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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Sultan Ahmad
  • Shamsul Hassan
  • P.R.Das
  • Naseem Ahmad
  • Md.Ayub
  • Dinesh Charan
  • Baldeva Sahay
Judges
  • V. Ramaswami, C.J
  • Raj Kishore Prasad, J.
Acts
  • Section 15(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Bihar Act VII of 1937), read with Rule 24(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938,
  • S. 15(1), and Rule 24(1) and (3) and Rule 24-A(1),
  • Rule 24-A(1), or, by S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1).6.
  • sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 24, or S. 15.19.
  • Rule 24(3); because S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1)
  • manner.10. Rules 24(1) and (3), and 24-A(1),
  • S. 15(1) and Rules 24(1) and 24-A(1),
  • S. 15(1), Rule 24(1) and Rule 24-A(1)
  • S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1).29.
  • Purchase) Act (Act XXIV of 1953)
  • sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 24
  • Das.18. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 24
  • Rule 24(3) of the Rules; and,5.
  • S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1)
  • Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules,
  • S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1)
  • sub-rule (4)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Sultan Ahmad
  • Shamsul Hassan
  • P.R.Das
  • Naseem Ahmad
  • Md.Ayub
  • Dinesh Charan
  • Baldeva Sahay
Judges
  • V. Ramaswami, C.J
  • Raj Kishore Prasad, J.
Acts
  • Section 15(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Bihar Act VII of 1937), read with Rule 24(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938,
  • S. 15(1), and Rule 24(1) and (3) and Rule 24-A(1),
  • Rule 24-A(1), or, by S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1).6.
  • sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 24, or S. 15.19.
  • Rule 24(3); because S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1)
  • manner.10. Rules 24(1) and (3), and 24-A(1),
  • S. 15(1) and Rules 24(1) and 24-A(1),
  • S. 15(1), Rule 24(1) and Rule 24-A(1)
  • S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1).29.
  • Purchase) Act (Act XXIV of 1953)
  • sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 24
  • Das.18. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 24
  • Rule 24(3) of the Rules; and,5.
  • S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1)
  • Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules,
  • S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1)
  • sub-rule (4)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Raj Kishore Prasad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a private limited company operating a sugar factory at Sugauli in the District of Champaran. The petitioner obtained a rule from the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to call up and quash an order of the Cane Commissioner, Bihar, dated 28-7-1956 (purporting to be issued under Rule 24-A(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938), and a writ of prohibition restraining the opposite parties from giving effect to that order.

Opposite Party 1 (the Cane Commissioner) and Opposite Party 3 (the State of Bihar) jointly showed cause and filed a counter-affidavit through the Advocate General; Opposite Party 2 (Cane Development and Cane Marketing Union, Limited) also showed cause and filed a counter-affidavit. The Cane Commissioner had earlier issued an order under S.15(1) read with Rule 24(1) declaring a reserved area; that order was made on 14-7-1956 and was published in the Bihar Gazette on 15-8-1956. The petitioner contested, among other things, the validity and timing of the Commissioner’s orders and whether required consultations took place.

After hearing, the High Court (Raj Kishore Prasad, J., with Ramaswami, C.J. concurring) discharged the rule and dismissed the petitioner’s application with costs of Rs. 250 to be divided between the opposite parties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Cane Commissioner’s order dated 28-7-1956 under Rule 24-A(1) was ultra vires because it was issued before a declaration of the reserved area required by S.15(1) read with Rule 24(1) had been made or published.
  2. Whether the Cane Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in issuing the order under Rule 24-A(1) because the occupier of the factory (the petitioner) was not consulted as required by Rule 24-A(1) and S.15(1) read with Rule 24(1).
  3. Whether the third proviso to S.18(2) (requiring not less than two-thirds membership of a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in a village) was satisfied for the villages included in the reserved area, and whether the Inspector’s report relied upon was admissible and sufficient.
  4. Whether the petitioner had locus standi to challenge the orders, in light of the argument that its interest was not materially affected.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Mr. P.R. Das)

  • Contended that the Cane Commissioner’s order under Rule 24-A(1) of 28-7-1956 was ultra vires because it preceded the declaration of the reserved area under S.15(1) and Rule 24(1), the publication of which occurred only on 15-8-1956; therefore the deadline of 1st August in Rule 24-A(1) had been missed.
  • Argued that the Cane Commissioner did not consult the occupier of the factory (the petitioner) as required by Rule 24-A(1) and S.15(1) read with Rule 24(1), so the condition precedent for issuing the order was not satisfied.
  • Maintained that the Inspector’s report (dated 22-7-1956) was inadmissible against the petitioner because the petitioner had no opportunity to know of the report and object; further argued that only 25 of 87 villages had current surveys showing the required two-thirds membership, while 72 villages’ claims were based on prior-season figures (1955–1956) and thus were not a proper legal basis for 1956–1957.

Opposite Parties (Advocate General and Dr. Syed Sultan Ahmad)

  • Submitted that the relevant date for the declaration of reserved area is the date on which the Cane Commissioner actually made the order (in this case 14-7-1956), not the subsequent date of publication in the Bihar Gazette (15-8-1956); thus the Commissioner’s order preceded the 1st August deadline and was valid under Rule 24-A(1).
  • Contended that the petitioner had been consulted and given ample opportunity to make objections (including correspondence and joint surveys beginning May 1956), and that the petitioner had been uncooperative; therefore the consultation requirement was satisfied.
  • Argued that the Inspector’s report did not prejudice the petitioner because the Inspector had visited the petitioner’s factory (15-7-1956 and 21-7-1956) and had attempted to work out an agreed solution, and that the 72 villages reserved in the prior season satisfied the two-thirds membership requirement absent evidence to the contrary.
  • Raised a locus standi objection relying on the Supreme Court decision in Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. (AIR 1956 SC 676), arguing that the petitioner’s interest was not adversely affected because commission payable to Co-operative Societies is factored into cane price and the petitioner was not put to loss; consequently the petitioner lacked sufficient interest to maintain the challenge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 676 Used to illustrate that similar statutory schemes allow orders restricting purchases through Co-operative Societies when membership thresholds are met; addressed whether occupiers are materially prejudiced (and thus their locus to challenge). The Advocate General relied on this decision to argue the petitioner was not adversely affected and therefore lacked locus standi. The court accepted the reasoning that the petitioner was not put to loss by the requirement (commission being included in price) and treated the precedent as supportive of the view that the petitioner’s interest was not sufficient to sustain the writ application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory scheme and sequencing required by the Act and the Rules. It read Sections 15(1), 18(1)–(2) (including the third proviso to S.18(2)) and Rules 24(1) and (3), and 24-A(1) to determine the legal prerequisites and the relevant dates for enforceability.

Stepwise analysis conducted by the court:

  1. Scheme and sequence: The court held that the scheme requires (a) an order by the Cane Commissioner under S.15(1) read with Rule 24(1) declaring a reserved area; (b) identification of Cane-growers' Co-operative Societies in that area; and (c) verification whether the area can supply more than 50% of the factory’s normal cane requirement. The order under S.15(1) is the foundation for limiting a factory-occupier’s right to purchase cane.
  2. Relevant date for a declaration under S.15(1) and Rule 24(1): The court concluded that the relevant date is the date on which the Cane Commissioner actually makes and issues the order, not the date of publication in the Bihar Gazette under Rule 24(3). The statutory text did not make publication a condition for the order’s effectiveness, nor did it deem the Gazette notification to be the operative date. Publication provisions (including Rule 24(3) and sub-rule (4)) were held to serve the protection and notice of aggrieved persons (for purposes such as limitation for appeal), not to control the operative date of the order.
  3. Application of the relevant date to the facts: The court found the reserved-area order had been made and issued on 14-7-1956. That date fell before the 1st August deadline required by Rule 24-A(1). Publication on 15-8-1956 did not invalidate the earlier validly-made order. Consequently, the Rule 24-A(1) order issued in relation to the villages was not ultra vires on the ground that it came after publication.
  4. Consultation requirement under S.15(1), Rule 24(1) and Rule 24-A(1): The court examined the petitioner’s affidavit and the counter-affidavits and concluded that the petitioner had been consulted and had ample opportunity to object. The court noted correspondence beginning in May 1956, joint surveys starting 28-5-1956, and visits by the Cane Inspector (15-7-1956 and 21-7-1956). The petitioner's failure to cooperate and to make timely objections led the court to reject the contention that consultation was not carried out.
  5. Inspector's report and the two-thirds membership requirement: The court addressed the petitioner’s contention that only 25 of 87 villages had current surveys showing two-thirds membership and that reliance on prior-season figures for 72 villages was improper. The court found the Inspector’s report recorded visits to the petitioner’s factory and attempts at agreement; there was no definite evidence that those 72 villages had ceased to meet the membership threshold. The petitioner could have produced evidence to demonstrate change but did not. The court held that absence of such evidence meant the prior-season basis could legitimately be used and that the Inspector’s report was not disqualified on the asserted grounds.
  6. Locus standi: The Advocate General relied on Tika Ramji (AIR 1956 SC 676) to argue that the petitioner was not prejudiced because the commission payable to Co-operative Societies was included in the cane price and, therefore, the petitioner would not suffer loss by being required to purchase through a Co-operative Society. The court accepted that line of reasoning and held that the petitioner’s interest was not sufficiently affected to sustain the writ application.

On the basis of the above factual findings and statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the petitioner’s two principal lines of attack (timing/publication and failure to consult) and the subsidiary evidentiary attack on the Inspector’s report were without merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court discharged the rule; the petitioner’s application was dismissed with costs. The impugned orders of the Cane Commissioner were held to be valid. Specifically, the court upheld: (a) that the operative date of a declaration under S.15(1)/Rule 24(1) is the date the Commissioner actually makes and issues the order (here 14-7-1956), not the date of Gazette publication (15-8-1956); and (b) that the consultation requirement and the third proviso to S.18(2) were satisfied on the material before the court.

Direct consequences for the parties: The petitioner’s challenge was dismissed. The petitioner was ordered to pay Rs. 250 as costs of the application, to be divided equally between Opposite Parties 1 and 3, and Opposite Party 2.

Broader implications: The opinion interprets the Act and Rules to treat the date of actual making/issue of the Commissioner’s order as the operative date for enforceability, and treats publication chiefly as a notice and limitation-related device. The court did not state that it was creating a broader new precedent beyond its statutory interpretation in these factual circumstances; the decision applies the statutory wording and the presented evidential record to uphold the Commissioner’s actions.

Judgment delivered by Raj Kishore Prasad, J.; Ramaswami, C.J. agreed. Application dismissed (costs awarded as stated).

Show full summary ...

    Sugauli Sugar Works Private Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner And Others Opposite Party.

    Raj Kishore Prasad, J.:— This rule raises an interesting point as to the right of the Cane Commissioner to issue an order declaring a reserved area for the supply of cane to the factory as required by Section 15(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Bihar Act VII of 1937), read with Rule 24(1) of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938, made by the State Government by virtue of the powers vested in them under S. 30 of the Act.

    2. In this case, the petitioner is a private Limited Company, and, it has a sugar factory at Sugauli in the district of Champaran. It has obtained a rule from the High Court, on an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for a writ, in the nature of certiorari, against the opposite party to call up and quash the order of the Cane Commissioner, Bihar, dated 28-7-1956, purporting to have been issued under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules, which is annexure G to the application. The petitioner has also asked for a writ in the nature of prohibition, refraining the opposite party from giving effect to the impugned order. Opposite Party 1, who is the Cane Commissioner, Bihar, and, opposite party 3, who is the State of Bihar, have both jointly shown cause against the rule through the learned Advocate General, and have also filed a counter-affidavit. Opposite party 2, who is the Cane Development and Cane Marketing Union, Limited, through its Secretary, has also shown cause through Dr. Syed Sultan Ahmad, and also filed a counter-affidavit.

    3. The only point presented for determination by Mr. P.R Das appearing for the petitioner, is that the order of the Cane Commissioner dated 28-7-1956, under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules, Annexure G to the petition, is ultra vires. He has attacked this order as without jurisdiction on two grounds:

    4. First, the impugned order dated 28-7-1956 purporting to have been issued under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules read with the third Proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act is ultra vires, because the Cane Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue such an order earlier on 28-7-1956, before declaration of the reserved area as required by S. 15(1) of the Act read with Rule 24(1) of the Rules, which, in the present case, was done on 15-8-1956, when it was published in the Bihar Gazette as required by Rule 24(3) of the Rules; and,

    5. Second, the impugned order is without jurisdiction also because the Cane Commissioner before issuing the impugned order under Rule 24-A(1) did not consult “the occupier of the factory for which the area is reserved” at any stage as required by Rule 24-A(1), or, by S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1).

    6. On the first question, the argument put forward by Mr. Das is that in the present case the order of the Cane Commissioner declaring the reserved area, made under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) was published in the Bihar Gazette on 15-8-1956, and, therefore, that ought to be taken to be the date when the order required by S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1) was made. That being the position, so runs his argument, the order by the Cane Commissioner has been made after the 1st August which is the dead line fixed by Rule 24-A(1), and, consequently, the impugned order of the Cane Commissioner is ultra vires.

    7. The learned Advocate General, whose argument has been adopted by Dr. Sultan Ahmad also, in reply, combated the above contention of Mr. P.R Das, and submitted that the actual making of the order by the Cane Commissioner, which, in the present case, was 14-7-1956, as will appear from the Bihar Gazette of 15-8-1956 itself, is the relevant date which should be considered to be the date of making of the order as required by S. 15(1) and Rules 24(1) and 24-A(1), and, therefore the Cane Commissioner having made the order on 14-7-1956, long before the 1st August, which is the dead line fixed by Rule 24-A(1), the impugned order of the Commissioner was perfectly valid in law, and quite consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules.

    8. For a correct appraisal of the points raised at the Bar, and, for a proper determination of the issue raised in the case, it is necessary to read Ss. 15(1), 18(1) and (2), and the third Proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act, and Rules 24(1) and (3) and 24-A(1) of the Rules.

    9. Sections 15(1) and 18(1), (2) and the third Proviso to S. 18(2) read as follows:

    “15(1) The Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the Advisory Committee or Committees, if any, of the area concerned and the occupier of the factory and after considering any objections that may be raised, issue an order declaring any area to be a reserved area for the purpose of the supply of cane to a particular factory during a particular season or seasons, and may likewise at any time cancel such order or after the boundaries of an area so reserved:

    Provided…………

    “18(1) A cane-grower or a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in a reserved area may offer in the form and by the date prescribed, to supply to the occupier of the factory, for which the area is reserved, cane grown by the cane-grower or by the members of such Cane-growers' Co-operative Society, as the case may be, not exceeding the quantity, if any prescribed for such grower or Cane-growers' Co-operative Society.

    (2) The occupier or manager of a factory for which an area is reserved shall enter into agreements in such form, by such date and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, to purchase the cane offered in accordance with sub-section (1):

    ‘Provided also that, where not less than two-thirds of the cane-growers of a village are members of a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society he shall not, so long as the order herein referred to is in force, purchase, or enter into an agreement to purchase, cane grown by any cane-grower of the village except through such Co-operative Society, in any case in which an order to that effect is made and published by the Cane Commissioner in the prescribed manner.

    10. Rules 24(1) and (3), and 24-A(1), are in these terms:

    “24. Declaration of reserved area. — (1) The Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the occupier of a factory and publishing a notice in the offices of the Collector and Sub-divisional Officers having jurisdiction over the area concerned and issuing copies thereof to the factories operating in such area, and after consulting the Advisory Committee or Committees, if any, of the area concerned and considering any objections that may be raised issue an order under S. 15(1) of the Act declaring any area to be a reserved area for the purposes of supply of cane to the factory during the ensuing crushing season or seasons, if he is satisfied that

    (a) the area so reserved is not likely to supply more than 50 per cent of the normal cane requirement of the factory or such percentage of the normal cane requirement as may be determined by the State Government from time to time;

    (3) An order of the Cane Commissioner declaring any area to be reserved for a particular factory or altering the boundaries of an area already reserved or cancelling any previous order declaring an area to be reserved shall be published in the Binar Gazette. A copy of the order shall be communicated to the factory concerned.

    “24-A. Purchase of cane through a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in a reserved area. — (1) Where in any village in a reserved area there is a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society of which not less than two-thirds of the cane-growers of that village are members, the Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the occupier of the factory for which the area is reserved and after considering any objections that may be raised, issue an order on or before the 1st August immediately preceding the crushing season in which the cane is required to be crushed, that every cane-grower growing cane in that village shall, if he intends to sell cane to a sugar factory, do so only through the Cane-growers' Co-operative Society of that village.

    11. The crucial issue, therefore, is, what should be considered to be the relevant date of the order of declaration of reserved area as contemplated by S. 15(1), third Proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act and Rules 24(1) and 24-A(1) of the Rules?

    12. From the provisions of the Act, and, the Rules enumerated above, it is clear beyond any possibility of doubt that the scheme of the Act and the Rules is that first of all an area for the purposes of supply of cane to a particular factory during a particular season or seasons has to be reserved by issue of an order by the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1). The second step in this connection is to find out if there is a Cane-grower or a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in the reserved area.

    13. The third step is to find out if the area so reserved can supply more than 50 per cent of the normal cane requirement of the factory. The consequence of an order of the Cane Commissioner declaring any area to be a reserved area for the purpose of the supply of cane to a particular factory is that after such a declaration of reserved area, the occupier or manager of a factory for such an area can purchase cane in such reserved area only from such Co-operative Society, and not from non-members and others, if, of course, not less than ⅔rd of the cane-growers of a village are members of such a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society.

    14. The issue of an order by the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) is, therefore, the foundation of the disability imposed upon the occupier or manager of a factory for which an area is reserved, on his right to purchase cane. After such an order by the Cane Commissioner, the occupier or the manager of a factory cannot purchase cane, if the conditions mentioned above are satisfied, from any person other than the Co-operative Society. Section 18(3)(a) prohibits the sale of cane grown in a reserved area, either to the occupier of a factory, other than the factory for which the area is reserved, or to any person, for the purpose of supply to any factory other than the factory for which the area is reserved, except with the permission of the Cane Commissioner, and, S. 27(5a) of the Act makes its contravention an offence punishable with fine.

    15. On the language of S. 15(1), therefore, it is quite plain, without any doubt, that the relevant date of an order issued by the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) is the date when such an order is actually made by him, and not when such an order is published in the Bihar Gazette as required by Rule 24(3); because S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1) both do not provide either that an order issued by the Cane Commissioner in respect of declaration of reserved area shall not be effective and shall not come into operation unless and until it is published in the Gazette, or, that the notification in the Gazette will be deemed to be the date of the issue of such an order.

    16. The power of the Cane Commissioner to issue an order declaring an area to be a reserved area is unconditioned, and not hedged by any restriction whatsoever in the matter of its publication in order to make it enforceable and effective. It is true that Rule 24(3) provides that an order of the Cane Commissioner declaring any area to be reserved for a particular factory shall be published in the Bihar Gazette, and, a copy of the order shall be communicated to the factory concerned, but it does not mean, nor, does it prove even impliedly, that unless such an order of the Cane Commissioner is published in the Bihar Gazette, or its copy is communicated to the factory concerned, the order of the Cane Commissioner made under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) shall not be operative.

    17. Mr. P.R Das relied very strongly on sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 24 in support of his contention that these sub-rules are clear manifestations of the intention of the Legislature that the order of the Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) shall not be effective, and deemed to be in force, unless it is published in the Bihar Gazette, and, that the date of the publication in the Bihar Gazette shall be the relevant date for commencement and enforceability of the order of the Cane Commissioner made under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1). I am, however, unable to accept this line of reasoning advanced by Mr. Das.

    18. sub-rule (4) of Rule 24 mentions the date of the publication of the order of the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) as the date from which the limitation would start for filing an appeal against such an order. This sub-rule (4) is obviously for the benefit of the aggrieved person, so that he may have no occasion to complain that he had no information of the order of the Cane Commissioner made under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1), either because it was not communicated to the factory concerned, if the factory is the aggrieved person, or, if any other person is the aggrieved person because of non-compliance of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 24, or S. 15.

    19. In my judgment, therefore, on the true interpretation of S. 15(1), and Rule 24(1) and (3) and Rule 24-A(1), it is clear enough that the intention of the Legislature is to make the date of the actual making and issue of an order contemplated by S. 15(1) and Rule 24(1) by the Cane Commissioner in respect of declaration of reserved area as the relevant date for its enforceability and its commencement, and that is the relevant date, to all intents and purposes, for making such an order applicable and operative against the persons concerned, and, the date of the publication of such an order in the Bihar Gazette as required by Rule 24(3) is not the relevant date for enforceability of such an order. One has, therefore, to look to the order itself, issued under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1), by the Cane Commissioner, to find out what is the relevant date, and, the publication of such an order subsequently in the Bihar Gazcite is not at all the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the persons concerned, and affected thereby.

    20. In the present case, the order of the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) having been made and issued on 14-7-1956 before the 1st August immediately preceding the crushing season in the year, which is in the present case 1956, as required by Rule 24-A(1) is perfectly legal and valid, and quite consistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. This order of the Cane Commissioner was sent to the Press, as contended by the learned Advocate General, on the same day, but it was published in the Bihar Gazette on 15-8-1956, as appears from the Bihar Gazette, Part II, of 15-8-1956.

    21. This subsequent publication of the order of the Cane Commissioner issued on 14-7-1956, under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) declaring the reserved area for the purposes of supply of cane to the petitioner for the crushing season 1956–1957 would not in the eye of law nullify the earlier order issued by the Cane Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, and make it dead. In my opinion, therefore, the first ground of attack, by Mr. P.R Das against the impugned order of the Cane Commissioner, is not well founded and, accordingly, it must be rejected.

    22. Mr. P.R Das has put forward his argument, in support of his second ground of attack against the impugned order in two ways:

    23. His first contention is that the petitioner was not consulted as required by S. 15(1), Rule 24(1) and Rule 24-A(1) by the Cane Commissioner before issuing the impugned order under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) declaring the reserved area for the purpose of supplying cane to the petitioner for the crushing season 1956–1957 and, therefore, the condition precedent required by the above provisions of the Act and the Rules having been broken and not observed, the impugned order is without jurisdiction.

    24. In the second place, he has contended that the third Proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act requires that not less than two-thirds of the cane-growers of the village should be the members of a cane-growers' Co-operative society, before the occupier or manager of a factory, like the petitioner, could be compelled to purchase the cane grown in the reserved area from the Co-operative Society of that area only; and, in the present case, there is nothing to show that the villages which have been notified as the reserved area, except some, had ⅔rd of the cane-growers of that area as members of such Society, in that, the report of the Inspector on this question (Annexure I to the counter-affidavit of opposite party 1 and 3) was inadmissible in evidence, and, if it was excluded from consideration, then there was no evidence that the conditions enjoined by the third Proviso to S. 18(2) had been complied with, and, therefore, on this ground also, the impugned order of the Cane Commissioner was without jurisdiction.

    25. On the first contention of Mr. P.R Das, I find that his grievance that the petitioner was not consulted by the Cane Commissioner, and, therefore, it had no knowledge of reserved area declared by the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1), is without any foundation. In this connection, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the petitioner's own affidavit are important. It will appear from the above paragraphs that in May, 1956, correspondence started between the petitioner and opposite party 2 for conducting a joint survey of the standing crops in order to find out the number of members of Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in every village, and, the actual work of joint survey was started on 28-5-1956, and continued thereafter with some breaks.

    (His Lordship then considered paragraphs 5, 7 to 11 and 13 of the petitioner's application together with the counter-affidavit of opposite party 1 to 3 and Annexures thereto and concluded): There can, therefore, be no doubt that prior to the making of the order on 14-7-1956, as also after it, the Cane Commissioner gave ample opportunities to the petitioner to make such objections as the petitioner liked not only prior to the proposed declaration, but also after the actual declaration of the reserved area by the Cane Commissioner, but the petitioner throughout anyhow on some pretext or other tried to put off the matter, so that the 1st August, which was the dead line fixed by R. 24A(1), was exceeded. If the petitioner wanted to make any objection, it was open to him to do so, and, then in that case the Cane Commissioner could have amended his original order issued under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1) on 14-7-1956, but the petitioner non-co-operated with the Cane Commissioner, and tried its best to nullify the order made by the Commissioner. In my opinion, therefore, on the facts disclosed by the petitioner's affidavit, and the counter-affidavit of opposite party 1 and 3 as also of opposite party 2, there can be no doubt that the petitioner was consulted and the petitioner was given ample and reasonable opportunity to make objections, if any, to the area reserved; but the petitioner did not avail itself of the opportunities offered to it, and, therefore, the petitioner alone is to be blamed even if any prejudice has been caused to it thereby, although as I will show hereafter the petitioner has not been prejudiced in the least. It is, therefore, not open to the petitioner now to make any grievance on this account. The first line of argument of Mr. P.R Das, in support of his second ground of attack, therefore, must be overruled.

    26. In support of the second branch of his argument, Mr. P.R Das has contended, firstly, that the report of the Inspector D/- 22-7-1956, could not be used against the petitioner, because it had no opportunity to know of it and to file any objection which the petitioner might have liked to make to the report of the Cane Inspector; and, a secondly, he has relied on paragraph 4, sub-para (3) of the report of the Cane Inspector to show that even on the report of the Cane Inspector only in respect of 25 villages, out of 87 villages claimed, survey had been done, and, therefore, only in 25 villages, co-operative societies commanded membership or more than 66% but in respect of 72 villages the Inspector himself says in his report that the cane survey was still in progress, and the claim in respect of these 72 villages, as opposite party 2 averred, has been based on the cane survey figures of the last season, because, in the circumstances, he, therefore, could not find out any alternative basis to check the claim so made in respect of the current year. Mr. P.R Das has, therefore, contended that the basis of the year 1955–1956 was not a proper and legal basis for the current season 1956–1957, and, therefore, on those grounds, the Inspector's report could not be accepted and was no evidence in the eye of law.

    27. The grievance of the petitioner that it had no information of the Inspector's report nor any knowledge of its contents cannot be accepted on the face of the report itself, quoted earlier, wherein the Cane Inspector has mentioned that he visited the petitioner's factory on two dates, that is, on 15-7-1956, and 21-7-1956, along with the Assistant Registrar of Cane-growers' Co-operative Societies, Motihari, and tried his best to work out an agreed solution, but the efforts of both proved to be of no avail, because the petitioner adopted a very unhelpful attitude. In my opinion, therefore, on the report itself, the contention of Mr. P.R Das that the petitioner had no knowledge of what the Inspector mentioned in his report cannot he accepted for a moment, and must accordingly, be rejected. (His Lordship further examined the contention and concluded): The 72 villages, which were declared in the last season 1955–1956 under R. 24A(1), definitely satisfied the conditions required under the third Proviso to S. 18(2) of the Act, as admitted by the petitioner also as stated earlier.

    28. In the absence of any definite evidence, therefore, to show that these 72 villages due either to resignation or otherwise, did not possess more than 66% membership of the Society, or, had less than 66% membership, it cannot reasonably be urged that the basis of 1955–1956 was no legal basis for 1956–1957 or that it was no legal consideration. The petitioner could have produced the material evidence before the Cane Inspector to show that the Co-operative Societies in these 72 villages now did not satisfy the conditions laid down in the third proviso to S. 18(2) but it made no such objection, in respect of these 72 villages although it did not make certain objections, in respect of certain other villages, in my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that 72 villages which were reserved area in 1955–1956, could not be taken to be the basis for the present year 1956–1957 for declaration as areas which could be reserved under S. 15(1) read with Rule 24(1).

    29. In my opinion, therefore, the two contentions of Mr. Das have no substance, and, they must be rejected.

    30. The learned Advocate General argued also that the petitioner could not make any grievance against the impugned order, because its interest was not affected thereby, and as such it had no locus standi to maintain the present application. He relied on a derision of the Supreme Court in Tika Ramji v. State of U.P, (S) AIR 1956 SC 676 in which the U.P Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act (Act XXIV of 1953) came up for consideration. The provisions of this Act are very much similar to the provisions of the present Act, with which we are concerned. His Lordship Bhagwati J. who delivered the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court, observed:

    “The payment of commission on purchase of cane is to be made by the occupier of a factory in both cases, whether the purchase is made through a Cane-growers Co-operative Society or the purchase is made direct from the cane growers. The cane-growers as well as the Cane-growers Co-operative Society are both within the ken of the impugned Act and it cannot be urged that the object of the Act is to promote cane-growers Co-operative Societies to the prejudice of the cane-grower himself. The Cane-growers Co-operative Societies are to be fostered if at all for furthering the interests of the canegrowers and there is no conflict between the interests of the cane-growers on the one hand and those of the Cane-growers Co-operative Societies on the other. Both, are equally catered for by the impugned Act but it is only when the State Government feels that there are circumstances justifying the issue of an order under which the cane grown by a cane grower shall not be purchased except through a Canegrowers Co-operative Society, the State Government in exercise of the power reserved under S. 16(2)(b) would issue an order accordingly.

    “The impugned notification dated 27-9-1954 (specifies the circumstances under which such a prohibitory order can be made. If the membership of a particular Cane-growers Co-operative Society is not less than 75 per cent (in the Bihar Act two thirds, that is 662/3 per cent) of the total number of cane growers within the particular area, then and then only it is considered expedient and desirable that all the cane purchased by an occupier of a factory from that area should be purchased only through the agency of the particular Canegrowers Co-operative Society.

    “It is with a view to eliminate unhealthy competition between the Cane-growers on the one hand and the Cane-growers Co-operative Societies on the other and also to prevent malpractice indulged in by the occupier of a factory for the purpose of breaking up the Cane-growers Co-operative Society that such a provision is made and a notification issued prohibiting the occupier of a factory from making any purchase from the area except through the Canegrowers Co-operative Society. It is a reasonable provision, made for the benefit of the large number of persons forming the members of the Canegrowers Co-operative Society and cannot be impugned as in any manner violative of any fundamental right of the petitioners.”

    31. The learned Advocate General has, therefore, contended that, the commission has to be paid in every case. A commission of -/-/9 is paid to the Co-operative Society no doubt, but in fixing the price of the cane the commission paid to the Co-operative Society is also included. In such circumstances, in every case the petitioner has to pay the commission, because when it purchases the cane at the price fixed, it includes the commission which is to be paid to the Society. In such circumstances the petitioner is not in any way put to any loss or disadvantage by the order passed by the Cane Commissioner under S. 15(1) read with R. 24(1) followed by an order under R. 24A(1). His Lordship Mr. Justice Bhagwnti has considered all the aspects of the matter in the above decision, and, in my opinion, on that judgment, it is clear that the petitioner has not been affected by the impugned order of the Cane Commissioner so as to make any grievance of it, and, as such, it has no locus standi to make the present application.

    32. For the reasons I have attempted to give, in my opinion, on which Mr. P.R Das for the petitioner relied, and, which he argued with much persuasiveness, have no substance and, therefore, his argument cannot prevail and, the rule must be discharged.

    33. In the result, the application fails, and, it is dismissed with costs, as the petitioner has not made out any case for issue of any writ against the opposite party. The petitioner will pay Rs. 250/- as cost of this application to the opposite party, which will be divided in equal shares between opposite party 1 and 3, and, opposite party 2.

    34. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.

    V.S.B

    35. Application dismissed.

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    Sugauli Sugar Works Private Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner And Others Opposite Party.
    (Jan 15, 1957)