this Court on 22-9-1958, in paragraph 6 of which it is stated as below:

    “6—That all the heirs of Sk. Nadir Ali are parties to this proceeding and were parties in the suit. In case it is proved that Sk. Nadir Ali left more heirs the decree-holder undertakes to indemnify the bank.”

    On this undertaking of the decree-holder-respondent there can be no doubt that the position of the appellant is absolutely secure and there is no risk for the appellant to pay the money twice over to any person. But that apart, I cannot understand, why an order of the Court should not be effective to give an absolute discharge from all liability to the appellant in respect of the money in question due to Nadir Ali? In this connection the Court below observed:

    “In my opinion, this Court is competent to ask the Bank to pay off the entire amount lying in deposit to the credit of Nadir Ali deceased towards the satisfaction of the decree obtained by the widow of Nadir Ali and this order of the Court will have the effect of absolving the Bank of their liability to pay the amount in question to the heirs of Nadir Ali. It is not necessary for the Bank in a case like the present one to insist upon the production of a succession certificate as required under Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act because the decree-holder or the judgment-debtors do not claim the amount in question from the Bank as successors entitled to the effects of the deceased Nadir Ali. Had they claimed this amount in that capacity the Bank would have been quite justified to ask for a Succession Certificate.

    27. Here the position is quite different because the amount in question is sought to be realised from the Bank in satisfaction of a decree passed against the legal representatives of Nadir Ali deceased and the decree is for the payment of money out of the assets of Nadir Ali deceased for the reasons that the decree is on account of the dower due from Nadir Ali. Admittedly the amount in question in deposit with the Bank forms part of the assets of Nadir Ali and as such it is liable to be appropriated in satisfaction of a Court's decree as contemplated under Section 52 of the CPC.”

    28. I entirely agree with the above observations of the Court below. To a case like the present the appellant cannot in law insist upon the production of a Succession Certificate and ask the Court that the decree-holder must produce a Succession Certificate before the money is paid into Court. This attitude of the appellant is entirely untenable. It cannot disregard the order of the Court on such flimsy grounds. Its responsibility ends when it deposits the money in the Court in pursuance of its order. The Court below made the position clear beyond any doubt. But, notwithstanding the above clarification made by the Court below, the appellant was dissatisfied and brought the matter in appeal to this Court, which of course it had the right to do, but which, in my opinion, involved the Bank into unnecessary litigation and expenses. As a public body it was its duty to obey the order of the Court, because on obedience of such an order the Bank is absolved from all liability in respect of the deposit in question.

    29. In my opinion, therefore, the order of the Court blow asking the appellant to pay the amount lying in deposit to the credit of Nadir Ali, deceased, to the decree-holder-respondent will amount to a valid discharge and will absolve the appellant from all liability so far as the Bank is concerned in respect of the deposit of Nadir Ali and, the appellant has no fright, in the instant case, to ask the decree-holder-respondent to produce a Succession Certificate before paying the money into Court.

    30. I would therefore, affirm the order of the Court below, and, hold, in agreement with it that the notice under O. 21, R. 63A has rightly been issued against the appellant and the garnishee proceeding is not without jurisdiction; on the other hand, it has been legally started against the appellant.

    31. The question whether the deposit with the appellant amounted to a debt within the meaning of R. 46 of O. 21 so as to attract the provisions of R. 63A of O. 21 is not necessary to be decided here, firstly, because it was not raised by Mr. Bhattacharya and secondly, because the appellant admitted in para 2(i) of its objections filed on 29-8-1951, that the deposit in question was a debt due by it to Nadir Ali deceased. Never, therefore, there was any dispute about the amount in deposit being a debt within the meaning of R. 46 of O. 21. The Court below, however, had its own doubts on this question, but it is unnecessary to express any opinion, when this question does not arise, as to whether the observation of the Court below on this question is correct or not.

    32. The appeal was argued, and, it has been decided, on the footing that the deposit in question with the appellant was a debt attachable under R. 46 of O. 21 of the Code.

    33. Mr. Bhattacharya no doubt challenged the fact of attachment under R. 46 of O. 21, but, the gravamen of his complaint was the alleged non-observance of the first part of clause (2) of R. 46 of O. 21, and, the sheet-anchor of his argument was the Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1947 Pat 385. All the objections raised by Mr. Bhattacharya have been considered, and having been found to be unsubstantial, rejected, and, therefore, the appeal must fail.

    34. With these observations, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    LB/V.R.B

    35. Appeal dismissed.

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