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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 6(1) of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948),
  • provisions of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947
  • Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Act, 1917 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948),
  • provisions of Section 182 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885,
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Act of 1951, sub-sec. (5)
  • S. 2(k) of that Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 6(1) of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948),
  • provisions of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947
  • Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Act, 1917 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948),
  • provisions of Section 182 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885,
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Act of 1951, sub-sec. (5)
  • S. 2(k) of that Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Choudhary, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These two proceedings (M.J.C. No. 145 of 1953 under Article 227 and M.J.C. No. 146 of 1953 under Article 226 of the Constitution) arise from a dispute over 45 acres comprising plot Nos. 229, 200 and 228 in village Sultanpur, District Patna (tauzi No. 132C/473).

The petitioners asserted that the land was their raiyati land and that they were in actual possession of plot No. 229. Respondents 1 to 4 occupied plot Nos. 228 and 200; the petitioners alleged this occupation was by leave and licence because the respondents served as ploughmen, and not as tenants.

The petitioners sued (Title Suit No. 93 of 1948, Munsif at Barh) for ejectment of respondents 1–4 from plots 200 and 228 and for confirmation of possession of plot 229. The trial court decreed the suit on 23-4-1951, and the lower appellate court (Additional Subordinate Judge) upheld that decree on 30-4-1952. Pursuant to the decree, the petitioners obtained delivery of possession of plots 228 and 200 through court on 3-8-1951.

The respondents had earlier (circa 1950) applied to the Collector of Patna under Section 6(1) of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948) for assessment of fair rent in respect of the three plots. A Deputy Collector reported that plot No. 229 was not within the scope of the Act, but recommended a fair rent of Rs. 2 per month for plots 228 and 200; the Collector accepted this report by order dated 13-6-1951.

On 27-1-1953 the respondents initiated a proceeding under the Act for restoration of possession (Case No. 175 of 1952–1953). On 20-3-1953 the Collector ordered the petitioners to restore possession of all three plots to respondents 1–4 as they existed before ejection. The petitioners moved the Court seeking certiorari to quash the restoration proceeding and the Collector’s order of 20-3-1953.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Collector had jurisdiction under the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act (Bihar Act 4 of 1948) to direct restoration of possession of plot No. 229 to the respondents.
  2. Whether the Collector had jurisdiction under the same Act to direct restoration of possession of plot Nos. 228 and 200 to the respondents, in light of the factual question whether the respondents were privileged tenants (liable to pay rent) or merely licensees/service-tenure holders (ploughmen) occupying by leave and licence.
  3. Whether, to determine the Collector’s jurisdiction on plots 228 and 200, the Court in writ proceedings under Articles 226/227 could re-open the factual determinations made or to be made by the Collector (i.e., whether the question of homestead status and tenancy is a question of fact for the Collector).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Plot No. 229 was always in the petitioners' khas (actual) possession; the civil courts confirmed this possession in Title Suit No. 93 of 1948. The Deputy Collector also reported that plot No. 229 was outside the scope of the Act; therefore the Collector had no jurisdiction to act under the Act with respect to plot No. 229.
  • With regard to plots Nos. 228 and 200, respondents 1–4 were occupying by leave and licence as ploughmen (service tenure), not as tenants; no rent was ever paid nor was there any contract that would have made them liable to pay rent. Accordingly they were not "privileged tenants" within the Act.
  • The petitioners relied on Athakutti v. Govinda, 16 Mad 97 (A), to support the proposition that occupation conditioned on performing work is a licence (service tenure) and not a tenancy.

Respondents' / Collector's Arguments (as presented by the Government Pleader)

  • A person holding a service tenure can be a tenant; whether an occupier is a tenant or a licensee/service-holder is a matter of evidence to be determined in the proceedings.
  • There was evidence before the Collector supporting tenant status for respondents 1–4: the judgment in the title suit in which respondents 1–4 were held to be tenants at will, and the Collector’s earlier order in the fair-rent assessment proceeding which treated them as tenants for plots 228 and 200.
  • The petitioners themselves in paragraph 8 of their petitions had stated that the question was finally determined inter partes that the respondents were tenants at will—supporting the Collector’s exercise of jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Athakutti v. Govinda, 16 Mad 97 (A) Occupancy allowed on condition of performing certain work was held to be a licence (service tenure) rather than a tenancy; on cessation of the work the occupier could be evicted without notice. The petitioners relied on this authority to argue that respondents who rendered service as ploughmen were licensees/service-tenure holders and not tenants (i.e., not privileged tenants under the Act). The Court noted the reliance but ultimately evaluated it against the particular evidence and findings in this matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded plot-by-plot and applied the statutory scheme of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act (Bihar Act 4 of 1948), including definitions of "homestead" (s.2(d)), "privileged person" and "privileged tenant" (s.2), and the restoration and protection provisions (ss.5, 8 and the 1951 amendment adding s.8(5)).

Concerning plot No. 229 the Court observed:

  • The petitioners were found by the civil courts to be in khas possession and their possession over plot No. 229 was confirmed in Title Suit No. 93 of 1948.
  • The Deputy Collector, in the fair-rent assessment proceeding, had reported that plot No. 229 was not the respondents' homestead and that assessment of fair rent for it was outside the Act's scope; the Collector accepted that report.
  • Despite those facts, the Collector’s restoration order treated the respondents as privileged tenants in respect of plot No. 229 and proceeded on the assumption they had been ejected from it. The Court found this assumption to be an error apparent on the record because nothing before the Collector showed plot No. 229 to be the respondents’ homestead or that respondents were evicted from it.
  • Consequently, the Collector had no jurisdiction under the Act to pass the restoration order in respect of plot No. 229; the order was therefore without jurisdiction as to that plot.

Concerning plot Nos. 228 and 200 the Court observed:

  • These two plots were, on the material before the Court, in the respondents' possession and had residential houses on them — facts relevant to the question whether they were "homesteads" within the Act.
  • The petitioners argued the respondents were licensees (service-tenure ploughmen) and not tenants — relying on the Athakutti precedent and the absence of rent or contract imposing liability to pay rent.
  • The Government pleader (for the Collector/respondents) replied that service-tenure holders may in law amount to tenants depending on evidence, and pointed to evidence: (a) the title suit judgment which had characterized the respondents as tenants at will and (b) the Collector’s earlier fair-rent assessment order which proceeded on the basis they were tenants.
  • The Court emphasized that whether the plots were homesteads of the respondents and whether the respondents were privileged tenants within the meaning of the Act were essentially questions of fact for the Collector to determine. In writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 the Court is not ordinarily entitled to re-appreciate such factual questions.
  • Given the existing evidence (including the inter partes determination in the title suit and the earlier administrative finding), the Court concluded that it was not established that the Collector's order in relation to plots 228 and 200 was without jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court partially allowed the petition. The order of the Collector dated 20-3-1953 in Case No. 175 of 1952–1953 under the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act (Bihar Act 4 of 1948) was set aside insofar as it related to plot No. 229. A writ in the nature of certiorari was issued quashing the restoration proceeding and the Collector's order to that extent. The applications with regard to plots Nos. 228 and 200 were dismissed.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners retain the benefit of the order quashing the Collector’s restoration order as to plot No. 229; the Collector’s order directing restoration of plots 228 and 200 to the respondents remains effective and the petitioners' challenge to those two plots fails.
  • The Court treated the status of plots 228 and 200 (and the question whether respondents were privileged tenants) as factual matters properly for determination by the Collector and not amenable to re-appreciation in this writ jurisdiction.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any new general legal principle beyond the application of the Act to the facts; no broader precedent was announced. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Order endorsed by Ramaswami, J., who agreed with the judgment.

    Hargobind Singh And Others v. Rambarn Paswan And Other .

    Choudhary, J.:— These two proceedings are between the same parties, and arise out of the same matter. M.J.C No. 145 of 1953 is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and M.J.C No. 146 of 1953 is under Article 226 of the said Constitution.

    2. The proceedings relate to 45 acre of land consisting of plot Nos. 229, 200, and 228, situate in village Sultanpur in the District of Patna appertaining to tauzi No. 132C/473. The case of the petitioners is that the land in question was their ‘raiyati’ land and they were in actual possession of plot No. 229. Plot Nos. 228 and 200 were in possession of respondents 1 to 4, not as tenants, but by their leave and license as they rendered services to them as ploughmen. The petitioners filed a title suit, No. 93 of 1948, in the court of the Munsif at Barh for ejectment of the aforesaid respondents from plot Nos. 200 and 228 and for confirmation of their possession over plot No. 229. The suit was decreed by the trial court on 23-4-1951, and the said respondents filed an appeal before the lower appellate court. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal upheld the judgment and decree of the trial court on 30-4-1952. (1951?) According to the decree in that suit the petitioners were held to be in possession of plot No. 229 and their possession was confirmed, and with respect to the other two plots they obtained a decree for recovery of possession.

    3. Accordingly on 3-8-1951, they obtained delivery of possession through court over plot Nos. 228 and 200. Some time in 1950 the respondents 1 to 4 made an application to the Collector of Patna under Section 6(1) of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948), for assessment of fair rent in respect of the land appertaining to the aforesaid three plots. A Deputy Collector, Mr. R. Prasad, was asked to inquire and report about the merit of the application. The said Deputy Collector found that plot No. 229 was not the homestead land of the respondents, and assessment of fair rent for that plot was outside the scope of the said Act. With respect to the other two plots, namely, plot Nos. 228 and 200, he reported that they were in possession of those respondents and recommended for fixing a rent of Rs. 2 per month. The Collector accepted the report of the Deputy Collector and passed an order on 13-6-1951, assessing a fair rent in accordance with the report made by him. On 27-1-1953, these respondents started a proceeding under the said Act for being restored to possession over the three plots in question, which was numbered as case No. 175 of 1952-1953. On 20-3-1953, the Collector passed an order directing the petitioners to put the respondents 1 to 4 to possession of the aforesaid three plots in the condition in which they existed before they were ejected. The petitioners have, therefore, moved this Court for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the proceeding for restoration of possession started under the provisions of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 (hereafter to be referred to as the Act), and they have also prayed for quashing the order of the Collector dated 20-3-1953, directing them to restore possession of the aforesaid three plots to the respondents 1 to 4.

    4. The Act came into operation on 18-2-1948, and subsequently it was amended on 19-12-1951. Section 2(d) of the Act defines “homestead” to mean any land which is held on lease or used with the consent, express or implied of the landlord for residential purposes and includes any building erected thereon, together with any ‘Sahan’ and ‘Ban’ appurtenant thereto, but does not include — (i) a homestead to which the provisions of Section 182 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, apply or (ii) a land which was originally used for purposes other than residential but is being used for such purposes without the consent, express or implied, of the landlord. Clause (1) of that section defines “privileged person” as follows:

    “‘Privileged person’ means a person who satisfies all the following conditions, namely:

    (1) he holds no land or no other land except his homestead;

    (2) he is a member of the scheduled castes within the meaning of the Government of India (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1938, or a member of the backward tribes as defined in paragraph 19 of the Fifth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, read with sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6 of Part VII of the Government of India (Provisional Legislative Assemblies) Order, 1936; or a member of the Muslim community belonging to such class or classes as may from time to time be notified by the Provincial Government in this behalf; and

    (3) he is not a proprietor or tenure-holder, under-tenure-holder, raiyat or mahajan.”

    According to clause (j) of that section “privileged tenant” is a privileged person who holds home stead under another person and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for such homestead to such person. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that

    “if any privileged tenant has been ejected by his landlord from his homestead or any part thereof within one year before the date of the commencement of this Act, otherwise than in due course of law, such tenant shall, for the purposes of S. 4, be deemed to have held such homestead or part thereof, as the case may be, continuously for a period of one year before the commencement of this Act and he may apply to the Collector for the restoration of his possession over the homestead or part thereof from which he has been so ejected.”

    Section 8(1) of the Act provides the grounds on which a privileged tenant shall be liable to ejectment. By the amending Act of 1951, sub-sec. (5) was added to the section, which provided:

    “If a privileged tenant has been ejected by his landlord from his homestead or any part thereof, otherwise than in accordance with the provision contained in sub-sec. (1), then the tenant may apply to the Collector for restoration of his possession over the homestead or part thereof from which he has been so ejected.”

    It has to be seen whether under these provisions of the Act the Collector had any jurisdiction to pass the order in question.

    5. I shall, first, deal with plot No. 229. As already stated, the petitioners' case is that they were all along in khas possession of this plot, and the civil court also found them to be in possession of this plot and confirmed their possession. Even the Deputy-Collector, who made the enquiry during the course of the proceeding for assessment of fair rent, found that the proceeding with respect to this plot was beyond the scope of the Act, and his report was accepted by the Collector.

    6. In the present proceeding the Collector does not seem to have considered this fact. He starts on the assumption that while passing the order for assessment of fair rent the respondents were treated as privileged tenants with respect to this plot also, and that they were ejected as a result of a petition moved by the landlord in the civil court. He commits an error apparently on the face of the record. The civil court decree was not to eject the respondents from this plot; rather by that decree, as already stated, the petitioners were held to be in possession, and their possession was confirmed. In the proceeding for assessment of fair rent also the Collector passed an order in accordance with the report of the Deputy-Collector, according to whom, this plot was beyond the scope of the Act. Therefore, there was nothing before the Collector to show that this plot was the homestead of these respondents within the meaning of the Act, nor was there anything to show that they were evicted by the petitioners from that plot. As held in the title suit the land was in possession of the petitioners, and the Collector had no jurisdiction to proceed as against that plot under the Act. The order in question, therefore, so far as this plot is concerned, is without jurisdiction.

    7. The question with respect to the other two plots is different. They were undoubtedly in possession of the respondents who had their residential houses on these plots. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the respondents were in possession of these plots by their leave and license as they were the ploughmen of the petitioners and not as tenants. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them and no rent was ever paid by the respondents to the petitioners for these two plots. Reliance has been placed on the case of — ‘Athakutti v. Govinda’, 16 Mad 97 (A), where the defendants were allowed to occupy on condition of doing certain work. It was held that it was not the case of a tenant, but the case of a licensee, and on ceasing to do work, the defendants were liable to eviction without notice. It has been conceded that the respondents are privileged persons within the meaning of the Act. But, it has been argued that they are not privileged tenants. In order to be a privileged tenant, he is or but for a special contract would be liable, to pay rent for such homestead to the person under whom he holds it.

    8. The contention is that the respondents were never liable to pay any rent, nor was there any contract but for which they would have been liable to pay rent. It has also been contended that rendering of service as ploughmen does not amount to rent within the meaning of the Act, which, according to S. 2(k) of that Act, means whatever is lawfully payable or deliverable in money or in any other form by a privileged tenant to his landlord on account of the use or occupation of the homestead held by such tenant. The Government pleader who has appeared for the Collector, respondent No. 5, and also for the tenants, respondents 1 to 4, has, however, contended that a person holding a service tenure can also be a tenant, and whether he is a tenant or not, will have to be determined with reference to the evidence adduced in the case. In the present case there was some evidence before the Collector, such as, the judgment of the title suit, wherein respondents 1 to 4 were held to be tenants at will and the order of the Collector in the proceeding for assessment of fair rent which was passed on the basis that they were tenants of the two plots. Even in paragraph 8 of the petitions of both the cases the petitioners have themselves stated that it was finally determined in the suit ‘inter partes’ that the respondents were mere tenants at will. It has, therefore, been contended on behalf of the respondents that the Collector had jurisdiction to pass the order in question with respect to these two plots. The Collector had no doubt jurisdiction to decide whether these plots were the homestead of the respondents within the meaning of the Act. It is a question of fact, and we cannot go into the question of fact in a proceeding under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.

    9. In my opinion, therefore, it has not been established that the order of the Collector with respect to these two plots is without jurisdiction.

    10. In the result the applications succeed so far as plot No. 229 is concerned and the order dated 20-3-1953, passed in Case No. 175 of 1952-1953 under the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Act, 1917 (Bihar Act 4 of 1948), is set aside.

    11. A writ in the nature of ‘certiorari’ is issued against the respondents quashing the proceeding and the said order of the Collector to this extent. The applications with regard to the other two plots are dismissed.

    12. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.

    13. Ramaswami, J.:— I agree.

    A/G.M.J

    14. Order accordingly.

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    Hargobind Singh And Others v. Rambarn Paswan And Other .
    (Jan 14, 1954)